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V NOTE  ON  &  SYSTEM  OF  TRANSLITERATIO 
Only  lesser  known  proper  names  have  been 
transliterated.  Well  known  names  are  retained 
in  their  most  familiar  form. 
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vi Abstract 
This  work  is,  essentially,  an  assessment  of  Saddam's 
regime  in  Iraq,  one  of  the  cruelest  and  most  violent  regimes 
of  modern  times,  and  the  Bath  Party  policies  and  ideological 
principles,  recognised  by  Saddam  as  the  theoretical  basis  for 
his  practices.  These  policies  and  practices  have  had 
catastrophic  consequences  for  Iraq,  "home  of  ancient 
civilisations",  jeopardising  its  sovereignty  and  future  and 
permitting  the  west  and  the  west-sponsored  states  in  the 
region  to  gain  favourable  concessions  at  the  expense  of 
Iraq's  interests.  This  thesis  is  divided  into  nine  chapters: 
The  first  deals  with  the  Baýth  Party,  its  founding, 
ideology,  set-backs  and  seizure  of  power. 
The  second  deals  with  the  founding  of  the  Ba'th  Party  in 
Iraq,  its  political  development  throughout  the  Monarchy 
regime,  Qdsim's  regime  and  the  period  during  which  the 
Baýthists  came  to  power  on  8  February  1963. 
The  third  deals  with  Saddam's  early  life  and  his 
political  activities  throughout  'Arif's  regime. 
The  fourth  deals  with  the  circumstances  in  which  the 
Ba'th  Party  returned  to  power. 
vii The  fifth  deals  with  the  presidency  of  A4mad  Uasan  al- 
Bakr  and  examines  Saddam's  role  and  the  nature  of  Ba'thist 
authority  during  that  period. 
The  sixth  deals  with  Saddam's  presidency  and  his 
assumption  of  all  responsibility  for  the  state  and  the 
Party. 
The  seventh  and  eighth  deal  with  the  first  and  second 
Gulf  wars,  the  occupation  of  Kuwait  and  the  results  these 
two  destructive  wars,  embarked  upon  at  the  whim  of  one  man, 
have  imposed  upon  the  Iraqi  army  and  people. 
The  ninth  comprises  a  summary  of  the  thesis,  in  which 
Saddam's  strange  and  unstable  personality  will  be  analysed 
and  a  possible  solution  will  be  suggested  for  the  future  of 
Iraq  -a  community  different  in  composition  and 
circumstances  from  any  other  country. 
viii Introduction 
Iraq  was  incorporated  into  the  Ottoman  empire  during 
the  sixteenth  century  as  three  VilayeTs.  Ottoman  rule  left 
a  deep  impression,  which  has  still  not  been  wholly 
eradicated.  The  rule  of  the  Valis,  as  throughout  the 
Empire,  was  arbitrary  and  despotic.  They,  their  government 
officials  and  civil  servants  were  all  Turks,  and  only  the 
least  important  functions  were  delegated  to  the  local 
inhabitants.  When  the  Iraqis  eventually  came  to  rule 
themselves,  they  had  no  other  government  model  and  they 
behaved  in  much  the  same  way.  They  also  inherited  the 
corruption  of  the  Ottoman  administration.  Bribery, 
nepotism  and  fraud  were  deep-rooted  in  the  bureaucratic 
apparatus  they  assumed. 
The  fact  that  the  Ottomans  favoured  the  Sunnis  and 
considered  the  Ja'fari  (Shi'ites),  who  formed  the  majority 
of  the  population,  virtually  as  infidels,  meant,  apart 
from  the  other  sectarian  problems  that  it  caused,  that  the 
Iraqi  officers  who  were  trained  in  the  Ottoman  military 
academies  were  all  Sunnis.  It  was  also  responsible  for 
continued  tension  and  occasional  hostilities  between 
ShiýIte  Iran  and  Turkey.  Iran  coveted  Mesopotamia,  not 
least  because  of  the  persecution  of  its  co-religionists. 
The  Ottoman-trained  officers,  many  of  whom  became 
powerful  in  post-1919  Iraq,  had  learnt  how  to  keep  power 
in  the  hands  of  the  army,  or,  more  specifically,  its 
I leaders.  They  practised  this  lesson  and  passed  it  on  to 
their  successors.  As  a  result  the  politicised  army  has 
carried  out  all  the  coups  and  revolutions  that  have  beset 
Iraq. 
The  corruption  of  the  administration  was  responsible 
for  the  rise  of  a  sort  of  aristocracy,  composed  of  small 
businessmen,  who  could  flatter  or  bribe  their  way  into  the 
favour  of  the  Vali  or  his  deputies,  transferring  their 
allegiance  wantonly  with  the  rise  and  fall  of  this  or  that 
great  man.  These  developed  into  the  Effendi  or  Baghdad 
Effendi  class,  who  were  the  only  people,  together  with  the 
Beys,  the  successors  of  the  Mamluks,  the  slaves  who  had 
previously  been  army  leaders  and  the  aides  and  assistants 
of  the  Valis,  that  the  British  could  depend  on  to  run  the 
country  and  to  support  them  after  they  invaded  during  the 
First  World  War. 
From  the  beginning  of-Ottoman  rule,  the  Arab  tribes, 
the  leaders  of  which  commanded  the  allegiance  of  a  large 
proportion  of  the  people,  made  periodical  attempts  to 
assert  their  own  power  as  a  political  force.  Their 
numerous  revolts  against  the  authorities  sometimes  brought 
them  a  short-lived  independence,  but  were  invariably 
suppressed  in  the  end  with  great  severity. 
Into  this  confused  situation  came  the  British  with  an 
expeditionary  force  from  India  in  1914  to  open  up  another 
front  against  the  Turks  and  to  anticipate  any  movement  of 
2 the  Central  Powers  against  the  Indian  Empire.  Af  ter  the 
eventual  Turkish  defeat,  Britain  was  given  the  mandate 
over  Iraq,  against  which  the  whole  of  Iraq  rose  in  revolt 
in  1920.  This  revolt  was  almost  successful.  However,  in 
spite  of  the  political  coalition  of  the  many  disparate 
elements,  there  remained  a  religious  schism  between  a 
number  of  the  leaders,  which  was  sufficient  to  bring  about 
its  failure.  It  considerably  affected  the  subsequent 
political  history  of  Iraq,  in  that  it  drew  the  British 
administration's  attention  to  the  latent  strength  of  the 
tribes.  They  promptly  proceeded  to  buy  those  tribal 
leaders  that  could  be  bought.  They  allowed  them  to  regain 
control  over  all  their  tribal  lands,  and  thus  created  a 
new  group  of  feudal  lords  muqýi,  Tn  who  became  the  greatest 
farmers  and  landlords  in  Iraq. 
By  buying  the  tribal  leaders,  the  British  succeeded  in 
winning  over  a  large  sector  of  the  Iraqi  people  into 
acquiescence  with  their  rule.  It  was  an  influential 
sector,  most  of  which  was  Shiah.  The  Hashemite  kings 
installed  by  the  British  followed  their  lead  in  their 
dealings  with  the  tribes.  This  alienated  the  Beys  and 
Effendis  and  also  many  of  the  other  Sunnis,  not  only  for 
religious  reasons,  but  also  because  they  felt  that  their 
positions  and  other  interests  were  threatened.  The 
tensions  thus  created  grew  gradually  more  acute  and 
culminated  in  the  coup  of  July  1958,  carried  out  by  a 
group  of  army  officers.  The  monarchy  was  removed  and 
replaced  by  a  republic.  This  solved  none  of  the  political 
3 problems  and  led  to  further  military  coups.  Most  of  the 
rulers  of  modern  Iraq  have  been  army  officers,  the 
successors  of  those  who  graduated  from  the  Ottoman 
military  academies.  They  have  been  consistently  despotic 
and  repressive.  They  have  suppressed  freedom  of  speech  and 
have  tortured  and  murdered  not  only  those  who  actively 
opposed  them,  but  also  their  relatives,  friends  and 
associates. 
This  thesis  will  be  concerned  with  Iraq's  suffering 
under  the  worst  catastrophe  that  it  has  yet  suffered  in 
its  unhappy  history,  the  rule  of  the  Baýth  Party  under 
Saddam  Husayn's  leadership.  It  will  be  divided  into  nine 
chapters: 
The  first  will  deal  with  the  Ba'th  Party,  its  founding, 
ideology,  set-backs  and  seizure  of  power. 
The  second  will  deal  with  the  founding  of  the  Ba'th 
Party  in  Iraq,  its  political  development  throughout  the 
Monarchy  regime,  Qdsim  regime  and  the  period  during  which 
the  Baýthists  came  to  power  on  8  February  1963  and. 
The  third  will  deal  with  Saddam's  early  life  and  his 
political  activities  throughout  'Arif's  regime. 
The  fourth  will  deal  with  the  circumstances  which 
allowed  the  Baýth  Party  to  return  to  power. 
4 The  fifth  will  deal  with  the  presidency  of  Aýmad  Vasan 
al-Bakr  and  Saddam's  role  during  that  period,  analysing 
the  nature  of  Baýathist  authority. 
The  sixth  will  deal  with  Saddam's  presidency  and  his 
assumption  of  all  responsibility  for  the  state  and  the 
Party. 
The  seventh  and  eighth  will  deal  with  the  f  irst  and 
second  Gulf  wars,  the  occupation  of  Kuwait  and  the  results 
these  two  destructive  wars  have  imposed  upon  the  Iraqi 
army  and  people  at  the  whim  of  one  man. 
The  ninth  will  comprise  a  summary  of  the  thesis,  in 
which  Saddam's  strange  and  unstable  personality  will  be 
analysed  and  a  possible  solution  will  be  suggested  for  the 
future  of  Iraq,  a  community  different  in  composition  and 
circumstances  from  any  other  country. 
5 CHAPTER  ONE 
THE  BATH  PARTY The  Emercrence  of  the  Baýth  Movement 
The  history  of  the  Ba'th  Party  will  not  be 
researched,  as  this  has  already  been  the  subject  of  many 
historical  works.  (l)  However,  attention  will  be  drawn  to 
certain  stages  on  its  journey.  These  stages  represent 
important  indicators  that  will  greatly  help  us  to  unveil 
the  true  nature  of  the  Ba'th  Party,  which  has  had  such  a 
disastrous  effect  on  Iraq's  modern  history. 
To  understand  the  motives  behind  the  foundation  of 
the  Baýth  Party,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  briefly  the 
most  striking  features  of  the  period  preceding  the 
foundation  of  the  Ba'th  and  the  common  political  climate 
at  the  time. 
intensified  competition  among  the  imperialist  powers 
over  the  Asian  territories  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  in 
particular  Mesopotamia,  influenced  the  imperialist  powers 
in  the  conduct  of  the  First  World  War. 
The  effect  of  the  War  and  the  post-war  arrangements 
between  the  victorious  allies  for  the  annexation  and 
creation  of  a  spheres  of  influence  in  line  with  their 
economic  and  strategic  imperialist  aims;  this  was  in 
accordance  with  the  secret  arrangements  of  the  Sykes-Picot 
agreement,  (2)  which  was  exposed  by  the  Russians  after  the 
Revolution,  (3)  and  provoked  the  following  developments  in 
the  Middle  East,  and  in  Iraq  in  particular: 
6 There  was  opposition  to  foreign  tutelary  control  of 
the  Arab  East  by  the  British  and  the  French,  who  had 
not  kept  their  assurance  to  the  Arabs  to  support  the 
creation  of  an  independent  Arab  Kingdom.  This  had 
been  agreed  with  the  Sharif  of  Mecca,  Amir  Iýusayn, 
who  had  encouraged  an  Arab  national  rising  against 
the  Ottoman  Empire. 
The  Arab  Forces  under  the  leadership  of  Amir 
Ijusayn  and  his  two  sons,  Amir  Fayýal  and  Amir 
'Abdall5h,  together  with  some  Iraqi  officers,  such  as 
Mir-1  al-Sa'ld  and  Mawl0d  Mukhlis,  played  a  major  role 
in  the  British-sponsored  Sharifian  army,  become  the 
first  group  to  carry  out  British  policy  in  Iraq  for 
about  four  decades,  (4)  and  co-operating  with  the 
British  to  destroy  the  Ottoman  Empire.  (5) 
(2)  The  Mandate  system  was  established,  which  was  based 
on  the  view  that  people  in  the  conquered  areas  were 
entitled  to  self  determination.  However,  because  they 
were  not  sufficiently  developed  politically  and 
educationally  they  were  incapable  of  self-rule,  so 
that  the  two  Great  Powers  were  given  a  mandate  by  the 
league  of  Nations.  This  system  found  less  opposition 
in  Syria  and  Lebanon  than  in  Iraq,  probably  because 
the  Syrians  and  the  Lebanese  were  more  familiar  with 
foreign  intervention  in  their  political  life  than  the 
Iraqis.  This  may  have  been  due  to  the  influence  of 
7 the  non-Muslim  Arab  and  other  religious  minorities  in 
the  country.  The  foreign  powers,  apart  from 
intervening  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire,  strengthened  and  protected  the  religious 
minority  as  political  units  with  a  communal 
consciousness.  Thus,  France  claimed  the  right  to 
protect  the  Maronite  Christians  of  Lebanon  and  Syria, 
who  were  attached  to  French  culture  and  looked  to 
France  as  the  epitome  of  a  country  upholding 
historical  freedom  and  the  rights  of  the  Christian 
minority  against  the  Muslim  majority.  (6)  The  Russian 
Government  claimed  to  protect  the  Greek  Orthodox 
Christians.  The  British  had  friendly  relations 
particularly  with  the  DrFazes  and  the  Jews.  (7)  It 
seems  that  this  policy  improved  the  lot  of  the 
religious  minorities,  but,  at  the  same  time,  incurred 
the  hatred  of  the  Ottoman  Government  and  the  Sunni 
Majority,  who  regarded  them  as  traitors  and  tools  of 
European  policy.  (8)  But  in  Iraq  the  situation  was 
different.  The  Iraqis  rejected  both  the  British  rule, 
and  the  Mandate,  despite  the  fact  that  the  British 
employed  extreme  measures  to  subordinate  them.  (9) 
(3)  The  Middle  East's  present  boundaries,  were 
established  according  to  the  British  and  French 
economic  and  strategic  imperialist  interests.  This 
was  demonstrated  clearly  in  the  case  of  Iraq,  when 
the  British  annexed  the  Mosul  Vilayet  to  Iraq, 
because  of  its  potential  oil  resources,  so  that  they 
8 would  have  the  possibility  of  developing  its  oil 
fields.  (10)  Then,  the  British  created  minorities,  by 
adding  a  substantial  area  of  Kurdistan  to  be  part  of 
Mesopotamia,  in  order  to  increase  their  influence,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  to  be  a  barrier  to  prevent  ideas  of 
the  Russian  Revolution  from  reaching  Mesopotamia,  on 
the  other.  (11)  The  British  also  placed  the  homeless 
group  of  Assyrians  from  Armenia  and  Georgia  in  Iraq 
as  a  minority  and  used  them  in  the  British  army. 
These  minorities  welcomed  foreign  rule,  in  return  for 
their  protection  from  the  Arab  majority.  In 
particular,  the  Assyrians  and  some  Kurdish 
chieftains,  such  as  Simko,  Tdhd  al-Shim2:  7in7i,  and  Shaykh 
ýAbd  al-Qddir,  declared  their  readiness  to  mobilise 
their  forces,  and  to  serve  British  interests.  (12) 
However,  this  did  not  prevent  some  Kurds  from  joining 
their  Arab  co-religionists  in  a  joint  effort  to  get 
rid  of  the  British.  Some  Kurds  had  an  important  role 
in  the  1920  great  Iraqi  revolution  of  1920.  This 
revolution  angered  the  British  because  it  united  non- 
Arabs  with  Arabs  on  religious  grounds;  such  unity  was 
the  only  effective  weapon  against  British 
domination.  (13) 
The  British  also  tried  to  use  sectarian, 
divisive  policies  so  as  to  isolate  the  Kurds  from  the 
Arabs  by  describing  the  Iraqi  nationalist  movement  as 
an  Arab  Shi'ite  mutiny.  (14)  They  also  tried  to  weaken 
the  Iraqi  national  movement  by  buying  off  Arab  tribal 
9 chieftains,  since  they  had  control  over  the 
peasants.  (15) 
Many  of  the  Baýth  Party's  founders  and  leaders 
were  of  a  feudal  and  upper  class  character,  (16)  and 
later  used  the  same  methods  as  the  British  in  buying 
off  tribal  chieftains,  so  as  to  establish  the  Ba'th 
Party's  power  in  Iraq,  particularly  during  Saddam's 
regime. 
(4)  The  Arab  Nationalist  movement  made  its  first 
appearence.  The  imperialist  power  recognised  the 
danger  of  Islam  and  its  ability  to  unite  the  Muslim 
territories  behind  their  leader  or  Im5m,  if  he  called 
for  a  Jih5d.  This  might  lead  to  a  serious  uprising 
throughout  the  area,  which  would  damage  the 
imperialist,  economic  and  strategic  interests. 
However,  a  number  of  secret  Arab  Nationalist 
societies  had  already  existed  in  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
and  more  came  into  being  after  the  War.  In  particular 
in  Syria  and  Lebanon,  such  as  al-ýIizb  al-QawmT  al-SarT 
(the  Syrian  Nationalist  Party),  'Aqbat  al-'Amal  al- 
QawmT  (the  National  Action  League)  and  Hdrakat  al-  l 
Ihyd  al-'Arab-i  (the  Arab  Revitalisation  Movement), 
which  became  the  Ba'th  Party.  Its  spokesmen  and 
leaders  were  selected  from  non-Muslim  Arab 
intellectuals  and  political  activists,  who  openly 
spread  a  secular  message.  This  message  was  that  the 
culture  and  the  political  aspirations  of  Arabs  would 
10 be  better  served  by  Arab  nationalism  than  by 
religion.  Thus,  the  idea  of  Arabism  and  Nationalism 
gained  ground  owing  to  these  movements  in  large  parts 
of  the  former  Ottoman  Provinces,  in  particular  in 
Syria  and  Lebanon.  Then  it  spread  to  the  Iraqis,  who 
were  a  very  rebellious  people,  and  were  the  first  to 
revolt  against  British  rule.  The  Iraqi  uprising  broke 
out  in  July  1920  and  continued  until  the  British 
cruelly  suppressed  it  early  in  1921.  (17)  The  first 
military  coup  in  the  Middle  East  was  also  in  Iraq  in 
1936.  Iraq  later  became  a  hot-bed  of  pro-Nazi  action 
as  well.  The  danger  of  pro-Nazi  control  in  Iraq, 
which  was  represented  by  the  Rastfid  ýAll  movement,  led 
to  the  Anglo-Iraqi  war  of  1941,  at  the  end  of  which 
the  Rash7id  'All  movement  was  crushed,  (18)  and  its 
military  leaders  the  four  Colonels,  were  executed. 
After  the  seconed  World  War,  Iraq  became  a  fertile 
field  for  pro-Communist  activity,  which  lasted 
throughout  the  Cold  War  period,  with  competition 
between  the  Western  and  Eastern  bloc  for  strategic 
and  economnic  influence  in  the  Middle  East. 
This  serious  challenge  by  the  Iraqis,  which 
represented  a  reverse  for  the  historical  British  imperial 
interest  in  Iraq,  led  the  British  to  deal  with  the  Iraqis, 
with  great  care.  They  attempted  to  break  their  internal 
resistance  by  subordinating  them  intellectually  and 
encouraging  them  to  adopt  the  Arab  Nationalist  movement, 
in  order  to  direct  the  growing  Iraq  anti-colonialism  and 
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purely  nationalist,  channel. 
12 Middle  East  Situation  After  the  Second  World  War 
In  the  post-world  war  2  period  the  Middle  East  area 
witnessed  radical  changes,  exemplified  by  the  major 
involvement  in  the  area  of  the  US,  as  a  consequence  of  its 
emergence  as  a  world  super-power.  It  began  to  unseat 
Britain  and  France  from  their  previous  predominant  position 
in  the  Middle  East  and  to  replace  them.  The  US  was  helped 
in  this  by  two  factors.  The  first  was,  the  continuous 
decline  in  the  credibility  of  British  and  French  creature 
regimes  in  the  area,  which  were  locked  in  a  losing  battle 
against  the  rising  tide  of  nationalism.  The  US  did  not  then 
face  the  same  popular  feeling  of  hostility  that  Britain  and 
France  were  facing.  It  thus  had  a  better  opportunity  than 
Britain  and  France  to  entrench  its  influence  in  the  area. 
The  second  factor  was  the  increase  in  Soviet  penetration  in 
the  area  through  local  communist  movements,  which  gained 
strength  because  of  the  emergence  of  the  Soviet  Union  as 
the  second  world  super-power.  Thus  the  US  began  its  efforts 
to  build  local  alliances,  in  order  to  stop  Soviet 
penetration  of  the  area,  and  put  forward  the  Dulles  Plan, 
which  aimed  at  replacing  the  British/French  power  by 
US/Israeli  power  in  the  area.  This  plan  was  not  welcomed  by 
Britain,  who  then  considered  the  Middle  East  to  be  her  own 
responsibility.  (19)  It  became  clear  that  Britain  and  the  US 
were  involved  in  a  competitive  struggle  against  each  other 
for  the  domination  of  the  Middle  East.  This  was  nowhere 
clearer  than  in  Syria,  where  the  coup  of  ýIusn7i  al-Za'lm  was 
engineered  by  the  CIA  to  make  al-Zaýlm  sign  the  Tapline  oil 
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Mediterranean  as  a  competitor  to  the  British  oil  pipe-line 
from  the  Iraqi  oil  fields).  Soon  after  that  a  second  coup 
in  Syria,  led  by  S5m1  al-lýandwif,  who  was  in  league  with  the 
British,  froze  the  Tapline  Agreement.  We  shall  discuss 
these  coups  later.  On  the  other  hand,  in  Egypt,  the  US 
delivered  severe  blows  to  British  interests  through  Nasir's 
regime.  The  US  helped  Nasir  to  expel  British  interests  and 
influence  from  Egypt  and  to  expand  Egyptian  influence  to 
countries  like  Jordan,  to  the  extent  that  King  1ýusayn  was 
pressured  by  Nasirism  to  dismiss  General  Glubb,  the  British 
commander  of  the  Jordanian  forces,  in  May  1956.  Britain 
then  considered  Nasir  as  a  real  threat  to  its 
interests.  (20) 
The  Americans  attempted  to  take  over  Iraq  f  rom  the 
British.  Mulýammad  ýiddiq  Shanshal,  the  general  secretary  of 
the  Independence  Party  in  the  early  fifties,  claimed  that 
the  Americans  had  contacted  him  and  offered  help  to  topple 
the  Royal  Family,  but  he  refused  to  switch  from  one 
Imperialism  to  another. 
Britain's  answer  was  through  the  Baghdad  Pact,  which 
assigned  regional  importance  to  Iraq,  Britain's  ally  and 
not  to  Egypt,  a  friend  of  the  US.  Although  the  competitive 
struggle  between,  the  US  and  Britain  took  the  form  of  local 
coups  and  counter  coups  as  well  as  alliances  and  counter- 
alliances,  it  did  not  degenerate  into  open  warfare  over 
Middle  East  domination.  This  was  due  to  the  lines  drawn  by 
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should  not  cross.  It  was  also  Britain  who  frequently  bowed 
to  US  pressure  and  accepted  US  predominance,  especially  in 
the  case  of  Iran,  following  the  collapse  of  Muýdiqls 
nationalisation  of  Iran's  oil  in  the  early  1950s  and  the 
subsequent  return  of  the  Shah,  with  the  active  support  of 
the  CIA. 
The  second  and  more  important  struggle  that  the  US  was 
involved  in  was  that  against  the  Soviet  Union.  In  contrast 
to  its  struggle  against  Britain  and  France,  the  struggle 
against  the  Soviet  Union  was  ideological  and  carried  with 
it  the  potential  of  turning  from  a  Cold  War  type  struggle 
into  a  hot  war.  The  Soviet  Union  paid  some  importance  to 
the  Middle  East,  due  to  its  geographical  proximity  to 
Soviet  territory,  so  that  the  US  and  its  western  allies 
could  use  it  as  a  launching  pad  for  an  assault  against  it. 
The  Soviet  Union  also  had  among  its  population  tens  of 
millions  of  Muslims,  who  were  bound  to  be  influenced  by 
developments  in  the  Middle  East.  (21) 
The  Soviet  policy  towards  the  middle  East  aimed  at 
achieving  the  following: 
(1)  Strengthening  anti-western  regimes  in  the  area; 
(2)  Gaining  military  facilities; 
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mistakes  of  the  latter,  thus  enabling  the  Soviet  Union 
to  play  the  role  of  honest  broker  in  regional 
squabbles; 
(4)  Supporting  national  liberation  and  radical  movements; 
(5)  Weakening  pro-western  regimes  in  the  area; 
(6)  Supporting  the  Communist  movement  and  parties  in  the 
Middle  East; 
(7)  Opposing  US  efforts  to  impose  solutions  to  regional 
squabbles  in  line  with  US  interests; 
However,  what  the  Soviet  Union  achieved  from  the  above 
strategy  was  almost  nothing.  The  series  of  treaties  of 
friendship  and  co-operation  the  Soviet  Union  signed  with 
Egypt,  Iraq,  Syria  and  Yemen  (North  and  South),  as  well  as 
the  wide  range  of  agreements  with  Libya  and  Algeria, 
resulted  in  no  material  benefit  to  the  Arabs.  Soviet 
support  for  its  Arab  allies  was  minimal  in  comparison  with 
US,  British  and  French  support  for  Israel.  In  fact  the 
Soviets  played  their  part  in  maintaining  Israeli  military 
superiority  by  ill-equipping  Arab  forces  and  making  them 
dependent  on  third  rate  Soviet  arms.  The  reasons  for  the 
lukewarm  Soviet  support  for  its  Arab  allies  is  that  they 
were  non-communists  and  the  Soviet  Union  valued  the 
stability  of  its  relations  with  the  West  above  its 
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did  not  agree  with  the  Arabs  about  Palestine,  and  was  the 
first  country  to  recognise  Israel.  Both  the  US  and  the 
Soviet  Union  wanted  to  stabilise  the  Arab  States  and  each 
wanted  to  exploit  whatever  it  could  exploit.  The  US  wanted 
to  exploit  the  Gulf  oil  and  the  Soviet  Union  wanted  to 
spread  Communism  in  populous  poor  countries  with  a 
historical  dislike  for  the  British  and  French,  namely 
Egypt,  Iraq  and  Syria.  Thus,  both  the  US  and  the  Soviet 
Union  agreed  jointly  to  rescue  Nasir  from  his  humiliating 
defeat  at  the  hands  of  the  Israelis  in  1956  and  turn  the 
whole  episode  into  a  humiliation  for  Britain  and  France. 
The  Arab  regimes,  that  came  to  power  on  the  wave  of 
pan-Arabism  and  anti-western  imperialism  failed  miserably 
in  achieving  any  of  their  declared  objectives.  on  the 
contrary,  the  ineptitude  and  corruption  in  dictatorships, 
from  Nasir  to  Asad  and  Saddam,  created  ideal  conditions  for 
the  Israelis  to  achieve  their  own  objectives  and  for 
western  powers  to  return  to  the  Middle  East  with  a 
vengeance.  The  post-Gulf-  war  period  has  revealed  how  the 
Americans  and  British  have  come  to  occupy  the  Gulf 
militarily. 
The  Baýth  regime  in  Syria,  through  its 
sectarian/family  misrule,  weakened  Syrian  resolve  against 
Israel,  which  meant  that  Israel  still  occupies  the  Golan 
Heights.  However,  in  Iraq,  the  crimes  of  the  Ba'th  regime 
and  then  the  horrendous  crimes  of  Saddam,  literally  broke 
17 the  back  of  Iraq  and  its  people  through  war,  sectarianism, 
and  Saddam's  family's  appropriation  of  the  entire  wealth 
of  the  country. 
18 The  early  years  of  the  establishment  of  the  part 
There  is  a  difference  of  opinion  as  to  who  was  the 
first  to  think  of  the  concept  of  Ba'thism.  There  is  even  a 
difference  of  opinion  among  Ba'thists  themselves.  Some 
think  that  it  was  Zaki  al-'Arsouzi  (a  Syrian  Alawite)  who 
first  conceived  the  idea.  (23)  Others,  however,  think  that 
the  role  of  al-'Arsouzi  in  establishing  the  Ba'th  is 
exaggerated,  although  he  played  a  role  to  the  extent  that 
the  first  generation  of  Ba'thists  were  admirers  of  his 
ideas.  (24)  On  the  other  hand,  there  are  views  which  deny 
any  role  for  al-'Arsouzi  and  assert  that  he  was  merely  a 
theoretician  and  did  not  take  a  single  step  to  establish  a 
political  party  as  did  'Aflaq.  (25)  Another  opinion  accuses 
'Aflaq  of  isolating  al-'Arsouzi  politically  and 
ideologically  from  others.  He  had  stolen  al-'Arsouzils 
ideas  and  turned  them  into  the  bases  of  a  political  party, 
drawing  all  al-'Arsouzi's  followers  to  himself. 
This  is  vindicated  by  the  fact  that  al-'Arsouzi 
himself  accused  'Aflaq  and  many  others  of  plotting  against 
him  and  he  was,  therefore,  forced  to  give  up  politics.  (26) 
Since  plotting,  deceit  and  treachery  are  central  to  the 
very  nature  of  the  Ba'th,  al-'Arsouzi  was  probably  quite 
right  in  his  suspicions. 
Whoever  may  have  been  the  originator  of  the  concept, 
it  is  now  accepted  that  there  are  two  groups  who  laid 
19 claim  to  the  name  of  the  Baýth  -al-'Arsouzi's  group  and 
ýAflaqls  group-  and  almost  all  accounts  agree  that  the 
former  bore  the  name  first,  and  that  he  was  primarily 
responsible  for  the  ideas  of  the  Ba'th.  According  to  al- 
ýArsouzils  account,  his  group  was  divided  into  two  parts: 
one  was  political,  the  Arab  Nationalist  Party,  and  the 
other  was  cultural,  the  Ba'th.  The  principal  task  of  the 
membership  of  this  group  was  to  write  or  translate  books 
on  the  renaissance  of  the  Arab  heritage.  (27) 
In  November  1940,  al-'Arsouzi  formed  a  party  of  six 
of  his  admirers,  after  lecturing  them  for  four  hours  about 
nationalism  and  socialism.  He  named  this  group  "al-Bath 
al-Arabi".  (28)  This  group  grew  in  the  course  of  the  next 
two  years,  but  never  exceeded  two  dozen  in  number. 
The  French  occupying  authorities  suppressed  al- 
'Arsouzi  Is  group  and  arrested  three  of  them.  (29)  al- 
'Arsouzi  himself  was  exiled  outside  Damascus  and, 
following  that,  gave  UP  Politics.  During  1944  his 
followers  left  him  and  joined  another  group  led  by  Wahhdb 
al-Ghdnim  (an  Alawite  landowner).  The  following  year  this 
I 
group  existed  side  by  side  with  ýAflaq's  group.  Meanwhile, 
al-'Arsouzi  became  volatile,  accusing  everybody  of  spying 
and  plunged  further  into  obscurity.  (30)  Some  thought  that 
he  was  consumed  with  jealousy  of  ýAflaq.  (31)  We  can, 
however,  conclude  that  if  there  was  jealousy,  there  was 
good  reason  for  it.  While  al-'Arsouzi  and  his  followers 
were  suppressed  by  the  French  authorities,  which  in  the 
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allowed  by  the  French  to  flourish  and  grow.  Jaldl  al- 
Sayyid  says: 
.1  as  time  went  by,  membership  of  the  party 
grew  through  recruitment  from  all  classes  and 
sections  of  Syrian  society  with  the  knowledge 
of  the  French  authorities,  who  did  not  take 
any  anti-party  measures  and  only  in  very  rare 
cases  attempted  to  caution  some  of  the  Ba'th 
Party  members.  "(32) 
With  regard  to  this  point,  Devlin,  who  has  researched 
the  history  of  the  Ba'th,  compares  the  fortunes  of  the  two 
groups: 
what  came  to  be  the  significant 
difference,  however,  was  that  'Arsouzi 
virtually  dropped  out  of  public  and  literary 
life  in  the  early  1940s.  'Aflaq  and  Bayýfir  were 
just  gathering  momentum.  -(33) 
We  have  here  an  irony,  to  say  the  least.  For,  while 
the  French  occupational  authorities  turned  a  blind  eye  to 
a  party  which  declared  publicly  that  it  was  in  the 
business  of  fighting  the  French  occupation  and  mobilising 
the  population  to  liberate  Syria  from  the  French,  it 
suppressed  another  party  (al-'Arsouzils  group)  which  had 
exactly  the  same  objectives.  This  lends  weight  to  the 
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with  the  French.  (34) 
The  Baýthists  themselves  admit  that  their  party  did 
not  differ  in  its  ideas  and  principles  from  other 
Nationalist  and  pan-Arabist  parties  and  groups  which 
preceded  it,  such  as  al-Kut:  lah  al-Waýaniyyah  (the 
Nationalist  Forum)  and  'Aqbat  al-ýAmal  al-QawmT  (the 
Nationalist  Action  League),  apart  from  their  slogans  for 
achieving  Arab  Unity  and  Socialism.  The  Baýth  Party  hoped 
to  fill  the  gap,  to  avoid  the  mistakes  of  these  two 
previous  groups,  and  to  try  to  supply  what  was  missing  in 
them.  These  groups  were  almost  identical  with  the  Ba'th  in 
terms  of  their  objectives,  the  means  of  achieving  those 
objectives  and  their  socialist  orientation.  (35)  The 
Nationalist  Action  League  and  others  like  it,  which  came 
into  existence  before  the  First  World  War,  and  then  in  the 
inter-war  period  were  organisations  created  and  led  by 
Christian  Arabs  had,  as  mentioned  before,  western 
inclinations  and  found  in  pan-Arabism,  as  opposed  to 
Islam,  a  useful  tool  to  end  the  Ottoman  occupation  and  the 
repression  of  all  those  who  opposed  the  Turkish  domination 
of  Syria.  Al-lýuqrli  says  that  Arab  Christians  do  not  concern 
themselves  with  Ottoman  and  Arab  history  because  they 
regard  it  as  purely  Islamic  history.  (36)  Such  an 
acknowledgement  by  one  of  the  leaders  of  Arab  Nationalism 
may  be  regarded  as  convincing  evidence  for  the 
relationship  between  Western  Europe  and  Arab  Christians, 
concerning  the  mission  of  the  Arab  Christians  in  the 
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created  many  problems  in  Arab  society.  These  problems 
continue  in  each  Arab  country  that  has  different  ethnic 
and  religious  groups,  like  Iraq,  which  consists  of  two 
main  ethnic  groups,  Arabs  and  Kurds,  as  well  as  others, 
such  as  Turks  and  Assyrians.  In  addition,  there  are 
different  religious  groups,  such  as  Shi'ah,  Sunnah, 
Christian  and  Jewish.  Therefore,  if  either  of  these  groups 
holds  absolute  power,  it  would  provoke  civil  war.  Thus, 
among  the  objects  of  foreign  powers  is  to  create 
hostility  between  the  different  ethnic  and  religious 
groups  in  the  Arab  world.  They  have  so  far  succeeded  in 
their  task,  and  the  Arab  and  Islamic  World  has  been 
greatly  fragmented. 
Probably  for  this  reason,  the  Ba'th  adopted  Arabism 
as  an  ideology  since  it  appealed  strongly  to  Arabic- 
speaking  religious  minorities,  who  hoped,  through  Arabism, 
to  free  themselves  of  their  minority  status.  (37) 
Other  political  parties  also  attracted  the  minority 
races  and  religious  groups  to  their  secular  ideology,  like 
the  Syrian  Nationalist  Party,  the  Syrian  Communist  Party 
(its  leader  was  Khdlid  Bikd5sh  from  the  Kurdish  minority  in 
Syria)  and  the  Iraqi  Communist  Party,  whose  first 
secretary  was  an  Arab  Christian  called  Yfisuf  Salm5n  (his 
clandestine  party  name  was  Fahd),  which  were  under  the 
direction  of  Moscow. 
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as  a  useful  tool  to  extend  their  influence  and,  perhaps, 
Syrian  political  and  cultural  domination  of  other  Arab 
lands  nearby.  (38) 
Pan-Arabism  was  attractive  to  the  two  European  powers 
that  were  engaged  in  a  struggle  against  the  Turkst  namely 
Britain  and  France.  T.  E.  Lawrence  in  his  Seven  Pillars  of 
Wisdom,  (39)  expresses  strong  sympathy  with  pan-Arabism, 
which  he  helped  to  win  the  day  against  Turkey  in  his 
direct  contribution  to  the  Arab  revolt  in  alliance  with 
the  western  powers  during  the  First  World  War.  Lawrence 
was  described  by  General  Allenby  as  the  real  leader  of  the 
Arab  revolt.  (40)  The  French  in  their  turn,  through  their 
councillor  in  Syria,  George  Picot,  played  the  role  of 
advisor  to  the  pan-Arabists  in  Syria  and  acted  as 
coordinator  between  them  and  France.  (41)  There  are  many 
sources  who  affirm  the  role  of  the  Christian  Arab  thinkers 
in  the  vanguard  of  radical  change  in  the  Arab  world 
through  the  ideology  of  pan-Arabism.  (42)  owing  to  the 
absence  of  religious  barriers  between  them  and  the  west, 
Arab  Christian  thinkers  were  able  to  establish  stronger 
links  with  the  west  than  could  their  fellow  Arab  Muslims. 
Similarly  the  west  also  had  a  deeper,  stronger  and  faster 
effect  on  Arab  Christians  than  it  had  on  Arab  Muslims. 
The  British  in  the  inter-war  period  generally  viewed 
pan-Arabism  as  an  ally,  to  the  extent  that  even  Arab 
Muslims  were  embraced.  Lionel  Smith,  the  British  advisor 
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period  that  saw  turmoil  in  Iraq,  considered  such  figures 
as  ý5ýi'  al-lýuqrl,  who  worked  under  his  direction, 
efficient  and  energetic,  and  described  them  as  such  in  his 
memoirs.  (43)  Al-lýuýtli,  of  course,  was  the  pioneer  of  pan- 
Arabism  in  the  education  of  Iraqis,  education  which,  from 
the  late  thirties  on,  was  to  lead  into  the  path  of 
fascism,  rather  than  into  British  democracy: 
"I  the  system,  which  carries  our  hopes  and 
achievements  is  fascism.  "(44) 
ýAflaqls  group,  which  had  a  co-founder,  namely  qa154 
al-Bayýdr,  is  historically  the  second  group  to  carry  the 
name  Ba'th,  a  third  co-founder,  Mal  al-Sayyid,  said: 
￿a  S..  I  met  'Aflaq  and  al-Bayýfir  during  April 
1942.  During  the  meeting  'Aflaq  said  that 
since  we  had  concluded  that  political  parties 
in  this  country  (Syria)  could  not,  by  the 
nature  and  composition,  carry  out  their 
nationalistic  and  pan-Arabist  duties.  Since 
they  believed  in  the  necessity  of  establishing 
an  organisation  of  a  new  kind,  which  could 
carry  the  burden  of  nationalist  and  pan- 
Arabist  duties,  in  a  manner  better  than  what 
was  available  now,  what  would  they  say  about 
forming  a  new  political  party  with  the  three 
25 of  them  as  its  nucleus,  entitled  the  Arab 
Ba'th  Party.  (45) 
ýAflaqls  nucleus  was  called  the  executive  committee 
and  began  recruiting  members  for  their  party.  (46)  However, 
the  birth  of  the  Baýth  Party  was  not  announced  until  1947, 
af  ull  f  ive  years  af  ter  its  f  oundation.  (47)  The  f  irst 
party  congress  was  held,  and  a  new  five-man  executive 
committee  was  formed,  headed  by  'Aflaq,  which  sanctioned 
internal  party  rules  and  regulations.  Hence,  ýAflaq 
continued  to  consider  his  political  career  as  having  taken 
off  during  the  early  1940s.  (48)  If  we  wonder  why  there  was 
a  five  years,  delay  in  announcing  the  birth  of  the  Ba'th 
Party,  we  should  look  back  at  that  particular  period  and 
take  account  of  the  regional  and  international  situation, 
namely  the  developing  of  the  Palestinian  problem,  (49) 
increasing  American  involvement  in  the  Middle  East  and 
American's  struggle  to  political  movement  in  the  area, 
particulary  in  Egypt.  (50) 
So,  one  may  wonder  the  possibility  that  the  whole  of 
the  Ba*th  movement  was  ment  to  be  born  then,  so  as  to  be 
an  outlet  and  a  containment  for  Islamic  emotions  that  were 
demanding  the  rescue  of  Palestine,  and  confrontation  of 
Communism,  which  was  the  predominont  Political  movement  in 
the  Middle  East  after  the  Second  World  War.  The  Ba'th 
Party  succeeded  in  fulfilling  these  functions,  and  did  its 
best  in  later  years  to  destroy  Arab  solidarity.  'Aflaq  was 
violently  hostilety  to  Nasir,  whom  the  Arab  masses 
26 considered  to  be  their  true  leader.  The  Islamic  movement 
in  Syria  and  Iraq  were  destroyed,  and  a  deepening  hatred 
grew  between  the  Arabs  and  Iranians.  This  was  partly  due 
to  Saddam's  miscalculate  policies  and  his  ill-considered 
aggression  against  the  Iranians  and,  finally,  to  Saddam's 
colossal  blunder  in  invading  Kuwait,  and  the  consequent 
Gulf  War,  which  delivered  the  Middle  East  in  its  entirety 
into  the  hands  of  America  and  Israel.  In  a  sense,  Saddam's 
failures  have  helped  Israel  to  achieve  favourable  results 
that  'no  other  Arab  failures  could  have  done  in  the 
past.  (51) 
After  their  first  congress,  Aflaq  and  his  fellow 
Baýthists  tried  to  reach  power  through  parliamentary 
means,  i.  e.  general  elections,  but  they  failed.  (52)  Majid 
Khadouri  says  with  regard  to  this: 
"....  'Aflaq's  three  repeated  failures  in 
parliamentary  elections  proved  to  him  that 
democratic  means  were  not  going  to  deliver  him 
into  power  and  achieve  his  objectives.  After 
that  he  did  not  stand  for  election,  instead  he 
began  publicly  to  call  for  the  use  of  violence 
to  achieve  social  and  political  change.  "(53) 
Thus,  he  urged  his  followers  to  be  vigilant  in 
achieving  their  goals: 
27 the  politically  dominant  and  economically 
exploitative  class  will  not  voluntarily 
surrender  its  position.  "(54) 
On  this  point,  Devlin's  justification,  with  which  I 
do  not  agree,  is  that  the  Bath  was  compelled  to  use 
violence  and  act  as  a  clandestine  organisation,  owing  to 
the  lack  of  a  legitimate  means  for  political  expression 
and  the  government's  severe  repression  at  that  time.  (55) 
The  reason  was  not  the  impotence  of  the  democratic 
process,  as  Khadouri  says,  nor  those  mentioned  by  Devlin, 
but  that  the  Ba'thists  could  not  possibly  win  power 
through  democratic  means  because  they  were  not  popular.  In 
Syria,  which  was  their  power-base,  the  Ba'thists  only  won 
twenty  seats  out  of  a  possible  142  in  the  1955  general 
election.  (56)  This  surely  indicates  their  meagre  popular 
base  and  lack  of  general  support  among  the  population. 
Hence,  they  set  out  to  destroy  democracy  in  Syria  and  have 
deprived  it  of  parliamentary  democracy  since  then. 
In  Iraq  they  were  even  less  of  a  popular  party,  to 
the  extent  that  the  monarchy  considered  them  to  be  the 
lesser  of  two  evils  in  comparison  with  the  Communists,  who 
were  treated  more  harshly  than  the  Ba'thists.  (57)  Devlin 
confirms  that: 
'I',  the  Ba'th  received  f  ar  gentler  treatment 
than  the  communists  during  this  period.  -(58) 
28 There  are  indications  in  Ba'th  literature  which 
confirm  this: 
1% 
-  the  Ba'th  was  alone  in  the  field.  The 
first  half  of  the  1950s  were  years  of 
stagnation  and  decline  and  of  revolutionary 
movements  in  Iraq  and  the  Arab  world;  however, 
at  the  same  time,  it  was  a  period  of 
establishment  and  formalisation  of  this  new 
revolutionary  movement  and  its  progress  and 
solidarity.  Once  these  years  were  over,  the 
Ba'th  was  immediately  in  the  field  of  popular 
struggle.  "  (59) 
The  practice  during  the  monarchy  in  Iraq  was  for  the 
secret  police  to  infiltrate'political  organisations.  (60) 
Although  Nfirli  al-Sa'ld  was  the  first  to  characterise  the 
Baýth  Party  as  a  secret  society,  it  did  not  receive  the 
same  harsh  treatment  as  did  the  Communists,  whose  leaders 
were  executed.  (61)  The  reason  may  be  that  the  Communists 
supported  the  creation  of  Israel  and  were  in  alliance 
with,  and  under  the  control  of,  the  Soviet  Union,  and 
consequently  threatened  the  pro-west  regime  in  Iraq  more 
than  did  the  Ba'thists. 
The  Ba'th  leadership  welcomed  Za'Im's  coup  in  March 
1949  in  Syria,  regarding  it  as  a  step  towards  a  real 
revolution,  (62)  whilst  ýAflaqls  earlier  writing  said  that 
the  revolution  or  inqildb,  as  he  called  it,  should  change 
29 people  in  the  Arab  world,  rather  than  the  system,  and  that 
when  people  changed,  the  system  would  follow 
automatically.  (63)  This  proves  that  the  term  inqildb  is 
attached  to  a  coup  dletat,  while  'Aflaq  uses  it  in  his 
romantic  rhetorical  style  as  the  "rebirth  of  the  Arab 
nation  or  awakening  of  the  Arab  nation".  In  the  sixties, 
however,  'Aflaq  began  to  use  the  term  thawrah  frequently, 
instead  of  inqildb,  after  the  Ba'th  had  overturned  the 
governments  in  Iraq  and  Syria  through  military  coups. 
However,  the  Baýthist  leadership  in  Syria  soon  began 
to  attack  Uusn-I  al-Za'Im,  which  led  to  the  imprisonment  of 
ýAflaq.  ýAflaq  subsequently,  in  an  effort  to  avoid 
imprisonment,  wrote  a  famous  letter  to  al-Za'lm,  requesting 
forgiveness  and  compassion,  and  he  promised  to  give  up 
politics.  (64)  This  indicated  the  lack  of  personal  stamina 
on  the  part  of  ýAflaq  and  his  unwillingness  to  practise 
what  he  preached.  That  famous  letter  led  to  the  collapse 
of  ýAflaqls  personal  standing,  even  within  his  party, 
which  was  shocked  by  his  behaviour.  (65)  However,  the  Ba'th 
Party  issued  no  explanation  and  let  the  episode  die  down, 
allowing  ýAflaq  to  remain  as  General  Secretary  of  the 
Party. 
Husni  al-Za'Im's  regime  did  not  last  long,  since  a  new 
coup  was  staged  by  Sdm1i  al-Handw-1  and  Adfib  al-Sh7ishikli.  It 
I 
seems  that  there  was  an  Anglo-American  agreement  to  oust 
al-Za'ImIs  regime,  (66)  by  backing  and  probably  even 
planning  the  al-IýandwT/  al-Sh-ishikli  coup,  for  which  they 
30 were  rewarded  by  ýAflaq  being  appointed  as  Minister  of 
Education  during  the  period  14  August-19  November  1949. 
Iýand  Batdt5  considered  ýAflaqls  assumption  of  the  post  of 
Minister  of  Education  as  a  political  mistake  without 
specifying  why.  (67) 
However,  it  appeared  that  regional  and  international 
considerations  were  behind  'Aflaqls  decision  to  assume  the 
post  of  Minister  of  Education  in  al-Uandwi's  government. 
This  was  dominated  by  members  of  the  People's  Party  al- 
Sh'ab,  which  was  strongly  in  favour  of  unity  with 
Iraq.  (68)  Since  such  a  close  relationship  between  Iraq  and 
Syria  was  not  in  the  interest  of  other  regional  and 
international  powers,  al-UandwIls  government  was  doomed. 
'Aflaq  left  the  government,  as  did  'Akrm  al-Uawrdn7i,  leader 
of  the  Arab  Socialist  Party,  prior  to  its  merger  with  the 
Ba'th  Party.  Their  reason  for  leaving  the  government  was 
claimed  to  be  their  desire  to  safeguard  the  republican 
regime  in  Syria,  which  would  have  been  endangered  by  unity 
with  the  Hashemite  regime  in  Iraq.  (69)  Al-Sh1shikll  turned 
against  his  old  comrade,  al-Hawrdri-i,  and  staged  a  third 
coup  in  Syria.  Al-Shlishikll, 
_although  against  unity  with 
Iraq,  was  also  against  trying  up  Syria  to  other  regional 
and  international  powers,  which  led  in  turn  to  his 
overthrow.  The  Ba'th  Party  with  the  co-operation  of  anti- 
ShTshiklT  elements  launched  a  denunciation  of  the  al- 
ShIishikll  regime  as  authoritarian.  (70)  Some  indicated  that 
Britain  had  a  hand  in  the  downfall  of  al-Shishikli.  (71) 
Jaldi  al-Sayyid,  who  represented  the  Ba'th  point  of  view, 
31 put  the  responsibility  squarely  on  the  shoulders  of  the 
Hashemite  regime  in  Iraq.  (72) 
In  November  1952,  ýAflaq  and  al-Bayýdr  united  their 
party  with  ýAkrm  al-Uawr5n7i's  Arab  Socialist  Party,  while 
the  three  were  in  exile  in  Lebanon,  after  they  had 
launched  a  campaign  against  al-Sh7ishikli's  regime.  The 
party  was  called  the  Arab  Socialist  Ba'th  Party  and  had 
adopted  the  Bath  constitution  in  1947.  According  to 
Batatu's  account,  (73)  with  which  I  agree,  the  reasons 
behind  the  merger  of  the  two  parties  were  the  following: 
The  Baý  th  Party  lacked  mass  support,  although  its 
membership  had  increased  to  about  4,500. 
(2)  The  leadership  was  impatient  and  preferred  quick  and 
effortless  political  ascents. 
(3)  Ijawr5nI  was  able  to  attract  mass  interest  and 
sympathy. 
(4)  4awrdn-i  had  a  foothold  in  the  officer  corps,  and  he 
persuaded  many  of  his  sympathisers  to  join  the  Homs 
Military  Academy. 
The  merger  was,  at  any  rate,  a  step  forward  on  the 
shortest  route  to  power,  namely  through  military  coups, 
after  it  had  failed  to  reach  power  through  the  ballot  box; 
32 there  were  however  ideological  differences  between  the  two 
leaders,  as  the  Ba'thists  themselves  admitted.  (74) 
Af  ter  the  merger  the  Party  expanded  greatly  and 
recruited  new  members  from  the  countryside,  particularly 
after  the  first  Syrian  Congress  for  Farmers  took  place, 
organised  and  run  by  the  Party  in  Aleppo.  (75) 
The  Party  also  established  branches  in  neighbouring 
countries  -  Lebanon,  Jordan  and,  of  course,  Iraq.  The 
Ba'th  also  played  an  important  role  in  the  union  of  Syria 
and  Egypt  into  the  United  Arab  Republic  (UAR).  It  looks  as 
if  the  Party  was  meant  to  play  an  important  role  in  the 
future  of  the  area.  Jaldl  al-Sayyid  explains: 
VL 
0  The  merger  between  the  Ba'th  and  the 
Arab  Socialist  Party  was  an  important  event  in 
the  history  of  the  Ba'th,  if  not  the  most 
important,  with  no  other  event  approaching  it 
in  importance,  apart  from  reaching  power  in 
Syria  and  3:  raq.  "(76) 
On  1  February  1958  the  Ba'th  leadership's  project  to 
unite  Syria  with  Egypt  was  initiated  as  af  irst  step 
towards  the  unification  of  the  Arab  world.  The  Ba'th 
decided  to  take  this  step  when  President  Nasir's  prestige 
was  at  its  height.  He  became  the  hero  of  the  hour,  not 
only  in  Egypt,  but  around  the  Arab,  Islamic  and  African 
33 world.  His  following  progressive  achievements,  later 
seemed  artificial,  as  CIA  records  show:  (77) 
(1)  He  ousted  the  British  from  Suez  and  eliminated 
foreign  bases; 
(2)  He  was  able  to  resist  the  tripartite  attack  in  1956; 
(3)  He  took  a  neutral  foreign  policy; 
(4)  He  nationalised  the  Suez  Canal; 
(5)  He  supported  the  Palestinian  cause; 
(6)  He  completed  an  arms  deal  with  Czechoslovakia; 
(7)  He  fought  the  Baghdad  Pact  and  the  Eisenhower 
principle;  (78) 
The  Baýthists  expected  that  they  would  take  prominent 
positions  in  the  new  united  state  and,  at  the  same  time, 
save  the  Ba'th  domestic  political  position,  which  had  a 
severe  inner  crisis.  In  addition  their  rivalry  with  the 
Communists,  who  became  the  most  influential  force  on  the 
Syrian  political  scene,  was  another  factor  which 
precipitated  the  Baýth  into  the  Union.  (79) 
Sdrd  al-Jundif  says  of  the  internal  struggle  within  the 
Party  at  that  time  that  on  1  February  a  regional  meeting 
34 was  held  at  which  the  leadership  put  forward  its  decision 
to  disband  the  Party  organisation  in  Syria: 
the  meeting  approved  unanimously.  In  fact 
the  members  felt  as  if  a  heavy  burden  had  been 
lifted  from  their  shoulders  since  they  were 
exhausted  by  the  squabbles  within  the  Party. 
(80) 
Thus,  when  the  Balthist  leaders  proclaimed  that  they 
agreed  to  dissolve  their  Party  as  the  price  of  Union  to 
prove  to  Nasir  their  real  intention  for  Union,  Nasir 
commented  on  this  point  during  the  trilateral  negotiations 
for  a  federal  Arab  Union  between  Egypt,  Syria  and  Iraq 
which  took  place  in  March  1963: 
my  information  about  the  Party  at  the 
time  of  the  talks  about  unity  hold  in  January 
1958,  was  that  it  had  problems  which  were 
almost  insuperable,  and  we  all  imagined  that 
you  yourselves  desired  its  dissolution.  -  (81) 
During  the  UAR  years  the  Baýth  Party  faced  many 
problems.  It  suffered  from  splits  in  many  regions,  which 
resulted  in  the  loss  of  many  early  members.  The  Ba'thists 
lost  their  influence,  owing  to  Nasir's  dictatorship,  and 
they  were  never  allowed  to  share  power.  Thus,  the  dispute 
between  the  Ba'th  and  Nasir  appeared  soon  after  the 
formation  of  the  UAR  and  the  split  between  them  seemed 
35 inevitable.  In  September  1961  Syria  seceded  from  the  UAR, 
blaming  Egyptian  domination.  many  sources  prove  that  the 
Ba'th  leadership  (Af  laq,  BayýZir  and  al-Uawrdnl)  were 
behind  this  departure.  (82) 
Nasir  in  his  turn,  did  not  agree  to  union  in  response 
to  a  genuine  feeling,  in  spite  of  slogans  similar  to  the 
Baýthls,  but,  rather,  as  his  political  vehicle  to  control 
other  Arab  states,  particularly  in  the  field  of  foreign 
affairs.  The  Ba'th  was  more  in  the  business  of  being  in 
line  with  the  interests  of  foreign  powers.  (83)  Thus,  when 
the  USA  turned  against  Nasir  in  the  four  years  following 
1958,  the  Ba'th  -  leaders  turned  against  him.  (84)  This 
served  American  policy  at  that  time. 
However,  the  Ba'th  leadership's  effort  to  take 
advantage  of  Nasir  through  union  (which  was  partly  to 
defeat  the  Communists)  had  failed.  (85)  The  growing 
strength  of  the  communists  in  Iraq  caused  the  Western 
Powers  to  panic  since  they  believed  that  Qdsim  was  under 
Communist  influence.  The  CIA  director,  Allen  Dulles, 
announced  that  the  situation  in  Iraq  was  the  most 
dangerous  in  the  World  at  that  time.  (86)  On  this  point 
Penrose  had  a  different  account,  with  which  I  agree: 
ILA  the  United  States  Ambassadors  in  this 
period,  Waldemar  Gallman  and  John  Jernigh, 
were  experienced  envoys  of  good  judgement,  who 
were  well  aware  that  the  accusation  of  the 
36 centre  from  internal  and  external  pressures,  " 
(87) 
This  is  a  testimony  to  the  fact  that  Qdsim  was 
pressurised,  under  the  pretext  of  confronting  Communism  by 
the  west  and  the  Ba'th.  (88)  Consequently  the  Ba'th  gave 
itself  the  right  to  move  to  rescue  what  they  considered  to 
be  a  threatening  situation  in  the  Middle  East.  A  Bathist 
leader  declared: 
1%  imperialism  did  not  worry  about  its 
position  in  the  Middle  East  more  than  it 
worried  during  the  period  preceding  1958  and 
the  period  immediately  after  it,  since  there 
was  a  unity  of  progressive  forces  in  the  Arab 
world.  "(89) 
Ba'thist  leaders  met  in  Beirut  some  time  in  1962  and 
formulated  a  plan  to  bring  down  the  regimes  in  both  Iraq 
and  Syria.  (90)  Qdsim,  in  fact,  destroyed  western  interests 
in  Iraq  and  achieved  the  liberation  of  Iraq  from  western 
domination,  so  the  Baýth  plan  to  bring  down  Q5sim's  regime 
was,  in  fact,  in  the  interests  of  western  countries.  One 
of  the  Baýth  Party  announcements  clearly  declared: 
the  masses  of  our  people  in  the  Iraqi 
quýr  who  are  experienced  in  struggle,  were 
able,  during  the  morning  of  8  February  1963 
and  in  one  decisive  blow,  to  smash  Qdsim's 
37 military  dictatorship.  By  doing  so,  it 
prevented  imperialism  and  reactionary  forces 
from  bringing  down  Q5sim's  regime  themselves, 
thus  preventing  the  return  of  Iraq  to  the 
imperialist  reactionary  camp.  "(91) 
Since  1963  the  Baýth  Party  has  been  ruling  Syria;  it 
ruled  Iraq  breifly  in  1963,  and  it  has  been  ruling  there 
again  since  1968.  In  Syria,  it  institutionalised  the  rule 
of  the  Alawite  minority,  and  has  deprived  the  country  of 
the  chance  of  peace  and  democracy  f  or  more  than  three 
decades.  In  Iraq,  it  has  institutionalised  the  rule  first 
of  the  tribe  and  then  of  the  family  and  it  has  eventually 
achieved  the  present  destruction  of  Iraq.  So  the  Ba'th 
Party  has  achieved  for  the  enemies  of  the  Arabs  what  would 
have  been  difficult  for  them  to  accomplish  otherwise. 
The  Baýthls  hypocritical  stance  on  Unity  first  came 
to  light,  in  its  atituded  towards  the  proposed  Iraqi- 
Syrian  union  in  the  late  1940s  and  early  1950s.  That  union 
was  opposed  by  Israel  because  it  feared  the  formation  of  a 
united  Arab  power  on  its  borders;  by  France,  who  did  not 
want  to  lose  its  influence  in  Syria;  by  Britain,  who  was 
the  mentor  of  Iraq;  by  Saudi  Arabia,  who  did  not  want  an 
expansion  of  competitors  to  the  desting  of  al-Saud  by  the 
Hashemites;  by  Egypt,  which  was  always  in  competition  with 
Iraq  and,  of  course,  by  the  Ba'th. 
38 Between  1954  and  1958  there  were  several  major 
political  changes  in  the  area  which  put  Syria  into  the 
centre  of  regional  and  international  competition.  Britain 
began  to  pressurise  Syria  to  stay  away  from  Egypt,  when  it 
began  to  understand  that  Egyptian  ambitions  in  Syria  might 
lead  to  problems  for  Britain's  friends  in  the  area,  namely 
Israel,  Iraq,  Jordan,  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  Gulf 
shaykhdoms.  (92) 
Nasir  began  to  gain  ascendancy  over  Hashemite  Iraq 
and  to  control  the  foreign  policy  of  a  number  of  Arab 
countries,  with  America's  direction  and  support.  (93)  In 
1957,  when  Jordan  refused  to  join  the  Baghdad  Pact,  and 
dismissed  General  Glubb  from  the  Arab  Legion  and  followed 
Nasir's  camp,  (94)  the  British  position  in  the  area  seemed 
precarious  and  so  a  plan  was  proposed  to  strike  at  Nasir's 
influence  in  Syria  by  forcing  Syria  to  merge  with 
Iraq.  (95) 
On  the  other  hand,  Syria  faced  pressures  from  both 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  The  United  States 
wanted  to  prevent  the  obvious  Soviet  influence  in  Syria, 
while  the  Soviet  Union  was  anxious  to  compel  Syria  not  to 
join  the  anti-Russian  alliances;  this  pushed  it  to  compete 
with  the  Western  Powers  for  influence  in  Syria. 
39 The  Founders  of  the  Baýth  Party 
It  is  important  to  try  to  get  to  know  the  main 
characters  who  were  responsible  for  the  ideas  of  the  Balth 
and  who  participated  in  the  establishment  of  the  Party: 
(1)  Zaki  al-'Arsouzi:  he  was  a  middle  class  landowner 
from  Alexandretta,  educated  at  the  Sorbonne  in  Paris.  His 
family  were  Alawites.  He  was  one  of  the  active  members  of 
the  'Aqbat  al-'Amal  al-Qawmi  from  1938  to  1939,  which  was 
similar  to  the  Balth  Party.  (96)  He  may  have  been  involved 
in  politics  because  of  Syria's  loss  of  Sanjak  of 
Alexandretta  and  have  moved  into  Syria  after  it  was 
annexed  by  Turkey,  with  the  approval  of  France.  He  led  a 
campaign  marked  by  extreme  racism  and  aroused  the  youth 
section  of  his  group  to  attack  the  Turks  and  the  French. 
In  one  of  his  comments  attacking  the  French  treatment  of 
the  Arabs,  al-'Arsouzi  says: 
11  *000  the  foreigner  was  afraid  for  his 
interests  from  Arabs,  and  used  Jews  to  ward 
off  this  threat.  It  is  only  natural  that  the 
dregs  of  the  earth  should  be  preferred  to  us, 
past  masters  of  the  world.  "(97) 
This  extreme  racism  has  allowed  some  researchers  to 
explain  why  some  of  his  supporters  deserted  him.  (98)  The 
dislike  of  al-'Arsouzi  for  the  Turks  was  due  to 
40 nationalistic  and  sectarian  reasons.  Al-'Arsouzi 
considered  all  Sunnis  as  Turkish.  He  also  used  to  confuse 
the  origin  of  an  Imam  and  his  followers;  for  example, 
Since  Abd  Harillfah  was  a  Persian,  his  followers  must  be 
Persian,  Turk  or  non-Arab.  Since  the  Shiýite  Imdms  are 
Arabs,  all  their  followers  must  also  be  Arab.  (99) 
Jaldl  al-Sayyid  represents  al-'Arsouzi  in  the 
following  light: 
11  when  his  name  used  to  be  put 
forward,  other  founding  members  of  the 
Party  used  to  exclude  him  on  the  grounds 
that  he  was  a  feudalist  and  not  a 
socialist  in  his  political  philosophy. 
He  was  more  of  the  Nazi  way  of  thinking 
in  fact,  of  the  ancient  Roman  way  of 
thinking,  in  which  people  were  divided 
into  masters  and  slaves.  He  was  also 
severe  with  people  who  disagreed  with 
him,  he  was  a  loner  who  did  not  fit  in 
with  others  whom  he  was  always  down 
upon.  "(100) 
Al-Sayyid  relates  the  violence  and  severity  of  the 
Ba'th  in  dealing  with  others  (which  is,  in  any  case,  a 
frank  admission  by  the  third  co-founder)  to  the  al- 
ýArsouzi  wing  of  the  Party.  (101)  Al-Sayyid's  attempt  to 
relate  the  Ba'th's  extreme  tendency  to  violence  to  him  is 
41 implausible  because  violence  and  cruelty  can  be  more 
easily  related  to  ýAflaq  himself,  who  says: 
the  national  action  that  is  susceptible 
to  success  is  one  which  evokes  hatred  to  the 
death  toward  those  who  personify  an  idea 
antithetical  to  nationalism.  It  finds  its 
incarnation  in  a  person  who  must  perish  so 
that  it  too  may  perish.  "(102) 
The  second  Ba'th  generation,  whether  Iraq's  Baýthists 
who  became  ýAflaqls  followers  or  Syria's  Ba'thists  who 
became  al-ýArsouzi's  followers,  practised  violence, 
cruelty  and  the  physical  liquidation  of  their  political 
opponents  to  a  horrendous  extent.  They  might  differ,  with 
the  Iraqi  Baýthists  being  more  brutal,  but  the  mass 
slaughter  in  the  Syrian  city  of  1ýamd,  when  the  Syrian 
Ba'thist  regime  physically  eliminated  tens  of  thousands  of 
its  inhabitants  on  the  pretext  of  their  being  members  of 
the  Muslim  Brotherhood  Party,  proves  that  the  Syrians 
could  be  equally  cruel.  (103)  This  was  the  biggest 
slaughter  the  Syrian  Ba'thists  undertook,  but  the  Iraqi 
Ba'thists  carried  out  bigger  ones  and  are  still  doing  so 
under  Saddam's  command. 
The  claim  that  ýAflaq  stole  al-ýArsouzils  views  and 
used  them  in  establishing  the  Ba'th  Party  is,  in  fact, 
near  the  truth.  (104)  Much  research  work  indicates  that 
although  'Aflaq  and  al-ýArsouzi  quarrelled,  they  were 
42 competing  for  the  position  of  supreme  power  in  the  Party, 
while  they  had  identical  views.  (105) 
Sdnd  al-Jund7i,  who  was  one  of  al-'Arsouzils  followers 
later  on,  went  on  to  say: 
-.  .  this  Party  was  a  group  of  strange  and 
peculiar  individuals,  who  mutinied  on  all 
values  held  by  society  and  by  all  human  beings 
and  who  had  a  religion  other  than  that  of 
God.  -(106) 
These  strange  and  peculiar  individuals  were  the  first 
seeds  of  Ba'thism  that  'Aflaq  later  usurped  to  form  the 
Baý  th  Party.  Sdrd  al-jund!  in  his  al-  Ba'th  gives  a  warning 
of  the  Ba'th  horror  to  come. 
(2)  Michel  'Af  lag  and  Pal5h  al-rFin  al-Bayý5r:  these 
are  recognised  as  the  founders  of  the  Ba'th  Party.  Both 
were  born  in  Damascus  of  middle-class  merchant  families. 
ýAflaq  was  a  Greek  Orthodox  Christian,  while  al-Baytdr  was 
a  Sunni  Muslim,  from  a  long  line  of  Ulamd',  which  means 
that  he  had  grown  up  in  a  very  conservative  environment. 
Both  were  educated  at  the  Sorbonne  in  Paris  where  they 
first  met  in  1929.  One  account  confirms  that  ýAflaq 
studied  under  the  well  known  French  Orientalist 
(Massignon),  who  was  the  spiritual  supervisor  of  the 
Protestant  Churches  overseas  and  consultant  to  the  French 
Colonies.  (107) 
43 After  their  return  to  Damascus  they  worked  as 
teachers  in  secondary  schools.  They  established  their 
reputations  in  those  days  as  writers  in  some  Communist 
magazines  which  al-Bayýdr  claims  they  founded.  So  they 
were  known  as  Communists,  but  'Aflaq  rejected  any  link 
with  communism,  (108)  although  he  did  not  deny  his 
admiration  for  the  Communist  organisation.  In  1936,  both 
turned  against  Communist  politics  and  stopped  writing.  It 
seems  that  their  attitude  stemmed  from  the  emergence  of 
the  Syrian  Communist  party  from  underground  activities  and 
the  increase  in  its  followers.  'Aflaq  said  about  this 
period: 
everyone  sensed  that  there  was  a  vacuum, 
that  the  old  leadership  had  gone  bankrupt 
that  a  new  movement  had  to  be 
established.  "(109) 
This  feeling  increased  with  the  outbreak  of  the 
Second  World  War.  Since  then  until  the  present  day,  the 
Ba'th  and  its  leaders  have  not  stopped  displaying  the 
aspect  of  their  character  that  is  usually'  exhibited  in 
condemning  all  other  forms  of  politics  than  their  own,  as 
well  as  describing  all  others  as  reactionary  agents  of 
imperialism  and  enemies  of  the  Arab  masses.  Thus, 
according  to  the  Ba'thists,  there  is  no  exemplary  group 
apart  from  themselves.  So  they  have  created  a  huge  gap 
between  themselves  and  the  mass  majority  of  the  society 
44 they  rule  or,  more  accurately,  misrule.  This  is  why  the 
Ba'th  has  become  more  of  a  military  organisation  than  a 
political  party. 
They  claimed  that  feudalism,  imperialism  and 
exploitation  would  be  abolished  only  by  their 
revolutionary  changes  and  that  they  would  create  a 
prosperous  and  modern  Arab  society  in  which  all  citizens 
would  find  justice,  brotherhood  and  equality.  But,  in 
practice,  the  only  benefits  from  it  have  seemed  to  be 
personal,  even  if  they  have  gone  against  their  proclaimed 
principles,  and  when  they  gained  power  the  outcome  was  the 
complete  reverse  of  what  they  were  calling  for.  The 
Ba'thists  admitted  this  fact  when  one  of  their 
participants  in  the  tripartite  union  talks,  which  were 
held  in  Cairo  in  1963,  said: 
when  revolutionary  movements  find 
themselves  in  power,  they  discover  that  many 
of  their  antecedent  ideas  need  to  be 
reconsidered.  While  still  at  the  stage  of 
popular  struggle,  they  call  for  democracy,  so 
that  they  can  carry  on  their  activity  under 
the  best  possible  conditions,  but  when  in 
government  they  find  that  this  bourgeois 
democracy  is  a  great  danger  to  the 
revolution.  "(110) 
45 In  October  1942  both  of  'Aflaq  and  al-Bayýdr 
resigned  from  their  posts  as  teachers  and  decided  to 
engage  in  politics. 
The  Ba'th  is,  in  fact,  an  attempt  to  take  the  Arabs 
back  to  a  pre-Islamic  era,  i.  e.  to  the  era  of  paganism 
which  is  considered  by  ýAflaq,  al-Bayýdr  and  al-'Arsouzi 
as  the  golden  age  of  the  Arabs.  What  is  clear  is  that  the 
Baýth  as  a  political  and,  before  that,  as  a  philosophical 
movement,  is  similar  to  the  European  renaissance  in  which 
the  latter  opposed  Christianity,  particularly  in  the  work 
of  Niccolo  Machiavelli  whose  thesis  is  the  antithesis  to 
Christianity.  The  Ba'th  copied  the  European  renaissance  in 
the  latter's  attempt  to  return  Europe  to  the  pagan  times 
of  the  Greeks  and  Romans.  However,  the  Ba'th's  aim  was  the 
destruction  of  Islam,  and  not  to  serve  paganism  but 
Christianity,  in  revenge  for  Islam's  victory  in  the 
crusades.  (111) 
However,  while  the  European  renaissance  took  Europe 
out  of  the  dark  ages,  the  Baýth  first  denied  the  golden 
age  of  Islam,  which  reached  its  zenith  during  the  'Abasid 
rule  in  Baghdad,  and  then  plunged  Baghdad  and  the  whole  of 
Iraq  into  a  new  dark  age  governed  by  the  values  of  tribal, 
than  which  one  could  hardly  find  more  backward  values 
anywhere  in  the  world. 
(3)  Akrm  al-4awrfihli:  was  born  in  1912  to  a  prominent 
Sunni  muslim  landowning  family  from  Iýamd.  He  graduated  in 
46 law  from  Damascus  Law  School.  He  both  joined  and  left  the 
ýIizb  al-QawmT  al-SarT  in  1936.  (112)  Soon  afterwads,  he 
became  the  leader  of  Ilizb  al-Shabdb,  which  had  been 
established  by  his  cousin  'Uthmdn  al-Iýawrdn7t.  (113)  At  the 
beginning  of  1950,  al-Iýawrdn7i  decided  to  change  the  name  of 
his  party  into  the  Arab  Socialist  Party,  promoting 
socialism  and  fighting  the  landowners  who  were  harsh  to 
the  peasants.  (114) 
As  Devlin  says: 
"....  this  organisation  became 
vehicle.  "(115) 
his  political 
It  indeed  gave  him  a  foothold  between  the  peasants 
in  Han-d  and  their  neighbours,  and  he  became  the  peasants, 
champion,  which  led  him  to  become  the  single  most  powerful 
figure  in  Syrian  politics.  (116)  He  tried  to  create  a  power 
base  in  the  army  as  well  when  he  encouraged  some  of  his 
followers  to  attend  the  Homs  Military  Academy.  (117)  He 
I 
also  gained  massive  support  as  a  result  of  his  aid  to 
Iraq's  military  movement  in  1941,  and  his  raids  with  some 
groups  of  Guerillas  on  Zionist  settlements  in  1948.  He  was 
elected  as  the  Nd'ib  for  Van-d  in  1943  and  as  a  parliamentry 
Nd'ib  in  1947  and  1949.  He  became  Minister  of  Agriculture 
in  August  1949  in  Sdnfl  al-4andwif's  government,  but  he  left 
this  post.  He  was  Minister  of  Defence,  in  Kh5lid  al-'Azmls 
cabinet  from  December  1949  to  June  1950  under  Ad-lb  al- 
47 Sh-ishikli's  Presidency,  but  he  left  this  post  too.  His 
party  joined  the  ýAflaq/Bayýdr  Baýth  Party,  but  he  split 
from  them  in  June  1962,  as  Devlin  says,  after  nearly  ten 
stormy  years  of  association.  (118)  On  his  joint  initiative 
with  'Aflaq  and  Bayýdr,  Syria  joined  Egypt  in  1958  and,  as 
a  further  result  of  his  efforts,  split  from  Egypt  in  1961. 
Batdtii  says: 
-....  he  was  surrounded  with  a  certain  shade  of 
mystery  and  his  enemies  began  to  refer  to  him 
as  the  fox  with  manicured  claws.  -(119) 
This  accusation  was  not  just  because  of  his  political 
changes  and  opportunistic  behaviour,  but  because  he  took 
part  in  all  three  military  coups  that  happened  in  Syria 
from  1949,  which  were  linked  one  way  or  another  with 
foreign  powers,  but  not  as  a  hero  or  patriot.  (120)  other 
personalities  that  took  part  in  these  coups  were 
extinguished,  either  physically  or  politically.  In  the 
next  section  we  will  further  investigate  the  mental 
processes  of  these  Ba'thist  leaders,  using  Ba'th 
literature  as  our  main  source. 
48 The  Ideology  of  the  Baýth  Part 
The  general  aims  of  the  Baýth  Party,  were,  a  secular 
society  in  which  all  Arabs,  irrespective  of  their 
religions,  could  participate,  Arab  unity,  freedom  and 
socialism;  its  principal  slogan  was:  "One  Arab  nation  with 
an  eternal  mission".  The  message  that  'Aflaq  delivered  was 
fundamentally  Arabism.  The  Arabs  formed  one  nation,  which 
had  an  apparent  existence  and  a  special  role  in  the  world. 
Thus,  he  placed  prime  importance  on  uniting  the  Arab 
people  in  a  single  state.  He  suggested  that  this  aim  could 
only  be  achieved  by  the  transformation  of  Arab  society 
from  its  present  rotten  situation  to  a  new,  vital  society 
in  which  the  Arab  People  could  enjoy  all  their  just 
glories  in  an  independent  united  state.  He  predicted  that 
the  Baýth  Party  would  be  an  elite  vanguard  whose  mission 
was  to  undertake  this  task,  not  through  the  elimination  of 
divisive  political  boundaries,  but  by  the  reformation  of 
the  Arab  character  and  society  after  freeing  themselves 
from  all  regional,  religious,  and  communal  loyalties;  to 
liberate  from  external  control  as  well  as  from  indigenous 
arbitrary  rule. 
However,  in  the  early  years  of  the  1940s  and  the 
1950s,  the  distinctive  quality  of  the  Ba'th  was 
intellectual  and  monopolised  by  'Aflaq  and,  to  a  lesser 
extent,  Bitar.  (121)  This  changed  in  the  latter  part  of  the 
1950s  and  the  1960s  in  Syria  because  of  the  integration  of 
49 ýAflaqls  Bath  Party  with  IýawrdnIls  Socialist  Party,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  rapid  expansion  of  the  Party's  ranks  on 
the  other.  Devlin  sees  the  reason  for  this  phenomenon  as 
the  differences  between  doctrine  and  practice.  (122)  As 
events  proved,  however,  this  was  not  the  only  reason, 
since  it  was  also  due  to  the  Baýthistsl  ambition  to  be  the 
main  influence. 
In  Iraq,  however,  the  Baýthists  continued  to  adhere 
to  ýAflaqls  doctrine  and  moved  under  his  direction.  Any 
member  could  lose  his  position,  or  even  his  life,  if  he 
displayed  any  disloyalty  to  the  Baýth  and  ýAflaqls 
doctrine. 
ýAflaqls  ideas,  however,  were  not  always  the  same. 
He  did  not  examine  them  carefully  and,  as  a  result,  they 
seem  to  contain  contradictions  when  viewed  as  a  whole. 
This  may  be  accounted  for  by  the  different  principles 
which  formed  his  doctrine.  Thus  his  opponent's  accusation 
of  taking  different  ideas  from  different  sources  and 
placing  them  together  to  create  a  final  misleading  and 
contradictary  doctrine,  as  a  result  of  his  own 
philosophising,  is  near  to  the  truth.  (123)  Some  neutral 
sources  have  commented  on  this  point  that  it  was  based  on 
'Aflaqls  taste,  as  he  relied  on  feelings  rather  than  an 
analysis  at  and  deduction  from  the  facts,  and  his  language 
is  rather  poetic,  characterised  by  suggestions  rather  than 
logical  propositions.  (124)  Another  source  says  about 
Aflaqls  language  and  ideas: 
50 11  to  read  'Aflag's  main  contribution  to  the 
post-1967  debate  is  to  perceive  fully  the 
bankruptcy  and  incoherence  of  the  politics  of 
the  Ba'th.  Nearly  three  hundred  pages  of  text 
yield  no  insight,  on  his  part,  into  what  went 
wrong  and  what  needed  to  be  done;  there  is 
only  the  visible  infatuation  with  words  and 
'Aflag's  summons  to  the  Party  to  renounce 
power  and  go  back  to  its  "pure  essence".  (125) 
These  defects,  characterise  'Aflaq's  general  aims. 
Below  are  some  of  his  more  general  notions,  selected  from 
official  Party  documents  (writings,  speeches,  the  Party 
constitution  and  instructions  to  the  membership)  in  which 
ýAflaq  gives  the  theoretical  justification  for  the  Ba'th 
party  doctrine,  which  enlighten  us  on  Ba'th  ideology.  The 
most  distinctive  feature  of  Ba'thism  is  its  pan-Arab 
ideology.  According  to  ýAflaq,  the  Arabs  are  one  people 
ummah  Arabiyyah  and  have  a  special  role  in  the  World. 
This  is  expressed  in  the  slogan: 
11  one  Arab  nation  with  an  eternal 
mission".  This  nationalism  is  mixed  up  with 
humanism.  n 
ýAflaq  says: 
51 the  Arab  is  bound  not  only  to  his  nation, 
but  also  to  mankind-,  (126)  and  %%.  **.  Arab 
nationalism  is  humanitarian  in  tendency.  "  (127) 
'Aflaq  regarded  the  nation  as  a  living  organism  and 
eternal(128)  and  the  individual's  association  with  the 
nation  as  organic.  (129)  He  believed  that  the  individual 
Arab  had  no  meaning  apart  from  the  nation  and  could  only 
achieve  things  as  part  of  his  nation,  otherwise  his  life 
would  be  dull  and  unfruitful.  (130)  ýAflaq  was  here  echoing 
the  German  philosopher,  Georg  Wilhelm  Friedrich  Hegel 
(1770-1831)  the  founder  of  modern  dialectic  philosophy, 
who  considered  human  history  as  having  been  moulded  by  the 
dialectical  process.  'Aflaq  believed,  as  Hegel  did,  that 
the  nation's  spirit  is  the  force  behind  the  dialectical 
process.  This  is  why  'Aflaq  repeatedly  stressed  the 
nation's  spirit,  exactly  as  Hegel  did.  (131)  For  Aflaq  the 
spirit  of  the  Arab  nation  is  like  a  fuel,  which  will 
propel  it  to  a  new  era  of  excellence,  which  will  mark  the 
end  of  centuries  of  Arab  decline  and  domination  by  foreign 
powers,  which  has  corrupted  the  Arab  character.  (132) 
Hence,  the  eternal  message  that  Aflaq  gave  the  Arabs  is 
the  service  of  humanity;  which  he  considered  not  to  be 
merely  a  slogan  or  even  a  principle,  but  an  article  of 
faith.  (133)  'Aflaq  was  not  echoing  Islam  here,  but, 
rather,  Hegelian  and  Marxist  beliefs  in  a  worldly  faith  or 
ideology  for,  through  faith  in  the  eternal  Arab  message  in 
the  service  of  humanity,  the  Arab  character  will  be 
liberated  from  centuries  of  decline.  It  is  worth  noting 
52 that  'Aflaq  later  (unusually  speaking  in  a  religious 
contexts)  declared  the  Arab  message  to  go  beyond  Islam  and 
to  the  other  two  faiths  before  Islam,  i.  e.  Christianity 
and  Judaism,  on  the  grounds  that  these  two  also  came  from 
Arab  lands  and  were  delivered  by  Arabs  or  pre-Arab  semitic 
people.  'Aflaq  tried  to  explain  Islam  in  terms  of  Arab 
nationalism: 
"....  Arabism  is  a  body  whose  soul  is  Islam  and 
Islam  is  a  tremor  that  stirs  the  latent  forces 
of  the  Arab  nation.  11  and 
a  revolution 
Arabs.  "(134) 
.  ...  Islam  produced 
in  the  soul  of  the 
'Aflaq's  aim  behind  his  romantic  rhetoric  in  these 
quotations  was  to  exploit  the  emotions  derived  from  Islam 
in  the  service  of  his  Party.  His  rhetorical  Language  about 
Islam  gave  the  impression  to  some  researchers,  that  he  did 
not  consider  Islam  to  be  of  secondary  importance  to 
Arabism.  (135)  Elsewhere  he  considers  Islam  to  be  another 
form  of  the  eternal  Arab  genius,  accepted  and  referred  to 
as  a  civilisation  or  a  national  culture.  'Aflaq  clearly 
indicated  that  Islam  was  not  God-given  alone,  but  was  a 
response  to  Arab  requirements  during  Mu4ammad's  time: 
Islam,  in  its  pure  essence,  arose  out  of 
the  heart  of  Arabism.  -  and  "....  today  the 
force  of  Islam  discloses  itself  in  a  new 
form,  that  of  Arab  nationalism.  "  (136) 
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the  Arabs  from  Islam  on  the  grounds  that  Islam  was  not  the 
only  pillar  of  the  Arab  national  existence.  There  were 
other  pillars,  namely  language,  a  joint  history,  a  common 
interest  and  a  geographical  unity.  This  is  specious, 
because  if  it  was  not  for  the  Quran,  the  Arabic  language 
might  easily  have  been  overwhelmed  by  Persian,  Greek  or 
Turkish,  or  by  a  western  language  such  as  French  or 
English.  ýAflaq's  claim  that  he  wanted  to  rebuild  the  Arab 
nation  on  new  foundations,  and  that  Islam  could  not  be  the 
only  basis  upon  which  a  new  Arab  emergence  could  be  based, 
stemmed  from  his  fear  that  non-Arab  Mulims,  e.  g.  Persians 
and  Turks,  could  use  Islam  as  a  means  to  deny  Arab 
nationalism  and  identity,  particularly  through  religious 
sectarianism.  He  thought  that  through  relegating  Islam  to 
a  secondary  position  in  Arab  life,  sectarianism  might  be 
avoided.  He  did  not  attempt  to  reduce  it  through  tolerance 
and  liberalism,  but  through  a  one-nation  party  rule. 
ýAflaqls  Bath  party  actually  increased  sectarianism  to 
an  unprecedented  level  in  Syria  and  Iraq,  and  both 
countries  are  now  ruled  by  elite  Ba'thist  minority  sects. 
Although  they  appeared  to  be  pursuing  an  ideology  that 
wanted  to  do  away  with  sectarian,  regional  and  tribal 
loyalties,  when  they  took  power  they  found  themselves 
forced  to  revert  to  those  loyalties  in  order  to  strengthen 
their  regimes.  As  we  have  seen  now  in  Syria,  the  Alawite 
minority  rules  over  the  mass  majority  of  Sunnis  and  in 
Iraq  a  minority  within  a  minority  rules  over  the  majority; 
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minority,  rules  over  the  Shi'ite  majority. 
ýAflaq  claimed  that  the  slogans  of  "Unity,  Freedom 
and  Socialism"  were  not  his  invention,  but  were  derived 
from  the  depths  of  the  Arab  soul.  They  express  not  only 
the  interest  of  the  nation,  but  also  the  truth  that  it 
possesses,  which  will  declare  itself,  whatever  the 
existing  conditions.  (137)  According  to  'Aflaq,  Arab 
society  could  only  be  revitalised  through  Arab  unity.  He 
regarded  this  unity  not  as  a  means  to  an  end,  but  as  a 
natural  right.  (138)  'Aflaq  regarded  this  unity  as 
historically  inevitable,  because  he  believed  that  the 
nation  had  a  natural  and  irresistible  tendency  to  cohere, 
to  gather  its  parts.  He  proclaimed  this  in  Article  I  of 
the  constitution: 
'I"  none  of  the  Arab  countries  can,  in 
isolation  from  others,  fulfil  the  conditions 
necessary  for  its  life;  all  differences  among 
the  sons  of  the  nation  are  incidental  and 
false  and  will  vanish  with  the  awakening  of 
the  Arab  consciousness.  " 
He  considered  all  the  differences  between  the  members 
of  one  nation  as  either  accidental  or  bogus,  created  by 
foreign  powers,  e.  g.  borders  between  Arab  countries.  By 
this  rather  false  logic,  ýAflaq  completely  ignored 
history,  such  as  the  eternal  competition  between  the 
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competition,  particularly  since  the  emergence  of  Islam, 
between  Iraq  and  Syria,  as  well  as  a  whole  host  of 
differences  that  have  proved  to  be  only  too  real  in 
keeping  the  Arabs  apart.  'Aflaq  totally  ignored  the 
lessons  of  ancient,  as  well  as  of  modern,  history  and 
proceeded  to  build  a  party  that  declared  as  its  prime 
objective  the  unity  of  the  Arab  nation,  which  was  slipposed 
to  be  already  united.  (139) 
In  a  way,  'Aflaq  was  echoing  another  German 
philosopher,  Karl  Marx  (1818-1883),  who  claimed  that  the 
revolution  of  the  proletariat  was  inevitable  and  yet  spent 
most  of  his  life  in  writing  and  political  activities, 
trying  to  bring  about  that  revolution,  which  he  claimed  to 
be  an  inevitability.  Another  similarity  between  Marx  and 
Aflaq  is  that  the  latter  respected  philosophy  that  aimed 
at  changing  existing  conditions,  which  is  why  he 
repeatedly  used  the  term  inqildb  as  a  synonym  for  Thawrah. 
Like  Marx,  Aflaq  also  despised  philosophies  that  were  not 
revolutionary.  (140)  Arab  unity  was  regarded  by  the  Ba'th 
as  the  keystone  to  Arab  liberation.  The  second  fundamental 
theoretical  slogan  of  the  Ba'th  is: 
"I  the  Arab  people  will  never  unify  their 
struggle  until  they  struggle  for  unity.  "(141) 
The  Ba'th  called  for  Arab  liberation  from  external 
control.  It  attacked  the  regimes  under  the  mandate  because 
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the  foreign  power,  and  it  accused  them  of  being 
subservient  to  latter's  desires.  It  also  refers  to  the 
freedom  of  the  Arab  individual,  which  is  embodied  in  the 
second  principle  of  the  Ba'th  constitution: 
"....  freedom  of  speech,  freedom  of  assembly, 
freedom  of  belief  and  artistic  freedom  are 
sacred  things  which  no  authority  can 
diminish.  " 
The  apparent  implication  of  this  article  seems  to 
affirm  the  primacy  of  the  individual.  ýAflaq  emphasises 
tries  to  the  importance  of  the  individual: 
the  individual  alone  renews  the  group  and 
the  group  produces  only  relative  values.  -  (142) 
But  in  other  clauses,  the  tendency  of  the  Ba'th  and 
'Aflaq  to  restrict  individual  freedom  is  apparent: 
"'....  the  State  shall  be  responsible  for  the 
protection  of  freedom  of  speech,  publication 
and  assembly  ...  within  the  limits  of  the 
higher  Arab  national  interest.  "  (143)  individual 
freedom  is  bound  up  with  the  spirit  of  the 
nation.  (144)  'Aflaq  also  says: 
57 individual  has  to  achieve  the 
condition  that  the  national  tie  imposes.  -(145) 
This  higher  Arab  national  interest  body,  as  ýAflaq 
suggests,  is  embodied  in  the  Ba'th  Party: 
"I  the  living  idea  of  the  nation.  -  (146) 
In  theory  the  Baýth  adhered  to  a  democratic  state. 
Article  5  of  the  constitution  asserts  that: 
￿I 
..  The  people  alone  are  the  source  of  all 
authority.  ff 
Article  14  asserts  that: 
the  governmental  system  in  the  Arab  state 
is  to  be  a  constitutional  elective  system, 
with  the  executive  responsible  to  a  directly 
elected  legislature.  " 
One  of  the  Ba  N  thist  leaders  commented  on 
parliamentary  government  on  follows: 
it  is  not  possible  for  this  sense  of 
community  (among  the  individuals  in  a  society) 
to  be  completely  achieved  except  through  a 
popular  democratic  system;  by  'democratic' 
meaning  a  freely  elected  parliamentary  system 
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the  representatives  of  the  people;  by 
"popular"  meaning  based  on  the  will  of  the 
majority  of  the  Ummah  wherein  each  person 
enjoys  freedom  of  thought  and  opinion  in  the 
widest  application.  "(147)  And  .....  democracy 
is  indispensable,  but  by  virtue  of 
inefficiency,  poor  education,  perversion  of 
morals  and  bad  economic  and  health  conditions, 
the  people  may  not  be  able  to  exercise  their 
rights  in  a  proper  manner  and  to  the  fullest 
extent.  We  do  not,  on  that  account,  call  for 
depriving  them  of  their  rights.  On  the 
contrary,  we  ought  to  work  through  them  ... 
and  in  this  way  strive  to  raise  their 
standards  ...  for  us  they  are  the  end  and  the 
means.  our  aim  is  to  serve  the  people  by  means 
of  the  people.  "(148) 
But,  at  the  same  time,  the  constitutional  provisions 
embodied  a  political  attitude  that  permitted  the  Party  to 
adopt  a  tutelary  stance  towards  the  people,  because,  the 
Ba'th,  as  'Aflaq  suggests,  constitutes  the  "higher  Arab 
national  interest.  "(149) 
ýAflaq  displayed  no  confidence  in  or  respect  for  the 
people  in  this  regard.  He  considered  them  incapable  of 
deciding  what  was  good  or  bad  for  them.  Thus  he  placed 
himself  and  his  Party  as  guardians  of  the  masses,  without 
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Party)  so  to  do.  Indeed,  by  this  tutelary  stance,  ýAflaq 
gave  himself,  his  Party  and,  eventually,  the  absolute 
ruler  permission  to  subordinate  the  Arab  masses. 
The  third  objective  of  the  Baýth,  Socialism,  ýAflaq 
proclaimed  to  his  followers,  like  the  other  objectives, 
issued  from  the  depths  of  the  Arab  nation.  (150)  Because  it 
was  nationalist,  it  could  not  constitute  a  factor  of 
internal  division  and  conflict.  (151)  He  pointed  out,  in 
order  to  exclude  the  influence  of  the  Communists,  that  the 
Ba'thist  vision  of  socialism  was  non-Marxist,  even  anti- 
Marxist,  in  that  it  emphasised  the  primacy  of  the  national 
ethnic  identity  and  rejected  the  notion  of  antagonistic 
social  classes.  However,  when  his  monopoly  on  the  Bath 
doctrine  was  broken  and  some  of  his  followers  had  shifted 
to  the  left,  he  was  compelled  to  make  some  changes  in  his 
position: 
am  not  against  Marxism,  but  the  Ba'th 
is  scientific  socialism  added  to  spirit.  -(152) 
He  continued  to  stress  that  there  was  a  basic 
difference  between  him  and  the  Communists  because  his 
Ba'th  project  connected  with  the  "spirit": 
because  our  socialism  is  nationalist,  it 
can  not  be  a  factor  of  internal  division  and 
conf  lict.  " 
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constitution,  that  "the  people  are  the  source  of  all 
authority". 
However,  in  another  place  he  contradicts  himself: 
1% 
owns  most  of  the  wealth  of  the  nation  and 
controls  and  disposes  of  power  in  a  manner 
that  accords  with  its  desires.  This  exploiting 
class  will  not  give  up  its  wealth  or  its 
interest  by  a  mere  appeal  in  the  name  of 
nationalism  or  of  the  spirit  or  of  progress. 
Struggle  is,  therefore,  inescapable.  -(153) 
The  contradiction  of  'Aflaq's  ideas  in  this  essay, 
(a)  that  class  struggle  is  inevitable  and  (b)  that 
socialism  is  opposed  to  internal  division,  is  very  clear 
because  they  appear  in  the  same  article. 
The  Party  Constitution,  article  26,  reads: 
11  the  Party  of  the  Arab  Bath  is  a 
socialist  party.  It  believes  that  the  economic 
wealth  of  the  fatherland  belongs  to  the 
nation" 
'Aflaq  is  thus  in  agreement  with  fascist  and  Marxist 
doctrines  of  the  supremacy  of  the  state  over  the 
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production.  (154) 
In  article  34  he  contradicts  the  previous  article: 
",...  Property  and  inheritance  are  true  natural 
rights.  They  are  protected  within  the  limits 
of  the  national  interest.  11 
As  always,  ýAflaq  turns  away  from  communism  because 
Communism  demands  of  private  property.  (155)  The 
justifications  which  the  Ba'thists  gave  for  their 
socialism  were  varied  and  theoretical.  on  one  occasion 
ýAflaq  terms  it  "scientific  socialismff  and  on  another  he 
calls  it  "nationalistic  issues  from  the  soul  of  the  Arab 
nationfl,  but  without  specifying  what  socialism  means  and 
what  the  particular  characteristics  in  socialism  are  that 
are  specifically  Arab.  Again,  his  justification  stresses 
the  benefit  of  the  Baýth: 
the  national  struggle  at  the  present  time 
can  only  be  based  on  the  generality  of  the 
Arabs  and  these  will  not  take  part  in  it  if 
they  are  exploited.,  '  (156) 
However,  he  regarded  socialism  as  a  necessity  issuing 
from  the  depths  of  Arab  nationalism  and  being  the  ideal 
system  to  allow  the  Arab  people  to  realise  their 
potentialities  and  develop  their  genius  to  the  full.  (157) 
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united,  they  would  be  liberated,  and  class  conflict  would 
disappear.  This  belief  was  generally  accompanied  by  a 
similar  conviction,  that  development  and  modernisation 
would  come  as  a  result  of  national  liberation  and  unity, 
and  that  the  Arabs  would  then  be  able  to  recapture  their 
former  glory.  Thus  the  Ba'thists  regarded  unity, 
liberation  and  socialism  as  interdependent. 
Turning  to  the  means  by  which  ýAflaq  thought  they 
could  achieve  Ba'thist  goals,  he  uses  the  word  inqildb. 
(158)  The  sixth  article  of  the  Ba'th  constitution  clearly 
states  that  the  Ba'th  Party  is  a  revolutionary  Party  that 
believes  that  its  objectives  in  the  renaissance  of  the 
Arab  nation  cannot  be  achieved  without  revolution.  The 
Ba'th  rejected  evolutionary  development  and  reforms  as  a 
means  and  insisted  on  conpulsion.  ýAflaq  claimed  that  this 
term,  inqildb  referred  to  revolution,  rather  than  the  more 
usual  coup  Idletat': 
",  **.  revolution  inqildb,  being  a  Political  and 
social  programme,  is  that  prime  propelling 
power,  that  powerful  psychic  current,  that 
mandatory  struggle,  without  which  the  re- 
awakening  of  the  nation  cannot  be  understood. 
This  is  what  we  understand  by  revolution.  "  (159) 
The  inqildb  is  regarded  as: 
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the  curing  of  the  nation  before  the  curing  of 
the  state,  for  what  is  that  state  ...  but  a 
body  without  a  soul.  "(160) 
Thus,  inqilab  must  change  people,  rather  than  the 
system.  Once  the  people,  or  enough  of  them,  have  undergone 
an  interior  transformation,  liberating  the  intellect  and 
releasing  the  source  of  faith  in  the  soul,  change  in  the 
system  will  follow  automatically.  (161) 
ýAflaq  gave  himself  the  right  to  change  the  present 
condition,  which  he  described  as  backward: 
-....  we  fight  the  status  quo  not  only  because 
it  is  diseased,  but  because  we  are  compelled 
to  fight  for  the  nation,  which,  despite  its 
backwardness  ...  possesses  truth,  and  this 
truth  manifests  itself,  whatever  the  power  of 
the  existing  facts.  The  Ingildb  is  this 
manifestation,  this  attestation  of  the 
existence  of  truth.  The  practical  expression 
of  the  idea  of  ingildb  is  struggle  ...  and  by 
'struggle'  is  meant  the  recapturing  by  the 
nation,  after  that  long  slumber,  ...  of  its 
yearning  to  wrestle  with  life  and  with  fate; 
its  viewing  of  existence  deeply  and 
heroically;  and  its  appreciation  of  the  value 
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effort.  "(162) 
ýAflaq  excluded  peaceful  means  to  realising  the 
inqildb  of  the  nation,  and  he  passed  to  the  Baýth  Party 
the  mission  of  reshaping  the  Arab  nation  with  fire  and 
iron.  In  order  to  justify  giving  the  Ba'th  elite  this 
task,  he  tried  to  reverse  the  principle  of  majority 
sovereignty  and  to  make  an  elitist  concept:  leadership 
should  remain  in  the  hands  of  an  elite: 
....  it  was  characteristic  of  the 
revolutionary  stage  in  enlightened  minority.  " 
He  also  said: 
-....  the  Inq1lilb,  in  its  incipient  form  as  a 
conscious  feeling  of  the  necessity  for  change, 
takes  effect  at  first,  not  in  the  wide  mass  of 
the  people,  but  in  a  minority.  -  And  by 
the  nation  I  intend  the  greater  number.  in 
this  connection  numbers  are  not  in  themselves 
sacred,  the  notion  is  not  an  arithmetical 
collection,  but  an  idea  embodied  in  all  or 
some  of  its  members  and  that,  therefore,  those 
in  whom  this  idea  is  personified  have  the 
right  to  speak  in  the  name  of  the  whole.  "(163) 
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interest  of  the  people,  which  must  be  chosen  and  specially 
ready  to  use  violence.  Thus  he  says: 
its  members  will  be  hard  on  themselves 
and  hard  on  theirs.  "(164) 
ýAflaq  then  reduced  this  elite  to  the  supremacy  of 
the  leader,  the  dictator.  This  is  a  particular 
characteristic  of  fascistic  philosophy.  'Aflaq  thus  says: 
our  movement  is  the  destiny  of  the  Arabs 
in  this  age.  "(165)  which  echoes  Lenin's  statement: 
the  future  is  with  us  in  any  case.,, 
This  is  the  ideology  of  the  Ba'th  Party  and  the  means 
of  achieving  its  objectives,  according  to  its  author.  One 
may  consider  Ba'thism  as  an  echo  of  German  idealistic  and 
materialistic  philosophy.  Certainly  Ba'thism  contains  most 
aspects  of  German  philosophical  eccentricities  and 
downright  extremism,  whether  in  Fascist  or  Marxist  form. 
ýAflaq  camouflaged  his  philosophical  and  political 
extremism  with  slogans  of  freedom,  unity  and  socialism, 
all  leading  to  the  progress  of  the  Arab  nation.  But 
freedom  and  progress  meant  no  more  to  Aflaq  than  it  meant 
to  Hitler  and  Stalin.  The  kind  of  freedom  and  progress 
that  ýAflaq  preached  and,  before  him,  Stalin  and  Hitler, 
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rejected  by  humanity  at  large. 
67 The  Set-Backs  Suffered  by  the  Ba'th  Party 
From  its  early  years  and  through  its  long  history 
before  and  after  seizing  power,  the  Baýth  Party  has 
experienced  set-backs  and  divisions  that  were  many  and 
dangerous.  Since  there  have  been  so  many  set-backs  and 
divisions,  I  will  only  refer  to  the  most  important  ones. 
(1)  Preliminary  f  ailures:  Aflaq  began  his  political 
life  by  calling  enthusiastically  for  parliamentary 
elections,  in  which  he  stood,  in  1943  (he  alone),  1947  and 
1949  (with  some  f1lowers),  but  was  completely 
unsuccessful.  Afterwards  'Aflaq  and  his  followers  began  to 
denounce  the  parliamentary  system  and  accused  it  of  being 
a  tool  in  the  hands  of  the  bourgeoisie  and  feudalist 
classes  and  the  state.  (166)  The  destruction  of  democracy 
and  its  institutions  was  the  chief  political  doctrine  of 
'Aflaqls  school  and  its  followers,  who  went  on  to  preach 
the  theology  of  violence,  (167)  which  praises  dictatorship. 
'Aflaqls  theology  is  still  followed  by  his  former  pupils 
in  Syria,  who  expelled  him  in  1966,  while  his  disciples 
in  Iraq  still  consider  him  to  be  their  spiritual  mentor. 
'Aflaq  addressed  a  critical  memorandum  to  Husni  al-za'im, 
on  24  May  1949;  (168)  This  led  to  his  arrest  by  al-Za'im 
and  the  closure  of  the  Baýth  Party  paper.  (169)  Under 
threat  of  ill-treatment,  according  to  Devlin's 
account,  (170)  ýAflaq  lost  his  nerve  and  it  was  reported 
that  he  signed  an  obsequious  letter  to  al-Za'im,  asking 
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politics: 
"I  as  for  me,  I  have  decided  to  retire 
definitely  from  politics  and  believe  that  my 
mission  has  come  to  an  end  and  that  my  method 
is  not  appropriate  to  the  era.  "(171) 
The  prevailing  opinion  is  that  ýAflaq  was  not 
physically  tortured  when  he  took  this  humiliating 
position.  This  event  still  dominates  the  Party's  history. 
(172)  It  created  a  huge  tremor  in  the  Party  and  in  many 
political  quarters.  (173)  ýAflaqls  followers  were  shocked 
by  his  defeatism  at  his  first  experience  of  prison  and 
severely  attacked  him.  His  influence  sharply  declined,  to 
such  an  extent,  that  they  wanted  to  put  him  on  trial. 
However,  the  Party  did  not  discuss  the  event  publicly  and 
issued  no  statement,  but  merely  discussed  it  in  an 
internal  meeting  in  1949.  As  the  years  passed,  both  his 
followers  and  the  public  forgot  this  affair  and  'Aflaq 
remained  the  philosopher  and  historical  trustee  of  the 
Party.  His  followers  in  Iraq,  particularly  Saddam,  were 
shaped  by  ýAflaqls  doctrine  and  regarded  him  as  spiritual 
leader.  It  seems  that  Saddam  has  inherited  this  particular 
character  trait  from  'Aflaq.  Sam1ir  al-Khalil  says  that 
Saddam  had  all  the  qualities  that  ýAflaq  needed,  such  as 
loyalty  and  physical  stamina.  (174)  1  do  not  agree  with 
al-Khalil,  because  Saddam's  defeatist  record  throughout  his 
political  career,  before  and  after  his  arrival  in  power, 
69 has  been  worse  than  Aflaq's.  Saddam  is  willing  to 
sacrifice  his  entire  people  and  country  for  his  political 
career. 
(2)  Adherence  to  principles:  'Aflaq  was  a  bad  example 
to  his  followers  as  a  defender  of  his  political  ideology. 
He  capitulated  on  his  first  confrontation  with  the 
authority  of  4usn!  al-Za'Im,  the  leader  of  the  f  irst 
military  coup  in  Syria,  when  ýAflaq  wrote  a  memorandum 
criticising  him. 
(3)  The  disbandment  of  the  Ba'th  Party:  The 
Baýthists  in  Syria  played  a  major  role  in  the  formation  of 
the  (UAR)  in  1958,  uniting  Egypt  and  Syria,  following 
Nasir's  decision  to  cancel  political  parties  in 
Egypt,  (175)  although  there  has  never  been  a  Ba'th  Party 
in  Egypt.  The  Baýth  Party  in  Syria  disbanded  itself  at  its 
third  conference,  in  the  belief,  held  by  its  leaders,  that 
they  would  play  an  important  role  in  the  UAR  as 
personalities  and  would  not  need  the  Party  for  their 
personal  positions  in  the  UAR.  However,  once  they  felt 
that  the  UAR  was  going  to  be  dominated  by  the  Egyptians 
and  that  Nasir  would  not  give  them  much  power,  they 
realised  that  they  had  made  a  mistake  and  went  back  on 
their  decision  to  disband  the  Party.  (176) 
70 (4)  The  Bath  set-back  in  Iraq  (18  November  1963): 
It  was  known  as  the  Tishrfn  (November)  set-back.  The  coup 
was  led  by  'Abd  al-Sal5m.  'Arif'  against  the  Ba'thists  in 
Iraq  and  resulted  in  expelling  them  from  power  after  nine 
months,  rule,  which  had  caused  the  Iraqi  people  great 
suffering,  as  will  be  discussed  in  greater  detail  in  later 
chapters.  One  measure  of  the  true  nature  of  the  deception 
and  intrigue  among  the  Baýthists  was  that  leading  members, 
who  were  mainly  from  Tikrit,  took  part  in  the  'Arif  coup  in 
the  hope  of  receiving  political  positions  in  the  new  'Arif 
regime.  Later  on,  'Arif  dropped  most  of  them,  including 
A4mad  Uasan  al-Bakr  al-Tikr-iti,  who  became  Vice  President, 
Tdhir  Ya4yd  al-Tikr-itT,  who  became  Prime  Minister,  Hdrdan 
al-Tikr!  tT,  who  became  Minister  of  Defence,  and  Rashid 
Muqli4  al-Tikriti,  who  became  Minister  of  the  Interior. 
Another  Ba'thist,.,,  Dr  ýIzzat  Mus,  t,  aUi,  3ýemained  Minister  of 
Health,  while  ý51eh  Mahd7l  ýAmm5sh  was  appointed  ambassador 
to  Egypt.  (177)  ýAflaq  issued  a  call  to  the  Party  to  stop 
resisting  the  change  because  it  was  necessary,  in  view  of 
the  mistakes  committed  by  the  Nationalist  Guards.  (178) 
'Ali  ýdle4  al-Sa'd7i  later  denounced  'Aflaq  as  the  person 
who  was  responsible  for  appointing  the  military  bureau  of 
the  Party,  who  were  right-wing  Tikr1itT  officers,  who  were 
the  ones  to  conspire  with  'Arif  against  the  Party.  (179) 
This  created  many  problems  within  the  Party  leadership  in 
Syria.  On  21  November  1963,  the  Syrian  President,  Amýn  al- 
Udfiý  said  that  those  who  took  up  posts  in  the  new  'Arif 
government  were  not  Baýthists  any  longer,  because  Ba'th 
rule  ended  on  18  November.  (180) 
71 According  to  an  eyewitness  account,  Saddam  attacked 
Party  offices  on  18  November  with  security  men  and  other 
supporters.  The  underground  Ba'th  leadership  issued  an 
order  for  Saddam's  arrest,  but  he  was  whisked  away  and 
protected  by  his  relatives,  the  Tikr'i-t-i  clan.  (181) 
(5)  The  phenomenon  of  withdrawal  from  parties  and 
division  within  parties:  Devlin  comments: 
the  splits,  defections  and  expulsions  the 
Party  organisation  suffered  in  its  four 
principal  regions,  Iraq,  Syria,  Lebanon  and 
Jordan,  resulted  in  the  departure  from  the 
Party  of  a  substantial  number  of  members  who 
had  been  associated  with  it  for  a  long  time. 
In  many  cases  those  who  lef  t  or  were  expelled 
had  been  among  the  first  to  adopt  the  doctrine 
in  their  country.  (182) 
The  Baýth  Party,  in  its  literature,  acknowledged  this 
phenomenon  and  described  the  divisions  in  and  the 
withdrawals  f  rom  the  Party  as  attempted  sabotage  of  the 
Party,  particularly  after  the  withdrawal  of  one  of  those 
implicated,  al-Rkrdwli.  The  others  leading  members  were  al- 
RIMM  and  al-Sa'di.  In  a  report  the  Party  acknowledged  the 
crucial  positions  that  the  splinter  Ba'thists  held.  (183) 
72 (a)  Jaldl  al-Sayyid,  a  Syrian  and  one  of  the  three 
founders  of  the  Ba'th  Party,  who  withdrew  in 
1955,  in  his  al-  Ba'th,  revealed  his 
disagreement  with  the  other  two  founders  and 
with  the  Party  on  political  and  social  issues: 
Al-Sayyid  says: 
when  I  could  not  correct  the  mistakes 
of  the  Party,  in  accordance  with  my 
beliefs,  I  found  no  course  of  action  but 
to  withdraw  f  rom  it" 
Al-Sayyid  goes  on  to  make  serious  accusations 
against  the  Party: 
'I',  the  Ba'th  Party  has  been  taken  over 
by  foreigners  and  does  not  belong  to  the 
Arab  nation  any  longer.  I  felt  as  if  the 
Party  was  following  a  course  drawn  for 
it.  "(184) 
(b)  ýaldlý  al-Din  al-Bayýdr,  another  Syrian  co-founder 
of  the  Party,  declared  in  his  letter  of 
resignation: 
"I  more  than  a  few  knew  that  I  moved 
away  from  the  Party  in  all  its  aspects 
(its  leadership,  institutions  and 
73 ideology)  a  long  time  ago,  particularly 
after  8  July  1963.11  (185) 
Some  Baýthist  quarters  put  the 
responsibility  for  removing  al-Bayýdr  from  the 
Party  leadership  on  the  committee  for 
reorganising  the  Party  because  al-Bayýdr  had 
signed  the  declaration  of  the  separation  of 
Syria  from  Egypt  and  had  attempted  to  take  up  an 
appointment  in  the  government  of  Bashdr  al-ýAým 
which  took  power  after  the  separation.  Al-Bayýdr 
attempted  to  stand  up  to  the  military  committee 
who  carried  out  the  8  March  1963  coup,  despite 
the  fact  that  they  had  made  him  Prime  Minister 
after  the  coup.  In  the  following  election  he 
was  removed  from  the  Party  leadership  and, 
later,  was  dismissed  from  the  Party.  (186)  He  was 
assassinated  in  Paris  on  21  July  1980,  following 
his  publication  of  several  articles,  in  his 
opposition  Journal  al-1h 
, 
yd  al-Arabi  (the  Arab 
Reviva),  the  original  name  of  the  Ba'th  Party 
before  it  was  officially  founded  in  1947.  (187) 
Many  accounts  agree  that  the  regionalists  and 
Marxist  factions  in  the  Ba'th  Party  helped  the 
military  organisation  to  exclude  al-Bayýdr  from 
the  Party.  (188) 
(c)  Akrm  al-Hourdifl,  another  Syrian  who  was  among  the 
first  in  the  national  leadership  in  1954  and  who 
74 elevated  to  the  same  rank  as  ýAflaq  and  al- 
Bayýdr,  following  the  merger  of  the  two  Parties. 
Later,  he  differed  with  the  Party  about  union 
with  Egypt  and  socialism  and  left  the  Party  in 
1962.  (189) 
(d)  SW  al-Jundi,  who  was  from  al-ýArsouzils  group, 
was  one  of  the  founding  members  of  the  Ba'th.  He 
later  lef  t  the  Party  and  declared  that  their 
hands  were  stained  with  blood  and  their  faces 
covered  with  shame.  (190) 
(e)  Fu  '  5d  al-Rikdb-i,  an  Iraqi,  was  a  member  of  the 
first  Baýthist  cell  in  Iraq  in  1949.  In  1954  he 
became  a  member  and  General  Secretary  of  the 
National  Leadership  in  Iraq.  He  held  a  press 
conference  in  Beirut  three  months  before  the 
separation  of  Syria  from  Egypt  in  which  he 
accused  ýAflaq  and  his  leadership  of  serious 
misdemeanours,  to  which  ýAflaq  replied  to.  (191) 
Al-Rikdb-i  later  joined  al-RimWil's  group,  who  had 
also  left  the  Party.  Al-Rikdb-i  was  later  to  be 
murdered  in  prison  in  Iraq  in  1969  on  Saddam's 
orders  after  "Aflaq  had  dismissed  him  in  1962 
for  disobedience. 
'Ali  Sdleh  al-Sa'di,  an  Iraqi  and  an  early  member 
of  the  Ba'th  and  among  the  first  members  of  its 
regional  leadership  during  the  Regional 
75 Congresses  in  1960,1961  and  1963.  He  became 
General  Secretary  of  the  regional  leadership. 
Al-Sa'dI  was  among  the  leading  Bathists  who 
came  to  power  in  1963.  After  their  dismissal  by 
'Arif  in  November  of  the  same  year,  al-Sa'd7i  and 
his  supporting  wing,  which  included  al-Fakayk-i 
and  al-Shaykh  R541,  were  dismissed  by  the 
National  Leadership  in  February  1964.  They  were 
accused  of  fomenting  lies  and  rumours  and 
indulging  in  non-ethical  behaviour  against  the 
Party.  (192)  Al-Sa'd7i  attacked  ýAflaq  severely 
and  accused  him  of  being  a  right-wing 
reactionary.  (193) 
(g)  'Abdallah  al-Rimdwi,  a  Palestinian  was  a  member 
of  the  National  Leadership  when  it  was  f  irst 
formed  in  1954.  He  became  a  representative  for 
Jordan  with  'Abdallah  Nalwds.  He  left  the  Party 
in  May  1960  and  formed  what  he  called  the 
National  Revolutionary  Leadership,  which  was 
supported  by  the  UAR  and  named  Iýizb  al-Ba'th  al- 
ArabT  al-ThawrT  al-Ishtirdkf  (the  Arab  Baýth 
Revolutionary  Socialist  Party).  (194)  Al-Rikdbil 
took  his  Iraqi  supporters  with  him  and  joined 
al-Rirrdwif.  However  the  al-Rirrdwi-  wing  did  not  last 
long  but  withered  away;  each  of  its  members  went 
his  separate  ways,  but  they  all  remained  enemies 
of  the  Ba'th. 
76 There  is  a  long  list  of  those  who  left  the 
Party  quietly,  without  fanfare,  such  as  Dr 
'Abdallah  'Abd  al-Ddlim,  who  was  a  founder  member 
and  was  among  its  early  ideologues.  (195)  Dr  'Abd 
al-Rahm5n  al-Mun-if,  who  became  a  member  of  the 
National  Leadership,  later  withdrew  and  became 
editor  of  the  journal  Oil  and  Development,  which 
used  to  be  published  in  Baghdad.  There  were  also 
Dr  ýAbd  al-Wahhdb  al-KaydlT,  Mun-if  al-Razz5z, 
Mas'ud  al-Sh5wi-  and  'Izzat  Mustaft.  (196) 
(6)  The  set-back  of  the  Party  in  Syria  in  February 
1966:  This  was  the  most  serious  set-back  suffered  by  the 
Party  after  losing  power  in  Iraq.  The  Party  military 
committee  in  Syria,  led  by  Saleh  Jadid,  took  over.  The 
struggle  between  the  civilians  and  military  in  the  Party 
dated  back  to  1963  when  al-Bayýdr  had  lost  that  struggle 
to  the  military  Ba'thists,  who  were  either  Alawites  or 
Druzes.  'Aflaq  and  his  close  allies,  such  as  the  Syrian 
President  Amin  al-Hdfiz,  allied  themselves  with  the 
military  against  al-Bayýdr.  (197)  However,  later  the 
Alawites,  led  by  Paldý  JadId  and  1ýdfiz  al-Asad,  ordered  the 
Druze  Colonel  Salim  1ýdtum  on  23  February  1966  to  attack 
government  offices,  including  the  presidential  palace.  The 
then  Syrian  President,  Amin  al-Vdfiz,  was  wounded  but  left 
Syria  with  ýAflaq  and  al-Bayýdr  and  went  to  Lebanon  and 
then  Iraq.  (198) 
77 The  reasons  for  these  divisions  and  problems  within 
the  Party  are  as  follows: 
(a)  The  Party  failed  to  develop  intellectually.  It 
substituted  slogans  for  real  understanding  and 
programmes  with  realistic  objectives.  (199)  The 
Party  was,  and  still  is,  characterised  by  an 
extreme  state  of  shallowness  and  ignorance  of 
all  forms  of  the  philosophical  and  intellectual 
side  of  politics.  Instead  of  developing  a  real 
and  comprehensive  commitment  to  modernisation, 
the  Party,  in  fact,  has  reverted  to  old  concepts 
of  loyalties,  sectarian,  tribal  and  family. 
(200) 
(b)  The  Party  opted  for  the  easier  method  of  change, 
namely  change  from  above,  which  meant  seizure  of 
power  through  military  coups.  (201)  A  leading 
Baýthist  admitted  that  there  was  a  gap  between 
the  historical  task  of  the  Party  and  its 
organisation  and  membership  as  a  tool  to  achieve 
that  historical  task.  (202)  The  Ba'th  Party 
substituted  for  historically  declared  objectives 
in  achieving  a  new  and  modern  Arab  society  a 
desperate  desire  to  seize  and  retain  power. 
78 The  Seizure  of  Power 
Before  discussing  this  topic  it  is  important  to 
analyse  the  political  environment  on  the  eve  of  the 
Baýthls  coming  to  power. 
The  1950s  and  early  1960s  witnessed  an 
intensification  of  the  regional  and  international  struggle 
in  the  Middle  East.  The  main  reason  for  this  was  the  1958 
coup  in  Iraq,  which  ushered  in  a  Communist  deluge,  never 
seen  before  in  an  Arab  or  Muslim  country.  The  USA 
considered  what  was  happening  in  Iraq  to  be  a  preview  of 
what  was  going  to  happen  in  the  rest  of  the  area,  which 
would  transform  it  into  a  Soviet  stronghold.  Qdsim's 
regime  was  against  western  interests  in  Iraq.  (203)  This 
was  manifested  primarily  by  QAsim's  withdrawal  from  the 
Sterling  Monetary  Area  and  by  his  issuing  Law  No  80,  which 
took  over  control  from  the  foreign  oil  companies.  He  also 
supported  Arab  liberation  movements,  particularly  the 
Algerian  revolution  against  France.  (204) 
There  was  another  Arab  regime  governed  by  a 
charismatic  leader  at  this  time  -  Egypt,  led  by  Nasir. 
Nasir  followed  his  humiliation  of  the  British  and  French 
in  the  Suez  fiasco,  which  clearly  exposed  the  latter  as 
allies  of  Israel  and  mortal  enemies  of  the  Arab  people,  by 
trying  to  unseat  the  Maronite  Christian  regime  in  Lebanon 
during  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1958.  This  compelled  the 
79 USA  to  send  its  troops  to  Lebanon  to  protect  the  Christian 
Maronite  minority  regime.  After  the  collapse  of  the  union 
between  Egypt  and  Syria,  Nasir  sent  his  troops  to  Yemen  to 
support  the  Republican  regime  there  against  the  onslaught 
on  it  by  the  Saudi  regime.  Nasir  thus  appeared  to  the  west 
as  a  man  bent  on  destroying  their  interests  and  influence 
in  the  area.  The  USA  therefore  made  a  strategic  decision 
to  end  Qdsim's  regime,  which  was  more  of  a  threat  because 
of  his  close  relationship  with  the  Communists  in  Iraq,  and 
then  to  turn  on  Nasir,  to  defeat  him  in  a  military 
campaign  executed  by  Israel  and  then  to  isolate  him  in 
Cairo.  (205) 
During  these  critical  circumstances,  conditions  were 
not  quite  right  for  the  Ba'th  Party  because  of  the 
following: 
The  Party  had  already  disbanded  itself  in  obedience  to 
Nasir's  direction  to  cancel  political  parties. 
(2)  The  Party  failed  to  obtain  power  and  privilege  through 
the  merger  of  Egypt  and  Syria,  which  led  it  to  plot 
against  the  merger  later  on. 
(3)  The  Party  failed  to  assassinate  Qdsim,  which  led  to  a 
severe  set-back  for  its  organisation  in  Iraq  after  the 
coup  suspects  were  rounded  up. 
80 (4)  There  were  widespread  withdrawals  and  divisions 
within  the  Party,  (206)  due  in  part  to  its  series  of 
failures. 
Since  the  Ba'th  Party  had  proved  its  inability  to 
achieve  its  objectives  through  a  genuine  mass  popular 
movement,  because  of  the  mistrust  that  the  mass  majority 
of  the  people  in  Syria  and  Iraq  had  for  ýAflaq,  it  set  out 
to  seize  power  through  military  coups.  Aflaq  began 
gathering  around  him  adventurous  young  army  officers,  in 
Syria  and  Iraq  to  help  him  achieve  his  objective.  In  the 
National  Party  Congress,  which  was  held  in  Homs,  in  1962, 
ýAflaq  put  the  finishing  touches  to  his  plan  to  destroy 
Qdsim's  regime  and  then  to  confront  Nasir  and  isolate  him 
in  the  Arab  world  after  he  had  taken  control  of  Iraq  and 
Syria.  (207) 
Despite  ýAflaqls  plans,  the  Baýth  Party  in  Iraq 
suffered  from  the  following: 
It  was  small,  with  not  more  than  eight  hundred 
members.  (208)  This  was  based  on  Ba'thist  figures,  so 
that  it  may  have  been  even  smaller  than  that. 
(2)  Some  of  its  leaders  were  in  prison,  owing  to  their 
involvement  in  the  assassination  attempt  against 
Qdsim,  while  others  were  in  hiding,  in  exile,  or  had 
left  the  Party. 
81 (3)  ýAflaq  reorganised  the  Baýth  Party  section  in  Iraq  and 
readied  it  for  seizing  power.  However,  there  was  a 
deep  division  between  its  former  General  Secretary, 
Tdlib  Shablib,  and  its  later  General  Secretary,  'Ali 
ýdle4  al-Sa'd-i.  This  conflict  was  to  explode  nine 
months  after  the  Party  seized  power;  this  led  to  the 
expulsion  of  the  Party  from  power  in  Iraq.  We  will 
discuss  this  later  when  we  come  to  evaluate  the 
Party's  experience  in  power  in  Iraq.  (209) 
(4)  Most  members  of  the  military  wing  of  the  Ba'th  Party 
in  Iraq  who  were  entrusted  with  the  execution  of  the 
coup  and  who  later  became  leading  figures  in  the  Party 
and  State,  were  recent  Baýthists  and  did  not  graduate 
from  the  Ba'th  Party's  cadre  school,  such  as  al-Bakr, 
Uarddn  al-Tikr-it!  and  'Am5sh.  They  did  not  have  any 
military  credentials  or  even  respect  among  their 
peers;  (210)  there  were  other  Bathist  and  non-Baýthist 
officers  who  had  much  better  credentials  and  were 
highly  respected  among  their  peers,  who  had  also  taken 
part  in  the  February  1963  coup,  but  who  did  not  have 
comparable  posts.  The  reason  for  the  ascendancy  of  the 
these  Tikt-it-l  Ba'thists  in  the  Party  was  that  they  were 
very  cliquish  by  nature,  and  very  sectarian,  and  bent 
on  the  domination  of  Iraq.  Al-Bakr,  for  example,  took 
part  in  a  haphazardly  arranged  counter  coup  one  month 
after  14  July  1958.  (211) 
82 (5)  More  important  than  all  of  the  above  is  the  fact  that 
Qasim  had  massive  support  among  the  Iraqi  people,  and 
that  the  Communist  party  was  the  most  dominant  force 
in  Iraqi  politics  at  that  time. 
Hence  the  Baýth  Party,  taking  into  account  its 
internal  conditions  and  circumstances,  could  not  have 
achieved  its  tasks,  in  particular  that  of  overthrowing  the 
popular  regime  of  Qdsim,  without  regional  and  international 
support  as  follows: 
(a)  Jamal  'Abd  al-Nasir:  Nasir  considered  Qasim  to 
be  a  competitor  and  wanted  him  out  of  the  arena, 
despite  the  fact  that  Qdsim  was  supported  by  the  Iraqi 
people  and  was  friendly  with  the  Soviet  Union,  which 
was  Nasir's  main  backer.  Nasir  admitted,  during  the 
unity  talks  which  he  held  with  the  Ba'thists  after 
seizing  power  in  Iraq  and  Syria,  that  he  had  paid 
money  to  the  Ba"th  Party  to  help  it  stage  the 
coup.  (212)  There  had  been  before  that  a  clear  Egyptian 
involvement  in  the  Shawdf  1959  uprising  in  Mosul.  (213) 
Nasir  was  also  involved  in  the  attempted  assassination 
of  Qdsim  by  the  Ba'thists.  'Ali  qdlelý  al-Sa'd7i  admitted 
that  Fuldd  al-RiMbi  received  the  sum  of  seven  thousand 
Egyptian  pounds  through  Khdlid  'Ali  ýM4  and  Aydd 
Sa'1d  Th5bit,  who  were  then  members  of  the  Bath 
regional  leadership,  to  liquidate  Qds  iM 
physically.  (214)  In  addition  to  this  the  Egyptian 
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against  Qdsim's  regime  throughout  the  area.  (215) 
(b)  The  Arab  National  List:  This  consisted  of 
various  groups,  including  the  Independence  Party  led 
by  Siddlq  Shanshal,  the  Movement  of  Arab 
Nationalists,  (216)  which  was  led  by  another  non-Iraqi, 
namely  Dr  George  Habash,  and  the  Arab  League  of  Hish5m 
al-Shdwvri  and  ýAdndn  al-Rdwif.  Following  the  split  up  of 
the  Independence  Party  in  1960,  a  new  party  was  formed 
by  ýAbd  al-Razzdq  Shablib,  Fayqal  al-Wdlily  and  Alýmad 
al-HabFlbT,  (217)  which  was  called  the  Arab  National 
Party.  There  was  also  what  was  then  called  the  Iraqi 
Gathering  in  Cairo.  This  group  represented  disparate 
individuals  and  interests  who  fled  to  Egypt  through 
Syria  following  the  failure  of  the  al-Shaww5f  uprising 
and  the  failed  assassination  attempt  on  Qdsim.  However 
disparate  they  may  have  been,  they  had  one  thing  in 
common,  to  remove  Q5sim  from  power.  These  groups  were 
all  on  the  payroll  of  Egypt.  (218)  Then,  in  1961,  the 
Ba'th,  the  Independence  Party  and  the  Movement  of  Arab 
Nationalists  formed  what  was  called  the  National 
Front,  which  was  dominated  by  the  Ba'thists.  The  Baýth 
Party  was  able  to  exploit  the  efforts  of  all  these 
pan-Arabist  groups  for  their  own  ends  and  thus  push 
their  efforts  into  destabilising  Qdsim's  regime. 
However,  all  these  groups  had  to  pay  a  terrible  price 
for  their  trust  in  the  Ba'th  Party.  (219) 
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fully  responsible  for  advertising  Ba'thism  as  a  major 
force  against  Qdsim.  In  fact,  the  Iraqi  Communists 
were  the  ones  who  drew  people's  attention  to  the  Baýth 
Party.  In  addition  to  this,  the  Communists  parted 
company  with  Qdsim  and  began  to  support  the  Kurdish 
uprising,  despite  their  admission  that  al-BarzdnT  was 
on  the  payroll  of  the  Shah  of  Iran.  The  secret 
communist  radio  stations  began  to  broadcast  in  support 
of  the  Kurds  and  against  Q5sim  and  his  army,  taking 
pride  in  reporting  Kurdish  victories  against  the  Iraqi 
army,  (220)  despite  the  clear  admission  by  the 
communists  that  the  Kurds  were  in  league  with  the 
British  and  Americans.  (221)  The  real  explanation  is 
that  the  Iraqi  Communist  Party  was,  and  still  is, 
heavily  dominated  by  non-Arabs  and  non-Muslims,  so 
that  these  have  always  found,  as  individuals,  more  in 
common  with  non-Arabs  and  non-Muslims  from  Iraq,  who 
were  sympathetic  to  the  Kurds. 
(d)  The  Kurds:  The  Kurdish  mutiny  against  Qdsim  was 
a  major  factor  in  facilitating  the  Ba'th  seizure  of 
power  despite  the  fact  that  Qdsim  was  highly 
sympathetic  to  the  Kurdish  population  of  Iraq,  and  all 
other  non-Arab  and  non-Muslim  minorities  in  Iraq.  This 
is  because  he  found  himself  from  the  very  first  few 
days  after  the  14  July  1958  revolution  in  a  power 
struggle  against  the  Arabist  army  officers  and 
politicians.  So,  Qdsim  looked  towards  the  Kurds  and all  other  non-Arabs  and  non-Muslims  in  Iraq  as  allies. 
However  the  Kurds  had  a  different  allay  to  that  of 
Qdsim.  Menachem  Begin  admitted-that  the  first  group  of 
Kurds  had  come  to  an  Israeli  base  near  Ramlah  in  the 
mid-1950s  for  training  in  sabotage.  Rafael  Eitan, 
later  Israel's  Chief  of  Staff,  had  himself  paid  a 
clandestine  visit  to  Iraqi  Kurdistan.  By  the  mid- 
1960s,  Israel  had  become  one  of  the  Kurds,  main 
supporters.  As  for  the  Kurds,  link  with  America  and 
its  ally,  Iran,  it  was  reported  that  both  were  arming 
and  financing  the  Kurds  as  a  means  to  weakening  Iraq 
and  sapping  its  strength.  (222)  It  may  have  been  that 
one  of  the  motives  behind  Saddam's  offensive  against 
the  Kurds  and  their  allies,  the  Communists,  was  his 
determination  to  end  his  opponents,  dependence  on 
external  forces  outside  his  control. 
The  Kurds  thought  that  Qdsim  was  not  being 
forthcoming  in  agreeing  to  their  demands  and  believed 
that  if  they  co-operated  with  his  opponents  and  helped 
to  overthrow  him,  then  the  new  government  would  be 
weakened  and  agree  to  their  demands.  There  are  plenty 
of  indications  that  there  was  some  tacit,  if  not  open, 
collusion  between  al-BarzdnT  and  some  leading 
Baýthists.  Even  after  the  Ba'th  began  its  war  against 
the  Kurds  (223)  some  leading  Ba'thists,  such  as  al- 
Sa'd7i  himself  and  al-FakaikT,  publicly  called  for  the 
recognition  of  the  Kurdish  right  to  self- 
determination,  i.  e.  independence  from  Iraq.  The  al- 
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when  the  TikrTit!  and  Duly'lfm7i  officers  took  control  of 
the  Party  during  the  war  against  the  Kurds. 
However,  the  constant  element  in  the  policy  of 
the  Kurdish  movement  in  Iraq  was,  and  is,  to  oppose 
each  and  every  government  in  Baghdad  and  to  ally 
itself  with  whoever  is  in  opposition  to  the 
government.  Thus,  those  forces  and  elements 
represented  great  danger  to  Iraqi  national 
independence,  owing  to  their  subservience  either  to 
foreign  power  or  to  a  foreign  philosophy.  Indeed,  most 
leaders  of  the  Communist  movement  in  Iraq  are  Kurdish. 
(e)  Religious  leaders:  The  Baýth  Party  was  able 
to  exploit  the  opposition  of  the  Islamic  religious 
leaders  to  Qdsim's  regime,  particularly  after  the 
latter  issued  a  decree  covering  personal  issues  that 
were  in  clear  and  direct  violation  of  Quranic  laws.  In 
addition,  Q5sim's  collaboration  with  the  Communists 
brought  down  on  him  the  wrath  of  the  religious  leaders 
since  the  Communists  went  on  the  rampage  against  all 
traditional  beliefs  and  customs  of  the  Iraqi  Muslims, 
to  the  extent  that  Mu4sin  al-Uaki-m,  the  chief  Shi'ite 
religious  leader,  issued  a  fatwa  banning  the  Communist 
party  on  the  grounds"that  it  was  anti-God.  The 
Ba'thists  seized  the  opportunity  and  supported  al- 
HaMm's  stand  against  Communism,  despite  the  fact  that 
some  leading  members  of  the  Ba'thist  front  were  very 
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and  the  rest  of  the  Tikrlitls,  Dulaimis  and  the  Mosul 
clans.  The  Baýth  Party  extended  4akim's  fatwd  to 
Qdsim's  regime,  as  they  began  to  describe  it  as  anti- 
Islam,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  their  leaders  in 
Syria  were  either  Christians  or  Druze  monarchists.  The 
Ba'thists  were  also  able  to  establish  links  and  co- 
ordinate  with  many  monarchists,  (224)  who  had  an  axe 
to  grind  against  Qdsim. 
(f  )  Foreign  Intelligence  Agencies:  It  is  certain 
that  the  British  intelligence  agency  was  involved  in 
anti-Qdsim  activities.  The  then  British  Ambassador  to 
Baghdad,  Humphrey  Trevelyan,  in  his  The  Middle  East  in 
Revolution,  recalled  that  he  visited  what  he  called 
the  Iraqi  mountains  and  met  with  Kurdish  chiefs  who 
were  rebelling  against  Qdsim.  (225)  IsmaU  'Arif,  a 
close  ally  of  Qdsim,  said  in  his  memoirs  that  the 
British  Embassy  paid  half  a  million  Iraqi  dinars  for 
anti-Q,  isim.  activities  by  the  Kurds.  (226)  Qdsim 
himself  accused  the  British  and  American  intelligence 
agencies,  in  a  press  conference,  of  being  behind  the 
Kurdish  mutiny  in  the  north.  (227)  The  British 
government  was  keen  to  be  rid  of  Qdsim's  regime. 
British  intelligence  had  dealings  with  the  Baýth 
Party,  even-before  they  seized  power.  After  seizing 
power,  the  British  government  began  supplying  them 
with  weapons.  Official  British  government  documents 
recently  released  revealed  that  Sir  Alec  Douglas- 
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with  weapons,  on  the  advice  of  the  minister  of  Trade, 
Edward  Heath,  who  held  that  supplying  the  Ba'th  regime 
in  Iraq  with  weapons  was  a  good  policy  for  halting 
Iraq's  dependence  on  the  Soviet  Union.  However,  Home 
himself  was  hesitant,  because  he  thought  that  the 
Ba'thists  in  Baghdad  might  attack  Kuwait.  Thus, 
British  weapons  would  be  used  against  British  oil 
wells  in  Kuwait,  or  they  might  be  used  against  the 
Kurds,  who  were  Britain's  allies  in  Iraq.  On  the 
strength  of  these  reservations  by  the  British  Prime 
Minister,  weapon  sales  were  reduced.  (228) 
Iraq's  neighbours:  Neighbouring  countries, 
particularly  Iran  and  Turkey,  gave  direct  support  to 
the  Kurdish  mutiny  against  Qdsim,  since  both  were 
British  and  American  allies  and  as  happy  as  their 
masters  were  to  see  Qdsim  go.  (229) 
Despite  all  these  favourable  internal  and  external 
circumstances,  the  Ba'thists  still  needed  direct  US 
support: 
(1)  Hana  Batdtii  remarks: 
a  member  of  the  1963  Iraqi  Ba'th  Command, 
who  requested  anonymity,  asserted  in  a 
conversation  with  this  writer  that  the  Yugoslav 
Embassy  in  Beirut  had  warned  certain  Ba'th 
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maintaining  surreptitious  contacts  with 
representatives  of  American  power.  -(230) 
(2)  In  an  interview  seven  months  af  ter  the  coup,  King 
Vusayn  told  Haikal: 
tell  me  that  American  Intelligence 
was  behind  the  events  of  1957  in  Jordan. 
Permit  me  to  tell  -  you  that  I  know  f  or  a 
certainty  that  what  happened  in  Iraq  on  8 
February  had  the  support  of  American 
Intelligence.  ....  numerous  meetings  were  held 
between  the  Ba'th  Party  and  American 
intelligence,  the  more  important  in  Kuwait.  Do 
you  know  that  ....  on  8  February  a  secret  radio 
beamed  to  Iraq  was  supplying  the  men  who 
pulled  the  coup  with  the  names  and  addresses 
of  the  communists  there  so  that  they  could  be 
arrested  and  executed.  "  (231) 
(3)  In  their  Iraq:  International  Relation  and  National 
DeveloDment,  Professors  Penrose  and  Penrose  say: 
vt  Hdshim  Jaw5d,  the  Iraqi  Foreign  minister, 
told  us  later  that  the  Iraqi  Foreign  Ministry 
had  information  of  complicity  between  the 
Ba'th  and  the  CIA.  in  many  cases,  the  CIA 
supplied  the  Ba'th  with  the  names  of 
1  90 individual  Communists,  some  of  whom  were  then 
taken  from  their  homes  and  murdered.  -(232) 
The  American  Ambassador  to  Baghdad,  Waldemar 
Gallman,  said: 
-....  it  was  plain  from  the  beginning  that 
Q5sim's  regime  could  not  be  overthrown  without 
a  superior,  speedy  and  external  force.  "(233) 
(5)  The  British  Foreign  Office  has  released  some  of  its 
documents  which  reveal  secret  links  between  British 
intelligence,  the  CIA  and  the  seizure  of  power  in 
Iraq  by  the  Baýthists.  This  confirms  the  near 
certainty  of  a  joint  venture  between  the  Ba'th  Party 
and  imperialism  in  bringing  down  Qdsim's  regime.  (234) 
In  addition,  one  might  read  into  the  Ba'th  Party's 
denial  of  the  accusations  made  against  it  by  several 
sources  that  it  was  working  in  league  with  British  and 
American  intelligence  agencies  an  unwitting 
acknowledgement  of  cooperation  with  these  agencies: 
the  masses  of  our  people,  in  the  Iraqi 
gutr  (a  Ba'th  term  for  the  Arab  States,  which 
I 
denotes  them  as  parts  and  not  a  whole)  were 
able  on  the  morning  of  14  Rama4dn  (8  February 
1963)  to  destroy  the  isolationist  military 
dictatorship,  which  was  erected  by  the  Q5simite 
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reactionary  forces  and  imperialism  the 
opportunity  to  destroy  Q5sim,  S  regime  and  thus 
transform  the  situation  in  Iraq  once  and  for 
all  to  its  advantage  in  Iraq.  "(235) 
Yfinis  Bahr-1,  in  his  The  Revolution  of  14  Ramadan, 
defended  the  coup  and  praised  its  Ba'thist  heroes,  on  the 
grounds  that  they  were  in  a  race  against  British  and 
American  imperialism  to  see  who  would  be  the  first  to 
bring  down  Qdsim's  regime.  (236) 
A  month  after  the  Ba'th  coup  in  Iraq,  a  second  Ba'th 
coup  took  place  in  Syria,  on  8  March  1963,  against  the 
regime  which  separated  Syria  from  Egypt  in  September  1961. 
It  was  accused  by  the  Syrian  Ba'thists  and  Nasirists  of 
being  separatist  and  reactionary,  while,  in  fact,  they 
were  behind  that  regime  and  were  the  ones  who  signed  the 
declaration  of  separation  from  Egypt.  (237)  Furthermore, 
the  leader  of  that  coup,  was  a  non-Muslim  Drfize  general, 
who  was  directly  involved  with  the  west  and  Israel.  (238) 
The  coup  of  8  March  1963  was  not  entirely  Ba'thist 
but,  like  the  one  in  Iraq  a  month  earlier,  a  joint  effort 
by  Baýthists  and  non-Baýthist  pan-Arabists.  (239)  The  real 
financier  of  the  coup  was  Egypt.  (240)  Nasir  acknowledged 
that  he  had  put  a  large  sum  of  money  at  the  disposal  of 
'Aflaq  and  al-Bayýdr  to  finance  their  political  work,  as 
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reuniting  Syria  again  with  Egypt.  (241) 
The  Ba  %  thists,  did  the  same  thing  in  Syria  as  in 
Iraq  by  out-manoeuvring  their  former  allies,  the  Nasirists 
and  other  pan-Arabists.  In  Syria,  the  latter  were 
physically  liquidated,  while  in  Iraq  they  were  saved  in 
the  nick  of  time  by  the  18  November  1963  coup,  which 
ejected  the  Ba%thists.  The  Ba%thists  in  Syria  were  bent  on 
ridding  Syria  of  the  Nasirists.  (242) 
It  is  strange  that  East  and  West  were  in  agreement 
that  the  Baýthists  should  be  allowed  to  smash  Nasirism. 
The  East  saw  Nasir  as  fundamentally  anti-Communist  because 
of  his  hostility  to  single  party  rule,  while  the  Syrian 
Ba'thists,  despite  the  bloody  suppression  of  the 
Communists  in  Iraq  by  the  Iraqi  Bathists,  could  be  made 
to  turn  and  formally  adopt  Marxism  as  the  only  socialist 
doctrine.  The  West,  in  turn,  saw  the  Syrian  Bathists' 
anti-Nasir  stand  as  the  best  guarantee  of  Israeli 
security(243)  from  Syrian  and  Egyptian  co-operation.  The 
West  was  accurate  in  its  diagnosis  -  much  more  accurate, 
in  fact,  than  the  Soviet  Union,  which  kept  encouraging  so 
called  I'marxist  thinkers"  to  lead  the  Ba'thists  slowly  on 
the  road  to  Marxism,  Leninism  and  Stalinism.  One  of  these 
so  called  Marxist  thinkers  was  Ydsln  al-Hdfiz,  who 
formulated  what  were  called  muntalaqdt  na-7ariyyah 
(theoretical  stepping  stones),  which  formed  the  basis  for 
the  sixth  regional  congress  of  the  Syrian  Ba'th  Party.  The 
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who  were  more  prevalent  in  Iraq  than  in  Syria,  went  ahead 
and  heeded  Moscow's  orders  to  form  a  front  with  the  second 
Ba'thist  regime  in  1972,  which  was  worse  (merely  because 
of  the  presence  of  Saddam)  than  the  first. 
The  Syrian  Baýthists  were  riven  with  divisions,  as 
were  their  counterparts  in  Iraq,  and  were  dominated  by  the 
Alawite  religious  sect  (an  extreme  form  of  Shi'ahism, 
which  had  been  excommunicated  from  Islam  by  the  Shiah 
themselves  in  the  Middle  Ages),  just  as  the  Party  in  Iraq 
was  dominated  by  the  Tikrilt-1  clan.  The  divisions  within  the 
Syrian  Baýthists  were  between  two  wings  and  took  many 
forms  -  left  against  right  -  military  against  civilian 
-pan-Syrian  against  pan-Arab-  Alawite,  Drfize,  or  Ismall! 
minorities  against  Sunni  Muslims,  Christians  and  so  on. 
The  truth,  however,  was  that  the  'Aflaq/al-Bayýdr/al-Vffiý 
wing  was  going  to  be  liquidated  by  the  Alawite/Drfize  wing 
-  ýa154  Jadild,  Viifiý  al-Asad  and  Salim  HdtOm  -  in  the 
second  Baýthist  coup  of  23  February  1966,  which  ended, 
once  and  for  all,  ýAflaqls  destructive  rule  in  Syria  and 
resulted  in  the  expulsion  of  him  and  his  disciples  from 
Syria.  Unfortunately,  as  soon  as  Syria  was  finished  with 
him,  it  was  Iraq's  turn. 
Later  on,  as  was  expected,  the  struggle  was  resumed 
between  the  Alawites  on  the  one  side  and  the  Drfize  on  the 
other.  Udfiý  al-Asad,  who  was  the  Minister  of  Defence 
during  the  disastrous  defeat  of  1967,  blamed  everybody  for 
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who  had  twice  plotted  coups  against  the  Alawites  and  then 
proceeded  to  liquidate  his  partner,  Saldh  Jad-id  on  1 
January  1971,  in  what  was  termed  a  "reforming  move".  (244) 
The  'Aflaq  wing  remained  in  the  wilderness  for  more 
than  two  years,  during  which  'Aflaq  travelled  to  Brazil, 
as  guest  of  some  of  his  relatives,  breeding  rumours  that 
he  might  become  a  Brazilian  immigrant.  However,  he  quickly 
returned  to  the  Middle  East  when  his  supporters  in  Iraq 
seized  power  in  July  1968.  The  division  between  the  two 
wings,  the  Syrian  and  the  Iraqi,  was  initially 
characterised  as  left  (Syrian)  and  right  (Iraqi),  which 
suggests  an  ideological  division.  (245)  This  was  far  from 
the  truth,  since  the  two  wings  were  dominated  from  the 
beginning  by  two  minority  clans  -  the  Alawites  in  Syria 
and  the  Tikr1t1s  in  Iraq  -  and  by  two  totalitarian 
dictators  -  al-Asad  in  Syria  and  Saddam  in  Iraq. 
The  artificial  dislike  of  the  West  and  the  pro-Soviet 
stance  of  the  Iraqi  Baýthists  (particularly  adopted  by 
Saddam),  were  much  greater  than  those  of  the  Syrian 
Ba'thists,  particularly  al-Asad,  who  openly  wanted  to 
appear  moderate  and  conciliatory  towards  the  west.  He 
received  US  President  Nixon  in  Syria  in  1974,  while  the 
Ba'th  in  Iraq  did  not  resume  diplomatic  relations 
officially  with  the  US  until  1985;  this  resumption  was 
immediately  clouded  by  Irangate  in  1986  and  the  sinking  of 
95 the  US  frigate  "Stark"  by  Iraqi  jet  fighters  in  the  Gulf 
in  1987. 
In  fact,  if  anything,  neither  Saddam  nor  al-Asad  was 
true  to  his  pan-Arabism  or  his  desire  fpr  revolutionary 
change  and  other  ostensible  objectives.  Both  of  them  were 
intent  on  extending  their  influence  as  far  as  possible  in 
the  name  of  pan-Arabism.  Both  wished  to  give  their  regimes 
a  revolutionary  image,  to  present  themselves  as  opposed  to 
the  west  in  general  and  to  the  USA  in  particular.  When  al- 
Saddt  concluded  his  peace  treaty  with  Israel,  Saddam  had 
ambitions  to  assume  the  vacant  seat  of  leader  of  the  Arab 
world  and  to  put  himself  forward  as  the  guardian  of  the 
Arab  Nation  and  the  foremost  champion  of  Arab  rights  in 
Palestine.  (246) 
96 False  Slocans 
The  two  Baýthist  coups  of  February  1963,  both  in  Iraq 
and  Syria,  were  not  merely  reactionary,  they  were  carried 
out  to  bring  a  fascist-style  party  to  power.  They  had 
first  institutionalised  the  role  of  the  tribe  and  then  the 
family,  and,  in  the  end,  they  achieved  the  destruction  of 
Iraq  and  deprived  Syria  of  the  chance  of  peace  and 
democracy  for  three  decades. 
The  Baýthist  demagogic  slogans,  and  all  the  public 
professions  of  Arab  unity,  freedom,  socialism, 
revolutionary  change,  anti-imperialism  and  anti-Zionism, 
the  creating  of  modern  Arab  society,  were  used  only  to 
retain  the  enthusiasm  of  the  People  and  to  disguise  the 
fact  that  the  Ba'th  Party  in  general  had  proved  in 
practice  to  be  an  instrument  used  by  outside  powers  and 
their  allies  in  the  region  to  re-establish  the  domination 
over  the  Middle  East.  In  fact,  the  Ba'th  in  Iraq  had 
declared  from  its  earliest  days  its  respect  for  western 
interests.  (247) 
In  Iraq,  the  Baýthist  coup  of  February  1963  was 
welcomed  by  all  reactionary  forces  (monorchy  supporters) 
and  the  enemies  of  Qdsim's  regime,  since  it  achieved  for 
them  what  would  have  been  difficult  for  them  to  accomplish 
otherwise  (we  will  discuss  this  subject  in  the  next 
chapter). 
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the  Syrian  Baýthist  role,  in  particular  that  of  al-Asad, 
in  the  disastrous  defeat  of  the  Arabs  in  1967.  First,  for 
supporting  Palestinian  guerrillas  who  launched  many  raids 
povoking  the  Israelis  into  launching  retaliatory 
raids.  (248)  Secondly,  he  escalated  tension,  by  launching  a 
propaganda  war  and  retaliating  to  Israeli  provocation, 
which  changed  the  struggle  between  the  two  sides  from 
border  clashes  to  a  large-scale  military  engagement,  in 
April  1967,  in  which  Syria  suffered  a  serious  military 
reverse. 
Thus,  the  Syrian  Baýthists  gave  Israel  a  good  excuse 
for  launching  attacks,  not  against  Syria,  to  punish  the 
Ba'thists  for  their  sponsorship  of  the  guerrilla 
pinpricks,  but  against  Jordan,  which  had  nothing  to  do 
with  the  Palestinian  actions.  Israel's  aims  from  this 
escalation  sharpened  the  Arab  divisions  by  provoking  and 
dragging  Jordan  into  war.  Nasir,  who  was  regarded  as  the 
champion  of  the  Arabs,  was  broken  by  being  dragged  into 
the  crisis.  (249)  More  importantly,  Israel  became  an  equal 
partner  with  the  US  in  the  Middle  East.  (250) 
The  Syrian  army  sat  tight,  did  not  fight  at  all  and 
left  the  Golan  Heights  for  Israel  to  conquer  easily.  This 
was  probably  the  reason  behind  the  Israeli  Ministerial 
Committee  on  Defence's  decision  against  attacking 
Syria.  (251)  It  seems  as  if  the  Syrian  Baýthistsl  strategy 
was  to  arrange  a  war  with  Israel  for  Nasir  and  the  rest  of 
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giving  up  Arab  territray,  including  the  Golan  Heights. 
Later  on,  the  Syrian  Ba'thists  led  by  al-Asad, 
carried  their  disagreement  with  the  Iraqi  Baýthists,  led 
by  Saddam,  to  its  natural  and  ultimate  conclusion,  when 
Syria  was  in  the  vanguard  of  the  US-led  military  build-up 
for  the  war  against  Iraq  in  1991. 
The  Syrian  Baýthists,  particularly  since  their  defeat 
of  1967,  had  became  increasingly  ridiculous;  every  defeat 
Syria  suffered  was  interpreted  as  a  victory  by  their  Nazi- 
like  and  Stalinist  propaganda.  Thus,  after  the  1967  defeat 
and  the  loss  of  the  Golan  Heights,  the  Syrian  Ba'thists 
claimed  a  victory,  because  they  saw  that  the  aim  of  the 
imperialists  and  Zionists  had  been  to  overthrow  the 
"progressive"  regime  in  Syria.  Since  they  had  failed  to  do 
so,  they  could  claim  that  the  Israelis  had  been  defeated. 
The  propaganda  machines  churned  out  such  nonsense  to  the 
Syrian  people,  but  what  gave  it  a  real  force,  although 
only  for  a  while,  was  the  support  it  received  from  the 
Soviet  propaganda  machine,  which  also  spread  a  similar 
evaluation  of-the  1967  Arab  defeat  on  the  grounds  that  the 
imperialists  and  Zionists  wanted  to  get  rid  of  the 
progressive  regimes  in  Egypt  and  Syria,  but  failed.  (252) 
Similar  logic  was  to  be  used  by  Saddam  after  his 
disastrous  defeat  in  1991. 
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Syria  and  Iraq  about  internal  achievements.  This  was 
particularly  so  in  Iraq,  which  is  far  richer  in  natural 
resources,  particularly  oil,  than  Syria.  Any  other 
government  in  Iraq  with  such  resources  would  have  achieved 
the  transformation  of  Iraq  into  a  modern  society.  Yet,  due 
to  the  backward,  fascistic  attitude  and  bloody  repression 
of  the  Ba'th,  (253)  Iraq  is  probably  now  the  poorest  nation 
on  earth.  Before  the  Baýthists  took  power,  they 
concentrated  on  issues  related  to  the  seizure  of  power, 
which  resulted  in  a  bloody  power  struggle  with  their 
political  rivals.  This  led  to  instability  and  restlessness 
in  both  countries.  Then,  when  they  gained  power,  mostly 
through  setting  up  coalitions,  and  after  consolidating 
their  position  and  widening  their  support,  they  started  to 
alter  the  balance  of  power  to  their  advantage  and 
systematically  eliminated  their  allies,  as  well  as  any 
opposition,  even  within  the  Ba'th  Party  itself.  This 
Stalinist  type  of  policy  was  applied  and  encouraged  by  the 
Ba'th  leaders  and  thinkers.  (254)  The  Ba'thists,  lacked  a 
considered  development  programme,  apart  from  the  radical 
economic  policies  they  were  keen  on  introducing,  such  as 
Arab  socialism,  (255)  which  they  interpreted  as  the  control 
by  the  state  of  all  resources  in  the  economy,  and  then  the 
creation  of  a  new  class  of  people  who  were  first  of  all 
family  members  and  then  members  of  the  Party,  from  Tikr-1t 
in  Iraq  and  the  Alawites  in  Syria.  (256)  Such  socialism 
could  be  described  as  the  socialism  of  one  clan  or  sect. 
Iraqi  and  Syrian  society  was  deprived  of  the  chance  to 
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East  European  States,  or  on  western  lines.  Instead  they 
followed  the  most  corrupt,  backward,  cruel  and  despotic 
path  of  Ba'th  ideology  and  policies.  (257) 
on  the  social  level,  the  Bath  have  followed  a 
policy,  over  the  last  three  decades,  which  has  resulted  in 
the  destruction  of  the  social  forms  in  Iraq,  dragging  it 
back  into  a  society  that  is  run  by  a  petty  tyrant.  In 
reality,  Saddam  is  not  a  modern  dictator,  but  a  more 
backward  type,  which  is  sometimes  referred  to  as  a 
"village  tyrant",  such  as  'Idi  Amin  was  in  Uganda.  Saddam 
has  worked  to  make-village  medieval  values  triumph  over 
city  values.  It  is  erroneous  to  think  that  Saddam  is  a 
moderniser;  he  is  not.  He  may  build  palaces  and  weapons  of 
mass  destruction,  but  these  are  hardly  examples  of 
modernity.  His  mental  capacity  is  very  limited,  and  his 
values  are  no  more  modern  than  those  of  a  medieval 
condottiere.  This  is  a  direct  result  of  the  Ba'th  ideology 
and  policies  which  stress  Arabism  and  Arab  values  of  a 
bygone  age. 
The  Party  did  not  achieve  its  main  declared 
objective,  namely  Arab  unity.  It  was  so  transparently 
insincere  on  this  point  that  it  worked  behind  the  scenes 
to  separate  Egypt  from  Syria  and,  when  it  gained  power  in 
Iraq,  it  began  tripartite  discussions  about  unity  in 
Cairo,  which  failed  miserably.  (258)  Nasir  exposed  the 
insincerity  of  its  belief  in  Arab  unity  when  he  published 
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which  clearly  placed  the  two  Ba'th  delegations,  one  led  by 
'Aflaq  with  al-Bayýdr  for  Syria  and  the  other  by  al-Bakr 
and  al-Sa'd7i  for  Iraq,  as  most  hostile  to  the  idea  of  a 
merger  with  Nasir  on  the  lines  of  1958,  or  on  any  other 
lines. 
The  second  objective  of  the  Baýth  Party,  freedom,  has 
been  ridiculed  since  Iraq,  in  particular,  and  Syria  have 
become  slave  societies. 
The  third  Ba'th  concept  of  socialism,  which  is  state 
socialism,  and  which  is  supposed  to  liberate  the 
individual  and  society  from  need  and  exploitation,  as  the 
Ba'thists  claimed,  (260)  has  resulted  in  the  creation  of 
the  Baýthist  elite,  which  has  monopolised  power  and  wealth 
and  enslaved  the  rest  of  the  people. 
The  Ba'th  ideology  and  policy  is  a  unique  Third  World 
blending  of  Italian  Fascism,  German  Nazism  and  Marxist- 
Stalinism.  (261)  The  emergence  of  the  two  tyrants,  Saddam 
in  Iraq  and  al-Asad  in  Syria,  is  a  clear  vindication  of 
such  a  conclusion.  (262) 
The  most  despotic,  backward  asýect  of  Ba'thism  is  the 
formal  institutionalisation  of  minority  elitist  rule.  In 
Syria  the  Alawites,  which  is  not  even  considered  Muslim, 
rule  over  the  mass  majority  of  Sunni  Muslims,  (263)  and  in 
Iraq  an  elite  of  villagers  from  Tiktlit  have  established  a 
102 TikrItI  dynasty  that  is  above  the  law,  as  was  evidenced 
when  Saddam's  family  executed  his  sons-in-law,  Husayn 
Kdmal  Hasan,  his  brother  and  their  entire  family  on  23 
February  1996. 
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THE  BA"'  TH  PARTY  IN  IRAQ The  Foundation  of  the  Baýth  Party  in  Iraq 
In  the  last  chapter  the  Baýth  Arab  Socialist  Party  has 
been  discussed  briefly  in  general.  To  complete  the  picture, 
it  will  be  necessary  to  add  more  details  about  the  Party 
through  out  assessment  of  it  in  Iraq. 
The  Ba'th  came  to  life  in  Iraq  at  a  time  when  Iraq  was 
moving  increasingly  towards  change  because  of  the  following 
factors: 
The  poor  living,  conditions  of  the  majority  of  the 
people,  owing  to  crude  economic  exploitation,  leading  to 
an  excessive  rise  in  the  cost  of  living.  This  was 
particularly  true  because  of  the  inflation  of  the  Second 
World  War.  At  the  same  time  the  privileged  class  in 
society,  represented  by  the  Government,  its  narrow 
circle  of  officials  and  its  supporters,  the  senior 
officers  (with  Ottoman  upbringing),  the  merchants, 
bureaucrats,  sheikhs  and  mall5ks,  enjoyed  a  good  time 
and  held  the  upper  hand. 
(2)  The  British  1930  Treaty,  which  obliged  the  Iraqis  to 
accept  the  British  as  their  overlords.  (1) 
(3)  The  Portsmouth  Agreement,  signed  in  January  1948,  which 
tied  Iraq  to  Britain  more  than  the  1930  Treaty  had 
done.  (2)  It  was  abrogated,  owing  to  the  widespread 
uprising  and  bloodi  events  (mostly  due  to  communist 
influence),  called  al-wathbdh  following  this  Treaty.  (3) 
13B The  Palestine  crisis.  All  political  life  in  the  Middle 
East  was  soured  by  the  consequences  of  the  Zionist 
invasion,  which  established  the  State  of  Israel  in 
Palestine;  this  was  encouraged  and  supported  by  foreign 
powers.  Arab  failure  in  the  war  to  restrain  Israel 
caused  embarrassment,  widespread  unrest  and  violent 
opposition  to  those  governments  which  had  supported  it. 
This  event  aroused  further  strong  anti-British  and  anti- 
Government  feeling  in  the  Arab  East,  particularly  in 
Iraq,  where  Britain  and  its  ally  al-Sa'ld  government  were 
regarded  as  the  leading  culprits. 
(5)  Political  movements  which  represented  the  middle 
classes,  such  as  the  National  Democrats,  -the  Liberals 
and  the  Independents.  These  were  running  mainly  for 
political  gain,  rather  than  for  mass  satisfaction. 
(6)  The  appearance  of  the  Communist  Party  in  the  political 
arena  in  the  forties  and  fifties.  This  brought 
widespread,  suppressed  resentment  into  open  action 
against  the  monarchy  and  their  British  advisers.  The 
Communists  re-educated  Iraqi  thought  about  poverty  and 
wealth,  which  people  had  previously  accepted  as  ordained 
by  fate,  according  to  their  religious  beliefs.  The 
Communists  concentrated  their  efforts  in  particular  in 
the  intellectual  field,  which  was  barren,  due  to  the 
political  underdevelopment  of  society.  This  was  so 
because  the  Government  was  afraid  of  freedom  of  thought 
and  did  not  introduce  any  political  programmes  into 
139 schools  or  colleges;  these  might  have  raised  questions 
about  the  foundations 
possibility  of  rejecting 
political  repression  and 
was  an  insurrection 
demonstrations  in  1952 
flood-tide  of  discontent 
of  society  and,  thus,  the 
the  status  quo.  As  a  result  of 
subservience  to  British,  there 
in  1948  al-wathbdh,  and 
al-Intifdqah.  Then  came  the 
against  the  series  of  military 
and  security  pacts  and  treaties  in  the  period  between 
1954  to  1955,  which  culminated  in  the  political  military 
pact  between  Iraq,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Britain,  Iran, 
Turkey,  Pakistan  and  the  USA,  on  the  other.  In  addition, 
regional  events  contributed  to  increased  internal 
incidents  in  Iraq,  like  the  nationalisation  of  Iranian 
oil  in  1951,  which  gave  the  Iraqis  the  incentive  to  make 
similar  demands  for  their  national  wealth. 
(7)  The  emergence  of  Nasirism  and  its  political  system, 
which  was  a  mixture  of  socialist  ideology,  and  in  which 
the  administration  was  dominated  by  military  officers, 
directed  by  a  single  dictator.  Nasir  was  introduced  to 
Egypt  as  the  leader  of  the  progressive  Arab  world,  the 
model  leader  of  a  new  kind  of  pan-Arabism  which  soon 
became  popular  throughout  the  area.  So  a  new  kind  of 
doctrinal  dispute  was  created  in  Middle  Eastern 
politics.  Both  internal  and  external  policies  adopted  by 
Nasir  raised  his  prestige  and,  in  particular,  appealed 
greatly  to  the  Iraqis.  These  were  disappointed  with 
their  reactionary  government,  which  they  felt  merely 
served  the  interests  of  feudal  landlords,  rich  merchants 
and  imperialists,  at  the  expense  of  Iraq  and  Iraqi 
140 interests.  This  strong  new  current  of  feeling  put  NUrl 
al-Sa'Id's  government  and  its  associates  at  home  and 
abroad  under  increasing  attack.  It  came  at  a  time  when 
NUr!  had  committed  Iraq  to  the  Baghdad  Pact  and  so  did 
not  react  strongly  enough  on  the  Suez  crisis;  this 
outraged  Iraqi  feeling,  causing  anti-government  riots 
and  demonstrations  in  many  Iraqi  cities  in  support  of 
Egypt. 
In  these  troubled  years  on  both  a  national  and  a 
regional  level,  with  violent  opposition  to  puppet  governments 
and  their  foreign  policy  in  the  Arab  East,  Ba'th  ideas  began 
. to  come  to  life  in  Iraq.  It  seems,  as  appeared  later,  that  it 
was  a  scenario  for  containing  the  gigantic  storm,  that  had 
slowly  been  gathering  over  the  years  and  had  almost  reached 
breaking  point,  for  replacing  the  current  formulae  and  for 
thwarting  Western  plans.  This  new  current  of  pan-Arabism, 
socialism,  unity,  neutralism  and  anti-imperialism,  which  was 
greatly  encouraged  by  Nasir  (under  American  direction,  as 
noted  before)  and  adopted  by  the  Ba'th  Party,  as  their 
slogans  reveal,  achieved  foreign  plans  for  the  whole  region, 
as  events  were  to  prove  later. 
However,  the  new  Ba'th  organisation  used  this  restless 
political  mood  to  promote  its  appearance  in  the  political 
field,  as  a  Baghdad  newspaper  mentioned  at  the  time.  (4)  In 
the  beginning,  it  was  no  more  than  an  aggregate,  which.  was 
basically  of  a  preparatory  nature  and  largely  confined  to  the 
propagation  of  ideas  by  painting  them  on  the  walls  of  cities 
from  time  to  time,  as  Devlin  notes.  (5)  There  is  a  difference 
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appeared  in  Iraq.  One  gives  the  first  half  of  1949.  (6) 
Another  thinks  it  was  the  beginning  of  1951.  (7)  Ba'thist 
sources  cite  the  year  1947  as  the  date  for  the  formation  of 
the  first  Baýthist  cell  in  Iraq,  (8)  while  the  official  Party 
organ  gives  the  years  between  1949  and  1951.  (9)  However  it  is 
evident  from  the  above  that  the  first  Baýthist  cell  in  Iraq 
was  organised  around  the  end  of  the  forties  and  the  beginning 
of  the  fifties.  This  was  due,  in  some  way,  to  the  initiative 
of  a  few  students  and  teachers  from  Damascus  and  Beirut,  who 
came  to  study  and  teach  at  Baghdad's  universities  and 
colleges.  Additionally,  some  Iraqi  students  studied  at  Syrian 
and  Lebanese  universities  and  were  influenced  by  Ba'thist 
doctrines,  like  'Izzat  Muýýafd,  who  studied  medicine  in  Syria, 
and  Sa'd5n  Uammdd7l,  who  studied  at  the  American  University  of 
Beirut.  (10) 
The  students  constituted  the  backbone  of  the  Party,  as 
in  the  parent  Baý  th  Party  in  Syria  and  other  branches  in 
Lebanon  and  Jordan.  It  was,  in  the  main,  an  extremely  young 
party,  of  students  and  junior  officials.  Although  it  tried  to 
broaden  its  base  and  claimed  to  have  representatives  of  the 
peasants  and  the  workers,  the  proportion  of  these  in  its 
ranks  was  always  small.  (11)  The  new  Bath  organisation 
gradually  extended  its  influence  to  other  parts  of  the 
country,  particularly  the  south,  as  many  Baghdad  students  who 
had  joined  the  Party  were  originally  from  there  and,  indeed, 
the  leader  who  took  the  helm  of  the  Party  for  the  first  eight 
years  was  from  Ndsiriyyah.  The  first  Ba'thist  organiser  was 
a 
the  Syrian  Fdliz  'Isnndýil.  After  his  return  to  Syria  in  1950, 
142 ýAbd  al-Ralýmdn  al-Ddym  from  Basrah  became  the  leader  of  the 
new-born  organisation.  In  1951  the  leadership  passed  to  Fu'dd 
al-RikWi,  who  joined  the  Party  in  1950.  This  sudden  promotion 
came  under  suspicion.  Some  put  it  down  to  al-Rik5bil's  ability 
to  organise  and  attract  supporters.  (12)  In  1952  the  Party  was 
recognised  as  a  constituent  branch  by  the  national  command  in 
Syria  and  in  1954  it  adopted  internal  rules.  Thus  the 
structure  of  the  organisation  came  into  existence.  (13)  Under 
al-Rik5bl's  leadership  the  Party's  numbers  and  supporters 
somehow  increased.  Most  of  them  were  his  friends  and 
relatives.  The  parent  Baýth  Party  in  Damascus  had  been  built 
up  on  the  same  basis.  Members  were  connected  to  each  other  by 
a  common  sectarian,  regional  or  tribal  background,  rather 
than  by  ideological  principles.  This  shows,  as  the  Ba'th  has 
proved  in  practice,  that  recruitment  relied  on  family  and 
social  relationships,  rather  than  on  ideology.  This 
phenomenon  subsequently  led  to  negative  consequences  when  the 
Ba'th  gained  power  in  Iraq  and  Syria  and  caused  a  serious 
power  struggle,  as  the  Baýth  Party  admitted  in  its  official 
report: 
..  S  the  weakness  of  objective  relationships 
within  the  Party,  whether  between  members  or  in 
the  (Party)  organisation,  has  most  negative  and 
dangerous  consequences  for  its  organisational 
cohesion,  for  its  capacity  for  unity  and  action 
and  for  its  homogeneous  development.  These 
ineffectual  relations  are  manifested  in  the  lack 
of  comradeship  shown  by  the  members,  the  presence 
of  personal  relationships,  rather  than  Party 
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between  the  organisation  and  the  blocs  that  exist 
in  the  Party.  The  result  of  all  this  is  that  the 
Party  is  threatened  by  the  infiltration  into  its 
midst  of  the  disorders  of  bourgeois,  feudal, 
tribal  and  sectarian  realities.  -(14) 
However,  the  distinctive  character  of  the  Party  in  Iraq, 
prior  to  1963,  was  that  the  majority,  both  of  members  and  of 
officials,  were  Shi'ites.  Batatu  notes  that  this  phenomenon 
may  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  the  Shi'ite 
sect  were  deprived  under  the  monarchy.  (15)  As  indicated 
previously,  the  Baýth  Party  was  founded  by  a  group  of  non- 
Muslims,  primarily  Christians,  but  also  Druzes  and  Alawites, 
who  thought  that  pan-Arabism  would  achieve  the  interests  of 
non-Muslim  minorities  in  two  ways.  First,  these  minorities 
would  not  be  second-class  citizens  any  more,  but  the  real 
intellectual  powerhouse  in  the  Arab  world,  and  even  the 
ultimate  political  leadership,  as  ýAflaq,  in  fact,  did 
become.  Secondly,  it  would  a  way  with  Islam,  politically  at 
least,  and  tie  the  Arab  world  to  the  Western  world,  which  was 
nominally,  co-religionist  with  the  Syrian  Christians. 
Anyhow,  Ba'thism  was  not  imported  into  Iraq  by  Iraqi 
Christians.  On  the  contrary,  they  were  fervent  Marxists.  It 
was  brought  by  Muslim  Shi'ites,  who  represented  more  than 
half  of  Iraq's  population.  The  Bath  Party,  until  November 
1963,  had  more  Shiýi  members  than  Sunni  ones.  After  this  the 
Shi'is  left  the  Party,  which  was  subsequently  taken  over  by 
the  Sunnis,  who  were  primarily  Tikr-it-is  and  others  coming  from 
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Baýth  Party  was  seen  by  the  Iraqi  Shi'ites  as  a  convenient 
vehicle  for  them  to  affirm  their  Arabness  and  take  the 
leading  role  in  Iraq,  a  role  that  they  were  deprived  of 
during  the  monarchy  when  only  four  of  the  many  prime 
ministers  were  Shi'ah.  (16)  It  is  ironic  that  it  was  only  Qdsim 
who  was  prepared  to  award  the  Shi'ah  equal  treatment  with  the 
Sunnah,  something  neither  the  monarchy  nor  later  republican 
regimes  were  ready  to  do  -yet  it  was  the  Baý  th  Party  who 
murdered  Qdsim.  It  can  be  clearly  observed  from  the 
composition  of  the  Baýth  Party  in  Iraq,  as  well  as  in  other 
regions,  that  the  leaders  were  drawn  predominantly  from 
minority  sects  and  religions  and  from  the  underprivileged. 
According  to  Baýthist  doctrine  the  minority  ruled  the 
majority,  as  noted  in  Chapter  One. 
Despite  the  fact  that  the  Ba'th  Party  was  known  as  the 
party  of  educated  people,  the  organisation  in  Iraq  could  not 
issue  its  clandestine  newspaper  until  1953,  (17)  because  of 
their  intellectual  bankruptcy  and  organisational 
inefficiency.  Another  feature  of  note  which  distinguished  the 
clandestine  newspaper  is  that  it  continued  to  change  its 
name.  The  first  two  issues  in  October  1953  were  called  al- 
ArabT  al-JadTd  then  the  next  issue  was  called  al- 
11sht:  irdkT..  (l8)  In  1958  the  name  was  changed  to  wa'y  al-Tall-ah 
and  then  three  issues  were  published  in  1960  entitled  1ý1-zb  al- 
jazrOhTr.  It  then  ceased  publication,  although  it  was  succeeded 
by  the  internal  Party  magazine,  entitled  al-Thavrah  al- 
A.  rabiyyah.  This  phenomenon  may  be  explained  by  the  suggestion 
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the  prevailing  political  atmosphere. 
In  the  beginning,  as  Batdtfi  notes,  the  Baýthists  were 
known  as  "the  League  of  Nationalist  Youth"(20)  and  issued 
their  first  publication  over  the  signature  of  the  "Arab 
University  Youth  In  Iraq".  (21) 
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With  regard  to  Baýth  activities  in  the  political  field 
in  Iraq  in  its  early  years,  the  objective  situation  was 
favourable  to  it  at  the  beginning  of  the  1950s,  for  the 
following  reasons: 
The  Communist  Party  adopted  an  extreme  line  from  the 
beginning  of  1951  with  regard  to  its  relations  with 
other  opposition  parties.  The  national  bourgeoisie 
became  more  reactionary,  lost  its  links  with  the  people 
and  became  the  main  enemy  of  the  liberation  movement,  so 
they  Placed  them  in  the  imperialist  camp.  This  attitude 
was  adopted  in  Syria,  as  well,  by  Khdlid  Bikddsh,  (22)  and 
by  other  Communists  in  the  Arab  east.  The  strict 
ideological  direction  of  the  Communists  seems  to  have 
been  dependent  on  Soviet  policy,  (23)  since  this  action 
was  inappropriate  to  the  political  situation  of  that 
period.  It  was  induced  by  the  predilection  of  Iraqis  to 
go  to  extremes  in  all  things  they  get  involved  in,  and 
it  revealed  the  low  political  level  of  the  Communist 
leadership  in  the  Arab  east;  it  left  the  Communists 
isolated  and  offered  little  scope  for  political 
manoeuvring.  They  could  not  attract  the  other  opposition 
parties  to  create  a  front  against  western  designs. 
(2)  The  suppression  of  the  Communists  changed  the  balance  of 
the  local  forces  in  favour  of  the  monarchy,  which 
enabled  it  to  prevent  any  proper  opposition  to  the 
regime,  and  to  paralyse  political  forces. 
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arms  from  the  Soviet  bloc  and  the  nationalisation  of  the 
Suez  Canal,  which  resulted  in  the  tripartite  attack  on 
Egypt  by  Britain,  France  and  Israel.  This  increased  his 
prestige,  as  did  his  pan-Arabism  and  his  neutral  policy, 
which  relied  on  a  defence  strategy  based  solely  on 
collective  Arab  security  throughout  the  Middle  East. 
This  policy,  which  was  keenly  adopted  by  the  Ba'thists, 
mostly  attracted  the  nationalists  in  Iraq,  (24)  while  it 
was  opposed  by  the  Communists  who  wanted  an  alliance 
with  the  socialist  Bloc  and  its  leader,  the  Soviet 
Union.  The  Communists  regarded  neutralism  and  the  "third 
force  Bloc"  as  an  attempt  to  cover  up  opening  links  with 
foreign  imperialism-(25) 
(4)  The  monarchy  used  special  tactics  to  infiltrate 
political  organisations,  particularly  the  Communist 
Party,  (26)  in  order  to  contain  the  acute  popular 
dissatisfaction  with  its  pro-western  policy,  which  was 
reinforced  by  the  course  of  international  events.  It  is 
likely  that  the  monarchy's  security  police  used  the 
newcomer  to  the  Iraqi  scene,  the  Ba'th  Party. 
The  following  evidence  supports  this  suggestion: 
(a)  Bat5tii  notes  that  the  Baý  th  Party  in  that  period 
(the  first  half  of  the  1950s)  was  the  only  active 
opposition  party.  (27) 
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gentler  treatment  than  the  Communists  during  that 
period.  (28) 
(c)  The  Ba  N  th  Party  itself  admitted  in  its  literature 
that  it  organised  the  whole  of  the  struggle  against 
Western  plans  on  its  own,  because  it  was  alone  in 
the  political  field.  (29) 
(d)  Since  the  Ba'th  Party  was  a  secret  organisation,  it 
was  able  to  diffuse  itself  in  society  as  informers 
for  the  security  Forces. 
However,  even  though  this  situation  helped  the  Baý  th 
Party  to  promote  its  appearance  on  the  political  scene  and  to 
increase  its  numbers  in  its  early  years,  the  Communists 
continued  to  have  a  greater  influence  on  the  streets,  and  the 
Ba'thists  did  not  amount  to  much  until  after  1958.  (30) 
Thus,  the  Ba'th  Party  exploited  the  political  mood  of 
the  1950s  in  Iraq  and  the  Middle  East  in  general  to  its 
benefit.  Feelings  against  the  old  pro-western  politicians, 
who  controlled  power  in  most  Middle  Eastern  countries  and  who 
relied  on  their  western  ties  to  develop  their  countries,  were 
extremely  high.  The  younger  generation  wanted  complete 
independence  from  the  west  and  its  military  arrangements, 
which  implicated  the  area  in  the  Cold  War  conflict  between 
the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union.  In  Iraq  the  struggle 
was  very  obvious,  owing  to  the  monarchy's  internal  repression 
and  its  visible  involvement  in  foreign  affairs.  Its  failure 
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which  outraged  the  feelings  of  many  in  Iraq,  put  the  monarchy 
in  a  critical  position;  the  entire  country  feeling  restless 
and  riotous.  Indeed,  the  most  damaging  element  which 
confronted  the  monarchy  with  a  crisis  almost  as  severe  as  the 
one  threatened  by  the  Iraqi  Communists,  was  the  propaganda 
campaign  broadcast  by  the  Voice  of  the  Arabs  in  Cairo.  (31) 
However,  as  far  as  the  Baýth  Party  was  concerned  in 
those  turbulent  years,  there  is  evidence  that  it 
collaborated  with  the  Communists  in  the  demonstrations  and 
riots  of  1952,  known  as  the  Intifadah.  (32)  The  intifadah  came 
to  nothing  and  the  regime  declared  martial  law  to  maintain 
order.  The  political  situation  called  for  a  new  defence 
arrangement  and,  more  importantly,  following  Stalin's  death, 
the  Communists  altered  their  tactics  in  their  anti-bourgeois 
stance.  (33)  In  Iraq  they  did  not  have  the  same  flexibility 
in  their  attitude  as  the  Syrian  communists,  or  any  other 
Middle  Eastern  Communists.  They  continued  with  their  struggle 
and  daily  clashes  with  the  monarchy  and  challenged  all  the 
other  opposition  groups  who  participated  in  the  parliamentary 
election  of  June  1954,  which  was  regarded  as  one  of  the  most 
free  in  Iraqi  history.  The  National  Democrats  and  the 
Independence  Party  participated  in  this  election.  on  12  May 
they  agreed  to  enter  into  a  national  front  with  some 
individual  Communists,  workers,  peasants,  students,  lawyers 
and  physicians.  The  Baýth  Party  did  not  enter  into  this  front 
under  the  pretext  that  it  was  preparing  for  the  Second 
National  Congress,  which  was  more  important  for  it  than  the 
parliamentary  election,  as  Devlin  notes.  (34)  It  seems  that 
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electoral  procedure  and  Nfirl's  success,  the  election  was  not 
in  favour  of  Nflrlls  regime.  It  set  the  stage  for  the  rebirth 
of  the  legal  opposition,  and  al-Sa'ld  would  not  accept  a 
parliament  that  included  even  Communist  sympathisers.  (35) 
However,  the  Communists  did  not  change  their  line  until  the 
dissolution  of  the  parliament  and  the  formation  of  the 
National  Front,  which  was  suppressed  by  Nfirl.  A  series  of 
harsh  decrees  was  designed  to  put  an  end  to  any  kind  of  open 
political  activity,  particularly  communist,  which,  however, 
the  government  was  unable  completely  to  stop,  (36)  in  order  to 
pass  the  Baghdad  Pact  legislation  through  Parliament 
unopposed.  It  is  ironic  that  Ndr!  al-Sa'Id's  regime  became  so 
fervently  anti-Communist,  while,  during  the  Second  World  War, 
his  British  masters  established  the  Freedom  Club  in  Baghdad, 
of  which  leading  members  of  the  Communist  Party  and  Nfirl's 
regime  were  founders.  Of  course,  the  Iraqi  Communists,  who 
were  totally  subservient  to  Stalin,  were  ordered  by  Soviet 
military  intelligence  to  co-operate  with  military 
intelligence  in  hunting  down  pan-Arabists  who  were 
sympathisers  with  Nazi  Germany. 
-Eventually  the  Communists  relinquished  their  domineering 
and  over-confident  attitude,  after  they  realised  how 
inappropriate  their  policy  was.  It  was  pursued  without 
consideration  of  the  weighty  facts  of  the  political  situation 
in  Iraq.  They  had  to  come  to  terms  with  other  opposition 
parties  in  the  face  of  what  it  necessarily  implied  to  hinder 
the  regime  and  western  plans.  (37)  The  Communists  and  other 
opposition  groups  were  in  a  state  of  paralysis,  enabling 
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importantly,  to  ride  out  the  Suez  affair,  which  came  later. 
The  Ba'th  Party  used  this  situation  to  try  to  generate  an 
anti-western  campaign  against  the  collective  defence 
arrangements,  the  Baghdad  Pact,  (38)  and  the  Suez  crisis  in 
particular.  (39) 
The  Ba'thist  role  in  these  events  seems  exaggerated.  The 
communists  held  the  upper  hand  in  the  streets,  despite  the 
ruthlessness  with  which  they  were  treated  by  the  monarchy's 
security  police.  The  consequences  of  the  regime's  failure  in 
foreign  and  domestic  policy,  the  Suez  crisis  and  the  Soviet 
positive  reassessment  of  nationalist  revolutionary 
movements,  (40)  such  as  Nasirls,  and  the  crucial  shifting  of 
the  Iraqi  middle  classes  against  the  regime,  made  it  possible 
to  smooth  the  way  for  joint  action  against  the  regime.  This 
first  took  the  form  of  the  National  Front,  which  was 
established  in  February  1957  between  the  four  Iraqi  parties, 
the  two  democratic  ones,  i.  e.  the  National  Democratic  Party 
and  the  Independence  Party,  and  the  two  revolutionary  ones, 
i.  e.  the  Communists  and  the  Bathists.  The  programme  of  the 
National  Front  was  issued  on  9  March  1957  from  the  secret 
printing  press  of  the  Iraqi  Communist  Party.  (41)  The  Front 
played  a  prominent  role  in  creating  the  circumstances  that 
led  to  the  Revolution  of  14  July  1958,  in  particular  after 
building  a  link  with  some  opposition  elements  in  the  army 
known  as  "the  free  officers"(42)  who  succeeded  in  bringing 
down  the  Monarchy. 
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It  is  impossible  to  assess  Baýthist  activities  during 
this  period  without  taking  into  consideration  the  intra- 
regional  and  external  conditions  in  and  before  1958  which  led 
to  the  July  Revolution,  as  well  as  the  actions  which  were 
taken  almost  immediately  by  the  Revolution  and  threatened 
forces  inside  and  outside  Iraq. 
The  complication  of  the  regional  and  international 
political  situation  after  the  Second  World  War,  which  was 
noted  in  the  last  chapter,  led  to  many  political 
developments,  such  as  the  struggle  between  Britain  and 
America  for  influence;  the  Cold  War  between  the  East  and  the 
West;  the  upsurge  of  democratic  principles  provoked  by  the 
allies  during  their  fight  against  Nazism;  the  spread  of 
rebellion  in  the  Middle  East,  and  the  vast  increase  in  the 
return  from  the  oil  industry  in  the  occupied  territories, 
which  caused  a  huge  increase  in  consumption  and  a  widening  of 
the  gap  between  the  rich  and  the  rest  of  society.  All  these 
developments  emphasised  the  need  for  social  changes.  This,  in 
turn,  pressurised  colonialist  states  to  give  some  democratic 
freedom  to  their  dependencies,  including  freedom  to  found 
political  parties. 
In  the  absence  of  bourgeois  democratic  parties  to 
express  the  hopes  of  the  biggest  segment  of  society, 
communist  parties  sprung  up.  To  a  large  degree  this  was 
because  they  were  founded  on  the  need  to  bring  about 
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rulers  under  pressure  to  prevent  foreign  monopolies  making 
military  treaties,  especially  after  the  declaration  of  the 
Iranian  Prime  Minister,  Dr  Musdiq,  on  15  March  1951,  of  the 
nationalisation  of  the  Anglo-Iranian  Oil  Company,  which  was 
owned  by  British  interests.  (43) 
It  was  essential  for  the  West,  particularly  America,  to 
avoid  the  loss  of  these  strategic  areas  and  even  more 
essential  to  prevent  their  forming  alliances  with  their 
enemies.  On  the  other  hand,  as  mentioned  above,  a  power 
struggle  began  to  develop  between  the  British  and  the 
Americans.  (44)  Because  of  these  two  factors  various  coups 
were  engineered. 
America  refused  to  sell  weapons  to  Nasir  because  of  its 
pro-Israel  policy  and  its  wish  to  ensure  Israel's 
superiority.  Nasir,  therefore,  changed  his  allegiance  from 
the  west  to  socialism,  taking  Syria  with  him  to  form  the 
United  Arab  Republic  (UAR).  It  has  been  admitted  by  the  CIA 
that  their  policies  failed  and  that  they  lost  Egypt  and  Syria 
by  causing  them  to  switch  to  the  communist  side  and  the 
Soviet  military  machine,  which  would  be  used  against 
Israel.  (45)  However,  whether  it  was  with  America's  or  the 
Soviets'  help,  Jamal  'Abd  al-Nasirwas  able  to  become  a  hero 
and  a  leader  for  the  Arab  world.  He  was  a  strong  nationalist 
with  a  charismatic  personality,  who  took  a  stand  against  the 
West  and  its  plots.  (46)  The  events  which  took  place  in  Egypt 
caused  a  strong  wave  of  resentment  in  the  Arab  World, 
especially  Iraq,  against  the  west  and  their  military 
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themselves  the  Free  Officers,  Movement,  started  to  prepare  a 
plan  to  terminate  the  Monarchy.  This  plan  was  supported  by 
the  UAR.  According  to  some  sources,  (47)  the  Commander  in 
Chief  of  the  Syrian  Army  began  to  negotiate  with  the  Iraqi 
Free  officers  about  the  possibility  of  arming  a  revolution  in 
Iraq.  1ýusayn  Jamil  was  the  representative  of  the  Free  Officers 
in  consultations  with  Jamal  'Abd  al-Nasir  about  his  attitude 
towards  the  overthrow  of  the  Monarchy.  He  answered  that  the 
west  regarded  its  interests  in  Iraq  as  more  important  than 
the  Royal  family  and  that  he  would  back  the  revolution  with 
any  required  aid.  (48) 
Nasir  was  especially  interested  in  a  revolution  in  Iraq 
because  he  suspected  Nfirl  al-Sa'1d  of  conspiring  with  the  US 
and  Britain  to  overthrow  the  Syrian  regime.  When  the 
revolution  started  he  was  the  first  to  recognise  it  and 
announced  that  any  aggression  against  Iraq  would  be  regarded 
as  aggression  against  the  UAR,  which  had  excellent  relations 
with  the  Soviet  Union.  The  second  to  recognise  the  July 
Revolution  was  Khrushchev,  who  sent  letters  to  Harold 
Macmillan,  the  British  Prime  Minister,  and  Eisenhower,  the 
President  of  the  United  States,  warning  them  of  the 
consequences  of  intervening  against  the  revolution  in 
Iraq.  (49) 
But  in  his  The  Strategy  and  Tactics  in  the  Soviet 
Foreign  Policy,  Macintosh  writes: 
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Revolution  in  Iraq  was  a  surprise,  not  only  for 
the  Western  Secret  Services,  but  even  to  the 
Soviet  Union  and  the  United  Arab  Republic.  "  (5  0) 
Many  documents  and  quotations  show  that  ýAbd  al-Karlm 
Qdsim  had  no  connections  with  any  Western  or  Eastern  Powers 
and  was  hoping  for  an  independent  policy  for  Iraq.  This  is 
suggested  in  Foreign  Minister  Hdshim  Jaw5d's  speech: 
.1  our  policy  is  not  Eastern  or  Western.  11 
With  regard  to  the  attitude  of  the  Ba'th,  in  the 
beginning  they  supported  the  14  July  Revolution.  The  Baýth 
gained  one  post  in  its  first  cabinet,  Minister  of 
Development,  held  by  the  Regional  Secretary,  Fu'dd  al-Rikdb-i. 
Many  other  elements  far  better  known  than  al-Rikdb-i  for  their 
opposition  to  the  old  regime,  or  their  participation  in  the 
Revolution,  were  excluded.  The  reason  for  this  is  still 
unclear.  (52)  However,  the  alliance  of  forces  which  the 
National  Front  reflected  and  had  largely  met  on  the  common 
ground  of  enmity  to  the  Monarchy  and  the  west,  particularly 
between  the  Ba'thists  and  the  communists,  did  not  last 
long.  (53)  It  changed  soon  after  the  Revolution  to  a  tragic 
conflict  between  them  and  allowed  the  Ba'thists  to  rise  to 
great  prominence  in  Qdsim's  time. 
It  seems  that  this  change  in  the  Ba'thists'  attitude 
towards  the  14  July  Revolution  resulted  from  the  reaction  of 
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Revolution,  as  follows: 
Britain  was  stunned  and  the  cabinet  was  convened  three 
times  in  twenty-four  hours.  NATO  Council  meetings  were 
held  on  15-16  July.  The  British  Foreign  Office  asked  its 
Ambassador  to  Iraq  to  meet  Qdsim,  in  order  to  discover 
the  intentions  of  the  new  Iraqi  government.  He  did  so  on 
the  first  day  of  the  Revolution  and  sent  back  a  report 
to  the  Foreign  office  in  which  he  assured  his  Goverment 
that  the  new  system  was  concerned  only  with  internal 
reforms  and  had  nothing  to  do  with  any  ideologies,  such 
as  Arab  Unity  or  Communism.  The  Foreign  Office  then 
wrote  a  report  to  this  effect  to  the  Prime  minister, 
entitled  The  Revolution  in  Ira  .  (54) 
(2)  In  Washington  the  surprise  was  even  greater  and  the  CIA 
itself  admitted  its  failure  to  predict  the  revolution, 
being  busy  at  the  time  with  Britain  assembling  an  Iraqi 
force  on  the  Syrian  border  in  an  attempt  to  organise  a 
coup  in  Syria.  The  Free  Officers  managed  to  stage  their 
coup  in  Baghdad  and  bring  western  control  in  Iraq  to  an 
end.  (55) 
The  July  Revolution  was  a  reformist  one,  which  led  to 
important  social  and  economic  changes.  The  new  agricultural 
reform  law  affected  the  political  influence  of  the  landowner 
classes  and  the  bourgeoisie.  Housing  problems  were  made 
easier  by  building  houses  for  the  poorer  classes.  The 
Resources  Law  and  Iraq's  withdrawal  from  the  Sterling  Area 
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developments  were  the  withdrawal  from  the  Raceme  Union  and 
the  Baghdad  Pact,  (56)  the  establishment  of  diplomatic 
relations  with  the  socialist  countries,  the  recognition  of 
the  People's  Republic  of  China,  and  the  signing  of  treaties 
of  economic  and  technical  co-operation  with  non-aligned 
countries.  The  most  important  was  Oil  Law  Number  80,  which 
took  back  90.5%  of  the  non-exploited  lands  given  previously 
to  the  oil  companies.  (57) 
These  achievements  were  a  great  shock  to  the  political 
balance  of  that  time.  They  affected  international  oil  and 
financial  markets.  It  was  obvious  that  a  challenge  like 
Qdsim's  would  not  pass  easily.  The  echoes  of  the  July 
revolution  went  too  far.  The  CENTO  Pact  was  in  great  disarray 
and  Great  Britain  had  fears  of  losing  her  influence  over  an 
entire  region,  especially  after  Qdsim's  demand  for  the 
annexation  of  Kuwait.  (58) 
In  April  1959  in  Washington,  the  CIA  chief,  Alan  Dulles 
announced: 
Alk  0.. 
0  The  situation  in  Iraq  is  the  most 
dangerous  in  today's  world.  "(59) 
However,  with  regard  to  the  activities  of  the  Ba'th 
throughout  Qdsim's  time  -a  time  which  the  Americans  regarded 
as  the  most  dangerous  in  the  world  -  they  erupted  more  than 
once  in  violent  clashes  and  led  to  a  number  of  serious 
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f  ollows: 
Early  disunity  developed  between  the  two  prominent 
figures  of  the  Revolution,  Qdsim  and  "Arif,  about  the 
issue  of  Arab  Union.  (60)  The  Ba'thists  took  the 
opportunity  to  deepen  the  differences.  In  the  first  week 
of  the  14  July  Revolution,  the  branch  of  the  Ba"th  Party 
in  Iraq  raised  the  question  of  unity  with  the  UAR.  The 
Secretary  General,  Michel  ýAflaq,  personally  came  to 
Iraq  and  launched  a  campaign  on  behalf  of  pan- 
Arabism.  (61)  'Aflaq  used  'Arif  for  his  own  motives, 
without  any  approval  from  the  new  government,  to  bring 
up  the  question  of  unity  with  the  UAR  on  the  very  next 
day  after  the  Revolution,  when  he  met  Nasir  in  Damascus 
on  his  way  back  from  Moscow.  (62)  'Arif's  enthusiasm  for 
pan-Arabism  was  largely  encouraged  by  the  Baýth  Party  in 
Iraq.  He  was  pushed  to  consider  uniting  Iraq  with  the 
UAR,  which  was  not  to  the  liking  of  Qdsim  and  his  desire 
to  keep  Iraq's  policies  independent  from  Nasir's 
influence.  Widespread  fear  was  aroused  among  Iraq's 
mixture  of  ethnic  and  religious  groups  because  the 
change  in  the  status  quo  would  have  affected  their 
survival  as  an  effective  force.  The  Iraqi  army  was  also 
concerned  about  the  way  in  which  the  Egyptian  and  Syrian 
armies  had  united.  There  was  also  concern  that  parties 
and  social  organisations  might  be  disbanded  and  freedom 
of  thought  prevented.  Co-operation  between  the  Iraqi  and 
Egyptian  economies  would  undoubtedly  set  back  Iraqi 
economic  development.  Thus,  the  project  of  unity  with 
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from  the  communists.  (63) 
That  was  the  beginning  of  the  disagreement  between 
Qdsim  and  Nasir,  which  led  to  hostilities  used  by  the 
west  to  separate  the  Arabs  and  hit  the  real  nationalist 
movements.  Nationalism  and  Arab  unity  were  just  tactical 
ideas  for  'Af  laq  and  his  Party  and  had  never  been  a 
strategic  political  choice.  This  is  why  they  did  not  do 
anything  for  Arab  unity  when  they  came  to  power,  but 
became  its  sworn  enemies  and  even  hostile  to  Nasir.  (64) 
However,  events  ended  in  defeat  for  'Arif  and  the 
pan-Arab  movement  after  a  rapid  series  of  incidents, 
such  as  the  removal  of  'Arif  from  all  his  jobs;  the 
uncovering  of  the  conspiracy  led  by  Rash7id  'All  al- 
Gayldnl;  the  resignation  of  the  pan-Arabist  ministers 
from  Qdsim's  cabinet  in  February  1959;  the  failure  of 
the  al-Shaw5f  military  coup  in  March  1959;  the  massacre 
of  non-Communists  in  Kirkfik  in  July  1959  and  the 
failure  of  the  attempt  on  Qdsim's  life  in  October  1959. 
(2)  Setbacks  to  progress  in  the  field  of  civil  and  political 
liberties  led  Qdsim  to  take  power  into  his  hands  to 
maintain  control.  He  did  not  show  any  interest  in  the 
development  of  political  parties  or  parliamentary 
constitutions,  owing  to  the  troubles  that  the 
nationalists,  Ba'thists  and  Communists  inflicted  on  him. 
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brought  into  the  open  because  of  the  bloody  events  in 
Mosul  and  Kirk5k.  Tribal,  ethnic,  religious  and  class 
conflicts  in  Iraqi  society  were  revealed.  (65) 
The  conflict  between  the  nationalists  and  the  Communists 
all  over  the  Arab  East  came  out  into  the  open.  (66) 
(5)  A  wedge  was  created  between  Iraq  and  the  other  leading 
Arab  power,  the  UAR,  particularly  after  the  mosul  revolt 
and  Nasir's  undoubted  connection  with  the  conspirators 
behind  this  revolt.  (67) 
(6)  A  crisis  was  accelerated  between  the  UAR  and  the  Soviet 
Union.  (68) 
(7)  Iraqi  society  was  weakened,  thus  facilitating  the  task 
of  foreign  imperialists  in  achieving  their  interests.  So 
the  nationalists,  Baýthists  and  Communists  had  worked  to 
the  advantage  of  those  whom  they  claimed  to  oppose 
Baýthist  and  Communist  conflicts  throughout  Qdsim's  time 
left  Iraq  with  a  series  of  crises  that  set  back  all  his 
efforts  to  find  a  balance  between  them.  Even  Qdsim's 
characteristic  ability  of  maintaining  a  balance  was  not 
as  good  as  in  the  beginning  and  his  grip  on  events  was 
weakened  as  time  went  by  to  the  extent  that  he  failed  to 
put  in  place  a  successful  plan  to  crush  the  Bathist 
plot.  He  barricaded  himself  inside  the  Ministry  of 
Defence  with  a  few  followers,  while  his  army  outside  the 
capital  remained  neutral. 
161 Thus,  although  Qdsim  was  somehow  able  to  defeat  the 
Nationalists  and  the  Ba'thists  in  the  beginning,  his  tragic 
end  in  February  1963  proved  that  his  defeat  by  the 
Nationalists  and  Baýthists  was  caused  by  indecisiveness.  The 
reasons  for  this  are  as  follows: 
The  regime's  tolerance  of  the  political  forces  which 
helped  them  to  organise  intrigue  behind  the  scenes  with 
various  groups  inside  and  outside  Iraq. 
(2)  The  isolation  of  the  Communists,  due  to  Qdsim's 
continuous  strikes  against  them,  eased  the  way  for  the 
Baýthists  and  Nationalists  to  gain  the  upper  hand  and 
prevent  the  Communi,  sts  from  defending  Qdsim's  regime.  In 
spite  of  this  the  Communists  did  not  turn  their  back  on 
Qdsim. 
(3)  Qdsim's  policy  of  maintaining  a  balance  allowed  the 
Nationalists  and  Ba'thists  to  take  a  place  in  the 
political  arena. 
(4)  Qdsim's  failure  to  build  a  solid  base  of  support  for  his 
rule  and  to  articulate  an  ideology  of  his  own.  His 
support-base  was  only  the  common  people  who  had  genuine 
affection  for  him  because  he  improved.  their  living 
conditions  and  did  not  make  empty  promises. 
The  outbreak  of  the  Kurdish  war,  which  greatly  helped 
the  Ba'thists  and  Nationalists.  The  British  Ambassador, 
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--in 
Revolution,  admits  that  he  took  trips  to  various  parts 
of  Iraq  and  set  up  a  number  of  puppets  to  make  troubles 
for  Qdsim's  government.  (69)  One  of  the  results  of  his 
attempts  was  the  start  of  the  war  with  the  Kurds  in  the 
north,  which  played  a  great  part  in  Qdsim's  fall.  It  is 
interesting  to  note  that  the  Kurds,  who  were  favoured  by 
Qdsim's  independent  policy,  also  stood  against  him  and 
co-operated  with  his  enemies  to  diminish  his  regime. 
(6)  Qdsim's  failure  in  his  foreign  policy,  particularly 
with  regard  to  Kuwait,  which  increasingly  isolated  his 
regime  from  the  Ba'thists  and  their  allies  in  Iraq  and 
abroad. 
(7)  The  most  important  factor  was  Qdsim's  oil  policy,  which 
sealed  his  fate  and  made  his  downfall  inevitable.  Hasan 
al-ýAlawf  writes: 
I  was  told  by  the  great  scholar  al-Sayyid 
murta4d  al-'Askari,  while  visiting  him  in  London 
on  30  June  1990,  that  one  of  Q5sim,  's  Ministers 
told  him  the  following:  during  the  meeting  of  the 
cabinet  of  ministers  in  which  we  discussed  and 
signed  the  Oil  Law,  'Abd  al-Karim  Qdsim  said, 
"Let  us  sign  our  own  death  sentence  with  our  own 
hands.  I  So  he  signed  and  we  signed  after  him-.  (7  0) 
(8)  Qdsim's  characteristic  'Iraq  first'  policy  roused 
nationalist  sentiment  against  his  regime  inside  and  outside 
163 Iraq.  From  the  viewpoint  of  Arab  politics  there  were  huge 
differences  in  the  understanding  of  Arab  Nationalism  between 
Qdsim  and  Nasir.  Qdsim  insisted  that  Arab  nationalism  was  to 
unite  the  efforts  of  all  Arab  countries  to  strengthen  their 
integrity  and  independence  in  the  face  of  external 
imperialist  influence,  without  assaulting  the  independence  of 
any  individual  Arab  country.  In  his  speech  in  February  1959, 
Qdsim  announced  that: 
%%  Iracl  is  part  of  a  whole,  not  part  of  a 
part.  " 
Nasir  felt  Qdsim's  challenge  to  him  and  his  reputation  as 
sole  leader  of  the  Arab  world.  He  began  a  large  campaign 
against  him  in  his  radio  broadcasts,  newspapers  and  speeches, 
accusing  Qdsim  of  narrow-minded  localistic  Iraqi  policies 
which  cared  only  about  Iraq  and  betrayed  Arabism  and  the  Arab 
world.  He  also  accused  Qdsim  of  giving  too  much  freedom  to  the 
communists  and  having  relations  with  socialist  countries, 
even  though  he  himself  had  opened  the  doors  of  Egypt  and 
other  Arab  countries  wide  to  the  interests  of  the  socialist 
bloc  and  had  not  hesitated  to  ally  himself  with  Russia  when 
he  was  denied  any  support  from  the  west.  (72) 
The  British  intelligence  services,  supervised  by  the 
British  Ambassador  to  Iraq,  Michael  Wright,  with  the  help  of 
the  American  intelligence  services,  did  their  best  to  widen 
and  deepen  the  differences  and  hostility  between  Qdsim,  and 
Nasir  in  order  to  contain  the  revolution  in  Iraq.  In  April 
1959  Alan  Dulles  announced: 
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close  to  complete  control  of  power,  the  situation 
has  not  used  the  bad  relations  between  Q5sim  and 
Nasir.  The  last  can  play  an  important  role  in 
rescuing  Iraq.  "  (73) 
President  Eisenhower,  himself,  praised  Nasir  for  being  a 
strong  leader  in  anti-Communist  activities.  (74) 
Thus  America,  Britain  and  Nasir  played  their  roles  in 
finishing  Qdsim  and  diminishing  the  July  Revolution.  The 
interests  of  all  western  and  Arab  forces  were  harmed  by  Qdsim, 
so  they  decided  to  eliminate  him.  Their  instrument  in  this 
was  the  Arab  Ba'th  Socialist  Party,  which  at  once  changed 
from  a  supporter  of  the  Revolution  to  an  opponent,  and  made 
many  efforts  to  put  barriers  in  the  way  of  the 
Revolution.  (75) 
The  Baýth  itself  admitted  that  there  were  nine  attempts 
on  the  life  of  Qdsim,  but  all  failed.  (76)  This  is  why  ýAflaq 
called  a  conference  in  West  Germany  in  summer  1962,  called 
the  "Third  Regional  Conference",  at  which  it  was  decided  to 
begin  a  counter-revolution  against  Qdsim's  government.  It 
should  be  borne  in  mind  that  this  was  not  a  proper 
conference,  that  there  were  no  delegates  from  the  regional 
committees  and  it  was  limited  to  a  narrow  group.  (77) 
The  culmination  of  attempts  at  power  by  the  Ba'th  was 
the  general  strike  called  by  the  National  Union  of  Iraqi 
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was  a  violent,  well-prepared  student  strike  with  the 
participation  of  many  gangsters  and  thugs  well  known  for 
cruelty  and  murder.  Such  people  were  often  used  initially  by 
the  Ba'th  to  eliminate  political  opponents.  Later  they  came 
to  control  the  government  and  included  men  like  ýAli  ýdlelý  al 
Sa'd-1  from  B5b  al-Shaykh,  who  became  Deputy  Prime  Minister 
after  the  coup  of  February  1963,  M#ammad  Fd#1  from  al-Karkh, 
al-Fddil,  Sab5h  Mirza  (Saddam's  bodyguard  during  the  1970s) 
from  al-ji'afr  and,  of  course,  Saddam  Husayn  himself,  who 
gained  complete  control  after  the  coup  of  17  July  1968  (78), 
as  well  as  common  thugs  like  Jabbdr  Kurdi.  The  timing  of  the 
strike  was  to  coincide  with  the  oil  companies'  threats  to 
'Abd  al-Karim  Qdsim  after  22  October  1962,  after  his 
announcing  the  Oil  Law.  It  was  expected  that,  after 
confrontation  with  the  oil  companies,  Qdsim's  end  would  be 
close. 
The  student  strike  did  not  end  until  8  February,  when 
Qdsim  was  executed  by  the  Ba'th,  and  the  threats  of  the  oil 
companies  were  realised.  At  the  first  press  conference  after 
8  February,  the  Ba'thist  Foreign  Minister  assured  the  oil 
companies  that  his  regime  would  not  harm  British  Petroleum  or 
the  Iraq  Petroleum  Company  (IPC)  and  would  respect  all 
agreements  with  them  and  guarantee  continuous  supplies  of 
oil.  (79)  Now,  after  the  opening  of  the  British  Foreign  office 
documents,  we  know  that  the  coup  of  8  February  was  planned  by 
the  USA.  (80)  As  Wilbur  Crane  Eveland  admits,  (81)  this  was 
just  part  of  many  secret  service  operations  carried  out  by 
the  Americans  in  the  region.  We  hardly  need  further  proof 
166 that  the  Ba"  th  was  an  instrument  of  American  and  Western 
plans  in  the  Middle  East,  especially  Iraq. 
However,  despite  the  above-mentioned  failures  by  Qdsim's 
regime  to  control  the  domestic  crisis  caused  mainly  by  the 
violent  clashes  between  the  Communists,  the  Nationalists  and 
the  Baýthists,  accompanied  by  foreign  policy  failures  and 
accusations  of  Qdsim's  military  autocracy,  it  can  hardly  be 
denied,  from  the  course  of  events  and  from  the  activities 
when  they  (Ba'thist  and  nationalist  throughout  'Arif  regime) 
gained  power,  that  Qdsim  was  a  patriotic  leader.  He  wanted  to 
create  an  independent  Iraq.  He  wanted  to  liberate  the 
national  wealth  and  he  wanted  equality  and  justice  for  all 
Iraqis.  Even  his  attacks  on  the  Communists  were  the  result  of 
their  devotion  to  Soviet  policy,  which  did  not  accede  to  his 
independent  policy  for  Iraq.  He  refused  to  arm  the  Communists 
or  the  angry  populace,  who  gathered  outside  the  Ministry  of 
Defence  and  in  the  streets  of  the  capital  to  defend  him, 
unarmed  except  with  canes,  and  launched  a  bitter  two-day 
fight  with  the  Ba'thists.  Qdsim  revealed  his  sense  of 
responsibility  for  his  country  by  refusing  to  the  end  to  hand 
out  arms  to  the  people,  even  at  this  crucial  time.  His 
opponents  obviously  lacked  this  quality.  They  called  Qdsim  a 
traitor  to  the  Arab  cause  and  claimed  to  champion  unity, 
liberty  and  political  freedom  and  to  fight  Zionism  and 
imperialism.  But,  when  they  gained  power,  the  outcome  was  the 
complete  reverse  of  all  that  they  had  been  calling  for,  as 
will  be  examined  in  the  next  section  in  our  assessment  of  the 
Ba'th  in  power. 
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This  section  will  not  analyse  the  details  of  the 
Baýthist  coup  of  February  1963,  as  this  has  been  done  by  many 
researchers,  (82)  or  the  massive  Bathist  conspiracies 
throughout  Qdsim's  time,  which  were  fully  described  in  Chapter 
one.  This  section  will  refer  briefly  to  the  particular  and 
more  specific  Ba'thist  practices  while  they  were  in  power  in 
Iraq. 
As  noted  before,  the  Baýth  Party,  after  it  had  failed  to 
assassinate  Qdsim,  faced  a  severe  retreat  and  went 
underground.  Its  secretary  general,  Fuldd  al-Rikdbl,  the 
organiser  of  the  plot,  managed  to  escape  to  Syria,  and  then 
Cairo,  with  the  other  assassins,  including  Saddam  Husayn, 
while  other  suspects  were  rounded  up.  Many  others  left  the 
Party  following  this  incident.  Hdzim  Jaw5d  was  appointed  to  be 
in  charge  of  the  few  remaining  cells.  After  two  months,  in 
January  1960,  an  Iraqi  bureau  was  set  up  in  Damascus  to  help 
Hdzim  Jaw5d  to  reorganise  the  scattered  Ba'th  members  in  Iraq. 
ýAli  pdle4  al-Sa'd-i  was  in  charge  of  this  bureau  with  two 
other  members,  Tdlib  Shablib  and  Fayqal  Iýablib  al-Khazardn.  In 
April  al-Sa'di  took  charge  of  the  Iraqi  region  of  the  Ba'th 
Party,  instead  of  Jaw5d,  and  returned  to  Iraq  to  reform  and 
solidify  the  splintered  organisation.  It  seems  that  the  main 
reason  for  the  choice  of  al-Sa'd!  by  the  National  Command  for 
this  job,  as  Batatu  notes  (83)  was  his  talent  for  conspiracy 
and  underground  activities,  which  suited  Baýthist  operations 
against  Qdsim  at  that  desperate  time  to  oust  him  and  destroy 
the  Communists.  Al-Sa'd!  somehow  managed  to  rebuild  the  Party. 
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the  attempt  on  Qdsim's  life  in  the  People's  Court,  which 
became  a  forum  for  Ba'thist  political  views,  because  of  the 
way  they  used  them  in  their  defence.  At  all  events,  al-Sa'd7i 
deviously  managed  to  put  the  finishing  touches  to  the  plan  to 
overthrow  Qdsim  and  the  Communists,  which  was  adopted  at  the 
National  Party  Congress  in  Voms  in  1962. 
As  mentioned  before,  the  Iraqi  Ba'th  Party  was  involved 
in  military  and  civilian  intrigue  and  was  helped  by  external 
and  regional  countries  to  seize  total  power  in  Iraq.  The  coup 
was  concluded  when  Qdsim  and  his  close  associates  were 
executed  on  the  second  day.  (84)  However,  the  situation  was 
not  fully  in  the  hands  of  the  plotters.  The  Communists  fought 
the  Ba'thists  and  their  militia,  the  National  Guard,  in 
bloody  street  battles  for  two  days.  (85)  Thousands  were 
killed,  mostly  Communists. 
Initially  the  Ba'th  Party  maintained  its  secrecy,  hiding 
behind  the  Nationalists,  to  make  it  look  as  if  the  coup  was  a 
Nationalist  achievement.  The  reason  for  this  lay  in  the  fact 
that  the  Baýthist  leadership  were  mostly  unknown  youth 
elements.  (86)  It  was  probably  also  due  to  their  fear  of 
revenge  attacks  resulting  from  their  purge  of  the 
communists.  (87)  On  the  first  day,  ýAbd  al-Saldm  'Arif  was 
formally  appointed  President  of  the  Bath  government.  This 
choice  was  probably  made  to  appeal  to  all  sides,  both  inside 
and  outside  Iraq,  as  he  was  well  known  and  popular  with  the 
army  and  the  general  population.  The  real  power  lay  in  the 
National  Council  of  Revolutionary  Command  (NCRC),  which  was 
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Party,  since  it  held  all  the  key  positions  of  power.  (88) 
There  was  a  shortage  of  Baýthists  in  the  military,  which  led 
to  many  sensitive  military  posts  being  held  by  non- 
Ba'thists.  (89)  This  thinness  of  military  support  was  one  of 
the  reasons  which  led  the  Party  to  give  more  weight  to  the 
National  Guard  in  the  beginning  as  its  power-base. 
On  the  first  day  of  the  coup,  the  new  plotters  declared 
their  initial  proclamation,  which  contained  grand  promises. 
on  15  March  the  internal  programme  was  broadcast  by  al-Bakr, 
who  was  the  Prime  Minister  of  the  new  regime,  which  called 
for  an  administration  in  which  the  masses  would  take  part  in 
running,  guiding  and  supervising  the  government,  which  would 
rely  not  only  on  the  Baýth  Party,  but  also  on  a  Front 
embracing  all  progressive  and  nationalist  organisations.  (90) 
But  the  Ba'thists  fulfilled  none  of  these  promises  and  stuck 
to  none  of  their  slogans. 
The  Baýthistsl  performance  was  politically  bankrupt  in 
every  sphere: 
a  (1)  Internal  affairs  Most  assessments,  including  pro- 
Ba'thist,  (91)  and  official  Party  statements,  (92)  agree  that 
the  Ba'thists  did  not  have  a  clear,  considered  programme. 
There  is  evidence  which  proves  that  the  Baýthists  did  not 
prepare  any  political  programme  in  advance.  (93)  This  was  due 
to  the  following: 
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political  vision  and  administrative  experience  to 
run  the  country.  This  was  probably  because  success 
in  the  Party  had  depended  on  ability  at  clandestine 
activities  and  conspiracy. 
(b)  Ba'thist  ideology  was  intellectually  barren,  as  al- 
Sa'di  acknowledged  later: 
-..,,  we  searched  till  weary  for  a  socialist 
thinker  who  might  help  us,  but  could  find 
none.  "(94) 
(c)  They  could  not  get  succour  from  the  National  Command 
of  the  Baýth  Party  because  it  was  itself  in  a  state 
of  paralysis,  with  no  idea  of  the  difficult  nature 
of  Iraqi  society.  (95) 
(d)  Most  important  of  all,  they  were  busy  struggling 
among  themselves  for  influence  and  power. 
I  Thus,  as  Batdtfi  notes,  the  Baýthists  used  violence  and 
adopted  one  party  rule  in  order  to  maintain  their  power-base 
and  control  their  domestic  crisis.  (96)  Indeed  the  one  party 
rule  and  violence  were  not  only  due  to  the  above  reasons 
alone,  nor  were  they  practised  only  by  some  radical  members 
of  the  Party,  like  al-Sa'd7i,  as  Devlin  notes,  (97)  and  as  the 
National  Command  of  the  Ba'th  Party  proclaimed,  (98)  to  clear 
itself  of  the  atrocities  committed  by  the  Iraqi  Ba'thists, 
which  embarrassed  the  Baýth  Party,  but  they  formed  one  of  the 
171 Baýth  Party's  doctrines.  Atrocity  was  the  natural  result  of 
their  philosophy  and  teaching,  as  expounded  by  their  leader, 
ýAflaq,  which  relied  on  it  and  suppressed  and  purged  all 
those  who  did  not  share  their  central  ideas.  (99)  Ba'th 
violence  and  ruthlessness  became  more  visible  when  they 
gained  power.  It  appeared  soon  after  the  coup  and  continued 
for  most  of  their  nine  months  in  power.  On  the  first  day  of 
the  coup  the  Ba"th  leadership  officially  authorised  the 
annihilation  of  any  opposition  to  the  regime.  (100) 
They  proclaimed  that  they  had  to  crush  all  resistance 
to  the  revolution,  which  harmed  the  interests  of  the  people 
and  the  State.  Their  main  target,  initially,  was  the 
Communists,  whom  they  wanted  to  expunge  completely  from  the 
political  scene  in  Iraq.  It  is  puzzling  that,  although  the 
Communists  had  warned  Qdsim  of  the  Baýthist  coup  and  told  him 
to  beware  of  their  activities  in  the  army,  (101)  they  did  not 
take  care  themselves  to  protect  themselves  against  the  coup. 
The  reason  for  this  may  be  the  fact  that  they  underestimated 
the  Baýthistsl  ability  and  the  extent  of  their  intrigue 
behind  the  scenes,  internally  and  externally.  They  also  over- 
estimated  themselves  because  of  their  influence  in  the  army 
and  other  mass  organisations.  They  did  not  notice  that  Qdsim 
had  allowed  too  many  Baýthists  and  Nationalists  to  gain  a 
foothold  in  the  army,  particularly  in  some  combat  units, 
regardless  of  the  risk,  in  order  to  balance  the  concentration 
of  the  Communists,  according  to  his  famous  see-saw  policy, 
enabling  Ba'thist  conspirators  and  their  allies  the 
opportunity  they  had  so  long  awaited. 
172 The  savagery  of  the  Bath's  ruthless  campaign  against 
the  opposition,  particularly  the  Communists,  was  beyond 
words.  There  are  many  stories  of  brutality  and  torture. 
Thousands  of  people  were  arrested,  including  women  and 
children.  Some  of  them  were  killed  in  secret,  while  others 
were  hanged  in  public.  (102)  The  news  of  Ba"thist  atrocities 
spread  throughout  Iraq  and  beyond  and  increasingly  affected 
their  reputation.  The  criticism  came  most  of  all  from  the 
Communist  countries.  The  Soviet  media  attacked  the  Baýth, 
with  Pravda  speaking  of  "a  wave  of  terror  in  Baghdad".  (103) 
It  caused  a  sharp  deterioration  in  relations  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  Soviet  economic  aid  to  the  Ba'th  slowed  down.  Arms 
deliveries  virtually  ceased,  particularly  after  the  outbreak 
of  the  Kurdish  war.  This  slowed  down  the  fighting  against  the 
Kurds,  owing  to  the  shortage  of  spare  parts  for  the  Soviet- 
supplied  weapons-(104)  However,  the  British  began  to  supply 
the  Ba'thists  with  weapons  on  request,  in  order  to  fight  the 
Kurds,  who  were  supposed  to  be  protected  by  the  British 
Government  because  of  their  previous  promises  to  them.  (105) 
The  National  Front,  from  the  Nasirites,  HarakTyyin  and 
the  newly-formed  Arab  Socialist  Party,  all  became  hostile  to 
the  regime  after  these  atrocities  and  the  stifling  of 
political  activity  in  Iraq.  (106) 
The  wholesale  murder  of  the  Communists  by  the  Baýthists 
disturbed  the  Kurds,  although  the  Ba'thists  initially 
declared  that  they  would  deal  with  the  Kurdish  problem 
peacefully.  This  was,  in  fact,  a  holding  measure  by  the 
Baýthists  until  they  were  ready  to  deal  with  them,  after  they 
173 had  been  rearmed  by  the  British  Government,  as  mentioned 
above. 
The  Kurds  welcomed  the  Ba'thist  coup  and  proclaimed  a 
cease-fire  because  of  their  secret,  prior  agreement  to  co- 
operate  with  them  in  the  overthrow  of  Qdsim,  in  return  for 
Ba'th  recognition  of  Kurdish  demands,  as  noted  in  Chapter 
One.  Devlin  notes  that  the  Baýthists  did  not  propose  an 
official  agreement  with  the  Kurds  before  the  coup,  except  for 
an  individual  attempt  by  Tdhir  Ya4y5,  who  was  a  shallow 
military  Baýthist-(107)  This  comment  indicates  the  negative 
attitude  of  the  Ba'thists  towards  their  allies,  in  the 
overthrow  of  Qdsim;  they  wanted  to  renew  the  war  and  purge  the 
Kurds,  the  wish  of  the  Baýthists  and  the  military  alike. 
Reading  Ba'th  Party  history  proves  that  the  Baýthists 
were  a  small  ineffective  minority,  passionately  eager  to  gain 
influence  and  power,  which  could  only  be  reached  through 
negotiating  successful  alliances.  As  soon  as  they  felt 
settled  and  ready  for  confrontation,  they  systematically 
eliminated  their  allies,  as  well  as  all  other  political 
organisations,  including  any  opposition  within  the  Ba'th 
Party  itself,  branding  them  as  traitors  and  instruments  of 
external  powers,  in  order  to  justify  their  attempts  to 
extinguish  them.  (108) 
(2)  On  the  objective  Ba'th  Level  The  Baýthists  and 
Nationalists  had  opposed  Qdsim  precisely  on  the  grounds  of  his 
luke-warmness  about  Arab  unity.  Thus,  when  they  gained  power 
they  decided  that  they  should  be  seen  to  be  acting  on  behalf 
174 of  Arab  unity  and  began  tripartite  discussions  about  unity  in 
Cairo,  which  failed  miserably  because  both  the  Ba'thists  and 
Nasir  were  insincere  on  this  point  and  both  worked  against  it 
behind  the  scenes.  The  tripartite  discussions  were  just  an 
attempt  to  display  their  credibility  on  this  subject  and  to 
corner  the  other  party.  (109)  It  was  one  of  the  reasons  that 
Nasir's  hatred  for  the  Ba'thists  did  much  to  bring  about  a 
change  in  the  Ba'th  government  in  November  1963  through  the 
pro-Nasir  element  in  Iraq,  with  the  co-operation  of  the 
Ba'thist  officers  (Tikr11t1s).  (110) 
With  regard  to  their  second  slogan,  freedom,  the  Ba'th 
Party  made  it  clear  from  the  first  day  of  the  coup  that  they 
did  not  tolerate  any  opposition  to  their  regime.  They  decided 
to  impose  their  own  point  of  view  on  the  opposition,  except 
when  it  seemed  beneficial  to  their  own  interests,  not  to  do 
so  even  though  this  may  have  been  contrary  to  their 
principles.  They  thought  that  all  the  opposition  were 
unpatriotic  and  an  instrument  for  outside  forces  and  that 
Iraq  and  the  Arab  nations  were  lucky  to  have  the  Ba'th  Party 
to  purge  the  deleterious  attitude  that  had  prevailed  before. 
Their  third  concept  was  socialism.  Devlin  notes  that  the 
Iraqi  Ba'thists,  particularly  al-Sa'di-  and  some  other  factions 
within  the  National  Command  in  Syria  were  not  keen  to  apply 
socialism  in  Iraq  or  Syria.  (111)  They  approached  socialism  in 
their  attempt  to  proclaim  their  ideological  purity  over  their 
opponents,  who  called  them  rightist.  This  was  due  to  the 
struggle  for  influence  and  power  between  the  two  wings  within 
the  Party,  which  suddenly  appeared  after  the  Baýthists  gained 
175 power  in  Iraq  and  Syria,  rather  to  a  change  of  political 
line. 
(3)  Internal  Baýth  Feuding  The  deep  split  in  the  Party 
leadership  in  Iraq  played  a  major  role  in  the  Ba"th  debacle 
in  November  1963.  The  differences  and  splits  were  deep-rooted 
and  had  existed  since  the  early  years  of  the  Baýth  Party  on 
the  political  scene,  as  noted  in  Chapter  One.  They  then 
developed  into  a  chronic  feature  of  the  Ba*th  Party,  but  when 
it  gained  power  they  became  more  serious  and  acute. 
Most  sources,  including  Baýthists  and  pro-Ba'thists, 
regarded  the  main  source  of  these  differences  among  the  Ba'th 
leadership  as  being  the  ruthless  activities  of  the  National 
Guard;  these  led  many  nationalist  elements  and  superficial 
Ba'thists  in  the  army  to  overthrow  the  Bath  Party.  (112) 
This  is  far  from  the  truth.  The  real  reason  for  the  split  in 
the  leadership  was  the  influence  of  the  National  Guard,  who 
acted  on  behalf  of  the  al-Sa'd-I  faction,  more  than  of  the 
ýAflaq  faction,  both  in  civilian  life  and  in  the  army  and 
threatened  the  lather's  position.  This  is  borne  out  by  the 
fact  that  the  initial  ruthlessness  of  the  National  Guard, 
exercised  on  behalf  of  the  Ba'th  Party,  which  was 
instrumental  in  the  success  of  the  coup,  the  crushing  of  the 
Communists  and  the  safeguarding  the  regime,  was  not  rejected 
by  the  Baýth  Party  or  their  allies,  the  Nationalists;  quite 
the  contrary,  it  had  the  blessing  of  Michel  'Aflaq  and  the 
support  of  all  the  Bathists.  Furthermore,  most  of  them  also 
were  guilty  of  committing  atrocities  as  shocking  as  those  of 
the  National  Guard.  (113) 
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the  two  factions.  (114)  The  moderate  wing,  led  by  1ýdzim  Jaw5d 
and  Tdlib  Shabib,  linked  with  most  of  the  senior  Ba'thist 
officers,  in  order  to  strengthen  its  power-base  in  the  state 
and  the  army.  The  militant  wing,  on  the  other  hand,  led  by 
al-Sa'di,  consolidated  its  hold  largely  on  the  Baýth  Party  and 
its  militia,  the  National  Guard,  to  balance  its  thinness  in 
military  support  and  in  the  NCRC,  in  particular  after  the 
Shabib/jawdd  wing  succeeded  in  shifting  al-Saý&  from  the 
Ministry  of  the  Interior  to  the  Ministry  of  Guidance.  This 
was  regarded  as  a  blow  to  al-Sa'd7i's  personal  power  and  an 
attempt  by  the  moderate  wing  to  reduce  the  influence  of  the 
al-Sa'd!  wing. 
The  apparent  success  of  the  al-Sa'd7i  wing  was  revealed 
when  al-Sa'd7i  and  his  partisans  dominated  the  Party  Regional 
Congress  of  September  1963.  Al-Sa'd-i  and  three  of  his 
followers  were  elected  to  the  new  regional  command  while  al- 
Sa'dils  opponent,  Tdlib  Shabib,  was  defeated,  despite  the 
military  support  for  his  wing  in  the  Congress;  This  was  later 
to  seem  to  be  superficial.  After  this  al-Sa'd7i  and  his  wing 
placed  themselves  on  the  left,  together  with  extremist 
infiltrates  from  Syria.  This  tactic  added,  in  no  small 
measure,  to  the  success  of  al-Sa'dI  and  his  wing  at  the  Sixth 
National  Congress  of  the  Baýth  Party  in  October  1963,  when  he 
won  most  of  the  seats  with  his  radical  socialist  ideas.  These 
manoeuvres  gave  a  clear  signal  that  al-Sa'd-I  and  his 
supporters  were  rebelling  against  'Aflaq  and  his  partisans, 
the  "rightists"  who  lost  their  influence  over  the  Party.  Thus 
177 they  decided  to  clear  out  the  extreme  left  group,  both  from 
Iraq  and  Syria.  This  was  done  by  employing  the  Vdzim  Jaw5d  and 
Tdlib  Shabib  groups,  which  had  been  expelled  from  the 
Regional  Congress,  and  by  calling  for  an  extraordinary 
regional  congress  -  to  settle  the  problems  within  the 
Party.  (115)  However,  Devlin  notes  that  the  true  intention  was 
to  elect  new  members  for  the  Party  leadership  in  Iraq.  (116) 
The  extraordinary  regional  congress  began  on  11  November 
1963.  It  was  confronted  by  an  armed  group  led  by  Colonel 
Mu4ammad  al-Mahddwi,  who  claimed  that  Michel  ýAflaq  had 
informed  him  that  a  number  of  extremists  (i.  e.  the  al- 
Sa'di/al-Fekak7i/al-Raý1  group)  had  tried  adversely  to  affect 
the  sixth  pan-Arab  Congress  contrary  to  the  interests  of  the 
Party  and  demanded  a  new  leadership  (i.  e.  'Aflaq).  The  new 
leadership  was  elected  under  the  naked  guns  of  Colonel  al- 
Mahd5w-1,  and  was  entirely  made  up  of  right-wing  members, 
including  a  large  number  of  army  officers,  while  the  al-Sa'd! 
group  was  ejected  and  escorted  by  soldiers  to  a  waiting  plane 
which  flew  them  to  Madrid,  without  even  their  passports.  (117) 
These  gangster  methods,  employed  by  the  Jawdd/Shabib  wing, 
were  largely  condemned  by  the  rank  and  file  of  the  Party,  who 
demanded  the  immediate  return  of  those  who  had  been  exiled. 
Al-Sa'dils  supporters  were  particularly  outspoken  and 
attacked  the  al-Rash-id  airforce  base  and  the  Presidential 
Palace.  The  Party  rank  and  file  and  the  National  Guard  took  a 
grip  on  the  political  situation  in  Baghdad.  This  sequence  of 
events  did  not  favour  "Aflaq  and  his  supporters  in  Iraq  urged 
two  Ba'thist  officers  (al-Bakr  and  ýAmmdsh)  to  appeal  to  the 
National  Command  for  help.  (118)  On  13  November,  'Aflaq,  Amin 
al-Udfiý  and  other  members  of  the  National  Command  of  the 
178 Baýth  Party  arrived  in  Baghdad.  On  the  next  day  a  meeting  of 
the  regional  and  pan-Arab  leadership  was  held,  in  which  it 
was  decided  to  eject  both  the  al-Sa'dif/al-Fekaki/al-Ra4l 
group,  i.  e.  the  so-called  left-wing,  and  the  al- 
Jaw5d/Shabib/al-Mihd5w1  group,  i.  e.  the  so-called  right-wing 
group.  This  led  to  two  dramatic  results:  one  was  the 
elevation  of  the  al-Bakr/'Ammdsh/Saddam,  so-called  centrist 
group  and  the  other  the  ruling  of  Iraq,  for  the  first  time 
since  the  British  occupation,  by  non-Iraqis,  i.  e.  ýAflaq.  The 
results  of  the  meetings  were  declared  on  15  November  1963: 
To  consider  the  Regional  Congress  held  in  Baghdad 
on  11  November  as  illegal  and  to  dissolve  the 
Regional  Command,  that  it  had  elected. 
(b)  To  dissolve  the  Regional  Command,  that  was  in  power 
when  the  Congress  was  held. 
(c)  To  invest  the  National  Command  with  all  the 
prerogatives  of  the  Regional  Command  in  Iraq. 
(d)  To  investigate  mistakes. 
(e)  To  restrict  the  power  of  passing  sentence  on  Iraqi 
Party  members  to  the  National  Command. 
To  hold  Party  elections  in  the  Iraqi  region  and  to 
hold  a  Regional  Congress  for  the  election  of  a  new 
Regional  Command  within  a  period  of  four 
months.  (119) 
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results  of  its  meeting,  particularly  when  it  was  announced 
that  the  National  Command  would  direct  affairs  in  Iraq  until 
the  new  Regional  Command  was  elected,  produced  a  very  tense 
atmosphere  and  a  feeling  of  dissatisfaction  in  Iraq.  'Arif 
tried  to  exploit  these  developments  in  his  favour.  He  moved 
quickly,  with  the  help  of  some  Ba'thist  army  officers, 
particularly  the  Tikr-itis,  to  overthrow  the  Bath  Party  and 
crush  all  resistance  and  to  assume  full  control  of 
Baghdad.  (120) 
As  for  the  pan-Arab  leadership  which  was  ruling  Iraq 
from  the  seat  of  government  in  Baghdad,  it  was  arrested,  as 
well  as  ýAflaq  and  the  Syrian  Head  of  State,  Amin  al-Hdfiz.  It 
is  thought  that  Tdhir  Yalýyd,  who  was  instrumental  in  the  coup 
as  Chief  of  Staff,  personally  arrested  ýAflaq  and  al-Udfiý, 
after  which  they  were  deported  back  to  Syria.  The  al- 
Jawdd/al-Shabib/al-Mahd5vd  group  supported  the  coup  while  in 
exile  in  Beirut.  Their  support  led  to  their  dismissal  from 
the  Party  during  its  Seventh  pan-Arabist  congress  held  in 
Syria  in  November  1964.  (121) 
This  indicates  that  the  Ba'thist  leaders  took  part  in 
the  destruction  for  their  own  personal  interest.  Ba'thists 
always  put  their  personal  ambitions  above  ideology  and,  in 
this  way,  are  no  better  than  gangsters.  Indeed  the  Ba'thists' 
alliance  with  'Arif  put  the  Baýth  Party  in  an  embarrassing 
situation  and  raised  questions  about  their  credibility;  this 
led  some  Baýthists  to  claim  that  those  elements  who  co- 
180 operated  with  'Arif  were  non-Ba'thist.  (122)  It  is  possible, 
if  the  events  preceding  the  11  October  1963  Congress  are 
analysed,  to  perceive  that  there  was  a  plan  by  the  Tikrit! 
elements,  who  were  in  league  with  ýAflaq.  The  truth  is  that 
the  Tikr-itlis,  i.  e.  al-Bakr,  Phir  Ya4yd,  Uard5n  al-Tikritli, 
Rash7id  Muqli4  (a  cousin  of  al-Bakr)  and,  of  course,  Saddam, 
were  increased  the  dispute  between  the  two  wings  of  the 
Party,  as  they  had  absolutely  no  Tikr-itis  among  them  and  were 
almost  entirely  Shi'ah,  with  the  exception  of  al-Saýdl,  though 
he  was  even  more  anti-Tikriti  than  the  Shi'ah.  Surviving 
members  of  the  two  wings  have  been  admitting  publicly  for 
decades  that  they  were  played  upon  by  the  Tikrit!  clan,  who 
encouraged  each  wing  to  cut  the  throat  of  the  other.  (123)  The 
Tikr-it!  wing,  which  called  itself  the  Central  wing,  was  highly 
acrobatic  in  its  dealings  with  the  other  two  wings,  who 
formed  the  mass  of  the  Party,  particularly  in  the  famous 
defection  of  some  other  than  Saddam  from  the  al-Sa'd!  wing  to 
the  al-Bakr/Tikriti  wing;  many  Tikrit!  officers  who  were 
initially  with  al-Sa'di-  then  also  changed  over  and  joined 
their  village  wing-(124)  The  gangster  method  the  Party 
employed  was  even  more  sinister  in  the  way  the  Tikr-itis  went 
about  the  business  of  removing  their  comrades  from  the  other 
wings.  (125)  'Aflaq  was  so  pleased  with  the  TikrTt!  wing  that 
he  rewarded  them  with  the  largest  share  of  seats  on  the  Party 
leadership.  (126)  The  tragedy  of  Iraq  was  about  to  begin. 
The  central  wing  (the  Tikr-itis)  displayed  their  skilful 
manipulation  of  circumstances  and  turning  each  time  to  the 
side  that  had  the  upper  hand,  in  order  to  seize  power,  even 
at  the  expense  of  their  principles.  In  bringing  down  Qdsim, 
181 the  unit  that  took  part  with  the  Ba'thists  was  later  accused 
of  being  with  the  CIA.  They  were  the  same  forces  who  played  a 
role  in  the  struggle  between  the  Party  wings  and  so  delivered 
a  blow  to  the  Party  from  behind.  They  later  joined  'Arif  in 
ousting  the  Bath  Party  from  government,  when  they  saw  that 
the  balance  of  power  had  gone  in  favour  of  'Arif,  and  they 
were  rewarded  with  key  posts  in  'Arif's  first  cabinet  as 
follows: 
(1)  Alynad  Hasan  al-Bakr  became  'Arif  Is  Vice-President. 
(2)  H'ard5n  al-Tikr-it!  became  Deputy  Commander  in  Chief  of  the 
armed  forces  and  Minister  of  Defence.  He  issued  the 
orders  for  the  disposition  of  the  forces  to  suppress  the 
National  Guard.  This  event  was  exploited  by  his  enemies 
in  internal  personal  feuds,  as  we  will  see  in  the  next 
chapter.  Indeed,  this  kind  of  personal  feud  has 
characterised  the  Party's  history  from  its  first  years 
until  the  present  day. 
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Education  and  Health,  respectively. 
There  were  the  same  forces  who  began  to  conspire  against 
'Arif  when  he  dismissed  them  from  his  government.  This 
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the  next  chapter. 
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Saddam's  early  years  and 
his  role  throughout  "'Arif  regime Saddam,  ls  earlv  life 
The  subject  of  the  activities  of  the  Baýth  Party, 
during  the  period  between  their  dismissal  by  Arif  and 
their  return  to  power,  has  not  yet  been  fully 
investigated,  because  we  have  not  yet  spoken  of 
character  of  Saddam  Husayn,  who  had  the  leading  role  in 
the  Ba'th  region  in  Iraq  at  that  time.  This  will  be 
concerned  in  this  chapter. 
As  we  have  noted  before,  the  end  of  the  1940s  and  the 
1950s  saw  important  events  in  the  Middle  East,  such  as  the 
creation  of  the  Jewish  state,  and  the  rise  of  anti-Israeli 
sentiment,  particularly  after  the  humiliating  Arab  defeats 
at  the  hands  of  Israel,  due  to  western  support  for  the 
Israelis.  Iraq  joined  Britain,  Turkey,  Iran  and  Pakistan  in 
forming  a  regional  defence  organisation  known  as  "the 
Baghdad  Pact"  (it  was  most  unpopular  with  the  Iraqi 
people),  which  was  designed  to  protect  the  Middle  East  from 
Soviet  expansionism.  There  was  also  the  tripartite 
aggression  by  France,  Britain  and  Israel  against  Egypt  (the 
Suez  Crisis).  These  developments  created  a  rebellious 
feeling  and  anti-Imperialist  movements  throughout  the  Arab 
world.  The  nationalist  movements  were  the  most  obvious  of 
these  political  movements,  and  they  promoted  President 
Jamal  'Abd  al-Nasir  of  Egypt  as  the  sole  leader  of  the  Arab 
world.  These  turbulent  currents  throughout  the  Arab  world 
created  in  Iraq  a  mood  of  rebellion  against  the  pro-western 
200 governments  and  brought  the  monarchy  to  an  end,  in  the 
revolution  of  14  July  1958. 
It  was  during  this  volatile  period  that  Saddam  grew 
up.  The  events  of  this  time,  coming  on  top  of  his  deprived 
and  violent  childhood,  appear  to  have  affected  his 
naturally  unstable  character  considerably.  It  is  this 
period  of  his  life,  before  he  assumed  the  leading  role  in 
the  Baýth  Party  during  'Arif's  period,  that  we  shall 
investigate  in  this  section. 
Different  writers  have  produced  often  conflicting 
accounts  of  Saddam's  life.  The  reference  relied  upon  is 
that  of  Fuldd  Maýar,  who  wrote  the  official  Iraqi  biography 
of  Saddam,  which  was  approved  by  Saddam.  It  even  includes 
the  crimes  and  adventures  in  which  Saddam  was  involved  in 
his  youth,  and  which  Maýar  and  Saddam  bragged  about  as  a 
manifestation  of  his  courage  and  heroism.  Such  misguided 
concepts  of  courage  and  heroism  existed  in  pre-Islamic 
Arabia.  Ba'thist  literature  admired  pre-Islamic  Arabia  for 
its  culture  and  way  of  life  of  raiding,  plundering,  robbery 
and  conquest. 
According  to  the  official  account,  Saddam  was  born  on 
28  April  1937  in  a  small  provincial  village  called  al- 
'Awjdh  near  Tikt-it,  a  hundred  miles  north  of  Baghdad.  Tikt-it 
had  historically  been  a  centre  of  defiance  to  external 
invaders,  such  as  the  Tatdrs  in  1258. 
201 Saddam  had  always  been  proud  of  this  and  held  his 
birthplace  in  great  affection.  (1)  Yet,  despite  his  fondness 
for  Tikr-it,  he  had  a  troubled  childhood.  His  family  were  of 
a  lowly  peasant  background.  His  place  of  birth  was  a  mud 
hut.  The  circumstances  which  surround  Saddam's  birth  and 
his  father  are  still  shrouded  in  uncertainty.  Contradictory 
assertions  have  been  made  about  his  father,  Husayn  al- 
Majid,  (2)  who  was  a  poor  landless  peasant.  One  account  has 
suggested  that  his  father  died  either  just  before  or  just 
after  Saddam's  birth,  while  others  say  that  his  father 
deserted  his  family.  His  official  biographies  shed  little 
light  on  this.  An  opposition  account  alleges  that  Saddam. 
was  illegitimate,  and  I  concur  with  the  latter  as  it  ties 
in  with  his  mother's  bad  reputation,  (3)  which  damaged  him 
psychologically  and  may  account  for  his  psychopathic 
behaviour. 
Whatever  the  truth,  all  references  agree  that-his 
mother,  ýab4ah  Talf54,  married  Ibrdh-im  al-Iýasan  directly 
after  Uusayn  al-Majid's  disappearance,  and  lived  with  him 
in  the  village  of  al-Shawaysh,  leaving  her  son  entrusted  to 
the  care  of  his  uncle,  Khayr  Allah  Talf54,  an  army  officer 
and  Nazi-sympathiser,  discharged  from  the  army  and 
imprisoned  for  five  years,  for  supporting  the  RashId  ýAli 
movement,  which  the  British  suppressed  in  1941. 
Saddam's  later  recollection  of  this  event  was  that  it 
inspired  him  with  nationalist  feeling  and  made  him 
resentful  of  foreign  influence.  (4)  This  recollection  may  be 
202 true,  because  he  inherited  from  his  uncle  an  admiration  for 
Nazi  principles  and  grew  up  with  Baýthist  ideas,  whose 
philosophy  was  based  on  the  ideology  of  German  National 
Socialism  and  on  Italian  Fascism.  But  his  allegation  that 
he  had  a  deep  hatred  for  foreign  influence(5)  is  far  from 
the  true;  his  political  behaviour  from  his  earliest  days 
until  the  present  has  proved  the  opposite. 
At  any  rate,  the  first  ten  years  of  Saddam's  life  were 
spent  moving  between  Talfd4ls  home  and  that  of  his  mother 
and  her  husband.  His  mother's  decision  to  remarry  and 
relieve  herself  of  responsibility  for  her  son's  upbringing 
allowed  Saddam  to  lead  an  aimless  life.  Lonely,  with  no  one 
having  any  interest  in  him,  he  had  to  look  after  himself 
from  his  very  early  years.  (6)  His  stepfather,  Uasan  al- 
Majid,  was  an  uneducated  and  crude  man.  He  used  to  enjoy 
himself  by  humiliating  Saddam  and  beating  him.  He  denied 
him  any  education  and  prevented  him  from  attending  school, 
forcing  him,  instead,  to  steal  for  him.  As  a  result  of 
this,  Saddam  was  arrested  and  confined  in  a  juvenile 
detention  centre-(7) 
It  was  in  this  atmosphere  that  Saddam  spent  his 
childhood.  He  grew  up  as  an  orphan  and  an  outcast.  He  had 
to  struggle  to  earn  a  living  in  an  illegal  way  to  survive 
in  his  very  early  years,  without  the  support  of  his  family 
or  an  uncaring  society.  He  also  had  no  friends  among  the 
village  boys,  who  often  mocked  him  for  being  fatherless. 
His  only  friend  was  his  cousin  ýAdndn  Khayr  Alldh,  three 
203 years  his  junior,  and  his  future  Defence  Minister.  Most 
references  agree  that  he  used  to  carry  an  iron  bar  to 
protect  himself  against  attacks,  and  that  he  often  amused 
himself  by  killing  animals.  (8) 
In  this  difficult  existence,  which  was  governed  by 
hard,  cruel  tribal  customs,  corruption,  lawlessness  and 
murder,  in  addition  to  his  miserable  childhood,  Saddam. 
learnt  to  be  ruthless  and  to  love  guns  from  the  age  of  ten, 
as  his  official  biography  notes.  (9)  These  factors  probably 
account  for  his  abnormal  behaviour.  He  hated  his  family, 
who  neglected  him,  when  he  needed  them  most.  He  also  hated 
society,  which  humiliated  him  all  the  time. 
It  seems  that  Saddam's  harsh  and  brutal  childhood  are 
things  he  is  not  proud  of  or  wants  known.  In  his  own 
recollection,  when  he  became  President,  he  tried  to  play 
down  the  poverty  and  misery  of  his  childhood  and  did  not 
admit  that  it  had  any  long-term  effect  on  him. 
11  Lif  8  was  difficult  everywhere  in 
Iraq  ....  very  few  people  wore  shoes.  And  in  many 
cases  they  only  wore  them  on  special  occasions. 
Some  peasants  would  not  put  their  shoes  on  until 
they  had  reached  their  destination  so  they  would 
look  smart.  -(10) 
In  his  interview  with  his  biographer,  Fuldd  Matar, 
I 
Saddam  said  that  he  never  felt  at  a  social  disadvantage  and 
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was  a  peasant's  son,  because  the  f  eudal  authority,  which 
had  invaded  many  parts  of  Iraq  at  that  time,  never  reached 
the  central  parts  of  Iraq  where  he  came  from.  (11)  Saddam's 
official  biographies  also  confirm  that  the  young  Saddam, 
despite  the  abuse  that  he  had  experienced,  never  withdrew 
within  himself,  and  faced  his  difficult  life  like  a 
man.  (12) 
From  these  statements,  can  we  deduce  that  Saddam's 
criminal  mind  is  actually  genetically  inherited  and  has  not 
been  influenced  by  his  upbringing?  Saddam.  admitted  that 
most  Iraqis  were  poor.  This  did  not  lead  them  all  to  become 
psychopathic  murderers,  so  his  environment  cannot  be 
entirely  blamed  for  his  behaviour. 
It  was  indeed  unfortunate  for  Iraq  that  a  person  with 
these  complexes  and  this  hatred  of  society  should  become 
the  head  of  state.  All  the  destruction  and  ruin  that  Iraq 
has  experienced  reflects  how  much  he  hates  society.  The 
problems  that  he  has  caused  Iraq  were  predictable,  and  it 
is  likely  that  if  he  continues  in  power  he  will  inflict 
more  catastrophes,  not  only  on  Iraq,  but  on  the  whole 
region  and  the  world. 
However,  in  1947,  shortly  after  his  uncle's  release 
from  prison,  he  left  his  mother  and  stepfather  and  returned 
to  Khayr  Alldh's  home  in  TikrIt,  where  he  began  attending 
school,  with  the  help  and  encouragement  of  his  cousin 
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could  not  even  spell  his  own  name  the  age  of  ten.  But  the 
support  and  guiding  hand  of  his  uncle,  Talfdh,  who  became 
inspector  of  a  local  primary  school  following  his  release 
from  prison,  kept  Saddam  going  through  his  difficult  school 
years.  (13)  In  Saddam's  eyes,  Khayr  Alldh  was  an 
intellectual,  who  understood  the  value  of  education.  (14) 
Khayr  All5h's  influence  on  Saddam's  life  seems 
critical.  He  probably  had  the  most  influence  over  Saddam  in 
forming  his  character.  He  played  the  role  of  father  to  him, 
and  it  was  with  him  that  Saddam  identified,  as  both  model 
and  mentor.  It  was  he  who  introduced  Saddam  to  people  who 
were  play  a  key  role  in  his  rise  to  power,  including  Alýmad 
Hasan  al-Bakr,  Khayr  All5h1s  relative  and  close  friend 
throughout  the  1940s  and  1950s.  Following  in  Talfah's 
footsteps,  Saddam  applied  to  the  Baghdad  Military  Academy, 
but  he  failed  the  entrance  examination  due  to  his  poor 
academic  record.  Even  his  uncle's  mediation  with  Tikr!  tT 
officers,  who  had  great  influence  in  the  Military  Academy 
and  the  government  at  that  time,  was  ineffective.  (15) 
His  unfulfilled  ambition  to  put  on  an  officer's 
uniform  was  to  haunt  him  for  two  decades  until,  in  1976,  he 
had  the  rank  of  General  conferred  upon  him  by  President  al- 
Bakr,  although  he  had  never  served  in  the  Iraqi  Military 
Forces.  It  would  seem  that  Khayr  Alldh's  home  provided 
Saddam  with  a  useful  classroom,  in  which  he  took  his  first 
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for  the  future. 
What  kind  of  inf  luence  did  the  uncle  have  on  his 
nephew?  We  can  understand  this  from  Khayr  Alldh's  public 
and  political  behaviour  in  future  years,  when  Saddam  began 
to  rise  in  power,  and  Khayr  Alldh  obtained  high  office  and 
a  considerable  fortune.  A  greedy  and  exploitative  person, 
he  used  his  position  as  Mayor  of  Baghdad  to  the  full,  in 
order  to  accumulate  great  wealth.  His  corruption  reached 
such  preposterous  proportions  that  Saddam  was  eventually 
forced  to  remove  him  from  office,  shortly  before  the 
occupation  of  Kuwait.  Seventeen  Companies  run  by  Khayr 
Alldh  were  closed  and  their  executives  arrested,  but  it 
seems  that  the  real  reason  for  Saddam's  action  against  his 
uncle  was  not  his  corruption  and  exploitation  of  his 
position,  since  Saddam's  greed  and  corruption  are  no  less 
than  his  uncle's.  After  Saddam's  occupation  of  Kuwait,  many 
newspapers  pointed  out  his  fantastic  wealth  and  his 
accounts  in  foreign  banks.  The  real  reason  was  a  family 
rift,  due  to  his  affair  with,  and  then  marriage  to,  Saiffrah 
al-Sh5hbandar,  ex-wife  of  the  Chairman  of  Iraq  Airways.  The 
Talf54  family  sided  with  their  daughter  Sdjidah  (Saddam's 
wife  and  Khayr  Alldh's  daughter)  over  Saddam's  involvement 
with  Mrs  Sh5hbandar.  The  dispute  ended  only  when  ýAdndn 
Khayr  Alldh  was  killed,  (16)  in  a  more  than  suspicious 
helicopter  crash,  soon  afterwards.  In  this  episode,  Saddam 
made  his  attitude  very  clear,  that  even  blood  links  were  no 
guarantee  of  survival,  if  they  stood  against  his  ambitions. 
207 His  uncle  Talf5h,  also  provided  Saddam  with  I 
his  first 
opportunity  to  kill  at  an  early  age.  There  is  a  widely 
circulated  story  that,  at  the  age  of  twenty,  he  was 
implicated  in  the  murder  of  his  relative  Saýdgn  al-Tikt-iti, 
in  his  hometown,  and  that  he  was  thrown  in  jail.  He  was 
freed  six  months  later,  owing  to  lack  of  evidence  against 
him.  The  motive  for  this  murder  is  still  unclear.  It  may 
have  been  a  political  dispute  or  a  family  feud.  According 
to  Islamic  opposition  sources,  Saddam  killed  a  relative  at 
the  behest  of  Vasan  Ibrdhlm.  (17) 
Another  more  reliable  source  (through  personal 
relations  with  people  close  to  Khayr  Alldh  T,  alf5h)  reveals 
that  Saýdfin  al-TikrItI,  also  known  as  Sa'dfln  al-Ndqirl,  was 
one  of  Saddam's  uncles  and  had  informed  on  Khayr  Alldh 
Talf5hIs  suspicious  activities  during  the  old  regime, 
II 
because  he  was  a  Communist  supporter  of  Qdsim.  As  a  result, 
Khayr  A115h  was  demoted  from  his  post  in  the  directorate  of 
education  in  Baghdad  to  a  smaller  post  as  inspector  for 
primary  schools.  Thus,  Khayr  Alldh  incited  Saddam  to  murder 
Sa'd5n.  (18) 
Baýthist  sources  confirm  that  Saddam  killed  his 
relative  Sa'd0n  al-Tikriti  after  a  family  dispute  about 
politics,  because  he  was  Communist.  It  was  no  crime  to 
disregard  Saddam's  offence.  Such  claims  were  common.  (19) 
Saddam's  biography  notes,  concerning  this  event,  that  he 
was  accused  of  having  killed  an  official  in  TikrTit  soon 
208 after  the  1958  revolution,  but  was  released  as  a  result  of 
national  pressure.  (20) 
However,  in  1955  at  the  age  of  18,  he  graduated  from 
primary  school  and  followed  his  uncle  to  Baghdad  where  he 
attended  the  Karkh  high  school.  The  political  mood  in  Iraq 
at  that  time,  as  we  have  noted  above,  was  restless.  Public 
dissatisfaction  reached  its  peak  in  the  autumn  of  1956, 
when  widespread  riots  overwhelmed  Baghdad  in  reaction  to 
the  regime's  inactivity  during  the  Suez  Crisis.  Saddam 
rushed  into  anti-regime  activities  during  these  heated 
days,  participating  in  demonstrations  and  riots.  (21)  He 
felt  at  home  in  this  turbulent  atmosphere  and  found 
political  intrigue  more  attractive  than  schoolwork.  His 
uncle's  activities  during  the  old  regime  had  inspired  him 
to  political  activism.  The  lack  of  close  emotional  ties  in 
his  early  childhood  had  taught  him  to  scheme  and  manipulate 
in  order  to  survive,  and  he  found  anti-government 
activities  far  more  gratifying  than  study,  preferring  to 
spend  his  time  in  the  service  of  his  new-found  cause,  the 
Ba'th  Party. 
209 Saddam  Husayn's  membershiv  of  the  Ba'th  Party 
Saddam  joined  the  Ba'th  Party  in  early  1957  at  the  age 
of  twenty,  (22)  when  he  was  probably  recruited  by  ýAbd  al- 
Khdliq  al-Samarrd'!,  a  municipal  clerk,  who  was  to  become 
one  of  the  Party's  chief  ideologists.  SamarrVT  was  to 
suffer  a  similar  fate  to  that  of  many  who  were  close  to 
Saddam  in  the  early  years  of  his  climbing  to  power.  It 
seems  that  he  was  the  one  who  brought  Saddam  into  the  Ba'th 
Party,  and  he  probably  knew  of  his  skill  with  firearms  and 
the  way  in  which  he  had  formerly  acted  as  a  hired  killer 
with  other  local  thugs  in  Juýayfir  and  Karkh.  (23) 
Saddam's  later  recollection  of  what  drove  him  to  join 
the  Balth  Party  was  its  commitment  to  the  idea  of  Arab 
Nationalism;  this  appealed  to  him  before  he  became  a  member 
of  the  Party,  because  his  uncle  inspired  him  with  a  great 
nationalistic  feeling.  The  nation's  problems  became  part  of 
his  conscience,  and  this  made  the  Party  part  of  him.  (24) 
However,  it  is  more  likely  that  Saddam  was  attracted 
to  Ba'thism  because  it  proved  opportune  to  his  needs  by 
enabling  him  to  practice  his  ruthlessness,  and  his  talent 
for  underground  activities,  the  use  of  weapons  and 
conspiracy.  These  qualities  also  suited  the  needs  of  the 
Baýth  Party,  particularly  ýAflaqls,  who  promoted  Saddam  to 
be  a  key  figure  in  the  Iraq  branch  of  the  BýL'th  Party. 
210 Saddam's  first  function,  during  his  earliest  days  in 
the  Balth,  was  to  incite  his  high-school  mates  into  anti- 
government  activities.  He  did  this  with  great  enthusiasm, 
rallying  the  students  (as  well  as  some  local  thugs)  into  an 
organised  gang  that  struck  fear  into  the  heart  of  the 
inhabitants  of  the  suburb  of  Karkh,  (25)  by  beating  innocent 
people  and  committing  other  ruthless  acts  with  his  lawless 
followers  under  the  pretext  of  political  activism. 
While  he  was  still  a  low-ranking  new  member  of  the 
Ba'th,  he  was  given  an  obscure  mission,  to  act  in  a 
supporting  role,  as  bodyguard  for  the  would-be  assassins  of 
'Abd  al-Ka2:  "j-m  Qdsim.  However,  later,  when  he  obtained  power, 
he  was  represented  by  his  media  as  the  hero  of  the 
operation,  as  we  shall  see  in  the  next  section. 
211 Saddam  Husayn's  involvement  in  the  attempt  to 
assassinate  ýAbd  al-Karim  Oasim 
To  unravel  the  reason  behind  the  attempt  by  the  Ba'th 
Party  to  assassinate  ýAbd  al-Karlm  Qdsim  in  1959,  it  is 
necessary  to  take  into  consideration  the  complication  of 
the  regional  and  international  political  situation 
(mentioned  before),  that  may  have  contributed  to  this 
attempt,  which  was  regarded  by  the  Ba'th  as  one  of  its  most 
sophisticated  operations  to  date. 
One  of  the  Baýth  Party's  practices,  as  mentioned 
before,  was  to  use  people  outside  the  law  against  their 
political  opponents.  When  he  found  that  Saddam  had  excelled 
in  using  weapons  from  a  young  age,  and  had  just  been 
released  from  prison,  Fuldd  al-Rik5b-1,  the  leader  of  the 
Iraqi  Baýth  Party  since  1952,  having  decided  that  killing 
Qdsim  was  the  only  way  to  stem  the  tide  of  Communism,  (26) 
saw  Saddam  as  an  asset  to  the  Party,  who  could  take  part  in 
the  attempted  assassination.  His  role  in  this  operation  was 
no  more  than  that  of  a  bodyguard,  as  has  been  said,  because 
of  his  skill  in  using  a  gun  and  his  talent  and  experience 
in  killing. 
The  official  accounts  of  the  operation  say  that  five 
men,  including  Saddam,  were  selected  and  trained  to 
participate  in  the  actual  operation.  Four  were  chosen  to 
carry  out  the  attack.  (27)  Two  were  to  fire  at  the  front 
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was  just  to  stand  on  the  pavement  and  cover  the  escape  of 
his  fellow  assassins.  He  was  not  supposed  to  fire.  (28) 
However,  as  the  operation  got  under  way  he  ignored  the 
original  plan,  acted  independently  and  opened  f  ire  on 
Qdsim.  As  Matar  notes  in  his  biography: 
11  when  he  found  himself  face  to  face  with  the 
dictator,  he  was  unable  to  restrain  himself.  He 
forgot  all  the  instructions  and  immediately 
opened  fire.  "(29) 
% 
He  confused  his  partners,  resulting  in  the  failure  of 
the  mission.  In  fact,  he  enabled  Qdsim's  bodyguard  to  open 
fire  himself,  whereupon  the  assassins  retreated.  Saddam's 
abortive  action  thus  produced  the  opposite  result  from  that 
which  the  Ba'th  hoped  for. 
In  the  process,  the  leader  of  the  operation,  'Abd  al- 
Wahhdb  al-Gharayrl  was  killed  by  Saddam's  fire,  and  Sarril-r 
al-Najm  was  hit  in  the  chest.  Saddam  himself  was  injured  in 
the  left  leg,  also  by  friendly  fire.  (30)  Qdsim  was  also 
wounded  in  the  hand,  but  within  weeks  had  recovered.  During 
this  time,  his  chief  of  staff,  Aýmad  ý51ilý  al  'Abd7i  managed 
to  control  the  country.  (31) 
Years  after  this  incident,  when  Saddam  had  reached  his 
goal  and  gained  absolute  power,  his  semi-official 
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described  the  operation  as  'legend'.  It  embodied  Saddam's 
brave  and  heroic  actions  and  made  him  into  a  great  leader 
and  a  national  hero.  In  fact,  any  attempt  on  Qdsim's  life 
at  that  time  should  have  been  extremely  easy,  because  he 
used  to  wander  the  streets  of  Baghdad  alone,  without 
protection.  (32) 
From  Saddam's  behaviour  in  the  attempted  assassination 
we  may  derive  the  following  points: 
(1)  Disobedience  to  Instructions:  This  appears  to  be 
a  dominant  characteristic  in  Saddam;  he  takes  pleasure  in 
breaking  laws  and  conventions,  whether  on  a  parochial  or  an 
international  level. 
(2)  Tyranny:  In  times  of  crisis,  Saddam  tends  to  show  his 
ferocious  temper.  He  loses  control  of  himself,  and  acts 
only  tyrannically.  (33) 
(3)  incorrect  Decisions:  Saddam,  s  tendency  to  make 
incorrect  decisions  appears  to  stem  from  his  dislike  of 
anyone  else's  sharing  in  the  process.  The  results,  so  far, 
have  been  unfortunate. 
(4)  Bloodthirstiness:  When  he  found  that  he  had  a 
weapon  in  his  hand  and  a  victim  in  front  of  him,  he  could 
not  resist  opening  fire.  This  is  backed  up  by  the  notes  of 
his  semi-official  biographer,  (34)  who  says  that  Saddam 
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during  the  regime  of  'Abd  al-Sal5m  'Arif.  According  to  this 
biographer,  Saddam  said  that  he  fired  at  'Abd  al-Kat-im,  not 
because  he  hated  him  -  he  said  that  he  had  nothing  against 
him  -  but  because  he  could  not  resist  firing  when  he  had  a 
target  in  front  of  him.  He  did,  however,  say  something 
completely  different  when  he  came  to  power  -  that  he 
attempted  to  assassinate  'Abd  al-Karlm  because  he  had 
swerved  from  the  original  path  of  the  14  July  revolution, 
and  that  that  was  why  he  had  to  be  removed  from  power. 
(5)  Betrayal:  He  exiled,  imprisoned,  tortured  or  killed 
almost  all  his  partners  in  the  attempt,  when  he 
reached  power: 
(a)  Fuldd  al-RikWi:  the  brains  behind  the  operation. 
Saddam  accused  him  of  being  a  spy  for  the  CIA, 
and  he  was  imprisoned,  then  executed  in  prison, 
by  order  of  Saddam.  (35) 
(b)  Salim  al  Zaybaq:  the  f  irst  to  be  poisoned  by 
Saddam  with  Thalium.  Most  people  thought  that  he 
had  died  of  cancer.  (36) 
(c)  ýAydd  Saýld  Th5bit:  Saddam  tried  to  assassinate 
him  many  times  but  failed.  He  fled  the  country 
and  is  still  living  in  exile. 
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wife's  deaths  in  a  car  accident.  (37) 
(e)  SamTr  al-Najm:  Saddam  planned  for  him  to  die  in 
an  air  crash,  together  with  another  of  his 
assassins,  IýamfldT  al-ýAzdwlf.  However  SamIr  al-Najm 
survived  the  crash.  He  begged  for  his  life  and  is 
still  alive;  he  was  given  an  inferior  post  in  the 
Ministry  of-Irrigation.  (38) 
"Abd  al-Kar-im  al-Shaykhll:  He  remained  Saddam's 
partner  for  twenty  years  and  carried  out  some 
dangerous  missions  for  him.  Saddam  arranged  for 
him  to  be  assassinated  on  8  April  1980,  when  he 
was  about  to  retire  from  his  duties  as  Foreign 
Minister. 
After  the  failed  attempt,  the  assassins  managed  to  get 
away  to  one  of  the  Party's  hide-outs  in  the  capital.  One  of 
the  leading  members  of  the  Baýth  Party  contacted  a  student 
doctor,  Ta4sIn  al-Mu'alld,  who  was  a  Baýthist  from  the 
Baghdad  College  of  Medicine.  Mu'alld  was  driven  to  the 
safe-house  and  there  treated  two  wounded  men.  Saddam  denies 
any  recollection  of  this.  (39)  After  a  while,  Saddam  decided 
to  leave  the  safe-house,  and,  subsequently,  the  country, 
minutes  before  the  intelligence  service  arrived.  This,  of 
course,  aroused  suspicion;  all  of  Saddam's  partners  were 
arrested  and  tried  in  public  by  the  People's  Court, 
presided  over  by  Colonel  F5#1  'Abb5s  al-Mahddw"L  Most  of 
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imprisonment;  six  were  sentenced  to  death,  but  the 
sentences  were  never  carried  out.  (40) 
The  sentence  that  al-MahdAwT  and  his  court  pronounced 
on  February  26  assigned  guilt  to  the  National  Command  of 
the  Baýth  Party  for  having  planned  the  assassination.  (41) 
The  National  Command's  response  to  the  court's 
accusation  was  conflicting.  At  one  time  it  denied  its 
involvement.  (42)  Then,  at  the  Fourth  National  Congress  of 
the  Party,  held  in  June  1960,  it  condemned  the  operation 
and  reliance  on  political  assassination  in  order  to  effect 
changes  in  reactionary  conditions.  (43)  At  another  time,  it 
alleged  that  Qdsim's  own  murder  of  the  people's  leaders,  of 
army  officers  and  intellectual  youths,  by  means  of  dragging 
them  through  the  streets  without  trial  except  by  Mahddwils 
false  tribunal,  had  incited  a  number  of  patriotic  youths, 
in  a  spirit  of  self-defence,  to  act  in  that  manner.  (44) 
When  al-Rikdbl  and  al-Rim5wi,  the  Jordanian  Regional 
Secretary  of  the  Ba'th  Party  combined,  with  Cairo's 
support,  against  the  authority  of  the  National  Command  and 
formed  their  own  rival  Ba'th  organisation,  (45)  the  Ba'th 
Party  issued  a  statement  blaming  al-Rik5bT  and  his 
associates  on  the  Regional  Command  in  Iraq  for  their 
unauthorised  attempt  to  assassinate  Q5sim,  with  the 
encouragement  of  the  UAR  Leaders  in  Syria.  (46)  Devlin  sided 
with  the  position  of  the  National  Command  and  gave  evidence 
to  support  this  view.  (47) 
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book  al-Hal  al-'Awhad,  (the  only  solution)  supports  the 
theory  that  the  UAR  was  involved  in  inciting  al-Rikdb-i  to 
make  the  attempt,  we  may  conclude  from  the  Ba'th's  public 
statement  justifying  its  political  position  in  trying  to 
oust  Qdsim,  that  he  was  under  the  influence  of  the 
Communists,  who  were  working  to  push  'Iraq  into  the  Eastern 
camp  and  to  introduce  it  into  the  cold  war  and  into 
international  conflict.  (48)  The  USSR,  on  the  other  hand, 
thought  that  Q5sim  had  pushed  the  Iraq  Communists  aside  and 
that  they  had  no  effect  on  the  government's  decisions, 
polices  or  the  running  of  the  country.  (49) 
Thus,  it  is  more  likely  that  the  Iraqi  Baýthist 
leaders  also  had  the  National  Command's  approval  to 
assassinate  Qasim  and  that  the  attempt  was  carried  out  with 
its  blessing,  even  though  the  evidence  is  not  conclusive. 
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Saddam  f  led  to  Tiktlit,  before  making  his  way  to  Syria, 
together  with  'Abd  al-Kar-im  al-Shaykhl!  and  Fu'dd  al-Rik5b-I, 
where  he  was  warmly  received  by  the  National  Command  in 
Damascus  and  the  Ba'th  leader,  Michel  'Aflaq,  who  promoted 
him  later  to  the  highest  rank  in  the  Party.  (50)  Other 
distinguished  leaders  who  had  taken  part  in  the  attempted 
assassination  were  unable  to  attain  any  comparable 
position.  Saddam  stayed  in  Syria  for  six  months,  before 
going  to  Cairo. 
on  21  February  1960  he  left  Damascus  for  Cairo, 
ostensibly  as  a  student.  Cairo,  at  that  time,  had  been  the 
centre  of  pan-Arabism  since  the  United  Arab  Republic  had 
been  formed  in  1958.  Like  many  other  details  in  Saddam's 
life,  his  period  in  Cairo  was  questionable  and  it  is  still 
shrouded  in  uncertainty.  His  official  biography  gives 
contradictory  stories  about  that  period.  It  is  said  that  he 
lived  in  Cairo  in  af  lat  in  the  N-11  quarter  of  Duqqi-.  He  was 
given  a  monthly  allowance  by  the  Arab  Interests  Bureau  of 
the  Egyptian  Mukhdbardt.  He  attended  Cairo's  Qasr  al-Wil 
private  secondary  school;  in  1961,  at  the  age  of  24,  he 
graduated  from  secondary  school  and  entered  the  Law  School 
at  Cairo  University.  (51)  He  failed  to  qualify  in  law  then, 
but  he  was  awarded  a  degree  at  Baghdad  University  when  he 
attained  power  some  years  later. 
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Cairo,  according  to  the  official  version,  was  that  he  was 
working  hard  on  strengthening  the  Baýth  Party  Command  in 
Cairo.  He  joined  'Abd  al-Kar-Im  al-Shaykhl!  in  an  Egyptian 
branch  of  the  Ba'th  Party,  and  within  a  short  while  he 
became  a  member  of  its  Branch  Command  and  then  of  the 
Regional  Command.  (52)  This  account  gives  the  impression 
that  Saddam  lived  in  Cairo  comfortably.  However,  at  the 
same  time,  his  biographer  reveals  that  Saddam  spent  his 
time  in  Cairo  as  if  in  prison.  He  was  harassed,  kept  under 
observation  and  had  his  rooms  searched.  (53) 
According  to  Saddam's  own  account,  his  period  in  Cairo 
was  like  a  prison  sentence,  but  it  was  an  opportunity  for 
him  to  meet  President  Nasir,  whom  he  admired  for  his 
political  career  and  his  strong  presidency  in  standing 
against  the  west  and  becoming  the  sole  leader  of  the  Arab 
world.  (54) 
Many  other  sources,  both  Arabic  and  non-Arabic,  also 
confirm  that  Saddam  was  harassed  by  the  Egyptian 
intelligence  service.  From  sources  close  to  Saddam  we  learn 
that  his  maintenance  allowance,  which  he  received  from  the 
Egyptian  government,  was  often  delayed,  and  sometimes 
suspended.  He  often  returned  to  his  flat  to  discover  that 
it  had  been  searched.  (55) 
The  explanations  for  his  harassment  by  the  Egyptian 
security  service  differ.  His  biography,  as,  usual,  sheds 
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usual  treatment  from  the  Egyptian  security  service  of  all 
political  exiles  in  Cairo.  Opposition  accounts  suggest  that 
he  was  chased  by  the  security  services  because  he  used  to 
take  frequent  trips  to  Syria  and  Beirut  to  meet  ýAflaq  and 
other  members  of  the  Ba'th  Command.  (56)  These  trips 
probably  caused  the  Egyptian  authorities  to  keep  an  eye  on 
his  activities,  especially  after  the  union  between  Syria 
and  Egypt  was  abrogated  in  September  1961.  Nasir,  who  had 
been  the  President  of  the  Federation,  started  to  worry 
about  anything  that  smelt  of  Ba'thism.  He  had  no  interest 
in  propping  up  Ba'thist  expansionism  which  might  threaten 
his  own  position. 
other  references  recount  that  Saddam  was  put  under 
pressure,  because  of  his  suspicious  political 
activities.  (57)  This  view  is  more  likely,  because  it  is 
supported  by  other  reports,  which  confirmed,  Saddam's 
suspicious  links  with  foreign  powers,  particularly  the 
Americans,  since  he  was  seen  visiting  the  American  Embassy 
in  Cairo  frequently.  (58) 
There  are  also  some  accounts  which  claim  that  Saddam 
was  arrested  twice  and  threatened  with  deportation  by  the 
Egyptians.  It  is  unclear  whether  this  occurred  because 
Saddam,  threatened  to  kill  an  Iraqi  exile,  or  because  he  was 
involved  with  drugs.  According  to  Batdtfi,  Saddam  was 
arrested  by  the  security  services  for  threatening  to  kill 
a  fellow  Iraqi,  with  Nasirite  sympathies,  over  political 
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seconed  time  after  chasing  a  fellow  Ba'thist  student 
through  the  streets  of  Cairo  with  a  knife.  (60) 
Whatever  the  truth,  he  was  released  at  once  on  the 
personal  intervention  of  President  Nasir.  (61)  This 
intervention  raises  further  questions: 
Why  did  President  Nasir  order  Saddam's  release,  while, 
at  the  same  time,  the  security  services  were  harassing 
him? 
(2)  Why  was  President  Nasir  involved  with  an  ordinary 
student  exile,  who  had  no  position  apart  from  being 
engaged  in  violence  and  suspicious  affairs? 
Thust  some  influential  body  must  have  interceded  on 
behalf  of  Saddam.  It  is,  however,  unlikely  to  have  been  the 
Ba'thists,  because  Nasir,  at  that  time,  regarded  the  Ba'th 
Party  as  his  main  enemy,  following  the  break-up  of  the 
union,  which  he  blamed  on  the  Ba'thists. 
It  was  in  Cairo  that  Saddam  decided  to  marry  his 
cousin,  Sdjidah  Talf54,  and  he  had  his  engagement  party 
there.  They  got  married  shortly  after  his  return  to  Iraq, 
in  early  1963.  It  was  said  that  Sajidah  had  been  brought  to 
Cairo  with  the  co-operation  of  the  Egyptian  Mukhdbardt.  in 
order  to  reduce  Saddam's  activities.  (62) 
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Cairo,  that  the'Ba'thists  were  going  to  attempt  a  coup  in 
Iraq.  According  to  one  of  his  personal  friends  in  Cairo, 
he  told  him  that  his  stay  in  Cairo  was  ending  because  there 
would  soon  be  change  in  Iraq.  (63) 
Shortly  after  this  announcement,  the  Ba'th  Party  was 
able  to  overthrow  Qdsim,  with  outside  help  and  the  blessing 
of  'Aflaq  (as  revealed  in  previous  chapters),  and  Saddam 
returned  to  Iraq  within  two  weeks  of  the  coup  to  take  part 
in  the  new  regime. 
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Ba'th  recime 
Saddam  returned  to  Iraq  soon  after  the  Ba'th  came  to 
power  on  8  February  1963.  Upon  arriving  in  Baghdad,  he 
found  himself  an  outsider.  His  three  and  a  half  years  in 
Egypt  had  kept  him  isolated  from  developments,  which  were 
extremely  confused  for  a  few  months  after  the  Baýth  coup. 
As  mentioned  before,  there  were  conflicts  between  different 
groups,  consisting  of  the  left-wing,  led  by  al-Sa'd7i,  the 
right-wing,  led  by  Tdlib  Shabib,  the  Foreign  minister,  and 
the  centrist  wing  or  moderates,  led  by  the  Tikrit!  army 
officers,  Aýpad  Uasan  al-Bakr,  1ýarddn  'Abd  al-Ghaffdr  and 
ýdli4  Ma4d!  'Andsh. 
These  factions  were  jockeying  for  power  and  personal 
interest  only,  as  can  be  seen  from  the  discussion  of  the 
events  in  chapter  two.  The  centrist  wing  was  behind  the 
conflict  between  the  left-wing  and  the  right-wing  in  order 
to  control  the  Party,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  seize  power 
in  Iraq,  on  the  other  hand.  The  first  initiative  of  the 
centrist  wing  was  to  use  al-Sa'd7i  as  a  bridge  to  reach  its 
aim.  It  was  represented  in  the  Fifth  Congress  of  the 
Regional  Command,  and  al-Bakr  was  appointed  a  member  of  the 
National  Command,  on  the  recommendation  of  al-Sa'di.  (64) 
The  centrist  wing  strengthened  its  link  with  the  hard- 
line  Iýdzlm  Jawdd  and  Tdlib  Shabib  in  order  to  wipe  out  the 
al-Sa  %  d!  wing;  it  then  employed  special  tactics  to  wipe  out 
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Iraq  as  well  (as  mentioned  in  chapter  two),  regarding  them 
responsible  for  the  organisation  crisis  of  the  Ba'th  in 
Iraq,  (65)  despite  the  fact  that  the  Tikrit!  officers  were 
just  as  responsible  as  they.  ýAflaq  also  blamed  the  two 
rival  factions  for  being  involved  with  military  officers, 
Tikr-1t1s,  (66)  while  he  rewarded  this  wing  with  the  largest 
share  of  seats  on  the  Party  leadership,  as  we  shall  see 
later. 
However,  Saddam  was  given  a  minor  position  as  a  member 
of  the  Party's  central  bureau  for  peasants,  (67)  which  was 
less  than  he  felt  he  deserved.  To  achieve  his  ambition  for 
rapid  promotion,  he  followed  the  centrist  faction.  This 
move  was  reinforced  by  his  blood  relationship  with  the 
Tikrit!  officers:  Aýpad  Iýasan  al-Bakr,  the  Prime  Minister, 
Rash1d  Musleh,  the  Military  Governor,  Tdhir  Ya4yd,  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff,  Iýardadn  al-Tikr-iti,  Commander  of  the  Air 
Force  and  ýdlilý  Mahdi-  'Amn-dsh,  Minister  of  Defence,  and  was 
strengthened  later  through  marriage,  which  helped  to  propel 
him  to  power.  He  was  seen  acting  as  a  bodyguard  f  or  his 
close  relative,  Ahmad  Iýasan  al-Bakr,  after  he  had  sensed 
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that  his  faction  was  effectively  supported  by  Michel 
ýAflaq.  (68)  It  was  an  astute  strategy,  for  the  reward  for 
Saddam's  faithfulness  to  the  al-Bakr  wing  followed  soon 
after. 
The  Ba'th  enjoyed  nine  bloody  months  of  power,  during 
which  Saddam  served  as  a  torturer  in  Qas,  r  al-Nihdyah, 
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taken  a  personal  interest  in  his  work  there. 
Saddam's  practices  in  Qaýr  al-Nihdyah  struck  terror 
even  inside  the  Party,  and,  combined  with  other  barbarous 
Baýthist  activities,  (69)  created  scandal  at  both  national 
and  international  level.  These  acts  had  the  blessing  of 
Michel  ýAflaq,  who  viewed  the  Communist  Party  in  ýIraq  as  a 
special  target  for  the  Baýthls  first  countrywide  barbarous 
crime,  as  he  declared  soon  after  the  coup: 
11  Communist  Parties  will  be  banned  and 
suppressed  with  the  utmost  severity  in  any 
country  where  the  Balth  comes  to  power.  "(70) 
It  is  also  however,  said,  that  ýAflaq  criticised  these 
ruthless  practices.  (71)  He  stated  at  the  1964  Extraordinary 
Congress  of  the  Syrian  Bath: 
11  1  constantly  warned  against  a  policy  of 
bloodshed  and  torture,  whosoever  might  be  its 
victims,  for  our  differences  with  the  communists 
cannot  possibly  justify  such  means  ....  was  it 
permissible  to  give  the  rein  to  non-party  or 
poorly  conscious  elements  ....  who  had  a  basic 
interest  in  the  killing  of  communists?  "  (72) 
We  may  infer  that  'Aflaqls  announcement  was 
disingenuous,  designed  to  give  his  party  a  civilised  image 
226 that  was  completely  at  odds  with  its  violent,  bloody 
nature,  of  which  he  approved.  If  this  had  not  been  the 
case,  the  Baýthists,  such  as  Saddam,  who  carried  out  many 
ruthless  activities,  and  was  one  of  those  responsible  for 
the  savagery  of  the  nine  months  of  the  Party's  first  period 
of  power,  which  led  to  its  total  rejection,  would  not  have 
been  reinstated  in  positions  of  even  greater  authority, 
when  it  gained  power  for  a  second  time  in  1968.  It  was 
probably  due  to  this  talent  that  he  jumped  in  one  year, 
from  February  1963  to  February  1964,  to  a  high  position  in 
the  Iraq  Regional  Command  of  the  Ba'th  Party,  with  'Aflaqls 
approval. 
However,  after  these  nine  months,  the  Ba'th  Party  in 
Iraq  was  defeated  by  'Abd  al-Saldm  'Arif  and  the  Tikrit! 
Ba'thist  officers.  The  National  Guard  had  been  suppressed 
by  the  order  of  General  4ard5n  al-Tikriti,  who  had  been 
commander  of  the  air  force,  and  who  in  that  position  had 
issued  the  order  for  the  disposition  of  the  forces  to 
suppress  the  Ba'thist  Guard.  (73)  The  new  Ba'th  Regional 
leadership  which  was  appointed  only  a  week  earlier,  was 
arrested.  Some  of  its  members  immediately  collaborated  with 
the  'Arif  regime.  Other  Ba'th  leaders  were  sent  abroad  into 
exile  without  offering  any  resistance.  It  was  a  severe  blow 
to  the  Baýth  Party  in  Iraq  and  its  regional  leadership, 
which  was  torn  apart  and  dissolved  itself. 
227 Saddam,  s  appontment  to  the  Regional  Command  of  the 
Iraci  Baýth  Party 
After  the  Baýthls  embarrassing  failure  in  Iraq  on  18 
November  1963,  some  remaining  elements  from  the  dissolved 
Ba'th  cadre  formed  a  committee  called  Lainat  tan;  Tm  al-Iraq 
(Committee  for  the  organisation  of  Iraq)  .  The  National 
Command  gave  orders  to  abolish  this  Committee  and  formally 
asked  the  chairman  and  the  members  to  co-operate  with  the 
new  Iraq  Regional  Command  for  the  discipline  and  unity  of 
the  Party. 
At  the  same  time,  Radio  Damascus  announced  the 
dismissal  of  the  chairman  and  the  members  of  the  Committee 
by  order  of  the  National  Command.  Many  Ba'thist  members  of 
this  Committee  were  put  in  prison,  while  others  escaped 
abroad,  after  they  had  been  denounced  by  some  Tikrit! 
officers  who  had  been  given  high  positions  in  'Ari  f  Is 
regime.  Saddam  associated  himself  with  these  officers  and 
joined  in  the  denunciations. 
Accounts  of  Saddam's  role  in  these  events  also  differ. 
According  to  former  Baýthist  accounts,  (74)  Rashid  Muýle4, 
the  Military  Governor  for  the  new  regime,  informed  Saddam 
of  undercover  Baýthist  organisations.  Saddam  was  seen,  with 
other  Baý  thists,  such  as  Md4sin  Sha'l5n,  and  %  Ari  fIs 
security  service,  when  attacking  Ba%thist  sites.  For  this, 
Saddam  was  expelled  from  the  Ba%th  and  was  penalised. 
Saddam  showed  that  his  loyalty  to  TikrItI  was  always 
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once  Saddam  was  in  power,  he  almost  certainly  had  Muqle4 
and  Sha'ldn  killed,  in  order  to  ensure  their  silence.  (75) 
Pro-Ba'thist  accounts  suggest  that  after  the  Ba'th 
defeat  in  November  1963,  the  members  of  the  Baýth  Party, 
including  Saddam,  were  forced  to  flee  Baghdad  and  go  into 
hiding.  (76) 
According  to  official  sources,  (77)  Saddam  travelled 
secretly  to  Syria  and  made  arrangements  with  ýAflaq  to  work 
for  a  strong  and  integrated  party  in  Iraq.  As  a  result,  he 
was  put  in  charge  of  military  affairs  in  the  Party,  in 
addition  to  security  affairs.  The  responsibility  helped  him 
to  control  the  whole  party  within  a  few  years. 
When  the  Seventh  Congress  of  the  Syrian  National 
Command  was  convened  in  Damascus  in  February  1964,  the  Iraq 
Ba'th  Party  was  reconstituted  and,  thanks  to  Michel 
'Aflaqls  efforts  and  al-Bakr  wing's  support,  Saddam,  was 
appointed  secretary  of  this  new  organisation.  (78)  Al-Bakr 
was  also  elected  a  member  of  the  National  Command  at  the 
Congress.  He  subsequently  became  Secretary  General  of  the 
Iraq  Regional  Command,  and  Saddam,  sensing  that  this  was 
where  power  resided,  attached  himself  to  him.  Saddam  was 
attached  to  this  faction  and  promoted  to  high  rank  in  the 
Party  through  the  influence  of  'Aflaq,  who  supported  this 
faction. 
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from  the  truth  is  that  "Aflaq  chose  elements  for  the  new 
Regional  Command  from  members  who  were  known  f  or  their 
experience  in  conflict  and  their  lack  of  involvement  in  the 
setback  or  in  the  personal  enmities  causing  it.  (79) 
Saddam  now  controlled  the  highest  decision-making  body 
of  the  Iraq  Branch  of  the  Baý  th  Party,  at  the  behest  of 
Michel  'Aflaq.  This  appointed  position  was  a  major  turning 
point  in  Saddam's  political  career,  which  transformed  him 
within  a  few  years  into  the  most  powerful  figure  in  the 
Party.  It  was  a  new  beginning  of  horror  for  the  Baýth  Party 
in  Iraq. 
From  his  first  moment  in  the  new  organisation,  he  was 
determined  to  assume  responsibility  for  military  and 
security  organisation.  Saddam  and  ýAflaq  (both  civilians) 
sensed  that  a  powerful  and  independent  military  always 
posed  a  threat  to  civilian  government.  Saddam  had  already 
learned  this  from  experience,  especially  when  the  TikrItI 
military  officers  in  the  Baýth  Party  sided  with  fellow 
officers  (despite  the  fact  that  he  took  the  TikrItI 
officers,  side)  to  oust  the  civilian  Bathists  and  to  eject 
the  Baýth  from  power.  Something  similar  happened  in  Syria, 
which  left  deep  divisions  throughout  the  Baýth 
organisation.  (80) 
In  Saddam's  view,  there  was  no  alternative  to  physical 
force  and  military  might  for  taking  power  and  staying 
230 there.  In  order  to  counter  the  existing  military  power, 
Saddam  took  charge  of  the  new  security  unit  of  the  IRAQ 
branch  of  the  Ba'th  Party  called  al-Jihdz  al-Khdss  and 
code-named  Jihdz  1PnTh.  (81) 
It  was  a  shadowy  unit  of  armed  men,  modelled  on  the 
Nazi  SS,  selected  from  the  most  devoted  Ba'thists,  to  be  a 
party-based  alternative  power  to  that  represented  by  the 
Ba'thist  officers,  who  obtained  their  authority  from  their 
vital  importance  to  the  State.  (82)  It  was  the  same  as  al- 
Haras  al-QawmT  (National  Guard),  who  carried  out  so  many 
crimes  in  the  first  Ba'th  regime.  But  this  time  the  unit 
was  a  tightly  organised  cell  and  had  an  important  role  in 
events  during  the  1968  Ba'thist  coup.  (83) 
It  seems  that  the  Militia  is  an  important  component  of 
Ba'th  ideology,  for  the  following  reasons: 
(a)  It  was  a  counterbalance  to  the  army,  which  Saddam 
and  Aflaq  always  feared. 
(b)  It  was  tool  of  confrontation  for  the  Party,  to 
carry  out  its  violent  operations.  I 
This  unit  subsequently  became  a  specialist  unit  for 
intelligence  matters,  the  most  powerful  and  feared 
organisation,  called  the  MukbaWrat. 
231 Saddam  Husayn's  activities  throughout  'Arif  Is 
Regime 
In  the  light  of  the  events  of  November  1963,  and  what 
the  Ba'thists  did  when  they  gained  power,  it  can  hardly  be 
denied  that  their  ambition  to  gain  power  is  an  important 
part  of  their  principles.  They  have  always  arranged 
coalitions  with  the  elements  who  had  the  upper  hand,  as  a 
key  role  in  their  attempt  to  overthrow  regimes.  This  became 
the  Ba'thist  doctrine  for  reaching  power.  But  the  Ba'thists 
did  not  like  to  be  part  of  any  coalition,  unless  they  were 
the  dominant  party.  It  was,  therefore,  impossible  for  the 
Ba'thists  who  shared  power  with  'Arif  to  stay  with  him. 
They  could  not  accept  any  sharing  of  the  responsibilities 
of  the  State.  In  addition,  it  seems  there  are  other  reasons 
which  prevented  them  from  staying  with  the  regime,  as 
Penrose  notes:  (84) 
(a)  The  Arab  nationalist  officers  who  co-operated 
with  the  'Arif  regime  and  shared  with  the 
Ba'thists  in  their  first  cabinet  were 
irreconcilably  opposed  to  the  Ba'th  Party  and  its 
methods. 
(b)  The  Iraq  Baýthists  experienced  a  virulent  attack 
from  the  radical  members  of  the  Syrian  Bath 
Party  and  from  al-Sa'dT  and  his  group,  who  were 
sheltering  in  Damascus  at  that  time. 
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who  had  committed  crimes  in  1963,  -return  to 
power. 
The  events  in  Syria  in  July  1963,  af  ter  the  Syrian 
Nasirites  had  attempted  a  coup  against  the  ruling  Ba'th 
regime,  which  was  severely  suppressed  by  the  Baýth  Party, 
led  to  bitter  verbal  attacks  from  each  side,  and  the  enmity 
between  Nasir  and  the  Ba'th  was  brought  to  a  head.  (85)  This 
may  be  another  reason  behind  the  removal  of  most  Iraqi 
Balthist  ministers  from  their  posts. 
However,  the  Baýthistsl  exclusion  or  resignation  from 
the  new  government  in  early  1964,  was  inevitable.  The  Prime 
Minister,  Tdhir  Yalýyd  and  the  minister  of  Interior,  Rashlid 
Musleh,  were  the  only  Tik3dtll  officers  who  kept  their  posts, 
having  bound  themselves  to  the  regime.  Batatu  suggests  on 
this  point(86)  that  the  spirit  of  accommodation  to  existing 
circumstances  for  the  latter  proved  stronger  than  ties  of 
party  or  town.  In  fact  this  phenomenon  characterised  not 
only  Ya4y5  and  Musleh,  but  all  the  Tikr-1t!  officers  group 
and  the  Ba'thists  themselves,  who  would  have  been  prepared 
to  continue  to  co-operate,  had  'Arif  permitted  it.  (87) 
Soon  after  the  Baýthistsl  removal  from  the 
government,  the  Ba'th  Party  instructed  Saddam  to 
assassinate  President  'Abd  al-Sal5m  'Arif.  Saddam  was  then 
in  charge  of  military  and  security  affairs.  His  biographer 
describes  how  he  reorganised  his  comrades,  purchased 
233 weapons,  obtained  explosives  for  bombing  attacks,  always 
travelled  with  a  machine-gun  and  a  revolver  and  rented  a 
house  as  a  hide-out  f  or  the  Party,  in  order  to  plot  the 
Coup  against  the  'Arif  regime.  (88) 
The  reasons  behind  the  Baý  thist  attempt,  as  some 
sources  suggest,  were  'Arifs  economic  and  political 
policies,  which  were  dominated  by  the  philosophy  and 
tactics  of  Nasir's  Arab  Socialism.  These  developments  did 
not  favour  western  interests.  (89)  It  was  said  that  the 
Ba'thists  were  acting  on  behalf  of  the  CIA  and  M16,  who  had 
contacts  with  Baýthist  officers,  particularly  the  Tiktlitls 
and  their  narrow  circle.  (90) 
According  to  the  official  account,  two  plans  were  made 
to  assassinate  President  'Arif,  with  Saddam  having  the 
leading  role  in  the  attempts.  (91) 
The  first  plan:  Saddam  arranged  with  an  officer  of  the 
Republican  Guard  to  help  him  to  slip  into  the 
Presidential  Palace  during  a  cabinet  meeting  and 
exterminate  the  whole  leadership.  This  plan  was 
unsuccessful  because  the  officer  who  was  working  with 
them  was  unexpectedly  removed  from  his  post. 
(2)  The  second  plan:  Saddam  proposed  to  assassinate  'Arif 
by  shooting  down  his  plane  on  his  way  to  attend  an 
Arab  summit  meeting  in  Cairo.  This  plan  failed  as  well 
234 when  it  was  discovered  that  one  of  the  pilots  was 
working  for  'Arif's  secret  service. 
Some  sources  say  that  'Abd  al-Kar-im  Naqrat  played  the 
crucial  rule  in  the  Baýth  plan  to  unseat  'Arif.  He  was  one 
of  the  Ba'thist  officers  who  co-operated  with  the  'Arif 
regime  and  had  the  post  of  divisional  commander  in  'Arif's 
government  but  was  fired  shortly  afterwards,  together  with 
the  other  Baýthists,  from  his  post.  (92) 
In  any  event,  when  these  plans  were  uncovered  by  the 
police,  there  was  a  wave  of  arrests  among  Party  members  and 
the  leadership.  Saddam  refused  to  flee  to  Syria  and 
continued  working  for  the  overthrow  of  the  'Arif  regime, 
until  the  National  Command  in  Damascus  ordered  him  to  flee, 
after  the  arrests  of  the  Ba'th  leadership  in  Iraq.  (93)  He 
did  this  because  he  did  not  want  to  lose  his  position  in 
the  Party  and  damage  his  prospects  for  future  glory  after 
having  had  a  stint  of  patient  hard  work,  just  because  of 
his  involvement  in  these  operations;  in  fact  the  risk  was 
far  smaller  than  those  he  had  already  taken  during  the 
attempt  on  Qdsim's  life.  His  decision  this  time  seems 
reasonable.  It  was  not  like  other  risky  decisions  that  he 
was  to  take  in  subsequent  years. 
He  went  underground,  but  in  mid-October  1964  he  was 
discovered  and  sent  to  the  central  prison  in  Baghdad.  (94) 
According  to  some  opponents,  after  he  was  arrested,  he 
collapsed  under  the  pressure,  and  gave  all  the  details  of 
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avoid  any  torture  that  they  might  inflict  upon  him.  (95) 
What  makes  this  claim  plausible  is  the  fact  that  he  had  no 
commitment  to  any  chauvinistic  aims  or  humanitarian  goals, 
as  is  evident  from  his  alliances  when  he  reached  power.  His 
abandoning  of  sovereignty  over  the  whole  of  Iraq  and  its 
people,  after  the  Second  Gulf  War,  tends  to  confirm  that  he 
looks  out  only  for  his  own  selfish  interests  and  his 
retention  of  power.  In  fact,  however,  he  was  not  subjected 
to  any  kind  of  torture,  because  Tdhir  Yalýyd  al-TikrTit!  (the 
Prime  Minister)  gave  orders  that  he  was  not  to  be 
harmed.  (96)  On  the  contrary,  more  or  less  absolute  freedom 
appears  to  been  given  to  the  prisoners,  (97)  and  the 
authorities  followed  Baýthist  activities  with  little  or  no 
real  interest.  This  is  quite  the  opposite  of  what  the 
Baýthists  claim,  namely,  that  they  were  the  victims  of 
torture  and  oppression.  In  addition  there  were  several 
invitations  from  'Abd  al-Ralýmdn  'Arif  to-the  major  leaders 
of  the  Ba'th  Party,  between  1966  and  1968,  to  take  part  in 
the  cabinet.  (98) 
In  Saddam's  account  of  his  prison  term,  he  says  that 
he  spent  his  time  reading  about  some  of  the  greatest 
political  characters,  like  Stalin.  Saddam.  has  admitted  to 
admiring  Stalin.  (99)  It  seems  that  he  has  followed  the 
Stalinist  model  of  political  control.  He  changed  the  Ba'th 
Party  into  a  political  military  machine,  the  main  function 
of  which  was  to  put  terror  into  the  hearts  of  the  people 
and  to  use  force  and  accusation  of  conspiracy  to  remain  in 
236 power.  This  was  Stalin's  strategy  in  his  early  years  when 
he  controlled  the  civilian  Soviet  Communist  Party  and 
rooted  it  deeply  in  power,  from  which  it  could  not  be 
removed  even  by  the  army.  He  also  disposed  of  his  political 
opponents  in  the  Party,  using  accusations  of  conspiracy  to 
achieve  this  aim.  (100)  A  further  important  benefit  to 
Saddam  from  his  period  in  prison  was  that  he  made  close 
contacts  with  Aýmad  4asan  al-Bakr,  who  had  already  been 
released.  They  had  both  of  them  decided  to  work  together  to 
return  the  Baýth  Party  to  power  by  any  means. 
In  October  1966,  Saddam  succeeded  in  escaping  from 
prison  with  two  other  Ba'thists,  for  emergency  reasons, 
according  to  his  biographer.  (101)  Like  many  other  stories 
about  Saddam's  heroic  and  impetuous  deeds,  his  days  in 
prison  and  his  escape  became  part  of  his  legend. 
However,  it  seems  that  the  main  reason  for  his  escape 
from  prison  was  the  serious  development  facing  ýAflaq  when 
a  military  coup  brought  the  radical  Marxist  faction  of  the 
Ba'th  to  power  in  Damascus  on  23  February  1966.  ýAflaq, 
qa154  al-Biýdr  and  their  faction  were  ousted,  and  the 
National  Command  was  dissolved.  A  new  one  was  established 
under  the  wing  of  Damascus  by  the  Ninth  National  Congress, 
which  was  held  in  September  1966.  (102) 
This  development  happened  at  a  time  when  the  Ba'th 
Party  in  Iraq  was  very  weak,  since  most  of  its  leadership 
and  members  were  in  prison  after  the  abortive  coup  against 
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carefully.  He  announced  that  there  was  a  Regional  Command, 
without  reverting  to  a  National  Command,  which  no  longer 
existed  after  the  coup  of  February  1966.  This  Regional 
Command  consisted  of  Saddam  Husayn,  'Abd  al-Kh5liq  al- 
SamarriPil,  'Abd  al-Karlim  al-ShaykhlT,  and  also  Alýmad  ýIasan 
al-Bakr,  who  could  not  often  attend  its  meetings  for 
security  reasons.  (103) 
Accordingly,  a  Regional  Congress  meeting  was  held  and 
Saddam  seized  the  post  of  Deputy  Secretary  General'of  the 
Party,  and  was  then  elected,  at  the  meeting,  to  the  new 
Regional  Command,  with  Aýmad  Iýasan  al-Bakr  as  Secretary 
General,  'Abd  al-Karilm  al-Shaykhll,  ýM4  MahdI  'An-ash,  Tahd 
al-jazrdidi-  and  'Abd  Allah  Salfim  al-Samarrd'!.  (104)  He  started 
to  build  an  inner  circle  of  supporters,  usually  his 
relatives,  on  whom  he  could  base  his  absolute  rule. 
Saddam  and  his  close  associates  were  greatly  concerned 
with  the  developments  in  Syria  for  two  important  reasons: 
The  leadership  of  the  coup  in  Syria  was  composed  of 
military  officers,  which  was  something  which  Saddam. 
always  tried  to  avoid. 
(2)  The  radical  faction  in  Syria  was  Marxist  -  as  they 
pretended  -  which  aroused  fears  of  a  possible 
reawakening  of  the  leftist  faction  of  the  Iraqi  Baýth. 
The  leftist  faction  was  not  completely  under  control; 
238 it  might  be  rejuvenated  with  the  support  of  the  Syrian 
faction. 
For  these  two  reasons,  Saddam  worked  very  hard  between 
October  1966  and  1968  to  establish  the  Party's  underground 
machine,  as  follows: 
(a)  He  eliminated  all  the  remaining  leftists  in  the 
ranks  of  the  Ba'th  Party. 
(b)  He  reconstructed  the  Party's  organisation,  and 
extended  the  network  of  branches  throughout  the 
country. 
(c)  He  completed  the  formation  of  the  Party's 
security  network  (al-Amn  al-Kh5ss),  which  he  had 
personally  headed  before  he  went  to  prison.  This 
was  extended  later  to  include  the  Party's 
military  militia;  they  played  an  important  role 
in  events  during  the  1968  Ba'thist  coup.  (105) 
These  underground  activities  enabled  Saddam  to  sharpen 
his  skills  and  affirm  his  leadership  over  his  associates  - 
he  also  had  a  native  talent,  as  already  mentioned,  f  or 
organising  conspiracy  and  deceit.  The  cautiousness  and 
distrust  which  he  had  acquired  during  his  early  years  of 
being  hunted  also  helped  him  a  lot.  Together  with  a  narrow 
circle  of  associates  he  worked  with  excellent  effect  to 
gain  power  and  exploited  the  sentiment  among  the  people, 
239 after  the  disastrous  effects  of  the  1967  War,  and 
government  tolerance  towards  Ba'thist  activities.  As  usual, 
Saddam  and  his  associates  came  to  an  arrangement  with  four 
senior  military  officers,  who  were  supposed  to  protect 
Arif  Is  regime  but  who  made  it  easy  for  them  to  achieve 
their  goal.  In  fact  without  them,  the  Baýth  Party  could 
not  have  hoped  to  gain  power,  as  will  be  seen  in  the  next 
chapter. 
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252 CHAPTER  FOUR 
THE  RETURN  OF  THE  BA""  TH Circumstances  that  enabled  the  Ba'th  Party-to  seize 
Power 
Before  discussing  the  course  of  events  during  and 
after  the  two  Coups  of  17  and  30  July  1968,  it  is  important 
to  examine  the  political  climate  in  the  region  with  respect 
to  Iraqi  internal  conditions,  and  the  regional  and 
international  situation. 
Iracri  Internal  Conditions:  The  conditions  that  pushed 
Iraq  in  direction  of  change  during  the  'Arif  regime  were 
particularly  in  its  last  months.  These  factors  were  related 
to  the  particular  socio-political  conditions  of  Iraq  and 
were  created  by  'Arif's  weakness  and  repeated  mistakes, 
particularly  in  the  field  of  foreign  affairs.  Thus  the 
regime  was  approaching  a  state  of  collapse,  brought  about 
this  state  of  affairs  were: 
(1)  Political  instability:  The  Political  situation 
during  the  regimes  of  the  'Arif  brothers  was  characterised 
by  the  struggle  between  various  political  groups  to  control 
the  regime.  That  struggle,  particularly  between  the  various 
wings  of  the  regime,  was  nourished  by  the  personal 
ambitions  of  the  various  military  and  civilian  figures  of 
that  regime.  This  is  clear  from  the  successive  cabinets 
that  were  formed  under  the  two  'Arifs  by  various  competing 
military  or  civilian  groups.  It  is  also  clear  from  the 
continual  flow  of  cabinet  ministers  in  and  out  of  their 
posts,  and  finally  from  several  attempted  military  coups 
253 and  assassination  attempts.  (1)  All  this  continued  in  a 
political  environment  rife  with  accusation  and  counter- 
accusation  and  a  daily  flow  of  rumours  of  impending  doom. 
The  regime  even  resorted  to  the  deportation  of  four  key 
military  figures,  even  though  they  were  out  of  active 
service  at  the  time.  (2)  These  factors,  particularly  during 
the  regime  of  the  second  'Arif,  were  due  to  his  personal 
military  and  political  ineptitude,  with  no  justification 
for  his  presidential  position  other  than  the  fact  of  being 
the  brother  of  the  previous  deceased  president,  who 
ironically  perhaps,  was  the  younger  of  the  two  brothers. 
His  naivete  and  generally  peaceful  and  trustworthy  nature 
exposed  him  to  the  wickedness  of  the  competing  wings  within 
his  own  regime,  (3)  as  well  as  to  those  outside,  namely  the 
Ba'thists  and  Communists.  His  Prime  Minister,  Tdhir  Ya4yd 
al-Tikr-iti,  on  the  other  hand,  was  known  for  his  ignorance, 
tribalism,  sectarianism,  widespread  corruption,  and  alleged 
involvement  in  substantial  deals  between  Iraq  and  French 
oil  companies.  (4) 
(2)  The  overwhelming  domination  of  military 
officers  in  affairs  of  state  and  society:  The  Iraqi 
army  became  involved  in  politics  early  in  its 
establishment.  The  first  military  coup  in  the  Middle  East 
took  place  in  Iraq  in  1936,  led  by  the  then  Chief  of 
Staff,  General  Bakr  qidqi-.  After  the  1958  Revolution,  which 
brought  down  the  monarchy  and  established  a  military 
republic,  military  officers  were  the  most  important  actors 
on  the  Iraqi  political  stage  until  the  time  when  Saddam 
254 became  the  only  actor.  Even  he  felt  that  he  had  to  grant 
himself  the  highest  military  rank  appropriate  to  his 
political  position.  The  two  'Arif  periods  were 
particularly  dominated  by  military  officers  who  became 
actively  involved  in  politics,  instead  of  in  their  own 
ch6sen  profession;  they  abandoned  the  latter  and  with  it 
the  command  of  Iraqi  military  units,  to  the  more  mediocre 
among  them.  Thus,  both  politics  and  soldiering  in  Iraq 
deteriorated  further,  even  from  the  low  level  at  which 
they  already  were.  Since  the  Revolution  of  1958,  Iraqi 
military  officers  have  become  a  class  above  all  others  in 
Iraqi  society. 
(3)  The  individualistic  nature  of  the  regime:  During 
the  'Arifs'  regimes,  sole  authority  was  in  the  hands  of  the 
President.  During  the  first  Ba'thist  regime,  it  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  Ba'thist  council,  called  the  Revolutionary 
Command  Council.  The  first  ýArif  had  no  more  than  a 
symbolic  office,  similar,  in  fact,  to  the  three  man  council 
of  sovereignty  during  Qdsim's  regime,  which,  in  turn,  was 
no  more  than  a  rubber  stamp  for  Qdsim,  s  unilateral 
decisions.  Iraqi  republican  regimes  had  no  genuine  interest 
whatsoever  in  establishing  legitimate  governments  through 
due  process  of  constitution  and  law.  Instead  authority  was 
highly  personalised,  in  Qasim's  hands,  and  then,  in  turn, 
in  'Abd  al-Sal5m  'Arif  Is  hands,  followed  by  his  bother, 
'Abd  al-Ra4m5n  'Arif,  until  the  return  to  power  of  the 
Baýth,  when  it  was  to  rest  in  the  hands  of  Saddam. 
255 (4)  Corruption:  The  two  'Arif  regimes  were  known  for 
widespread  corruption,  although  it  did  not  reach  the  level 
it  attained  later,  when  the  Bath  returned  to  power.  Many 
key  military  and  civilian  figures  in  the  two  'Arif  regimes 
were  accused  of  corruption,  particularly  related  to  the 
deal  with  the  French  oil  company,  Erap,  (5)  and  to  payments 
that  were  made  by  Anglo-American  oil  companies,  working  in 
Iraq  under  the  name  of  the  Iraq  Oil  Company.  (6)  Leading 
army  officers  were  also  corrupt  in  stealing  government 
funds  which  were  allocated  for  fighting  or  bribing  the 
Kurdish  tribes.  (7)  In  fact,  it  was  in  the  financial 
interests  of  the  top  commanders  in  the  war  against  the 
Kurds  for  the  war  to  continue,  albeit  only  in  name,  so  that 
they  could  continue  to  receive  their  war-related  extra 
payments. 
(5)  Absence  of  parliamentary  life:  The  Revolution  of 
1958  abolished  parliamentary  life  while  it  was  still  in  its 
infancy.  The  permanent  constitution  of  1925  was  also 
abolished,  and  in  its  place  what  was  called  a  temporary 
constitution  was  proclaimed  by  'Abd  al-Kar-im  Qdsim.  After 
the  dismissal  of  the  Bath  Party  from  power  by  'Arif  on  18 
November  1963,  'Arif  issued  an  order  banning  all  political 
parties,  just  as  Nasir  had  done  before  him.  He  then  set  out 
to  form  a  single  party  called  the  Arab  Socialist  Union, 
again  as  Nasir  had  before  him.  He  failed  on  both  counts. 
Political  parties  remained  active,  albeit  underground,  and 
the  Arab  Socialist  Union  was  a  miserable  failure. 
Successive  temporary  constitutions  were  proclaimed  by 
256 successive  regimes,  until  1971,  when  a  Soviet-style  single- 
party  constitution  was  proclaimed  by  al-Bakr.  Later  on, 
Saddam  even  personalised  the  constitution,  when  he  drafted 
one  that  stipulated  conditions  for  candidates  for  the  post 
of  President  that  could  fit  none  else  but  himself.  Thus, 
conditions  in  Iraq  prevented  any  attempt  at  a  return  to  a 
semblance  of  parliamentary  rule.  One  account  suggested  that 
there  were  some  indications,  that  a  permanent  constitution 
might  be  proclaimed  under  Qdsim's  regime,  but  the  political 
instability  owing  to  the  struggle  between  the 
Baýthists/Nationalists  and  the  Communists  in  that  period 
prevented  this.  (8) 
Also,  during  the  al-Bazz5z  civilian  cabinet,  which 
covered  the  last  months  of  the  first  'Arif  regime  and  the 
first  months  of  the  second  'Arif  regime,  which  was 
appointed  to  defuse  the  political  and  economic  crisis, 
there  were  suggestions  by  al-Bazzdz  himself  in  a  number  of 
public  statements,  that  he  wanted  a  return  to  parliamentary 
rule;  he  adopted  a  new  economic  policy  in  order  to  improve 
the  bad  economic  conditions  that  had  prevailed  since  the 
previous  years  national  i  sation,  in  imitation  of  Nasir's 
socialist  measures.  (9)  In  addition,  al-Bazzdz  tried  to 
solve  the  Kurdish  problem;  he  conducted  negotiations  with 
the  Kurds  and  reached  an  agreement  known  as  the  29  June 
1966  Agreement.  (10)  This  agreement  was  an  important  step 
towards  solving  one  of  the  most  serious  threats  facing 
Iraq's  national  security.  However,  he  could  not  stay  in 
power  to  implement  it,  since  he  was  deposed  by  'Abd  al- 
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fact  mainly  Kurds,  did  not  intend  to  implement  it,  since 
their  real  demand  was  for  autonomy,  which  the  'Arif 
regimes  could  not  grant.  Al-Bazz5z  also  wanted  the  army 
officers  to  refrain  from  deep  involvement  in  politics, 
since  their  repeated  coups  had  destabilised  the 
country.  (11)  Thus,  al-Bazzdz  immediately,  had  been 
denounced  by  the  military  officers  and  the  other  elements 
oppositions  of  whose  interests  his  Policy  threatened,  for 
his  close  association  with  the  west  and  reactionary 
circles.  (12) 
(6)  Failure  of  socialist  policies:  Abd  al-Sal5m  "Arif 
was  initially  pro-Nasir,  so,  with  pressure  from  the 
Nasirist  elements  in  his  regime,  he  was  pushed  into 
adopting  a  Nasirite-type  economic  system  that  was  termed 
"Arab  Socialism".  He  ordered  the  formation  of  an  economic 
committee  headed  by  the  statistician,  Dr  Khayr  al-Din  Vaslib, 
who  was  pro-Nasir,  to  study  the  feasibility  of  copying  the 
Egyptian  economic  system  in  Iraq.  The  committee 
subsequently  recommended  the  adoption  of  an  Egyptian-type 
socialism,  (13)  despite  the  fundamental  differences  between 
the  two  economies. 
During  the  celebration  of  the  14  July  Revolution,  the 
regime  issued  many  decrees  nationalising  foreign  trade  and 
all  the  then  small-scale  industries.  The  regime  tried  to 
demonstrate  that  such  an  expropriation  of  private  property 
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development  in  Iraq.  However  the  socialism  of  Dr  Has-ib  was 
received  with  widespread  opposition  from  the  right,  on  the 
grounds  that  it  would  destroy  the  Iraqi  economy,  and  from 
the  left,  who  considered  it  half-hearted.  The  real 
consequences  of  Arab  socialism  in  Iraq  were  severe  and 
inauspicious.  (14)  'Arif,  realising  the  failure  of  Arab 
socialism,  dismissed  Dr  Haslib  and  began  distancing  himself 
I 
from  Nasir  and  all  those  pro-Nasir  Iraqis  who  wanted 
nothing  less  than  the  conversion  of  Iraq  into  an  Egyptian 
province. 
Besides  the  problems  that  the  ýArif  regime  created 
for  itself,  there  were  other  problems  before  his  coming  to 
power  which  the  regime  failed  to  solve. 
-  The  Kurdish  problem:  The  Kurdish  problem  is  more 
acute  in  Iraq  than  either  in  Turkey,  which  has  within  its 
borders  three  times  as  many  Kurds  as  Iraq,  or  in  Iran, 
which  has  twice  as  many.  In  fact,  Iraq  was  the  first 
country  to  acknowledge  the  existence  of  the  Kurds  as  a 
separate  ethnic  group,  with  several  Prime  Ministers  and 
Chiefs  of  Staff  during  the  monarchy  being  Kurds.  Qdsim,  in 
his  temporary  constitution,  declared  that  Iraq  was  jointly 
owned  by  Arabs  and  Kurds,  and  he  was  more  in  sympathy  with 
the  Kurds  than  with  the  Arabs.  However  this  did  not  spare 
either  Iraq  or  Qdsim.  On  the  contrary,  Kurdish  nationalism 
and  calls  to  arms  were  concentrated  in  Iraq,  because  Iraq 
was  seen  by  the  Kurds  a  weaker  link  in  comparison  with 
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also  able  more  easily  to  launch  their  insurgency  against 
Qdsim's  regime  because  of  the  terrain.  The  fact  that  it  was 
Qdsim  who  had  gone  to  Baghdad  airport  to  welcome  Barz5n-1 
three  years  earlier  on  his  return  from  exile  in  the  Soviet 
Union,  counted  for  little.  Turkey  did  not  acknowledge  the 
existence  of  the  Kurds  as  an  entity  and  called  them, 
instead,  "mountain  Turks",  while  Iran  crushed  the  Kurdish 
"Mahabdd  state",  established  by  Stalin,  after  Soviet 
withdrawal  from  Iran.  So  in  1961,  Mullah  Muqýafd  al-Barz5n-i 
told  his  sons  that  they  should  never  take  up  arms  against 
Turkey  or  ally  themselves  with  Iran  to  fight  Iraq,  even 
though  it  was  led  by  Qdsim.  Neither  the  first  Ba'thist 
regime,  nor  the  successive  regimes  of  the  'Arif  brothers, 
were  able  to  do  much  to  solve  the  Kurdish  problem 
peacefully.  By  then  it  had  become  entangled  in  a  complex 
web  of  deceit  which  included  several  regional  powers, 
including  Iran  and  Israel,  and  two  world  powers,  namely  the 
USA  and  the  UK.  The  four  were  on  the  side  of  the  Kurds 
against  Iraq.  Kurdish  demands  were  always  shifting  upwards. 
They  began  demanding  what  they  termed  "cultural  rights, 
which  were  fully  acknowledged  by  the  al-Bazzdz  government, 
who  signed  an  agreement  with  them.  However,  by  then  their 
demand  had  risen  to  one  for  autonomy,  which  the  ýArif 
regimes  could  not  grant.  In  1970,  Saddam  granted  the  Kurds 
in  Iraq  autonomy,  but  by  then  their  demands  had  again 
shifted  and  they  wanted  a  federal  state.  The  final  object 
of  the  Kurdish  nationalist  movement  in  Iraq  was  a  separate 
state  for  the  Kurds.  The  effect  of  the  Kurdish  insurgency 
260 on  'Abd  al-Ralým5n  'Arif  's  regime  was  disastrous  since  the 
regime  failed  to  control  large  areas  of  northern  Iraq, 
which  Barz5n!  turned,  with  the  help  of  Iraqi  communists, 
into  a  strong-hold  of  anti-goverment  activists. 
-  Iraq's  claim  to  Kuwait:  Following  Britain's  granting 
the  shaykhdom  of  Kuwait  its  independence  in  1961,  Qdsim,  s 
regime  decided  not  to  recognise  the  independence  of  Kuwait, 
but  to  press  Iraq's  historical  claim,  that  Kuwait  was  part 
of  Iraq,  according  to  Ottoman  documents  kept  in  the  Iraqi 
Foreign  Ministry.  These  Ottoman  documents  indicate  that 
Kuwait  was  a  qd1imaqdmiyyah  (part  of  a  vilayat)  of  Basrah 
vilayat.  The  Ottoman  vali  of  Basrah  was  the  one  to  appoint 
the  shaykh  of  Kuwait  as  a  qd'imaqdm.  This  was  in  effect  even 
after  the  British  had  occupied  Kuwait  in  1899,  and  even 
after  the  establishment  of  the  Iraqi  state.  In  spite  of 
British  anti-Iraqi  propaganda,  that  Qdsim  was  about  to 
annex  Kuwait  by  force,  he  did  not  do  so.  His  generals 
wanted  him  to  annex  Kuwait  and  he  could  have  crushed  the 
British  force.  Instead  he  wanted  a  peaceful  solution 
whereby  the  Kuwaitis  themselves  would  choose  to  be  united 
with  Iraq. 
Through  secret  negotiations  in  Switzerland  between 
Iraq  and  the  al-ýabdlý  family,  the  latter  agreed  in  mid-1962 
to  relinquish  the  independence  of  Kuwait  and  settle, 
instead,  for  federal  status  within  the  State  of  Iraq. 
However,  Nasir  was  furious  with  the  al-ýabdh  family,  as 
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Nasir  was  a  strong  opponent  of  the  State  of  Iraq  and  the 
enlarging  of  its  power,  whether  it  was  a  monarchy  or  a 
republic,  Iraqi  nationalist  or  pan-Arabist.  British 
propaganda,  as  well  as  Egyptian  propaganda,  was  then  in 
full  swing  against  Qdsim's  regime,  painting  a  picture  of 
him  as  an  adventurer  and  isolationist.  At  the  same  time 
Qdsim  began  to  cultivate  good  relations  with  Syria,  after 
its  separation  from  Egypt,  and  was  very  popular  with  the 
newly  independent  Algeria,  owing  to  his  support  for  the 
Algerian  war  of  independence.  Q5sim  thought  that  a  federal 
state,  comprising  Iraq,  Kuwait  and  Syria,  was  feasible  and 
could  serve  as  a  nucleus  for  further  Arab  unity.  In 
contrast  to  the  UAR,  where  Syria  was  economically  weakened, 
Syria  would  benefit  from  Iraq's  and  Kuwait's  oil.  This 
last  proposal  is  thought  to  have  whipped  Egyptian  and 
British  intelligence  into  a  frenzy  of  eagerness  to  bring 
down  Qdsim's  regime  and  the  Syrian  regime  through  the  two 
Ba'thist  coups  of  8  February  1963  in  Baghdad  and  8  March 
1963  in  Damascus  - 
(15)  The  Baýth  regime,  after  Qdsim, 
recognised  the  independence  and  Soverignty  of  Kuwait  in  a 
communique  issued  in  Baghdad  on  4  October  1963.  In  return 
they  received  an  interest-free  loan  of  E100  million  from 
Kuwait.  (16) 
Border  problems  were  raised  again  in  October  1964, 
when  the  Kuwaitis  pushed  their  unmarked  border  further 
north.  'Arif  Is  regime  responded  with  military  manoeuvres 
which  failed  to  impress.  The  Kuwaitis  had  Nasir  and  the 
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Soviets  began  to  cultivate  closer  relations  with  Kuwait, 
while  relations  with  Iraq  were  strained  because  of  the 
suppression  of  the  Iraqi  Communist  Party  since  February 
1963.  British  documents  released  by  the  British  Foreign 
office  indicated  that  the  British  government  took 
precautionary  measures  against  a  possible  Iraqi  invasion  of 
Kuwait.  (17)  On  19  April  1967,  Iraqi  forces  bulldozed 
buildings  erected  by  Kuwait  on  disputed  land  and  then 
withdrew  into  Iraqi  territory.  Although  the  "Arif  regime 
tended  to  be  fairly  docile,  Britain  still  felt  worried 
about  its  interests  in  Kuwait  at  a  time  when  the  whole 
Middle  East  was  in  turmoil.  (18) 
In  addition  to  the  above,  the  'Arif  regimes,  foreign 
and  oil  policies  were  generally  out  of  line  with  British 
and  American  interests;  this  definitely  shortened  the 
lifetime  of  these  regimes. 
(1)  Competition  between  f  oreign  oil  companies:  During 
the  second  'Arif  regime,  Iraq  became  a  battleground  for 
competing  Anglo-American  oil  companies,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  French  and  Soviet  oil  companies,  on  the  other,  and  thus 
provided  an  arena  for  the  four  major  powers  to  gain 
influence  in  Iraq.  While  Britain  was  trying  to  maintain  its 
oil  and  strategic  interests  in  Iraq,  the  US  was  trying  to 
replace  Britain  as  the  main  western  power.  The  Soviet  Union 
came  into  the  picture  after  1958,  and  by  the  late  sixties 
was  strengthening  its  position  in  Iraq,  in  spite  of  the 
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Communist  Party.  To  complicate  the  picture  further,  France 
began  to  court  Iraq  and  began  to  reap  commercial  benefits, 
owing  to  its  neutral  diplomatic  position  on  the  1967  war, 
even  though  it  was  French-built  jets  of  the  Israeli  air 
force  which  defeated  the  Egyptian,  Syrian  and  Jordanian  air 
forces.  Thus  France  was  able  to  win  an  oil  agreement  for 
the  French  oil  company,  Erap.  (19)  The  British  were  rather 
unhappy  about  the  French  success  in  Iraq.  This  was 
expressed  by  the  British  journalist,  Richard  Jones,  who 
wrote  in  the  London  Financial  Times: 
'I  if  a  ....  new-found  Iraqi-French  relationship 
is  allowed  to  develop  that  will  strengthen 
Iraqi  power  as  an  alternative  to  the  defeated 
Egypt  and  Syria,  it  will  strike  at  the  heart  of 
Anglo-Saxon  oil  interests  in  Iraq  and  the  Gulf 
at  large.  11  (2  0) 
Apart  from  oil,  Iraq  also  has  large  deposits  of 
sulphur,  and  if  they  were  developed,  Iraq  might  be  able  to 
influence  its  price;  these  were  at  that  time  entirely  in 
the  hands  of  the  US.  The  Soviet  Union  was  eager  to  develop 
stronger  Iraqi  dependence  on  it,  not  only  in  arms  supplies, 
but  also  in  oil,  even  though  there  was  the  problem  of  the 
Iraqi  Communist  Party's  clandestine  anti-government 
activities.  (21)  On  24  December  1967  Iraq  and  the  Soviet 
Union  reached  an  agreement  on  the  development  by  the  Soviet 
Union  of  the  North  Rumaila  oil  fields  and  the  marketing  of 
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more  symbolically,  on  11  May  1968,  a  Soviet  fleet  sailed 
into  Iraq's  naval  port  of  Umm  Qasr.  This  was  the  first  such 
visit  since  a  Russian  ship  had  ventured  into  the  Gulf  in 
1903.  The  British  and  Americans  were  enraged  and  threatened 
'Arif  with  severe  consequences.  (23) 
This  came  on  top  of  the  already  existing  struggle 
between  American  and  French  companies  concerning  the 
exploitation  of  these  sulphur  deposits  in  Iraq.  (24)  The 
British  and  American  governments  employed  various  measures 
and  even  open  warfare  to  dissuade  'Arif  from  granting  more 
influence  to  the  Soviets  and  French.  Open  warfare  included 
the  blowing  up  of  the  Iraqi  government  oil  installations  by 
Kurdish  agents  working  for  the  Anglo-American  oil 
companies,  (25)  in  an  effort  by  Britain  and  the  USA  to 
prevent  Soviet  and  French  companies  gaining  a  greater 
foothold  in  Iraq.  'Arif  himself  accused  the  Anglo-British 
oil  companies  of  instigating  terrorist  activities  against 
Iraq.  (26)  Although  he  tried  to  put  a  brave  face  on  it, 
Anglo-American  pressures,  combined  with  domestic  pressures 
by  the  Kurds  and  their  communist  allies,  forced  'Arif  to 
freeze  his  agreements  with  Soviet  and  French  companies  and 
even  to  put  the  much  publicised  purchase  by  his  air  force 
of  54  Mirage  5  French-built  jet  fighters  on  hold.  (27) 
(2)  Arms  supplies:  During  the  monarchy  weapons  that 
were  used  by  the  Iraqi  army  were  almost  entirely  British, 
except  for  a  few  supplied  by  America.  After  the  1958 
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from  one  source  and  one  source  only,  the  Soviet  Union. 
However,  the  latter  used  arms  supplies  as  a  political  lever 
and  blackmailed  Iraq  several  times,  when  they  felt  the  need 
to  do  so.  The  situation  was  very  unsatisfactory.  Iraq  was 
not  a  communist  country,  and  being  blackmailed  by  a  super- 
power  was  very  dangerous,  in  view  of  the  growing  power  of 
Iran  and  Syria.  The  1967  war  proved  conclusively  that 
Soviet  weapons  supplied  to  Iraq,  Egypt  and  Syria  were 
inferior.  'Arif  tried  to  diversify  arms  supplies  by 
acquiring  the  very  jet  fighters  that  had  defeated  the 
Egyptian  and  Syrian  air  forces,  namely  the  Mirage  and  a  new 
version  of  it,  the  Mirage  5.  The  British,  Americans  and 
Israelis  were  predictably  angered  and  threatened  France 
with  the  consequence  of  going  ahead  with  the  deal.  Moscow 
was  equally  enraged  and  threatened  to  cut  off  all 
ammunition  and  spare  parts  for  Soviet  weapons  already 
delivered.  According  to  Le  Monde,  there  was  a  tacit 
agreement  between  Moscow  and  Washington,  to  prevent  Iraq 
from  acquiring  advanced  weapons.  (28)  The  Israeli  Foreign 
Ministry's  comment  about  this  deal  was  that  Israel 
condemned  the  French  deal  to  supply  the  Arab  States  with 
advancedweapons,  as  long  as  they  were  still  in  a  state  of 
war  with  Israel.  (29) 
(3)  The  regime"s  foreign  policy:  The  defeat  of  Egypt, 
Syria  and  Jordan  at  the  hands  of  Israel,  which  was  called 
naksah  or  azmah,  caused  deep  shock,  despair  and  utter 
resentment  among  the  Iraqi  people  towards  the  US  and 
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and  desecrate  Muslim  holy  places.  owing  to  this  widespread 
feeling,  ýArif  Is  regime  resorted  to  certain  measures,  that 
included  the  following  symbolic  acts: 
(a)  Severing  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Britain  and 
the  US. 
(b)  Condemnation  of  the  recognition  of  Israel. 
(c)  Fiery  statements  by  ,  Arif  himself  during  his 
visit  to  France  in  1968,  when  he  described  the 
creation  of  Israel  as  the  crime  of  the  twentieth 
century.  (30,31)  He  also  declared  that  Israel  was 
created  by  the  British  to  fight  the  Arabs 
indirectly,  and  that  such  a  situation  couldnot 
continue.  (32)  'Arif  further  stated  that  he  would 
allocate  all  Iraq's  resources  to  co-operation 
with  other  Arab  states.  (33)  The  Iraqi  Minister  of 
Defence,  Shdkir  Mahm9d  Shukr11,  called  on  the  Arab 
states  to  combine  their  military  efforts  and 
suggested  a  plan  for  doing  so,  (34)  while  the 
Foreign  Minister,  Isma'11  Khayr  All5h,  called  for 
the  punishment  of  Britain  and  the  US  through  the 
destruction  of  their  oil  interests  in  the  Arab 
world. 
(4)  Deployment  of  Iraqi  f  orces  in  Jordan:  Following 
the  collapse  of  the  Jordanian  army,  'Arif's  regime  sent  an 
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They  were  attacked  on  their  way  by  several  Israeli  air 
force  jets,  (35)  two  of  which  were  shot  down  by  Iraqi  jets; 
their  pilots  were  captured  and  displayed  on  Baghdad 
television.  The  Iraqi  Foreign  Minister  declared  that  Iraq 
wanted  to  send  forces  to  Syria  and  Lebanon.  (36)  Although 
Iraq's  participation  in  the  actual  fighting  was  limited, 
because  its  forces  did  not  reach  the  battle-  front  in  time, 
the  subsequent  Iraqi  military  build-up  in  Jordan  and  the 
light  casualties  suffered  by  Iraq,  which  numbered  only  a 
few  jets,  convinced  Israel,  as  well  as  the  US  and  the  UK, 
that  Iraq  was  about  to  pick  up  the  mantle  that  Nasir  had 
allowed  to  slip  from  his  hand.  Thus,  'Arif's  regime  put 
itself  in  direct  confrontation  with  Israel,  who,  backed  by 
the  US  and  Britain,  demanded  that  its  victory  over  Egypt, 
Syria  and  Jordan  be  formally  acknowledged  by  the 
vanquished.  Iraq,  however,  through  its  supply  of  arms,  was 
keeping  Jordan  in  confrontation  with  Israel.  Thus,  it  was 
necessary  for  Iraq's  enemies  to  instal  a  new  regime  that 
would  pull  Iraqi  forces  out  of  Jordan  and  enable  Israel  to 
advance  further  into  it.  (37) 
In  addition  to  its  dangerous  involvement  in  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict,  'Arif's  regime  was  facing  several 
political  trends  that  were  working  to  overthrow  it,  in 
particular  the  radical  movements  (the  Communist  and  the 
Islamic),  on  the  grounds  that  it  was  not  revolutionary  and 
progressive  enough,  and  was  not  serious  in  combating 
Israel,  the  US  and  Britain.  Thus,  there  was  a  danger  that 
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Soviet  camp,  and  the  other  bring  it  under  Iranian 
influence.  The  main  Political  movements  in  Iraq  at  that 
time  were: 
-  The  pan-Arab  movement:  By  the  mid-sixties,  the  pan- 
Arab  movement  was  extremely  fragmented,  with  two  Ba'th 
parties,  one  pro-Syria  and  the  other  pro-'Aflaq  and  al- 
Bakr,  while  the  Nasirists  had  rather  small  parties  or 
groups,  (38)  all  claiming  that  they  were  loyal  to  Nasir  and 
aiming  to  hand  the  country  over  to  him.  Out  of  this  topsy- 
turvy  deranged  world  of  pro-Nasir  Iraqis  gradually  emerged 
a  third  group  who  stood  back  from  Nasirism.  It  also  began 
to  question  the  wisdom  of  merging  Iraq  with  Egypt  and  also 
began  to  campaign  against  socialism,  on  the  grounds  that  it 
had  destroyed  the  Iraqi  economy.  This  latter  group  was 
described  by  it  former  pan-Arabist  colleagues  as  iqlTmiyyan 
or  quýri3oýan  (provincials),  a  rather  derogatory  term  in  the 
dictionary  of  pan-Arab  political  culture  in  Iraq.  These 
provincials  also  called  for  a  return  to  parliamentary  rule 
and  the  freeing  of  Iraqi  foreign  policy  from  a  blind 
adherence  to  Egyptian  foreign  policy.  (39)  The  pan-Arabists, 
by  1967,  were  very  weak,  following  the  division  of  the 
Baýth  Party,  the  failure  of  two  attempted  coups  and  the 
defeat  of  June  1967. 
-  The  Marxists:  The  Marxists  were  then  by  far  the 
largest  single  political  movement,  particularly  among  the 
so-called  educated  Iraqis.  This  is  despite  the  fact  that 
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from  the  beginning  by  such  minorities  as  the  Christians, 
Jews  and,  of  course,  the  Kurds.  They  were  open  supporters 
of  the  creation  of  the  state  of  Israel,  to  the  extent  that 
they  organised  demonstrations  in  Baghdad  in  celebration  of 
it,  no  doubt  working  under  strict  instructions  from  Stalin. 
However,  as  Soviet  foreign  policy  towards  Iraq  changed, 
following  the  1958  revolution,  the  Iraqi  Communist  Party 
did  likewise,  faithfully  following  Soviet  foreign 
policy.  (40)  However,  the  Communist  Party  continued  to  give 
its  unquestioning  support  to  the  Kurdish  insurgency,  even 
after  Iran,  the  US,  Britain  and  Israel  became  the  chief 
supporters  of  the  Kurds;  it  also  continued  to  spread 
hostile  rumours  against  the  Iraqi  armed  forces,  even  when 
those  were  equipped  and  trained  by  the  Soviets.  It  had 
difficulty  in  explaining  away  the  fact  that  its  leader, 
"Azlz  Muhammad,  was  a  Kurd,  as  was  'Azlz  al-H5jj  the  second 
man  in  the  party.  The  communists  later  became  very  hostile 
to  ýArifls  regime,  even  though  'Arif  had  just  crushed  their 
chief  rivals,  the  Ba'thists,  and  despite  'Arif's  lenient 
attitude  to  them.  Their  excuse  was  that  the  'Arif  regime 
was  a  military  dictatorship  which  did  not  serve  the 
interests  of  the  people.  (41)  However,  owing  to  heavy  Soviet 
pressure,  particularly  following  the  meeting  between  'Arif 
and  Krushchev  in  Cairo  and  the  resumption  of  Soviet  arms 
supplies  to  Iraq,  severed  since  February  1963,  the  central 
committee  of  the  Iraqi  Communist  Party  relented  in  its 
hostility  to  the  'Arif  regime.  It  issued  a  communique  in 
which  it  changed  its  position  of  total  hostility  to  the 
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was  described  as  the  August  1964  line.  The  architect  of 
this  line  was  Amir  'Abd  All5h,  who  was  the  only  Arab  in  the 
politburo  of  the  Iraqi  Communist  Party.  The  main 
justification  of  the  August  1964  line  was  that  the  '*Arif 
regime  was  copying  Nasir's  socialist  transformation  in  the 
direction  of  what  the  Marxists  termed  "the  non-capitalist 
road  to  development".  (42)  Moscow  publicly  welcomed  the 
socialist  measures  taken  by  'Arif's  regime  and  the  peaceful 
Settlement  with  the  Kurds.  It  affirmed  its  wishes  to 
establish  long  lasting  relations  with  Iraq.  (43)  "Arif  Is 
regime  began  a  wholesale  release  of  communist  detainees 
and,  following  the  failed  Ba'thist  plot  of  September  1964, 
the  regime's  security  apparatus  concentrated  on  the  real 
danger  of  the  Baýthists.  However,  the  rank  and  file  of  the 
Iraqi  Communist  Party  were  against  the  August  1964  line  and 
wanted  an  open  confrontation  with  the  regime,  particularly 
its  Kurdish  rank  and  file.  This  led,  within  eighteen 
months,  to  an  open  rebellion(44)  within  the  Iraqi  Communist 
Party,  since  ýAzlz  al-Hdjj,  known  for  his  highly  extremist  I 
Marxist  views,  jumped  on  the  band-wagon  of  "Mao  Tse  Tung" 
and  his  Cultural  Revolution  in  China,  arrested  his  fellow 
members  of  the  politburo  and  declared  a  guerrilla  war  in 
the  Marshes.  This  eventually  pressurised  the  pro-Moscow 
wing  to  change  its  attitude  yet  again  and  in  the  reverse 
direction.  Once  the  war  against  the  Kurds  was  resumed, 
owing  to  the  rejection  by  Mullah  Muýýafd  al-Barzdnl  of 
government  peace  terms,  the  Iraqi  Communist  Party  declared 
that  the  'Arif  regime  must  be  destroyed  and  that  the 
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Anir  'Abd  Alldh  himself  was  again  the  architect  of  the  new 
attitude  towards  the  regime,  which  was  exactly  the  opposite 
of  the  previous  attitude,  also  devised  by  him  only  a  few 
months  earlier.  (45)  One  will  never  know  in  reality  the  full 
extent  of  Soviet  interference  in  the  new  Iraqi  Communist 
Party's  attitude  towards  'Arif's  regime,  but  the  Soviets 
probably  wanted  to  intimidate  it  by  threatening  it  with  the 
local  communists. 
However,  shifting  grounds  and  changing  attitudes 
affected  the  party  seriously.  (46)  It  eventually  split  up 
into  groups,  a  pro-Moscow  group  known  as  'the  central 
committee'  and  a  pro-China  group  of  ýAzlz  al-H5jj,  known  as  I 
,  the  central  command'  or  'the  central  leadership'.  (47) 
ýAzlz  al-lýdjjs  wing  was  uncompromising  on  every  issue, 
calling  for  the  destruction  of  the  'Arif  regime  through  an 
all-out  civil  war,  starting  from  the  marshes.  (48)  It  is 
supprising  that  in  view  of  the  fact  that  'Azlz  al-H5jj  had 
I 
been  until  then  a  member  of  a  party  which  recognised  the 
existence  of  Israel,  he  now  called  for  its  destruction, 
again  through  popular  war.  He  parroted  the  Chinese  line, 
which  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  rights  of  the  Palestinian 
people.  Al-Iýdjj  began  his  Chinese-  inspired  crusade  in  the 
Marshes  against  the  Iraqi  army,  just  at  the  time  when  the 
army  was  bracing  itself  for  the  task  of  combating  Israel. 
The  final  attitude  of  the  communists,  whether  al-Hajjls 
version  or  Am1r  'Abd  All5h1s,  led  to  the  weakening  of  the 
Arif  regime.  It  was  clear  to  the  western  powers  that 
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game  of  cat  and  mouse  with  'Arif,  aiming  at  his  surrender 
to  Moscow,  whereas  the  Chinese,  through  the  al-]ýdjj  wing, 
might  introduce  upheaval  and  instability  at  the  heart  of 
western  interests.  Consequently  the  writing  was  on  the  wall 
for  the  'Arif  regime. 
-  The  Islamists:  There  were  two  main  parties,  the 
Muslim  Brotherhood,  led  by  Shaykh  'Abd  al-ýAzlz  al-Badr-1, 
whom  the  Ba'th  regime  tortured  and  then  murdered  in  early 
1970,  and  the  al-Da'wah  party,  led  by  Shaykh  Bdqir  al-ýadr, 
whom  the  Baýth  regime  also  tortured  and  then  murdered  in 
1980.  These  two  parties  began  to  win  widespread  support, 
particularly  after  the  1967  defeat  and  the  occupation  of 
Jerusalem  by  Israel,  which  revealed  the  bankruptcy  of  the 
pan-Arab  movement,  headed  by  the  Nasir  regime,  which  was 
hostile  to  the  Pan-Islamic  movement.  The  growth  of  the 
Islamic  movement  was  rather  a  strange  phenomenon,  in  the 
case  of  Iraq,  since  Iraq  was  traditionally  more  secular 
than  Egypt,  and  the  two  main  parties  in  Iraq,  the 
communists  and  the  Ba'thists,  were  founded  by  non-Muslims. 
Even  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  Nasirists  in  Iraq  was  a 
Palestinian  Christian,  George  Habash.  The  Islamists  were 
enraged  by  the  loss  of  the  al-Aqýd  mosque  and  by  Iraq's 
youth  being  led  astray  by  non-Muslims,  looking  towards 
Moscow  or  Beijing  rather  than  Baghdad.  The  rapid  growth  of 
the  Islamic  movement,  especially  after  the  defeat  of  1967, 
convinced  western  powers  and  their  chief  puppet  in  the 
area,  Saudi  Arabia,  to  act  speedily  to  replace  the  'Arif 
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rival.  These  factors  combined  to  weaken  the  regime,  which 
began  to  decay  to  the  core  in  its  final  few  weeks,  with 
near  anarchy  in  government  departments.  The  symptoms  of 
that  decay  and  anarchy  were  as  follows:  (49) 
(a)  The  repeated  resignation  of  Ministers  from  the 
Tdhir  Yalýyd  cabinet. 
(b)  The  continuous  Kurdish  uprising  in  the  north, 
coupled  with  the  pro-Chinese  uprising  in  the 
Marshes. 
(c)  Several  attempts  on  the  lives  of  leading  members 
of  the  regime. 
(d)  Attempts  at  disabling  Iraqi  oil  exports  by 
Kurdish  and  Communist  insurgents. 
(e)  The  discovery  of  a  major  espionage  ring  in  Basra 
working  for  the  Israeli  intelligence  agency, 
Mossad,  which  had  been  active  since  1965. 
Several  weeks  before  the  July  1968  Coup  actually  took 
place,  many  Arab  newspapers  published  in  Beirut  and  Cairo, 
stated  that  the  'Ar'if  regime  had  uncovered  several  plots 
and  coup  attempts,  financed  by  Saudi  Arabia,  on  behalf  of 
the  US  and  British  government,  apparently  leaked  by  'Arif 
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plot  to  the  newspaper  were: 
(a)  To  prevent  the  plotters  from  carrying  on  with 
their  plot. 
(b)  To  spread  the  word  wider  within  Iraq  that  a  plot 
was  being  hatched  to  return  Iraq  to  the  violence 
of  earlier  times. 
'Arif  knew  of  the  coup  from  an  officer  named  Muq'ab 
al-Ijard5n,  who  confessed  to  him  that  he  had  received 
150,000  Dinars  from  the  plotters  in  return  for  his 
participation  with  them  in  the  coup.  Al-Uarddn  informed 
ýArif  of  the  names  of  the  plotters  and  regional  and  great 
powers  that  supported  them.  (51)  'Arif  called  the  plotters 
who  were  his  palace  officers,  and  confronted  them  with  the 
confessions  of  al-Iýarddn.  They  denied  it  and  took  an  oath 
on  the  Qur'5n  that  they  had  not  betrayed  him;  'Arif 
believed  them.  (52) 
The  'Arif  regime  discovered  a  pro-Syrian  Bath  cell, 
working  on  behalf  of  Syrian  intelligence.  (53)  Some  reports 
suggested  that  the  other  Ba'th  wing,  i.  e.  ýAflaq-al-Bakr, 
was  behind  that  discovery,  so  as  to  divert  ýArif  away  from 
their  own  clandestine  activities.  (54) 
On  16  April  1968,  thirteen  senior  Iraqi  former 
generals  (f  ive  of  whom  were  Ba'thists)  who  had  become 
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These  ex-Generals  included  Ndjl  Tdlib  and  'Arif  'Abd  al- 
Razz5q,  both  former  Prime  Ministers,  ýublýl  ýAbd  al-Ham1ld, 
Iýardan  al-Tikr-ItY,  al-Bakr,  another  former  Prime  Minister, 
Rash1d  Muý1111ý,  'Abd  al-Ghan7i  al-R5wi,  'Abd  al-ýAzlz  al-'UqaylT 
and  Muhmmad  Shayt  Khatt5b.  They  demanded  the  removal  of  the 
Prime  Minister,  Tdh-ir  Ya4yd,  and  the  establishment  of  a 
national  council  and,  under  it,  a  coalition  government.  The 
sole  purpose  of  the  latter  would  be  to  prepare  for  handing 
over  power  to  the  people  after  electing  a  constituent 
assembly  within  two  years,  thus  ending  the  emergency  rule 
which  had  been  going  on  for  nearly  sixteen  years.  (55)  And 
they  made  other  demands  including  that  of  cancelling  the 
Mirage  deal,  on  the  grounds  that  the  Iraqi  Air  Force  was 
Soviet-equipped  and  that  it  was  unwise  to  replace  this 
source  of  supply,  particularly  since  the  French  Mirages 
were  more  expensive  than  the  Soviet  Migs. 
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In  addition  to  the  internal  conditions  that  were 
pushing  the  regime  towards  collapse,  regional  conditions 
were  doing  likewise.  Following  the  1967  defeat,  as  pointed 
out  above,  a  perilous  state  of  affairs  developed  in  the 
Middle  East.  Pan-Arabism,  at  least  pre-1967,  was  proved  to 
be  a  myth.  According  to  a  defender  of  pan-Arabism 
S..  every  time  pan-Arabism  faced  defeat,  the 
masses  retreated  to  the  frontiers  of  their 
religious  beliefs  to  protect  it  within  the 
security  of  absolute  faith".  (56) 
It  seems  that  Iraq  was  the  first  candidate  for  such  a 
convulsion,  owing  to  its  internal  conditions,  which  pushed 
in  the  direction  of  changing  the  regime  by  introducing  into 
power  one  regime  which  would  grant  companies  f  avourable 
concessions  (57)  and  be  more  able  to  deal  with  the  new 
regional  conditions. 
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The  Gulf  area,  including  Iraq  and  Iran,  contains  the 
greatest  percentage  of  world  reserves  of  crude  oil.  The  Oil 
industry,  after  the  second  world  war,  did  not  remain  just  a 
business  of  buying,  selling  and  refining  oil,  but  became 
strategic.  Western  imperialist  powers  became  totally 
dependent  on  Gulf  oil,  as  did  Japan.  This  contrasted  with 
the  Soviet  Union,  which  had  its  own  domestic  supplies. 
Western  imperialist  powers  were  determined  to  safeguard 
their  oil  interests,  particularly  as  the  Cold  War  reached 
its  climax  during  the  late  1960s.  Following  the 
destabilising  events  of  the  sixties,  which  culminated  in 
the  June  1967  defeat,  Western  imperialist  power  strategies 
were: 
(1)  The  creation  of  local  regimes  in  the  area  that  combated 
western  imperialism  and  Zionism  in  name,  while  the 
real  effect  of  their  policies  was  in  accordance  with 
western  Zionist  interests.  This  was,  and  still  is, 
very  clear  in  the  two  Ba'thist  regimes  in  Iraq  and 
Syria. 
(2)  The  reformation  of  Anglo-American  relations  with  Gulf 
Shaykhdoms  on  new  bases  of  mutual  defence  between  the 
Shaykhdoms  themselves,  under  US  supervision. 
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bolstering  its  military  capabilities,  on  the  grounds 
that  it  was  a  front-line  post  in  the  defence  of  Anglo- 
American  interests  in  the  area,  namely  oil. 
(4)  Encouragement  of  inter-Arab  rivalries  and  conflicts, 
so  as  to  siphon  off  the  economic  and  social  energies 
of  the  Arab  states  and  thus  divert  them  from 
confronting  Anglo-American  domination  and  Israeli 
expansionism.  (58) 
Anglo-American  strategic  planning  considered  that  the 
above  was  a  better  alternative  to  direct  military  presence, 
which  had  become  very  difficult,  given  the  high  tide  of 
anti-British  and  anti-American  feeling  that  followed  the 
1967  Arab  defeat.  The  Soviets  were  gaining  ground,  through 
their  arms  sales  to  the  Arabs  and  their  ideological 
infiltration  of  Arab  regimes  by  local  Marxists. 
One  of  the  first  manifestations  of  the  new  Western 
strategy  was  the  decision  by  Britain,  at  the  beginning  of 
1968,  to  withdraw  its  forces  from  the  Gulf  Shaykhdoms 
before  1970  as  a  part  of  British  withdrawals  from  east  of 
Suez,  a  sphere  of  influence  in  which  Britain  had  been 
active  for  a  hundred  and  fifty  years.  Harold  Wilson's 
Labour  Government  justified  this  decision  on  the  grounds 
that  Britain  could  not  bear  the  economic  cost,  and  that  it 
could  not  maintain  a  military  presence  in  an  area  boiling 
with  anti-British,  anti-American  and  anti-Israeli 
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most  Arab  states,  the  Gulf  Shaykhdoms  themselves  were 
terrified  and  begged  the  British  to  remain  as  their 
masters.  (60)  The  US  was  also  worried  about  the  British 
decision,  at  a  time  when  the  US  was  deep  in  the  Vietnam 
quagmire;  they  accordingly  began  to  look  for  ways  to 
protect  their  own  interests  in  the  shaykhdoms,  which  were 
greater  than  those  of  Britain.  (61)  Israel,  on  the  other 
hand,  while  announcing  that  British  withdrawals  would  not 
affect  her  security,  declared  that  there  would  be 
instability,  and  that  the  US  should  step  in  to  fill  the 
vacuum.  (62) 
This  the  US  did,  though  not  in  the  style  of  the 
landing  in  Lebanon  in  1958,  following  the  collapse  of  the 
monarchy  in  Iraq.  (63)  However,  British  withdrawal  from  Aden 
left  its  government  in  the  hands  of  a  Marxist  group,  which 
displayed  its  hostility  to  North  Yemen  and  the  Shaykhdoms 
of  the  Gulf,  pushing  them  further  into  the  arms  of  the  US 
and  providing  the  Soviet  Union  with  an  ideological  -and 
military  base  in  Aden.  (64) 
Anglo-American  co-ordination  concerning  the  post- 
British  withdrawal  was  as  follows: 
Dean  Rusk,  for  the  USA  and  George  Brown  for  Britain 
met  and,  after  frank  discussions,  reached  an 
understanding.  (65) 
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Gulf  to  instruct  the  Saudis  and  Kuwaitis  that  they 
should  form  a  military  alliance  with  Iran,  to  be  in 
place  by  the  time  British,  forces  were  withdrawn  from 
the  Gulf.  (66)  The  British  Government  then  discovered, 
through  its  discussions  with  the  shaykhs,  that  there 
was  a  difficulty  in  substituting  Iran  for  Britain; 
some  suggested  that  a  role  should  be  given  to  Iraq, 
since  it  was  also  a  Gulf  state.  (67)  on  20  January  1968 
the  US  Assistant  Secretary  of  State,  Eugene  Rostow, 
declared  that  the  vacuum  created  by  Britain  should  be 
filled  by  a  defence  pact  between  Britain,  the  US  and 
some  of  the  states  in  the  area.  (68) 
(3)  Gulf  rulers  echoed  US  and  British  announcements 
faithfully.  The  first  was  King  Fayýal  of  Saudi  Arabia, 
who  agreed,  as  usual,  with  the  US  view  that  there 
should  be  defensive  arrangements  between  the  states  in 
the  area.  (69) 
(4)  The  Shah  of  Iran  also  supported  the  US  view,  since  he 
was  going  to  be  the  main  beneficiary  of  such  an 
arrangement.  He  declared  that  coverage  of  the  British 
withdrawal  and  the  filling  of  the  vacuum  created  by 
the  British  could  be  met  by  the  states  in  the  area,  no 
doubt  meaning  Iran.  (70) 
(5)  The  Iranian  Prime  Minister,  Amlin  'Abbds  Howaydd, 
declared  that  the  British  forces  should  not  be 
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country  outside  the  area;  he  would  not  even 
contemplate  the  reappearance  of  the  British  in  a 
different  guise.  (71)  Iranian  expansionist  aims  were 
behind  Howay(ld's  announcements. 
(6)  After  the  initial  terrified  reaction  of  the  Gulf 
shaykhs,  when  Britain  announced  its  intention  to  pull 
out  from  the  Gulf,  the  assurances  of  the  US  and  Iran 
went  some  way  to  calm  down  such  rulers  as  the  Shaykh 
of  Bahrain.  (72)  The  Soviet  Union,  in  a  commentary  by 
the  Government  -c  ontro  1  led  Novosti  News  Agency  on  4 
June  1968,  declared  that  the  US  was  replacing  Britain 
in  the  Gulf,  and  that  the  creation  of  the  United  Arab 
Emirates,  through  British-American  efforts,  by 
combining  the  various  trucial  states,  was  a  step  in 
that  direction. 
However,  one  may  conclude  that  the  threat  to  the 
western  interests  in  the  region  was  unlikely  to  come  from 
the  Gulf  States,  which  were  already  under  the  influence  of 
the  Western  Powers.  But  it  was  Iraq  that,  in  view  of  its 
internal  condition,  that  might  be  the  source  of  trouble,  as 
one  of  the  British  papers  hinted.  (73)  The  following  facts 
supported  this  view: 
The  three  main  countries  in  the  Gulf  area  were  Iraq, 
Iran  and  Saudi  Arabia.  The  latter  two  were  then 
puppets  in  the  hands  of  the  Anglo-American  alliance 
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new  western  security  arrangements  for  the  area. 
(2)  Political  conditions  in  Iran  and  Saudi  Arabia  were 
relatively  stable,  in  comparison  with  Iraq,  which  was 
on  the  verge  of  a  massive  political  convulsion. 
(3)  Iraq  had  an  historical  claim  to  Kuwait,  which  was  a 
source  of  deep  concern  for  Anglo-American  interests. 
Since  Iraq  was  highly  unstable  Politically,  and  there 
was  every  chance  of  a  regime  coming  to  power  that 
would  re-activate  this  claim.  (74)  Consequently,  there 
was  a  clear  urgency  to  introduce  a  regime  that  would 
be  more  favourable  to  Western  interests.  More  than  two 
decades  later  the  Gulf  War  suggested  that  Kuwait  was 
used  as  a  tool  for  the  benefit  of  the  US,  Britain  and 
Israel,  for  the  destruction  of  Iraq. 
(4)  A  wave  of  anti-American  and  anti-British  feeling  swept 
Iraq  following  the  June  1967  Arab-Israeli  war;  this 
added  to  the  traditional  anti-Western  sentiment  of 
most  Iraqis,  whether  communist,  pan-Arabist  or 
Islamist.  Consequently,  there  was  a  desire  in  the  West 
to  prevent  a  regime  coming  to  power  hostile  to  western 
interests.  (75) 
There  were  Soviet  attempts  to  exploit  the  situation  in 
Iraq  to  their  own  advantage,  which  were  demonstrated 
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newspapers,  particularly  Halaretz,  commented: 
",...  Iraq  has  designs  on  'Kuwaiti  oil,  while 
Nasir  has  similar  designs  on  the  oil  of  the 
other  Gulf  states.  So  if  the  USA  does  not  want 
an  enemy  power,  in  name  Iraq  or  Egypt,  but  in 
reality  the  Soviet  Union,  then  the  US  must 
replace  Britain.  "  (76) 
After  Israel  defeated  Nasir  and  brought  down  Egyptian 
pride  into  the  gutter  (with  some  clandestine  help  from  the 
Alawite  regime  in  Syria),  there  was  no  one  left,  apart  from 
Iraq,  to  face  Israel.  It  was  imperative  to  reassure  Israel 
and  the  Gulf  shaykhdoms  before  British  withdrawal. 
According  to  the  Times: 
VL 
0.. 
0  even  when  our  influence  will  be 
marginal,  it  must  still  be  used  to  contain 
troubles  that  are  likely  to  be  unleashed.  -(77) 
Thus,  and  based  on  the  above,  the  plan  to  re-Order 
the  area  by  the  western  powers,  following  the  June  War  of 
1967,  in  order  to  avoid  serious  consequences,  came  to  light 
by  a  series  of  coups.  This  was  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
the  re-ordering  of  the  area  had  been  planned  earlier,  as 
was  said  in  the  preceding  chapters.  One  took  place, 
immediately  after  the  June  defeat,  in  Yemen  against  'Abd 
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I 
coup  followed  in  Sudan,  in  May  1969,  led  by  al-Numayr-i, 
which  brought  down  al-Azharli.  This  then  was  followed  by  the 
Somali  coup  led  by  Siyydd-Bartli.  Also  Sultan  Qdbgs  bin  Sa'Td 
took  over  in  Oman  in  July  1970.  These  developments  may,  or 
may  not,  have  had  any  bearing  on  developments  in  Iraq.  More 
notable  than  these  changes,  however,  were  the  two  coups  of 
17  and  30  July  1968  in  Iraq,  which  were  intended  to  bring 
the  Ba'th  Party  in  Iraq  to  power. 
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In  the  light  of  the  above-1  -what  was  the  role  of  the 
Arab  Socialist  Ba'th  Party  in  the  emerging  regional  and 
international  situation,  given  the  fact  that  it  was  the 
same  Party  that  had  done  such  great  service  to  the  Anglo- 
American-Israeli  alliance,  by  severing  the  Egyptian-Syrian 
union,  destroying  the  Qdsim  regime  and  dragging  Nasir  into 
the  1967  disaster?  (78)  The  Anglo-American  Israeli  moves 
were  directed  against  Iraq  in  an  attempt'to  secure  their 
interests  in  the  oil  shaykhdoms.  Ba'th  Party  literature 
itself  states: 
In  *00  When  the  Revolution  of  July  1968 
occurred,  the  imperialist  plans  for  the  Arabian 
Gulf,  in  particular,  were  already  in  train.  A 
major  advance  had  been  made  before  the 
Revolutionary  Council  undertook  its  pan-Arab 
responsibilities  in  this  area.  "(79) 
Was  the  Ba"th  party  so  strong  and  united  that  it  was 
able  to  seize  control,  while  other  forces,  which  it  called 
reactionary  and  were  more  trusted  by  the  imperialist 
powers,  held  the  leading  positions  of  authority?  It 
acknowledged  in  its  political  report  that: 
%%,  ...  Reactionary  forces  in  foreign  pay  advanced 
daily  to  occupy  crucial  positions  in  the 
286 government  and  in  the  institutions  of  society 
and  state.  American,  British,  Iranian  and 
Israeli  espionage  networks  functioned  openly  in 
the  country  and  penetrated  most  political 
groups.  ee  The  situation  was  explosive  and 
risked  bringing  to  power  either  an  even  more 
reactionary  government  of  hirelings  or  a 
military  dictatorship,  with  the  probable 
destruction  of  the  Party  and  the  entire  national 
movement,  throwing  Iraq  back  into  a  situation 
like  that  prevailing  before  the  1958  revolution, 
and  shifting  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Arab 
world  in  favour  of  imperialism  and 
reaction.  "(80) 
If  the  Ba'th  and  pan-Arabist  movement  was  really  a 
danger  that  threatened  imperialist  interests,  why  did  the 
latter  allow  it  to  attain  power  instead  of  other  forces 
which  the  Ba'th  described  as  reactionary,  who,  by 
implication  would  fulfil  imperialist  designs?  More 
importantly,  was  the  Ba'th  really  united  and  strong  enough 
to  decisively  alter  the  situation  in  its  favour?  To  answer 
these  questions  we  must  study  the  Baýth  Party,  particularly 
in  Iraq,  just  before  it  regained  power. 
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before  reaainina  power: 
When  the  political  status  of  the  Baý  th  Party  is 
investigated  during  the  period  from  23  February  1966,  which 
witnessed  its  tearing  apart,  until  18  February  1968,  which 
saw  the  convening  of  the  Ninth  pan-Arab  Congress  of  the 
Party,  one  must  conclude  that  it  was  all  but  disbanded.  It 
disintegrated  into  pockets,  .  owing  to  the  absence  of  the 
ýAflaq,  al-Biý5r,  and  al-Razz5z  influence,  (81)  some  of 
which  were  no  more  than  politico-criminals,  such  as  those 
in  Iraq,  headed  by  Saddam  and  'Abd  al  Karlim  al-Shaykhly. 
What  is  clear  is  that  the  prophesies  of  the  founder  of  the 
Ba'th  seemed  to  be  beginning  to  materialise. 
It  was  'Aflaq,  before  he  was  expelled  from  Syria,  who 
said: 
11  We  must  rescue  this  Party  before  it  is  too 
late  and  before  the  Party  is  lost,  because  the 
problem  within  it  is  old  and  dangerous.  -(82) 
qaldý  al-B#5r,  in  his  letter  of  resignation  from  the 
Party  on  10  October  1967,  said: 
"I  I  was  the  first  to  stress  the  inevitability 
of  the  Party's  collaipse.  "(83) 
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Party  was  finished  historically  and  objectively.  (84)  The 
Party  acknowledges  this  fully  in  its  literature: 
%,  during  this  period  the  Arab  Ba'th 
Socialist  Party  faced*  the  most  dangerous 
challenge  in  its  history.  Its  future,  its 
relations  with  the  people,  its  pioneering  role 
in  their  revolutionary  movement  and  even  its 
existence  were  at  stake.  "(85) 
The  Party's  position  in  Iraq  was  even  worse  than  its 
totally  discredited  position'  in  the  Arab  world  generally: 
11  on  both  regional  and  pan-Arab  levels  the 
Party  suffered  severely  from  internal 
dissension  and  from  the  consequences  of  the 
failure  of  its  experiments  in  Political 
administration  in  Iraq  and  Syria.  "  The  report 
adds:  "...  the  spread  of  dissidence  and  its 
effect  on  structure  and  morale  cost  the  Party  a 
considerable  number  of  former  leaders,  senior 
cadres,  members,  organised  supporters  and 
adherents.  Some  fell  under  the  weight  of 
despair  or  of  terrorism.  Some  withdrew  from  the 
struggle  while  some  'Joined  one  or  another  of 
the  schismatic  groups.  "(86) 
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power  to  confront  the  weak  and  collapsing  I 'Arif  regime,  and 
so  the  revolution  must  be  delayed  indefinitely: 
"....  to  rely  on  the-  forces  of  the  Party  and 
masses  to  overthrow  the  apostate  November 
regime  (i.  e.  'ýkrifls  regime)  would  inevitably 
have  meant  postponing  the  Revolution  for  a  very 
long  time.  "  (87) 
However,  ýAflaq  did  not  leave  it  at  that;  he  soon 
left  Brazil,  where  he  had  fled  after  being  expelled  from 
Syria  and  was  back  in  the  Middle  East,  in  Lebanon,  in 
February  1968,  where  he  began  gathering  together  the 
remnants  of  the  Party,  (88)  He  was  able,  despite  its 
desperate  state,  to  convene  a  congress  in  Beirut  in 
February  1968,  which  was  called  the  Ninth  Pan-Arab  Congress 
of  the  Baýth  Party.  (89) 
The  political  report  of  the  Eighth  Congress  of  the 
Arab  Baýth  Party  in  Iraq  declares,  concerning  the  Party's 
condition,  that: 
"...  the  Party  organisation  at  home  and  abroad 
was  in  no  position  to  give  to  the  Pan-Arab 
Command  enough  material  or  organisationallf 
coherence  to  unite  and  guide  the  party  "organs, 
followers  and  allies,  particularly  in  the  years 
immediately  preceding  the  revolution  in  Iraq. 
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Ninth  Pan-Arab  Congress  of  the  Ba'th  Party,  but 
it  did  not  take  place  until  February  1968.11(90) 
The  political  report  went  on  to  state  how,  despite 
all  difficulties  and  obstacles,  'Aflaq  managed  to  gather 
around  himself  the  remnants  of  his  Party.  It  is  noteworthy 
that  the  Ninth  Party  Congress  was  held  during  the  period 
18-25  February  1968,  a  time  which  witnessed  feverish  Anglo- 
American  attempts  to  rearrange  the  political  situation  in 
the  area,  and  in  Iraq,  in  particular,  in  the  form  of  the 
meeting  concerning  the  Middle  East  between  George  Brown  and 
Dean  Rusk.  Was  ýAflaqls  Ninth  Party  Congress  merely  a 
coincidence,  given  the  fact  that  the  Alawite  wing  of  the 
Party  ruling  Syria  could  have  blown  up  the  Congress  on 
'Aflaq's  head,  unless  there  were  powers  that  were 
protecting  ýAflaq?  While  he  was  in  Lebanon  they  were  much 
bigger  and  more  powerful  than  the  Alawite  wing  of  the  Ba'th 
Party  that  ruled.  However  it  is  useful  to  remember  the 
following: 
Given  the  degree  of  weakness  of  the  Party  that  the 
I 
political  report  asserts,  is  it  not  logical  to  ask  why 
it  was  a  danger  to  Anglo-American  interests  in  Iraq 
and  the  area  at  large? 
(2)  The  political  groups  that  had  the  upper  hand  in  the 
state  and  its  apparatus  and,  as  the  political  report 
claims,  were  supported  by  an  Anglo-American-Zionist 
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from  'Arif. 
(3)  The  forces  that  were  real  threats  to  Anglo-American- 
Zionist  interests  in  the  area  were  not  the  Ba'th  Party 
nor,  for  that  matter,  the  pan-Arab  movement  in 
general,  which  was  dying  out,  following  the  defeat  of 
Egypt  and  Syria  in  June  1967  and  the  subsequent  demise 
of  Nasirism.  The  real  forces  were  the  rising  tide  of 
militant  Islam  and  the  communists.  Neither  of  these 
forces  was  in  a  position  to  compromise  with  the  West, 
particularly  the  latter,  since  they  were  tied  up 
totally  either  to  the  Soviet  Union  or  China  and,  thus, 
ideologically  hostile  to  the  West.  The  Ba'th  Party 
acknowledged  this  much  in  its  political  report  when  it 
declared  that  the  Ninth  Congress  was: 
11  to  resolve  a  matter  of  urgency.  -  (9  1) 
In  fact,  the  matter  of  urgency  that  ýAflaq  and  his 
Ba'th  Party  wanted  to  resolve  in  Iraq  was  the  fear  of  the 
possibility  of  other  forces  seizing  power  from  'Arif, 
forces  that  might  constitute  a  danger  to  Israeli  and  Anglo- 
American  interests  in  Iraq  and  the  area  at  large.  (92) 
"Aflaq's  moves  in  1968  were  similar  to  his  moves  in  1962, 
which  resulted  in  the  two  Baýthist  coups,  in  Iraq  in 
February  1963  and  in  Syria  in  March  1963. 
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Western,  because  of  their  slogans;  in  reality,  they  were 
pro-west,  particularly  with  respect  to  oil.  (93)  The  Ba'th 
regime  was  less  extreme  on  oil  issues,  not  giving  full 
support  to  the  Arab  oil  embargo  during  the  1973  war,  than 
would  be  expected  from  their  slogans.  (94)  In  fact,  later 
on,  as  oil  prices  began  to  rise,  Saddam  began  to  call 
publicly  for  lower  oil  prices,  particularly  in  1979-80,  as 
the  new  situation  in  the  region,  following  the  revolution 
in  Iran  and  the  coming  to  power,  of  Khomeini,  promised  to 
open  an  easier  road  to  regional  influence. 
One  may  conclude  that,  without  giving  clear  and 
unambiguous  guarantees  to  regional,  as  well  as  to 
international,  powers,  the  Bath  would  never  have  returned 
to  power,  certainly  not  so  easily.  As  the  sixties  drew  to 
a  close,  it  became  quite  clear  to  US  strategic  planners 
that  the  US's  real  interestsý  lay  in  the  Middle  East  much 
more  than  in  south-east  Asia,  primarily  because  of  the 
necessity  to  safeguard  Israel's  superiority  over  the  Arabs, 
and  to  safeguard  cheap  supplies  of  oil  to  the  US  market  and 
its  allies.  Both  factors  were  detrimental  to  the  Soviet 
Union,  which  failed  to  support  the  Arabs  after  their  defeat 
in  1967,  as  the  US  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  Britain, 
supported  Israel. 
293 THE  PREPARATION  OF  THE  COUP: 
As  noted  before,  there  were  a  number  of  groups  and 
individuals  who  had  been  jockeying  for  Position  on  the 
political  scene  throughout  the  'Abd  al-Ralým?  in  period.  In 
addition,  there  were  army  political  groups,  all  seeking  to 
reach  power,  namely: 
(1)  'Abd  al-Razzdq  al-Nd'if  (Deputy  Director  of  Military 
intelligence),  Ibr5hIm  al-Ddwfld  (Head  of  the  Republican 
Guard),  Sa'dfln  Ghayddn  (Commander  of  a  key  tank 
brigade  in  the  Republican  Guard)  who  are  known  as  the 
'Palace  officers'.  They  were  the  key  pillars  of 
'Arif's  regime,  being  of  his  clan  and  so  having  his 
confidence. 
(2)  The  old  "Free  Officers'  of  1958,  led  by  General  Mij! 
Tdlib  and  General  Rijdb  'Abd  al-Majid.  They  were 
Nasirists. 
(3)  General  "Abd  al-"Azlz  al-'Uqayll's  group,  which  opposed 
Kurdish  claims  to  national  rights. 
(4)  General  Aýmad  Uasan  al-Bakr's  group,  which  included 
Ifarddn  al-Tikriti,  Sdlih  Mahd!  ýAmmdsh  and  other 
Ba'thist  officers. 
In  the  last  months  of  the  'Arif  regime,  which  had 
reached  a  state  of  collapse,  there  were  rumours  of  contacts 
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government.  It  was  said  that  a  US  delegation,  headed  by 
Former  Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  Robert  Anderson, 
who  visited  Iraq  at  that  time  to  negotiate  the  issue  of 
joint  investment  in  Sulphur  with  the  Iraqi  government  by  us 
Companies,  (95)  met  secretly  with  all  military-political 
groups,  with  the  exception  of  the  Nasirist  group.  (96)  The 
reason  for  this  was  probably  that  the  Nasirists  were  more 
anti-British  and  anti-American,  and  that  they  tended  to 
favour  France  as  the  western  country  sympathetic  to  their 
interests.  (97) 
The  Americans  probably  made  this  move  af  ter  they 
knew  that  there  was  a  coup  in  the  making.  The  organiser  was 
al-Nd'if  and  his  group,  who  occupied  sensitive  posts  in  the 
'Arif  regime.  (98)  They  had  became  discontented  with  'Arif, 
owing  to  his  refusal  to  dismiss  Tdhir  Yalýyd  from  office.  It 
seems  that  T5hir  Ya4yd  had  quarreled  with  al-Ndif  and  his 
group  for  several  reasons,  principally  concerning 
influence.  (99)  In  'Arif's  view,  as  he  acknowledged  later  to 
Batatu,  (100)  al-Nd'if  was  a  tool  whetted  with  money  by  the 
Principal  Forging  companies  in  Iraq  and  the  Powers  behind 
them,  after  his  government  had  given  the  oil  contract  to 
ERAP  and  denied  a  sulphur  concession  to  the  Pan-American 
Company,  and  had  reached  an  understanding  concerning 
technical  assistance  with  the  Soviet  Union  for  the 
development  of  the  North  Riimailah  field.  There  is  an 
authoritative  American  source  that  supports  this  view,  (101) 
suggesting  that  pro-western  elements  that  criticised  the 
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French  and  damaging  British  and  American  interests  in  Iraq 
might  have  taken  action  against  'Arif  in  the  coup  of  17 
July  1968.  Immediately  after  the  coup,  rumours  began  to 
anticipate  the  cancellation  of  the  ERAP  contract  and  the 
return  of  the  North  Rumailah  field  to  the  Iraqi  Petroleum 
Company  (IPC),  and  the  giving  of  the  Sulphur  concession  to 
the  Pan-American  Company.  (102) 
Concerning  al-D5wfldIs  and  Ghayd5nIs  withdrawal  from 
'Arif's  regime,  the  first  was  dissatisfied  with  'Arif's 
toleration  of  the  Nasirites,  who  made  frequent  plots 
against  the  regime.  When,  after  the  June  War,  ýArif 
released  and  returned  many  of  them  to  their  old  positions, 
al-Ddwgd  feared  Nasirite  revenge  because  of  his  role  in 
suppressing  their  plots.  (103)  The  second  was  linked  with 
the  Ba'th  through  General  4ard5n  al-Tikriti,  who  sought 
supporters  from  the  Republican  Guard  to  smooth  the  way  for 
the  Ba'th  coup.  (104) 
One  source  claims  that  al-Vdnn71,  the  Iraqi  ambassador  in 
Beirut,  had  been  informed  by  the  Americans  about  al-Bakr 
group's  proposed  coup.  He  warned  al-Nd'if  not  to  include  the 
Ba'thist  officers  in  his  plans.  (105)  But  how  the  two 
conspiring  groups  agreed  later  on  to  co-operate,  and  who 
made  the  first  contacts  with  each  other,  it  is  difficult  to 
say.  It  is  evident  that  the  American  mediation  drew  their 
mutual  interests  together  to  stage  the  coup;  if  they  had 
acted  separately,  they  might  have  failed.  (106) 
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including  authoritative  Ba'thist  sources,  make  clear,  that 
there  was  af  oreign  power  involvement  in  the  coup.  The 
report  of  the  Eighth  Regional  Congress  of  the  Iraqi  Ba'th 
Party,  which  was  published  in  January  1974,  contains  the 
official  Party  account  of  the  coup  and  of  al-Nd'i  f  Is 
involvement  with  foreign  powers.  However,  the  Party 
justified  its  agreement  to  co-operate  with  al-Nd'if  Is  group, 
on  the  grounds  that  it  was  not  strong  enough  to  do  without 
its  help;  it  then  proposed  to  jettison  it  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment.  (107) 
On  the  Baýth  side,  the  question  of  the  the  extent  of 
involvement  with  foreign  powers,  either  of  the  Party  or  of 
individuals,  is  not  clear,  since  its  arrangements  are 
cloaked  in  secrecy.  All  the  witnesses  of  the  coup  affair, 
who  knew  about  it  or  took  part  in  it,  were  brutally 
assassinated.  It  may  be  the  reason  behind  the  assassination 
of  Ndqiral-Udni's,  the  Former  Iraqi  Ambassador  in  Lebanon. 
The  Foreign  Minister  in  the  first  government  formed  after 
the  coup  destroyed  any  incriminating  evidence  concerning 
the  Ba"th's  secret  involvement  with  foreign  Powers,  in 
which  al-Udni  had  played  a  key  role.  (108)  The  Ba'th  Party 
has  never  given  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  how  it 
managed  to  seize  power,  ýwhile  its  organisation  at  home  and 
abroad  was  in  no  position  to  do  so,  particularly  in  the 
years  immediately  preceding  the  coup.  (109) 
297 The  issues  that  were  discussed  between  the  US  team 
and  the  representatives  of  the  various  Iraqi  groups  that 
were  important  to  the  west  were  the  following: 
The  possibility  of  cancelling  the  Mirage  deal,  in 
which  the  'Arif  government,  had  arranged  to  buy  the 
aircraft  from  France  in  1967,  particularly  since  some 
of  the  jets  were  going  to  Egypt  to  train  Egyptian 
pilots.  Mirage  jets  played  a  decisive  role  during  the 
June  War  of  1967. 
(2)  The  issue  of  the  Rumailah  oil  field  and  the  concession 
given  by  ýArif  to  the  French  Company,  ERAP,  which  was 
due  to  the  'Arif  government's  pro-French  and  anti-US 
and  anti-UK  stance. 
(3)  The  issue  of  the  left  wing  threat  which  frightened 
the  US,  owing  to  the  spreading  of  the  armed  activities 
of  the  Iraqi  Communist  Party's  pro-China  Wing,  which 
was  called  the  Central  Leadership  and  led  by  %Azlz  al- 
1ýdjj.  al-U5jj  called  for  revolutionary  violence,  the 
arming  of  the  people  and  the  waging  of  the  armed 
struggle  in  the  towns  and  in  the  countryside.  The 
Central  Leadership's  main  base  was  in  the  marshes.  It 
called  for  the  downfall  of  the  dictatorship  and  the 
setting  up  of  a  popular  regime,  and  for  the 
destruction  of  the  Zionist  State  in  Palestine  and  its 
replacement  by  an  Arab-Jewish  one;  it  maintained  that 
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securing  Arab  rights  in  Palestine. 
(4)  The  issue  of  Kurdish  activities  in  the  north,  which 
were  pressuring  the  'Arif  Government,  on  the  grounds 
that  it  had  not  implemented  the  1966  12-point 
agreement  reached  between  the  Kurds  and  the  Prime 
minister  of  the  day,  'Abd  al-Rakurdn  al-BazzAz. 
(5)  The  issue  of  the  eastern  front,  which  was  led  by  Iraq 
and  included  Syria  and  Jordan.  Iraq  sent  an  armoured 
division  to  Jordan  in  an  attempt  to  reduce  the 
pressure  on  the  Egyptian  army  which  was  f  acing  the 
Israeli  Army  across  the  Suez  Canal.  The  US  did  not 
like  this,  since  it  wanted  to  discipline  Nasir,  not  to 
help  him. 
(6)  The  issue  of  Palestinian  resistance,  which  had  had  a 
strong  focus  in  Iraq  since  General  Qasim.  It  was 
supported  by  both  the  people  and  government  of  Iraq. 
Later,  the  Ba'th  regime's  in  Iraq  joining  Jordan  in 
suppressing  the  Palestinians  (110)  is  an  indication  of 
the  Ba"th's  adherence  to  its  agreement  with  the  great 
powers,  which  helped  it  to  stage  the  17  July  Coup. 
These  were  the  issues  that  were  discussed  by  the  US 
representatives  with  the  above  groups.  They  were  important 
to  the  west,  being  the  result  of  internal  Iraqi  conditions 
during  the  'Arif  government  and  of  regional  issues  due  to 
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immediate  steps  with  the  effective,  groups  to  implement 
their  plans,  particularly  with  regard  to  the  leftist  and 
Islamic  threat  to  topple  the  government. 
At  any  rate,  from  all  the  various  groups  that  met  the 
US  team,  the  al-BakrIs  and  al-Nd'if  Is  groups  were  chosen  to 
co-operate  in  mounting  the  coup.  The'reasons  for  this  were 
the  following: 
(a)  The  execution  of  the  coup  had  to  be  by  al-Nd'if 
group  (Palace  officers),  because  they  had  the 
keys  to  the  Presidential  Palace. 
(b)  The  Ba'th  Party,  represented  by  al-Bakrls  group, 
was  unpopular  because  of  people's  experience  of 
its  ruthlessness  in  1963.  It  was  a  weak  group, 
working  secretly  and  fairly  unsuccessfully 
underground  against  the  'Arif  regime.  When  it 
took  over,  it  claimed  that  its  Party  membership 
was  around  5000  full  members.  This  number  was 
most  likely  exaggerated  by  the  Baýth,  as  some 
sources  indicate.  (111) 
Thus,  reliance  had  to  be  put  on  a  strong  and 
effective  group  to  stage  the  coup.  After  the  coup  the 
Palace  Officers  could  not  hold  on  to  power  and  steer  Iraq 
to  stability,  because  of  its  difficult  internal  Political 
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credibility  and  of  a  political  party.  (112)  Hence,  there  was 
a  need,  just,  for  the  al-Bakr  group,  which  was  favoured  and 
trusted  by  the  US  and  differed  from  the  other  groups  in  the 
following  ways: 
It  had  a  party  organisation  with  an  internal  security 
apparatus,  Jih5z  Uarifin,  which  had  been  established  by 
Saddam.  on  the  orders  of  'Aflaq,  to  curb  all  popular 
opposition  movements,  which  had  influence  at  that 
period,  particularly  the  left-wing  ones.  Some  sources 
have  described  how  Saddam  and  the  members  of  his  JiMz 
Han1in  caused  fear  and  horror  in  student  organisations, 
and  throughout  the  colleges  in  Baghdad,  particularly 
among  left-wing  students.  (113)  Another  source 
indicates  that  JiMz  Varfin  instigated  several  political 
assassinations  of  left-wing  activists  during  the  'Arif 
government,  with  the  help  of  the  CIA,  through  links 
with  the  US  and  British  Embassies.  (114)  It  was  said 
that  President  Nasir  sent  a  warning  to  the  Iraqi 
government  that  he  was  informed  by  his  intelligence 
service  of  a  Ba'thist  link  with  the  CIA.  (115)  This 
was  done  with  the  knowledge  of  the  Iraqi  Ambassador  in 
Lebanon,  Ndqiral-lýdni,  which  was  the  reason  for  his 
assassination  after  Saddam  reached  power. 
(2)  It  was  extremely  anti-left,  despite  its  claim  that  it 
was  socialist;  this  was  only  for  the  sake  of 
appearances.  This  group  would,  then,  guarantee  US  and 
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economic  and  a  political  measures  of  the  previous 
government's  policies.  (116) 
(3)  There  were  bad  relations  between  the  Ba'th  leadership 
and  Nasir;  it  consistently  wrecked  any  attempts  to 
unify  them,  despite  their  both  subscribing  to  similar 
ideologies 
(4)  It  was  close  to  the  ýAflaq  group  in  Lebanon  with  Jean 
Obaid,  chief  editor  of  the,,  -Lebanese  newspaper  al- 
qayydd,  as  one  of  the  links  between  it  and 
'Af  laq.  (117) 
These  features  of  the  al-Bakr  group  persuaded  the  US 
that  it  was  the  best  ally  possible  for  the  al-  Nd'if  group, 
for  the  staging  of  the  coup,  in  order  to  secure  the  US  and 
the  west's  interests  not  only  in  Iraq,  but  in  the  whole 
Arab  world. 
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The  Baýthists  named  17  July  Ithe'white  revolution', 
not  because  they  did  not  want'  to  shed  blood,  as  they 
acknowledged  in  the  Political  Report  which  states: 
11  in  the  revolution  of  8  -February  1963  blood 
was  shed  f  reely  ....  therefore,  the  leadership  of 
the  Party  determined  that  this  time  power  must 
be  taken  without  such  bloodletting  as  would 
spoil  the  image  and  divert  the  course  of  the 
revolution,  -  (118)  -, 
But  because  they  did  not  meet  any  resistance  from 
President  'Arif,  since  he  had  been  betrayed  by  the 
guardians  of  his  regimes,  al-Ddwfld,  al-M'if,  GhaydZin  and 
Shih5b.  It  was  assumed  to  be  no  more  than  the  handing  over 
of  power  from  one  group  to  another.  ' 
Early  in  the  morning  of  17  July,  al-Ndif  occupied  the 
Ministry  of  Defence.  Al-Ddwgd  occupied  the  broadcasting 
station,  which  was  controlled  by  the  Republican  Guard  that 
he  commanded,  while  Sa'dUn  Ghayddn  opened  the  gate  of  the 
Presidential  Palace  to  the  Ba'thists,  who  called  out  their 
militia,  including  Saddam'Hussein,  together  with  members  of 
Jih5z  IýanIn  dressed  in  army  uniform,  who  rode  in  a  truck  in 
the  direction  of  the  Palace.  (119)  They  arrived  when  the 
coup  had  already  been  ensured  by  the  Palace  Officers.  The 
President,  Tdhir  Yalýyd  and  many  other  figures  of  the  regime 
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other  hands.  Later,  however,  Saddam's  biographies  minimise 
the  role  of  the  Palace  officers,  and  give  the  credit  for 
the  coup's  success  to  Saddam.  (120) 
The  new  government  that  was  established  on  the  day  of 
the  coup  was  a  kind  of  coalition  in  which  the  Ba'thists 
were  the  weaker  partner,  since  the  leading  Posts  had  been 
given  to  the  Palace  officers  in  return  for  their 
participation  in  the  coup,  according  to  their  advance 
agreement  with  the  Ba'thist  Officers.  Al-Nd'if  became  the 
new  Prime  Minister,  al-Ddwgd  the  Minister  of  Defence,  and 
Ghayddn  the  Commander  of  the  Republican  Guard. 
The  clash  between  the  al-Bakr  group  and  the  al-Ndif 
group  began  early;  it  was  about  seats  in  the  cabinet  and 
influence.  Publicly,  Saddam  claimed  that  he  did  not  want 
the  al-Nd'if  group  to  take  part  because  they  were  involved 
with  foreign  intelligence  networks.  He  claimed  that  the 
whole  operation  depended  on  the  role  of  the  Republican 
Guard  and  its  Commanders,  and  so  it  was  imperative  that  he 
took  part  in  it.  (121)  But,  in  reality,  as  always,  the  Ba'th 
intended  to  exercise  total  control  without  unwanted 
partners  in  power,  in  order  to  prevent  the  great  powers 
from  plotting  against  them  through  such  partners;  they  were 
determined  to  abandon  them,  '  particularly  when  they  felt 
that  events  were  beginning  to  go  against  them  and  in  favour 
of  the  al-Wif  and  al-Ddwild  groups.  They  felt  that  unless 
they  moved  immediately  and  finished  off  the  Palace 
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power.  (122) 
This  belief,  held  particularly  by  the  civilian 
Baýthists,  concerning  their  allies  was  a  reason  to  get  rid 
of  them  quickly,  particularly  for  Saddam,  whose  role  in  the 
coup  was  conspicuously  lacking,  (123)  and  his  name  had  not 
been  put  forward  for  a  leading  post  in  the  new  regime.  All 
posts  in  the  first  cabinet  had  been  allocated  either  to 
Tikxiftli  officers  or  to  Palace  officers. 
The  Baý  thists  took  immediate  steps  to  alter  the 
military  balance  in  their  favour,  by  pensioning  off  or 
transfering  the  hostile  officers,  and  replacing  them  with 
relatively  sympathetic  officers,  capitalising  on  the  delay 
by  the  al-DdwUd  to  take  up  theýpost  of  Defence  Minister 
within  three  days.  (124)  This  operation  was  undertaken  by 
the  Chief  of  Staff,  Hardan  al-Tikriti,  one  of  al-Bakr's 
followers.  Hence,  within  two  weeks-the  power  Position 
within  the  army  had  switched  to 
-the  advantage  of  the 
Baýthists.  Over  2,000  Ba'thist  Officers  and  non- 
commissioned  officers  replaced  those  who  had  been 
transferred  in  key  units  during  this  period.  (125)  The 
Ba'thists  also  sent  the  Defence  Minister,  al-Ddwfid,  on  29 
July  on  an  inspection  of  the  Iraqi  Army  units  based  in 
Jordan,  leaving  behind  him  the  Chief  of  Staff,  Vard5n  al- 
Tikr-iti,  with  full  control  of  the  army.  The  real  purpose  of 
the  trip  was  to  get  rid  of  both  al-Ddwgd  and  al-Nd'if  -  The 
latter  was  arrested  by  Saddam-personally,  with  a  gun  in  his 
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dismissed  from  their  posts.  Saddam  was  very  proud  of  having 
taken  part  in  the  arrest  of  al-Nd'if  and  regarded  it  as  his 
most  successful  operation.  (126) 
By  30  July,  after  only  thirteen  days,  the  Ba'th  had 
taken  complete  power,  after  betraying  their  allies.  The 
special  features  of  this  second  coup  were: 
It  was  planned  and  executed  by  Saddam  himself,  who  had 
not  played  any  visible  role  in  the  17  July  Coup. 
(2)  The  composition  of  the  Revolutionary  Command  Council 
(RCC)  became  completely  Baýthist.  Ghayddn  and  Shihab, 
who  had  never  had  any  previous  connection  with  the 
Baýth  Party,  were  declared  to  be  Ba'thist.  (127) 
(3)  The  RCC  was  dominated  by  army  officers.  This  continued 
until  November  1969.  Later,  -  their  proportion  was 
gradually  reduced,  owing,.  to  Saddam's  frequent  purges 
of  the  armed  forces.  (128),  : 
(4)  The  representation  and  the  domination  of  TikrItIs 
became  significant,  both  in  the  RCC  and  in  the 
Party,  (129)  until  Saddam  took  over  power  and  gradually 
instituted  family  rule. 
(5)  The  weight  of  the  Sunnis'  influence  in  the  regime  had 
risen,  while  that  of  the  Shiis  had  declined.  This  may 
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challenge  to  Michel  'Aflaqls  authority  by  al-RikWI  and 
'Ali  ýdlilý  al-Sa'di,  both  of  whom  were  Shii. 
(6)  The  weight  of  influence  of  the  civilian  Baýthists  was 
less  than  that  of  their  officer  colleagues,  except  for 
Saddam  who  depended  firstly  on  his  family  connection 
with  the  Tikr-itis,  particularly  al-Bakr,  and  secondly 
on  his  security  and  intelligence  apparatus.  Until 
Saddam  became  Vice-Chairman  of  the  RCC,  in  November 
1969,  he  preferred  to  pull  strings  behind  the'scenes. 
This  was  for  the  following  reasons: 
(a)  To  prove  to  al-Bakr  that  he  was  not  interested 
in  any  post;  he  was  responsible  only  for 
protecting  al-Bakr  and  the  Party. 
(b)  To  prove  that  he  was  a  capable  man,  who  deserved 
office.  Saddam  did  -  not  have  any  particular 
qualities  which  qualified  him  for  a  leading  post, 
apart  from  being  a  relative  of  al-Bakr's  and 
being  handy  with  a  gun.  So,  if  he  pushed  himself 
forward  prematurely,  he  would  have  trouble  with 
the  main  personalities  in  the  government  and  the 
Party. 
(c)  To  give  a  chance  to  the  military  and  political 
personalities  among  the  members  to  make  mistakes 
while  in  power;  this  would  enable  him  to  identify 
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make  'organised  plans  to  liquidate  them. 
(d)  To  give  himself  the  chance  to  concentrate  on  the 
security  and  intelligence  organs  of  the  Party  and 
the  State,  in  addition  to  JiMz  Hdifin. 
Saddam,  was  extremely  successful  in  his  plan.  Soon  he 
became  the  second  man  in  the  State,  after  liquidating  all 
his  opponents,  either  openly,  by  accusing'them  of  plotting 
against  the  State  and  the  Party,.  or  secretly,  by 
assassination.  This  policy  of  'terror  and  repression' 
became  more  effective  when  it  was  backed  by  propaganda,  to 
which  he  had  allocated  a  large  amount  of  the  Iraqi  budget, 
benefiting,  no  doubt,  from  Nasirl  s  'propaganda.  Not  only  had 
Saddam's  efforts  in  uniting  the  Party,  the  State  and  Iraqi 
society  (which  was  notoriously  difficult  to  unite  in  any 
sustained  common  endeavour)  during  eleven  years  of  power- 
sharing  with  al-Bakr,  had  succeeded,  but  he  managed  to  stay 
(politically)  afloat. 
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323 CHAPTER  FIVE 
PARTNERSHIP  OF 
AL-BAKR  AND  SADDAM  IN  POWER 
JA". The  search  for  Legitimac 
With  the  exclusion  of  al-Ndif/al-Ddwgd,  power  passed 
to  the  Ba'thists  who  gained  exclusive  control  over  the 
country.  According  to  his  biographer,  it  was  thanks  to 
Saddam  that  the  Ba'th  Party  had  risen  to  power  without 
unwanted  partners,  within  two  weeks.  (l)  However,  the  Ba'th 
faced  an  apathetic  and  demoralised  atmosphere,  not  greeted 
with  mass  acclaim,  owing  to  its  narrow  popular  base.  It  met 
suspicion,  as  the  general  feeling  was  that  the  Ba"th  was 
about  to  implement  new  western  designs  on  Iraq,  following 
the  Arab  defeat  of  1967.  In  particular,  the  Baýthists 
rulers  were  the  same  elements  as  in  the  previous  Ba'th 
regime,  who  were  remembered  with  fear  and  resentment.  The 
Ba'th  had  to  find  remedy  for  this  lack  of  approval.  The 
main  objective  was  to  defend  their  legitimacy  in  the  eyes 
of  the  Iraqis.  They  tried  to  hide  their  true  nature  and 
their  future  schemes,  and  they  gave  no  discernible 
indication  of  a  consistent  political  line. 
The  regime  began  to  represent  itself  as  a  new  regime 
that  had  nothing  to  do  with  the  previous  bloody  experience 
of  1963.  It  justified  its  seizure  of  power  on  the  grounds 
that  the  'Arif  regime  had  decayed  and  had  played  no  serious 
part  in  the  1967  war,  despite  Iraq's  military  power,  which 
was  not  much  less  than  that  of  Egypt.  The  Baýthist  felt  the 
need  to  present  some  kind`bf-policy  relevant  to  the  new 
developments.  So,  they  adopted  a  plausible  line  on  the 
question  of  Palestine  and  the.  -conflict  in  the  Middle  East. 
324 Indeed,  they  transformed  the  Palestinian  issue  into  a 
matter  of  life  and  death  for  ordinary  Iraqis,  and  made 
assertions  that  they  would  liberate  Palestine.  while,  at 
the  same  time,  being  at  odds  with  the  three  countries  most 
concerned  with  the  conflict  with  Israel,  namely  Egypt, 
Syria  and  Jordan,  despite  their  having  left  the  Eastern 
Command,  which  greatly  compromised  the  credibility  of 
their  radical  stance  toward  Israel.  (3) 
. Apart  from  denunciations  of  Zionism  and  imperialism,  MY 
the  Ba'thist  rulers  made  some  other  pronouncements,  in 
order  to  retain  the  sympathies  of  the  Iraqis,  and  to  give 
themselves  a  confidant  cover.  For  example,  they  promised 
to  follow  the  Principles  of  the  14  July  revolution,  and 
claimed  that  their  revolution  was  a  natural  extension  of 
it.  (4)  They  promised  a  solution  to  the  Kurdish  problem, 
although,  by  the  Autumn  of  1968,  clashes  were  taking  place 
between  the  Iraqi  army  and  the  Kurds.  They  also  guaranteed 
equal  opportunities  and  a  democratic  life  for  all  the  Iraqi 
people.  They  began  to  act  as  if  they  were  going  to  prepare 
the  stage  for  legitimate  constitutional  and  parliamentary 
politics,  by  giving  some  Seats  in  the  cabinet  to  the 
parties  of  the  left,  in  August  1968.  (5)  They  released  all 
political  prisoners  on  5  September  1968,  (6)  and  called  on 
other  political  groups  to  co-operate  with  the  regime. 
There  was,  however,  in  practice,  a  wide  gap  between 
the  words  and  the  actions  of  the  Baýthist  rulers.  In  one 
of  Saddam's  public  statements  he  said: 
325 11  the  ideal  revolutionary  command  should 
effectively  direct  all  planing  and 
implementation.  It  must  not  allow  the  growth  of 
any  other  rival  centre  of  Power.  There  must  be 
one  command  pooling  and  directing  the 
subsequent  government  departments,  including 
the  armed  forces.  (7) 
This  authoritarian  vision  of  the  Ba'thists  for  their 
political  system,  indicated  that  they  had  no  intention  of 
establishing  a  liberal  democracy  in  Iraq.  On  the  contrary, 
they  soon  set  up  a  one-party  rule,  with  organs  of 
suppression  under  strict  Party  directives. 
In  their  pursuit  of  popularity,  the  Ba'thist  rulers 
also  declared  their  intention  to  pursue  an  independent  oil 
policy  and  decrease  the  international  oil  monopolies, 
blaming  al-Ndif  and  al-Ddwgd  for  favouring  the  abolition 
of  the  State  oil  company  (lNOC).  (8) 
In  their  pursuit  of  legitimacy  among  the  Arab  and  in 
their  need  to  portray  the  image  that  they  were  present  the 
Arab  interests,  Ba'thist  rulers  gave  their  regime  a  pan- 
Arabs  character.  (9)  While  according  to  some  observers,  the 
Baýthists'  strategy  of  conferring  on  their  regime  image  was 
part  of  a  determined  ploy  to  outmanoeuvre  their  Syrian 
rival  counterparts  in  the  fight  for  the  much  coveted 
accolade  of  pan-Arabism  leaders.  (10)  According  to  others, 
326 there  was  nothing  pan-Arabist  about  the  Ba'thist  regime  and 
such  a  regime  had  in  practice  largely  relied  on  the 
regional  and  tribalist  loyalties  which  it  had  so  vehemently 
in  the  past  condemned  as  part  of  Qdsim's  and  'Arif's 
regimes.  (11) 
The  Ba'thists  also,  invited  ýAflaq  to  became  Secretary 
General  of  the  sole  legitimate  Ba'th  Party.  'Aflaq's 
presence  in  Iraq  as  a  front  for  the  Iraqi  regime,  greatly 
enhanced  Baghdad's  Ba'thi  legitimacy.  Most  importantly, 
%  Aflaq's  opposition  to  military  domination  within  the  Ba%th 
Party  was  very  useful  for  Saddam  in  asserting  the  Party's 
control  over  the  armed  forces,  and  in  transforming  them 
into  an  instrument  of  Party  leadership,  or  in  other  words, 
an  instrument  for  himself. 
By  such  measures  as  these  and  by  an  anti-semitic 
policy  towards  the  Palestinian  issue,  which  made  a  profound 
impression  on  the  public,  the  new  Ba'thist  leaders,  purpose 
was  intend  merely  to  gain  popularity.  Behind  the  scenes 
they  were  trying  hard  to  consolidate  their  position,  and  to 
guarantee  the  regimes  survival,  in  order  to  avoid 
repetition  of  the  Ba'th  fate  in  1963.  While,  at  the  same 
time,  the  process  for  legitimacy  was  under  way,  the 
Ba'thist  rulers,  in  particular  Saddam,  spread  an  atmosphere 
of  total  indiscriminate  terror,  which  eliminated  all  actual 
or  potential  opposition.  It  gave  a  direct  message  to 
political  opponents  and  the  public  at  large  that  the  Baýth 
this  time  had  come  to  stay,  and  that  any  attempt  to 
327 overthrow  it  would  be  severely  crushed.  In  this  process  of 
terror,  the  regime  began  to  execute  people  who  it  claimed 
were  involved  in  plots  against  it. 
328 Consolidation  of  Power 
The  Ba'th  combined  the  process  of  enhancing  its 
popularity,  with  a  process  of  consolidating  its  authority 
and  strengthening  its  hold  on  Power.  The  first  step  in  this 
direction  was,  a  communique  issued  on  the  first  day  of  the 
July  30  coup,  that  Alýmad  Uasan  al-Bakr,  the  Secretary  of 
the  Regional  Command,  was  to  be  Prime  Minister  and 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  armed  forces,  in  addition  to  his 
post  as  President  of  the  Republic,  which  he  had  held  since 
18  july.  (12) 
Saddam  Husayn  became  vice-president  of  the 
Revolutionary  Command  Council(RCC),  but  this  was  not 
officially  announced,  on  the  grounds  that  he  had  no 
personal  ambition  for  any  official  post,  preferring  instead 
to  concentrate  on  Party  affairs,  in  order  to  prevent  any 
possible  fall  from  Power  again.  (13)  His  undeclared 
objective  was  to  remain  in  the  background  until  he  felt 
secure  enough  to  set  about  disposing  of  his  rivals,  as  we 
will  see  later. 
The  urgent  task  of  the  Ba'thist  leader's  was  to 
strengthen  their  newly  gained  hold  on  Power.  Accordingly, 
the  RCC,  was  expanded  to  fifteen,  to  include  the  entire 
Regional  Command  of  the  Baýth  Party.  (14)  The  RCC  was  formed 
on  17  July.  It  was,  until  the  expansion  of  30  July, 
composed  of  five  people,  i.  e.  General  Ahmad  Hasan  al-Bakr, 
329 Lieutenant  General  ýdli4  Mahd7i  'Amm5sh,  air  major  General 
Hard5n  Abd  al-Ghaffdr  al-Tikriti,  Major  General  Hammad  Shehdb 
II 
and  Major  General  Sa'dfin  Ghaddn.  The  new  composition  was 
not  officially  made  public  until  November  1969.  It  was  at 
this  time  that  Saddam's  position  as  Deputy  Chairman  of  the 
RCC  was  also  officially  announced.  (15) 
Another  step  in  the  Bathist  leaders  I  process  of 
consolidation  was  to  constitutionals  their  power  within  the 
state.  This  step  was  put  into  effect  on  September  21  1968, 
when  the  regime  issued  its  first  provisional  constitution, 
which  was  characterised  as  "democratic  and  popular", 
although  it  was  not  agreed  on  by  any  representative  group 
of  the  people.  It  was  singed  by  the  five  people  who 
designated  themselves  the  Revolutionary  Command  Council. 
This  constitution  gave  the  RCC  or  more  accurately  its 
chairman  dominant  power,  as  legislative,  judicial  and 
executive  authority.  The  cabinet  and  the  "projected" 
National  Assembly,  which  eventually  came  into  being  in 
1980,  were  to  be  subordinate  to  the  RCC.  (16)  The 
constitution  also  provided  that  the  newly  elected  members 
of  the  RCC  should  become  members  of  the  regional  command 
of  the  Ba"th  party,  (17)  thus  eliminating  the  RCC  as  a 
separate  body. 
Thus,  being  completely  controlled  by  the  party  (or 
more  accurately  by  its  two  leaders,  al-Bakr  and  Saddam)  , 
the  RCC  and  the  cabinet  became  no  more  than  symbolic, 
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step  was  combined  with  a  purge  of  all  non-Baýthists  and 
those  who  were  not  subservient  to  the  Ba'th  leadership  from 
the  RCC  and  the  Cabinet,  who  were  replaced  by  Ba'thists  and 
sympathisers.  The  Tikr-it!  representation  among  them  was  the 
highest. 
Within  this  framework,  Power  was  increasingly 
concentrated  in  the  hands  of  the  Ba'thist  leadership, 
especially  in  those  of  Saddam.  Gradually,  the  influence  of 
the  RCC,  the  state  institutions,  including  the  armed 
forces,  and  the  Ba'th  Party  itself,  substantially  declined; 
the  members  of  these  institutions  became  virtual  ciphers, 
carrying  out  the  leadership's  orders  only. 
All  these  legitimising  and  consolidating  measures  were 
prerequisites  for  the  terror  that  followed.  This  was 
planned  and  carried  out  by  Saddam  himself  and  his 
instrument  of  terror,  the  security  apparatus.  It  involved 
the  destruction  of  Iraq's  civilian  society  and  the 
establishment  of  a  Soviet-style  totalitarian  system,  within 
the  framework  of  Bathist  doctrine.  Saddam's  policy  carried 
both  the  semblance  of  a  progressive  and  non-aggressive 
regime,  on  the  one  hand,  and  a  threat  of  punishment  for 
those  who  publicly  opposed  the  Ba'th  regime,  on  the  other, 
i.  e.  it  was  "a  carrot  and  stick  policy".  At  any  rate,  the 
ostensible  progressive  and  non-aggressive  policy  was  only  a 
temporary  one,  designed  to  enable  the  regime  to  strengthen 
its  grip  on  power,  by  deluding  the  people  that  its 
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had  established  absolute  authority. 
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Alongside  these  Legitimising  and  Consolidating 
measures,  Saddam  was  quietly  manoeuvring  himself  into  a 
position  where  he  could  take  supremacy  over  the  Party  and 
the  RCC  as  well  as  the  machinery  of  State,  including  the 
armed  forces.  To  achieve  this,  his  first  step  was  to 
develop  the  machinery  of  the  party  and  the  security 
services.  By  these  instruments  of  control,  he  would  be  able 
to  check  all  potential  threats  to  the  Baýth  regime,  or  to 
be  specific,  his  own  power  base.  Within  a  few  years,  he 
became  the  second  most  important  figure  in  the  country 
after  al  Bakr. 
How  did  Saddam  gain  this  high  degree  of  domination? 
For  one  thing,  he  had  the  absolute  trust  and  complete 
support  of  al-Bakr,  in  his  capacity  as  secretary  general  of 
the  Baýth  party  and  President  of  the  state.  He  had  had  a 
good  relationship  with  al-Bakr  since  1964,  when  they  were 
both  in  prison  during  the'Arif  period.  This  relation  was 
sealed  and  cemented  by  ties  of  kinship.  (18)  Thus,  by 
following  al-Bakr's  steps,  Saddam  gained  superiority  over 
all  other  important  elements  in  the  party  and  the  state. 
Al-Bakr  gave  up  to  Saddam  most  of  his  authority  to 
issue  important  political  resolutions.  One  may  deduce 
from  this,  either  that  al-Bakr  was  a  weak  and 
indecisive  Person  or  that  he  could  exercise  no  control 
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Iraq.  (19))  In  any  case,  it  was  al-Bakr,  who  was 
ultimately  responsible  for  Saddam's  gradual  rise  to 
power. 
(2)  Al-  Bakr  gave  Saddam  a  free  hand  over  the  Baýth  Party, 
after  he  handed  over  to  him  all  his  responsibilities. 
Saddam  worked  first  to  build  up  his  base  in  the  Party. 
He  reorganised  the  party  apparatus,  of  which  had  been 
in  charge  since  1966.  It  now  contained  more  trusted 
personnel,  who  were  there  merely  to  carry  out  his 
orders.  He  himself  assumed  complete  authority  in  all 
matters.  The  aim  of  this  measure  was  fundamentally  to 
avoid  the  emergence  of  any  individual  identity  within 
the  Party,  capable  of  rivalling  and  threatening  his 
hegemony  of  the  Party  and  to  avoid  any  setback  like 
that  of  February  1963.  (20)  This  meant  that  Saddam  had 
transformed  the  Ba'th  Party  into  an  instrument  for 
securing  his  Power  base. 
3-  Al-  Bakr  authorised  Saddam  to  develop  his  own 
security  apparatus  LTihdz  HdnTn,  of  which  he  had  been  in 
charge  since  his  years  in  the  political 
wilderness.  (21)  At  the  beginning,  it  was  known  as  the 
Dd'Trat  al-'Aldqdt  (Relations  Bureau)  .  In  1972,  it 
developed  into  the  Dd'irat  al-Mukhdbardt  al-'Amah 
(General  Intelligence  Bureau),  headed  by  SaýdEn  Sh5kr, 
a  member  of  the  RCC  and  Saddam's  close  friend.  Its 
duty,  according  to  the  1974  Political  Report,  was  to 
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repressing  and  liquidating  espionage  networks.  A 
section  of  the  Mukhdbardt  created  in  1982,  called  al- 
'Amn  al-Khdss  (special  security  section)  was  headed 
by  Saddam's  son  Quqay.  Its  main  duty  was,  to  ensure 
the  President's  security.  (22) 
These  agencies  were  ostensibly  professional  organs 
responsible  for  the  safeguarding  of  national  security,  but 
they  were  in  fact  political  and  intelligence  bodies, 
equipped  with  the  most  up-to-date  instruments  of 
surveillance  and  coercion.  Its  members  combined 
professional  experience  with  political  knowledge  and 
loyalty  to  Saddam  only.  He  choose  the  members  of  these 
agencies  exclusively  from  his  family  and  close  relative, 
e.  g.  his  half-brothers  Barazdn,  Sab'dwil,  Watbdn,  his  cousin 
Ali  Hasan  al-Majid,  his  son,  Qusay,  his  two-sons  in-law 
Husayn  K5mel  and  Sadd5m  K5mel  al-Majid,  his  brother  in  law 
'Arshad  Y5sTn  and  his  close  friend  Sa'd5un  Sh5kr.  The  main 
reason  for  this  was  to  make  any  hostel  action  against  him 
impossible.  This  indicates  also  that  Saddam  was  afraid  even 
of  the  Tikr-it-is  themselves. 
Saddam  choose  many  bosses  instead  of  one  big  chief, 
controlling  those  below,  and  keeping  an  ever  watchful  eye 
on  those  above.  At  the  same  time,  he  directed  these 
agencies  to  watch  the  other  police  networks,  and  to  control 
the  state's  activities.  It  is  a  complex  system  to  arrange 
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of  the  party  and  the  state. 
This  powerful  method  maintained  a  permanent  condition 
of  fear  and  insecurity  at  every  level,  among  those  who 
worked  in  these  agencies.  Saddam  introduced  this  system 
also  into  the  Baýth  Party  apparatus.  It  was  then  extended 
to  all  the  apparatus  of  the  state  and  to  the  whole  of  Iraqi 
society,  by  the  infiltration  of  members  of  these  agencies. 
According  to  diplomats  and  other  foreigners  working  in 
Iraq: 
11  There  is  a  feeling  that  at  least  three 
million  are  watching  the  eleven  million 
others", 
and  an  Arab  specialist  in  a  western  embassy  said: 
11  The  security  Service  permeate  Society  to  a 
degree  that,  no  one  ever  knows  who's  who".  (23) 
(4)  Al-Bakr  enabled  Saddam  also  to  control  the  State 
Security  apparatus,  after  he  handed  him  the 
responsibility  for  the  National  Security  Bureau  of  the 
RCC  Maktab  al-'Amn  al-Qawf  (the  President's  personal 
security  apparatus).  (24)  From  this  bureau,  Saddam 
controlled  the  al-IstikhWrdt:  al-'Askariyyah  (Military 
Intelligence),  and  al-,  Amn  al-'Amm  (the  department  of 
internal  Security)  which  came  to  function  under  his 
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Kizdr,  a  Bathist  who  had  earned  a  notorious  reputation 
as  a  torturer  in  Qaqr  al-Nihayah  during  the  first 
Ba'th  regime  in  1963. 
(5)  Al-Bakr  enabled  Saddam  to  subordinate  the  army  to  the 
Party,  after  he  had  convinced  him  that  no  co-operation 
between  civilians  and  the  military  was  possible, 
because  Power  would  automatically  be  turned  to  the 
advantage  of  the  military.  This  was  true  of  the 
Party's  setbacks  of  1963  in  Iraq  and  1966  in  Syria, 
when  the  Ba'thist  officers  in  both  countries  had 
driven  the  civilian  faction  from  Power;  the  Monarchy 
had  also  experienced  this,  with  the  first  "aborted" 
military  Coup  in  1936.  Since  then,  regular 
intervention  in  political  life  had  made  the  military 
into  a  powerful  and  autonomous  actor  and  a 
destabilizing  element.  Thus,  Saddam  knew  that  if  he 
relied  on  the  army,  he  would  certainly  fail  to  impose 
his  personal  power.  (25) 
Accordingly,  backed  by  al-Bakr,  he  turned  his 
attention  to  the  army,  with  process  of  replacing,  retiring 
and  dismissing  all  Ba'thist  dissidents.  The  process  has 
been  systematically  continued  ever  since.  (26)  Al-Bakr  and 
Saddam  determined  that  the  only  means  of  guaranteeing  the 
new  regime's  stability  was  to  transform  the  role  of  the 
armed  forces,  and  to  prevent  the  emergence  of  any  "military 
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threatening  the  hegemony  of  the  their  regime.  (27) 
As  a  result,  they  managed  together  to  achieve  a  degree 
of  domination  of  both  the  Party  and  the  government  that 
neither  could  have  achieved  on  his  own.  Al-Bakr,  as  a 
senior  officer  and  one  of  the  Free  Officers,  provided  the 
party  some  legitimacy.  Also,  he  brought  support  from  the 
army  which  Saddam  lacked,  owing  to  his  influence  with 
army  officers,  with  whom  he  had  working  ties  for  years. 
Saddam  on'  the  other  hand,  with  his  operational  and 
organisational  skills  as  well  as  his  pragmatic 
ruthlessness,  provided  al-Bakr  with  the  qualities  that  he 
desperately  required  to  strengthen  his  regime.  It  is 
doubtful  whether  without  Saddam's  dogged  determination  and 
his  paranoiac  wariness,  al-Bakr  would  have  been  able  so 
successfully  to  overwhelm  the  military  faction  or  to  spread 
the  Party's  tentacles  throughout  the  Iraqi  nation.  Saddam. 
was  also  convinced  that,  without  al-Bakr's  relentless 
support,  his  ability  to  achieve  his  ultimate  goal  would 
have  been  seriously  impaired.  (28)  Thus,  although  Saddam 
from  the  beginning  began  to  gather  power  into  his  hands, 
he  was  very  careful  not  to  challenge  al  Bakr's  leadership, 
in  order  to  gain  his  trust.  (29) 
Another  important  factor  that  contributed  to  Saddam's 
rise  to  power  was  the  relationship  which  bound  him  to 
'Aflaq  and  the  Ba'th  Party  doctrine.  He  remained  faithful 
to  the  central  tenets  of  the  Ba'th  Party  thinking.  This  was 
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from  his  earliest  days,  his  use  of  violence  and  fear  to 
establish  and  maintain  his  political  influence,  and  his 
disdain  for  Parliamentary  democracy  regime.  His  policy,  of 
using  sectarianism  and  tribal  loyalty  to  strengthen  and 
keep  his  power,  was  entirely  consonant  with  the  spirit  of 
the  Ba'th  thinking,  despite  the  fact  that  the  Baýth  claims 
to  reject  sectarian,  regional  and  tribal  loyalties,  in 
accordance  with  its  secular  Arab-nationalist  ideology.  (30) 
A  further  factor  which  helped  Saddam  in  no  small 
degree  was  the  ease  with  which  Iraqis  themselves  submitted 
to  the  regime,  after  Saddam  had  made  them  accomplices  in 
his  violence.  By  this  Stalinist-style  policy  he  instilled 
fear  into  the  mass  of  the  people.  By  the  end  of  the  1970s, 
when  Saddam  had  absolute  power,  public  political  dialogue 
had  vanished;  once  politics  was  the  main  subject  of  all 
Iraqi  conversation. 
Yet  another  important  reason  for  Saddam's  emergence 
and  the  stabilising  of  rule  was  the  miscalculation  of 
policy  by  the  previously  most  important  political  power  in 
the  country,  the  Communists,  in  a  accepting  Moscow's  order 
to  associate  with  the  Baýth.  Despite  the  fact  that  the 
Communists  faced  increasing  attacks,  harassment  and 
assassination  attempts  from  the  Ba"th,  at  the  same  time  the 
Ba'th  made  efforts  to  improve  its  relations  with  them  and 
with  the  Socialist  Countries. 
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Saddam  with-  the  total  support  of  al-Bakr  launched  a 
campaign  of  terror,  in  which  he  stamped  out  all  his 
potential  rivals,  inside  and  outside  the  party  and  the 
state.  (31) 
340 The  elimination  of  opponents 
Within  a  few  months,  the  Ba'thist  leaders  displayed 
their  real  intentions,  and  the  Ba'th's  policy  of  terror 
had  officially  begun.  This  time,  however,  the  terror  took  a 
different  that  in  1963,  which  was  confined  to  one  wing  only 
led  by  al-Sadi.  It  now  became  an  official  organised 
program,  followed  by  the  government  and  the  party  alike, 
and  used  a  particular  technique,  "the  uncovering  of 
fabricated  plots".  This  became  the  "habitual"  over  the  next 
decade.  (32) 
During  the  initial  months,  until  1973,  the  Baýth 
regime  claimed  to  have  uncovered  several  plots  against  it, 
all  of  which  were  crushed  ruthlessly.  A  series  of  purges 
took  place,  throughout  this  period,  in  the  name  of 
purifying  the  country  of  spies,  conspirators  and  plotters, 
who  prevented  the  leadership  and  the  party  doing  their  duty 
properly.  (33)  They  hit  out  indiscriminately,  at  any  kind  of 
opposition  which  might  threaten  them:  right  or  left, 
Communists,  Nasirists,  pro-Syrian  Baýthists,  Former 
Ministers,  ex-officials,  business  men,  former  civil 
servants  from  the  previous  regime,  who  were  hostile  to 
prominent  Ba'thists  and  openly  criticised  al-Bakr/Saddam's 
policies.  Eventually,  a  purges  of  the  military  Ba'thists  by 
the  Civilian  wing  represented  by  took  place.  One  account 
suggests  that  the  reason  for  this  was  that,  since  the 
Ba'thists  had  failed  to  gain  popularity,  they  found 
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of  these  purges  were: 
To  prove  to  the  Iraqis  that  the  Baýth  regime  intend  to 
eradicate  the  espionage  networks,  which  no  previous 
regime  had  had  the  intention  or  the  capability  to 
do.  (35) 
(2)  To  give  a  direct  message  to  his  opponents  to  think 
twice  before  organising  any  attempt  against  the 
regime,  as  Saddam  latter  commented: 
""..,,  the  men  were  hanged  to  teach  the  people  a 
lesson  ...  anyone  thinking  of  organising  a  coup 
should  think  again....  this  time  the  Ba'thists 
were  here  to  stay.  "(36) 
(3)  To  create  a  kind  of  general  fear,  which  would  have  a 
powerful  political  effect  on  the  Iraqis  in  the  future 
years  of  the  Ba'th  rule. 
Below  are  examples  of  such  purges: 
(a)  The  purge  of  unwanted  non-Ba'th  from  all 
government  institutions  of  the  former  regime, 
beginning  with  prominent  civilian  officials  who 
had  been  most  involved  in  the  Erap  negotiations, 
like  'Abd  al-Sattdr  "Ali  al-Uusayn  the  minister 
for  oil,  AcUb  al-iddir  and  Khayr  al-Din  Has-lb,  from 
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.  They  were  arrested,  some  of  them  were 
tortured,  and  their  properties  were 
impounded.  (37) 
(b)  The  purges  of  unwanted  non-Baýthist  high-ranking 
officers  from  the  old  regime,  who  were  replaced 
by  Ba'thists  or  Ba'thist  sympathisers.  (38)  In 
December  1968,  Fayýal  al-Ansdri,  the  chief  of  I 
staff,  was  retired  and  replaced  by  Vanm-dd  Shih5b, 
the  most  sympathetic  person  to  Saddam  within  the 
military  faction.  The  commander  of  the  air  force, 
Lieutenant  General,  Jdsim  Mulýammed  al-Sh5hir,  was 
retired  and  replaced  by  the  Tikrit!  Ba'thist 
Ijusayn  Haydwl.  (39)  Lieutenant  General  Ma4mfld 
'Araym,  the  commander  of  Iraq  forces  in  Jordan, 
was  replaced  by  Lieutenant  General  Uasan  al- 
Naq-1b,  sympathetic  and  loyal  to  the  Ba'th.  (40) 
(c)  The  purge  of  al-Ndif  Is  supporters  -  All  of  these 
were  liquidated,  e.  g.  Ndýir  al-45n!,  foreign 
minister  after  the  coup  and  former  Iraqi 
ambassador  in  Washington  and  Beirut  during  the 
Arif  period.  It  appears  that  he  knew  too  many 
secrets  about  the  al-Bakr/Saddam  connection;  (41) 
he  was  kidnapped  by  a  Baýthist  agent,  and  never 
seen  alive  again.  (42) 
(d)  The  purges  of  the  Iraqi  Jewish  Community,  which 
took  place  in  Baghdad  and  the  South  of  Iraq.  The 
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the  government  and  society  from  spies,  plotters 
and  conspirators.  The  undeclared  objective  was  to 
suppress  the  real  targets,  political  rivals. 
There  are  in  the  list  of  these  alleged  spy 
network  many  names  of  political  dissidents,  with 
whom  al-Bakr  and  Saddam  had  a  disagreements;  they 
accused  them  of  being  Israeli  and  CIA  agents.  (43) 
One  of  these  opponents  was  Rashid  Muslih,  the 
former  Minister  of  the  interior,  who  left  the 
Ba'th  and  joined  'Arif  in  November  1963.  He 
confessed  under  torture  to  having  spied  for  the 
CIA  and  was  executed.  The  underlying  reason  for 
killing  Rashid  Muslih  was  the  fear  that  he  would 
reveal  some  secrets  about  the  al-Bakr/Saddam 
group-(44)  Another  rival,  was  Fuldd  al-Riklibii,  the 
first  secretary  of  the  Baýth  Party  in  Iraq.  Soon 
after  the  coup,  he  was  put  under  house  arrest, 
his  properties  were  impounded,  and  he  was 
prohibited  from  any  political  activity;  he  was 
later  arrested  and  put  in  prison  for  one  and  half 
years  for  being  a  spy  for  the  CIA.  Two  days 
before  he  was  due  to  be  released,  he  was  stabbed 
in  the  chest,  by  order  of  Saddam,  and  left 
unattended  in  the  hospital  until  he  was  dead.  (45) 
Vihir  Yahyd,  the  former  Prime  Minister,  was 
imprisoned  on  accusation  of  corruption;  he  died 
in  prison  under  torture.  (46)  'Abd  al-'Aziz  al- 
'Aqull,  the  former  Minister  of  Defence,  was  on 
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given  a  lengthy  period  of  imprisonment  and  died 
in  prison.  (47)  ýAbd  al-Rehm5n  al-Bazz5z,  the 
former  Prime  Minister,  was  accused  of  spying  for 
Israel;  he  died  just  shortly  after  his  release, 
because  of  his  torture  in  prison.  (48) 
(e)  The  purge  of  pro-Syria  Ba'thists.  The  regime 
attempted  to  contain  or  neutralise  Ba'thists  who 
sympathised  with  Syria.  It  tried  to  win  over  some 
of  these,  but  because  of  their  unwillingness  to 
participate  or  co-operate  with  it,  it  carried  out 
a  wave  of  arrests  of  them.  Colonel  'Abd  al-Karlim 
mustaft  Nasrat,  the  former  Minister,  in  charge  of 
the  Army  Faction  of  the  Baýth  Syrian  wing,  '  was 
arrested  and  died  in  prison  under  torture.  A 
public  confession  was  produced  from  some  criminal 
who  admitted  to  having  had  an  affair  with  him, 
and  to  having  stabbed  him  to  death,  in  order  to 
keep  this  secret.  (49) 
The  second  part  of  this  series  of  purges  consisted  of 
the  suppression  of  certain  of  their  followers  in  the  armed 
forces.  It  was  centred  on  two  prominent  Baýthist  officers, 
Lieutenant  General  ýdli4  Ma4di  'Ammdsh,  and  air  Major 
General  1ýarddn  'Abd  al-Ghaffdr  al-Tikx'i-t-i.  Both  had  followers 
and  supporters  in  the  armed  forces  and  in  the  party. 
345 Al-Bakr  and  Saddam,  who  were  experienced  in  political 
manipulation,  employed  a  ruse  to  oust  the  two  of  them  from 
their  sensitive  posts  in  the  Ministry  of  Defence  and 
Ministry  of  Interior.  This  was  to  encourage  the  rivalry 
between  the  two  of  them,  in  order  to  weaken  them,  al-Bakr 
then  ordered  both  of  them  to  be  removed  from  their  posts 
and  to  be  appointed-vice  presidents,  in  April  1970. 
Eventually,  General  Harddn  was  dismissed  from  this  post 
while  he  was  abroad;  he  was  assassinated  by  a  Mukhdbardt 
agent  in  Kuwait.  (50)  To  justify  his  murder,  he  was  accused 
of  not  helping  the  Palestinians  in  Jordan  in  the  bloody 
events  of  September  1970  "Black  September";  these 
accusations  were  in  truth  baseless,  because  General  Hard5n 
had  already  lost  his  job  as  minister  of  defence  in  April 
1970  and  played  no  part  in  the  affair.  (51)  The  regime  laid 
the  blame  for  its  shameful  action  at  4arddn's  own  door 
after  he  had  been  liquidated.  The  ones  to  blame  for  Iraqi 
inaction  in  the  war  was  General  1ýammdd  Shih5b,  the  Defence 
Minister,  his  chief  of  staff  'Abd  al-Jabbdr  Shanshal  and 
above  all  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  armed  forces,  al- 
Bakr  himself. 
As  for  General  'Amn-Ash,  shortly  af  ter  his  appointment 
as  vice-president,  he  was  sent  as  ambassador  to  Moscow.  In 
the-mid  1970s  he  was  allowed  to  return,  and  was  then 
accused  of  being  involved  with  'Abd  al-Katlim  al-shekhl!  in  a 
plot  against  the  regime;  eventually  he  was  reported  to 
have  died  in  complete  obscurity.  (52)  The  undeclared  reason 
for  General  ýAmmdshls  dismissal  and  subsequent  possible 
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a  special  ministerial  committee  which  was  given  the  task  of 
dealing  with  the  IPC,  (53)  which  Saddam  wanted  to  be  under 
his  direct  control. 
In  a  press  interview  with  the  Kuwait  newspaper  al- 
Sivasah,  Saddam  denied  rumours  that  the  dismissal  of 
'Amm5sh  and  ýIarddn  was  the  result  of  a  struggle  for  power 
in  which  he  had  emerged  as  the  victor.  He  argued  that  it 
was  a  matter  of  party  democracy,  and  they  had  gone  in 
accordance  with  the  principle  of  self-criticism  practised 
by  the  party.  (54)  Commenting  on  Saddam's  speech  we  may 
say  : 
What  Saddam  was  talking  about  was  Stalinism  ,  in  which 
the  Marxist  concept  of  central  democracy  was  exploited 
by  him  for  his  own  ends. 
it  resembled  Stalin's  double  speak,  in  which  a  word 
means  the  exact  opposite. 
Another  purge  was  instituted  in  the  army  after  a  plot 
was  uncovered,  led  by  a  retired  of  f  icer,  'Abd  al-GhanT  al- 
RAwif,  to  over-throw  the  regime.  It  was  assumed  that  the  plot 
was  supported  by  Iran,  the  CIA,  and  Israel.  (55)  Several 
dozen  officers  were  executed.  The  death  penalty  was  passed 
on  the  exiled  Prime  Minister,  al-Ndif,  for  his  involvement 
in  the  plot;  he  was  later  assassinated  in  London.  (56)  There 
is  a  suggestion  that  the  reason  for  this  plot  was  the 
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that,  after  resolving  the  Kurdish  problem  peacefully,  al- 
Bakr  and  Saddam  would  become  more  influential.  (57) 
It  seems  clear  from  the  frequently  renewed  purges  of 
the  commanders  and  officers  of  the  armed  forces,  who  were 
in  any  case  subject  to  constant  surveillance  by  the 
security  service  and  infiltrated  by  those  loyal  to  Bakr  and 
Saddam,  that  the  latter  was  determined  to  gain  full  control 
over  these  services,  in  order  to  prevent  them  again  taking 
over  the  government  and  the  party.  Al-Bakr's  and  Saddam's 
objectives  were  openly  declared  when  Saddam  broadcast 
proudly: 
our  party  methods,  there  is  no 
chance  for  anyone  who  disagrees  with  us  to  jump 
on  a  couple  of  tanks  and  overthrow  the 
government.  "(58) 
The  1974  Political  Report,  which  was  adopted  by  the 
Eighth  Congress  of  the  Baýth  Party,  acknowledges  the  policy 
of  purging  the  armed  forces  from  the  earliest  days: 
11  the  party  had  urgently  to  consolidate  its 
leadership  of  the  armed  forces,  to  purge  them 
of  suspect  elements,  conspirators  and 
adventurers,  to  cultivate  Pan-Arab  and 
socialist  principles  army,  the  soldiers  to 
establish  the  ideological  and  military  criteria 
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duty  as  well  as  possible  and  would  immunise 
them  against  the  deviations  which  the  Qdsim  and 
'ý,  rif  regimes  and  their  military  aristocrats 
had  committed  in  the  army's  name  and  thus  to 
integrate  the  armed  forces  with  the  people's 
movement,  directed  by  their  party.  (59) 
The  next  stage  of  Saddams  system  of  purges  was  his 
purge  of  the  civilian  faction  of  the  Baýth  party.  The  first 
victim  was  'Abd  Alldh  Sallfim  al-S5marra,  T,  a  member  of-  the 
RCC  and  Minister  of  Culture  and  Information.  He  was  removed 
from  his  post,  to  become  ambassador  in  India,  in  March 
1970.  (60)  ýa154  'Umar  al-ýAli  lost  his  membership  of  the 
RCC  and  his  post  as  Minister,  in  Summer  1970.  (61)  'Abd  al- 
Karlim  al-Shaykhll,  one  of  the  abduction  and  execution  team 
of  the  Bath  Party  and  a  member  of  Jih5z  1ýanlien,  who  had 
been  Foreign  minister  since  30  July  Coup  1968,  was  removed 
from  all  his  duties  in  September  1971,  and  was  sent  abroad 
as  the  Ambassador  of  Iraq  to  the  Untied  Nations.  (62)  His 
popularity  inside  the  Baýth  Party,  at  the  top  of  the 
organisation,  gave  him  a  possible  future  as  a  leader  of  the 
party  leadership;  (63)  the  same  was  true  of  'Abd  al-Khdliq 
al-S5marrall  a  "left-wing  party  theoretician".  Thus,  they 
would  be  likely  to  pose  a  serious  threat  to  Saddam's 
ambitions.  (64)  Accordingly,  al-Shaykhl!  was  recalled  to 
Baghdad  and  put  in  prison  for  his  alleged  involvement  in  a 
plot  with  General  'Amn-Ash  against  Saddam.  Shortly  after  his 
release,  he  was  assassinated,  in  1980.  (65) 
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S5marrall,  "the  most  dangerous  opponent  of  Saddam's  within 
the  civilian  faction",  was  as  follows:  In  1973,  Ndzim  Kizdr, 
the  head  of  the  security  service  and  Saddam's  right-  hand 
men  led  a  plot  against  the  regime,  allegedly  because  of  the 
Sunni,  in  particular  the  Tikt'iftls  domination  in  the  Ba'th 
Party  and  the  Government,  as  was  reported  in  many 
references.  (66)  The  plot  was  uncovered.  Kizdr  and  his 
supporters  were  executed.  'Abd  al-Kh5liq  al-S5inarrall  was 
alleged  to  have  been  involved  in  the  plot;  his  death 
penalty  was  commuted  to  one  of  life  imprisonment,  after  the 
intervention  of  the  National  Command.  (67) 
only  a  few  facts  were  released  by  the  regime  about 
Kizdrls  coup,  and  it  seems  that  there  is  more  behind  the 
whole  affair  than  was  reported.  One  account  alleges  that 
Saddam.  was  behind  Kizdr  Is  plot.  (68)  Although  this  cannot 
be  proved,  there  is  weighty  evidence  for  Saddam's 
complicity: 
Saddam  was  Kizdr's  direct  party  superior,  and  it  was 
he  who  was  appointed  him  to  leading  post  in  the 
security  forces,  in  1969;  (69)  he  then  promoted  him  to 
high  rank  in  the  police,  four  years  before  he  had  any 
rank  himself.  This  was  due  to  Kizdrls  great  skill  in 
torture  and  murder,  which  the  two  of  them  had 
practised  together  in  "Qasr  al-  Nihyah",  during  the 
first  Ba'th  rule,  in  1963. 
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al-Bakr  to  achieve  his  goal,  that  of  becoming  the 
first  man  in  the  state.  Given  that  Kizdr  was  his  right 
hand  man,  it  is  not  improbable  that  he  should  have 
conspired  with  him  to  remove  al-Bakr.  This  is  lent 
credibility  by  the  fact  that  Saddam  had  already 
distanced  al-Bakr  from  his  official  functions. 
Eventually,  in  1982,  he  killed  him.  If  he  was  able  to 
remove  him  in  1979,  likely  that  he  already  had  such 
intention  in  1973. 
(3)  According  to  one  source  associated  with  the  event,  it 
was  said  that  by  the  Presidential  order,  no  one  at 
all  was  allowed  to  concern  himself  with  the  al-Kizdr 
af  f  air.  (70)  That  meant  that,  the  af  f  air  became  a 
matter  between  al-Bakr  and  Saddam  alone.  Since  Saddam. 
was  most  experienced  in  fabrication,  he  easily 
convinced  al-Bakr  to  believe  any  story  he  told. 
(4)  From  the  course  of  the  events,  it  seems  that  Kizdr  did 
not  know  Saddam's  real  aim,  or  that  he  would  betray 
him  if  the  plot  failed.  Evidence  for  this  is  provided 
by  the  fact  that  Kizdr  shot  the  two  hostages,  who  were 
to  be  accused  of  instigating  the  plot  against  al-Bakr, 
if  it  succeeded.  (71)  There  is  a  likelihood  that  Kizdr 
was  in  contact  with  Saddam  (over  the  radio)  and  that 
he  gave  him  the  order  to  kill  the  hostages  as  a 
condition  being  given  safe  conduct  out  of  the  country. 
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them,  and  also  to  get  rid  of  the  two  hostages,  the 
ministers,  who  were  in  charge  of  the  armed  forces  and 
the  police.  Kizdr  would  then  get  the  blame  for  their 
liquidation,  not  Saddam.  Thus,  the  claim  which  was 
made  by  the  regime  that  KizRr  abducted  the  two 
Ministers  as  hostages  in  order  to  negotiate  with  the 
government,  is  far  from  the  truth.  This  is  further 
supported  by  the  fact  that,  one  of  the  two  Ministers, 
Saýddn  Ghiddn,  survived  to  shooting;  he  was  dismissed 
in  1982,  and  died  suddenly  in  1985,  most  likely  by 
poison,  when  he  began  to  reveal  secrets,  which  aroused 
Saddam's  anger,  he  decided  to  keep  him  silence  for 
ever. 
(5)  In  fact,  Saddam  would  be  the  winner.  whether  the 
plot  succeeded  or  failed.  If  it  succeeded,  Saddam 
would  gain  the  following  advantages: 
(a)  He  would  get  rid  of  al-Bakr  and  became  President, 
because  he  was  his  Deputy. 
(b)  He  would  get  rid  of  al-S5marrall,  having  arranged 
with  Kizdr  to  mention  his  name  in  the  plot. 
otherwise,  there  would  be  no  evidence  linking 
Kiz5r  with  al-S5marrall,  who  unlike  Kizdr  was  of 
good  standing  in  the  Party  and  was  an  important 
rival  to  the  al-Bakr/Saddam  group.  (72) 
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ministers. 
(d)  He  would  get  rid  of  Kizdr's  power-base  within  the 
security  system,  which  would  then  be  unlikely  to 
challenge  him  in  the  future. 
If  the  operation  failed,  Saddam  would  still  gain  the 
following  advantages: 
(1)  He  would  get  rid  of  his  dangerous  rival  al-SAmarrall. 
(2)  Saddam  would  be  able  freely  to  increase  his  security 
measures,  with  out  criticism,  in  the  name  of  saving 
the  party  and  the  Government  from  plotters.  (73) 
(3)  He  would  be  able  to  administrate  the  secret  police 
himself.  At  the  Eighth  Regional  Congress  of  the  Ba'th 
Party,  which  was  held  in  Baghdad  in  LTanuary  1974,  the 
leadership  admitted  that  they  had  made  a  big  mistake 
in  allowing  this  sensitive  organisation  to  operate 
without  careful  control.  (74) 
(4)  He  would  be  able  to  put  the  blame  for  many  of  his 
ruthless  activities  at  the  door  of  Kizdr  and  his 
agencies,  (75)  despite  the  fact  that  Kiz5r's  close 
connection  with  him  meant  that  he  could  not  possibly 
have  been  unaware  of  the  activities  of  his 
subordinate.  (76) 
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ideological  grounds,  especially  concerning  Saddam's 
new  enthusiasm  for  the  Communists,  prevented  Saddam 
from  proceeding  with  his  new  scheme,  while  Kizdr  was 
still  in  his  post.  In  fact,  the  alliance  between  the 
Ba'th  and  the  Communists  was  announced  directly  after 
Kiz5r's  attempted  coup.  It  was  afterwards  believed  in 
some  Communist  wings  that  leftist  elements  within  the 
Baýth  Party  leadership  had  got  the  upper  hand. 
(6)  Saddam  presents  himself  as  a  patriotic  leader,  who  is 
besieged  by  imperialism  and  reaction.  In  fact,  in  his 
speech  on  24  September  1973,  Saddam  linked  the  Kizdr 
affair  with  imperialism,  especially  since  it  was 
preceded  by  his  oil  nationalisation  in  March  1973.  He 
said: 
we  know  that  imperialism  realised 
finally  and  particularly  in  1972  that  the 
Revolution  in  Iraq  had  gone  past  the  state  of 
"permitted  revolution"  which  it  is  accustomed 
to  see  in  the  countries  of  the  Third 
World  ....  However  hard  imperialism  may  now  look 
for  its  concealed  reserves  (in  Iraq)  it  will 
never  be  able  to  compel  our  Revolution  to 
retreat  and  collapse  ....  Those  who  have  sold 
themselves  to  the  foreigner  will  not  escape 
punishment  ....  those  who  are  committing  these 
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exploited  in  certain  ways  in  the  midst  of  the 
difficult  phase  through  which  we  are 
passing  ....  we  know  on  this  basis  that  when 
imperialism  was  surprised  by  the  revolutionary 
moves  and  measures  of  1972,  it  re-examined  the 
situation  in  order  to  launch  a  counter 
attack.  (77) 
However,  Saddam's  image  was  affected  very  much  by  the 
Kizdr  affair,  and  his  position  was  weakened.  Hence  he  was 
in  need  of  desperate  measures  to  recover  his  position  in 
the  eyes  of  his  superior,  al-Bakr,  and  of  the  Party  and  the 
public  in  general.  Accordingly,  he  immediately  took  a 
number  of  administrative  and  constitutional  measures  to 
safeguard  his  position: 
The  provisional  constitution  was  amended,  to  redefine 
the  power  of  the  president  (78)  as  follows: 
(a)  Under  Article  57,  the  President  became  Commander 
-in-Chief  of  the  armed  forces  as  well  as  head  of 
State,  and  could  exercise  his  power  either 
directly  or  through  the  Council  of  Ministers. 
(b)  Article  58  conferred  a  further  wide  range  of 
powers  on  the  President,  since  he  was  charged 
with  the  preservation  of  the  independence  of  the 
country  and  the  integrity  of  the  land, 
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the  law,  resolutions,  judicial  decisions  and 
development  projects  in  all  parts  of  Iraq. 
(c)  The  President  took  responsibility  for  appointing 
and  dismissing  Ministers,  Judges,  Civil  Servants 
and  Officers,  and  for  directing  and  controlling 
the  work  of  Ministers  and  institutions. 
(2)  The  RCC  was  reduced  to  seven  members.  Many  of  its 
powers  were  transferred  into  the  hands  of  al-Bakr  as 
President  of  the  Republic  and  Chairman  of  the  Council 
of  Ministers.  (79) 
(3)  Al-Bakr  took  over  the  Defence  Ministry  after  the  death 
of  General  Uammdd  Shih5b,  and  the  army  was  excluded 
from  involvement  in  any  operation  concerning  the  Kizdr 
affair,  in  order  to  avoid  any  further  disturbance. 
(4)  Saddam  acted  personally  to  resolve  the  confusion  that 
had  spread  through  the  ranks  of  the  Party  Militia  of 
whom  the  loyalties  of  many  local  Commanders  were 
divided  between  to  Kizdr  and  the  state. 
(5)  Saddam  took  over  the  administration  of  the  secret 
police  and  restructured  it,  by  himself.  This  force  now 
became  three  agencies,  independently  responsible  to 
the  RCC,  and  Saýdfin  Sh5kir,  Barazdn  al-Tikr-itI,  his 
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these  new  agencies. 
(6)  The  Party  leadership  called  a  regional  Congress,  which 
was  the  8th  Party  Congress.  It  took  place  from  8  to  12 
January  1974.  It  elected  eight  new  members,  in 
addition  to  the  previous  five. 
(7)  In  November  1974,  a  cabinet  reshuffle  was  announced. 
Eight  new  ministers  were  appointed,  five  of  whom  were 
the  newly  elected  members  of  the  Party  Regional 
Command.  This  means  that  the  key  posts  were  occupied 
by  Ba'th  Party  Members. 
By  means  of  their  achievements  and  the  support  given 
him  by  al-Bakr,  which,  at  the  same  time  enabled  Saddam.  to 
control  al-Bakr  himself,  Saddam  had  complete  control  of  the 
security  services,  the  RCC,  the  army  and  the  Baýth  party, 
all  of  which  had  been  cleansed  of  all  unreliable  elements. 
Saddam  was  now  in  a  position  to  take  his  next  step 
towards  complete  power,  that  of  containing  the  other  two 
strong  political  rivals  in  the  country,  the  Communists  and 
the  Kurds,  who  were  now  ready  to  accept  an  alliance  with 
the  regime,  after  Saddam  had  given  them  the  impression  that 
he  was  the  principal  pro-Communist  within  the  Ba'th  Party 
and  the  RCC.  In  particular,  Saddam  adopted  some  progressive 
policies  in  order  to  persuade  them  to  co-operate  with  him 
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beginning  of  their  end. 
358 addam's  reconciliation's 
Although  the  Ba'th  process  of  consolidation  was  taking 
place,  the  situation  continued  to  be  unstable.  The  reason 
for  this  was  principally  the  regime's  failure  to  obtain 
left-wing  support,  represented  by  the  Communists,  who  could 
muster  potential  opposition  to  it,  owing  to  their  exclusive 
influence  among  the  popular  organisations,  and  by  the 
I'Baýth-Syria  wing",  who  accused  the  al  Bakr/Saddam  group  of 
having  links  with  the  west.  (80) 
Saddam,  backed  by  al-Bakr,  took  tactical  steps,  to 
overcome  these  and  other  obstacles.  He  introduced  a  series 
of  radical  and  progressive  measures,  in  an  attempt  to 
restrain  the  rival  political  forces,  without  giving  them 
any  actual  share  of  power.  These  measures  consisted  partly 
of  an  economic  and  social  program,  including  modification 
of  the  labour  and  Pension  and  Social  Security  laws,  (81)  and 
of  the  Agrarian  Reform  law  (promulgated  May  1970).  (82) 
Education  and  Health  Service  were  expanded.  Internal  and 
External  trade  were  fully  controled  by  the  State.  The 
public  sector  was  rename  of  the  "Socialist  Sector".  This 
legislation,  to  some  extent,  benefited  the  population,  but 
their  avowed  purpose  was  to  reduce  the  private  sector  and 
bring  all  economic  and  social  affairs  into  government 
hands,  in  accordance  with  the  ostensible  Ba'th  policy  of 
Socialisation. 
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symbolised  by  his  move  to  forge  close  links  with  the  Soviet 
Union  and  other  Socialist  countries,  which  began  at  the 
beginning  of  1969.  In  March  and  June  1969,  the  regime 
signed  agreements  with  the  Soviet  Union,  to  develop  the 
North  Rumaila  oil  field.  (83)  It  later  awarded  a  major 
concession  for  sulphur  extraction  to  a  Polish  Company.  (84) 
The  most  extreme  turn  in  the  regime's  foreign  policy 
was  its  recognition  of  the  German  Democratic  Republic,  in 
July  1969.  The  aim  of  the  Ba'th  departure  to  the  left  was 
to  give  the  impression  that  it  was  more  progressive  and 
more  to  the  left  than  the  Communists.  This  gaven  the 
Communists  no  choice  but  to  co-operate  with  it;  they  had 
refused  its  initial  offer  of  participation  in  the  cabinet 
within  a  framework  of  Ba'thist  hegemony.  (85) 
As  for  the  Kurds,  they  interpreted  the  Ba"ths 
immediate  announcement  of  a  peaceful  settlement  based  on 
the  June  1966  Declaration  and  an  amnesty  which  was  now 
proclaimed  by  the  regime  for  all  Kurds  who  had  taken  part 
in  the  fighting,  as  a  sign  of  weakness.  They  took  this 
view,  presumably,  because  of  the  regime's  obvious  unsettled 
domestic  and  regional  situation  at  that  time.  Hence,  they 
made  several  attacks,  in  March  1969,  on  the  oil 
installations  at  Kirkuk,  with  Iranian  military  aid,  causing 
serious  damage  to  the  regime.  The  escalation  of  the 
conflict  became  more  serious  and  imposed  a  major  threat  to 
the  Ba'th  when  it  combined  with  an  Iranian  hard-line  policy 
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military  assistance  to  the  Kurds.  This  policy  was  partly 
due  to  Saddam's  strong-line  stance,  in  conjunction  with 
Libya,  on  the  question  of  the  occupation  of  the  islands  of 
AM  MUsd  and  the  tow  Tunbs  by  the  Shah  of  Iran,  which 
caused  the  breaking  off  of  diplomatic  relations  with  Iran, 
in  November  1971.  The  Shah  used  the  Kurds  as  an  instrument 
to  impose  his  will  on  the  Baýthls  Regime. 
It  was  therefore  urgent  to  take  step  toward 
reconciliation  with  the  Kurds  who  had  become  a  real  threat 
to  the  Ba'th,  while  the  Baýthls  authority  was  still  shaky. 
There  were  still  potential  sources  of  opposition  to  al-Bakr 
and  Saddam  within  the  armed  forces,  which  conflict  with  the 
Kurds  would  undoubtedly  strengthen.  The  regime's  relation 
with  the  IPC  were  strained.  On  the  regional  level,  the 
regime  had  a  crisis  in  its  relations  with  Iran,  which  had 
started  to  supply  the  Kurds  with  extensive  quantities  of 
money  and  sophisticated  weapons,  as  mentioned  above.  Syrian 
Ba'thists  criticised  the  Iraqi  Bathists'  stance  in  Arab 
affairs,  and  their  propaganda  machine  regularly  condemned 
the  Iraqi  Ba'thists  as  reactionary  and  rightist.  (86)  The 
Ba"th's  moderate  neighbours,  i.  e.  Saudi  Arabia  and  the 
other  Gulf  States,  were  suspicious  and  fearful  of  its 
radical  foreign  policy  and  its  growing  ambitions  in  the 
region.  (87)  However,  the  Baýthls  radical  left  policies,  to 
a  certain  extent,  reduced  its  credibility,  because  they 
were  contrary  to  its  ideological  principles,  and  caused 
confrontation  inside  the  Baýth  Party  itself. 
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Kurdish  problem  by  military  means,  and  stressed  the  need 
for  a  peaceful  settlement.  This  was  the  reason  for  Saddam's 
initiative  in  going  to  Mullah  Muqýafd  al-Barazdn!  and  .4 
speaking  of  his  wish  for  the  autonomy  of  Kurdistan.  The 
regime  started  its  negotiation  with  the  Kurds,  which  ended 
with  the  publication  of  the  Manifesto  of  11  March  1970.  The 
Manifesto  contained  far-reaching  concessions  to  the 
Kurds.  (88)  Therefore,  it  was  attacked  by  many  elements  in 
the  armed  forces  and  even  within  the  Baýth  Party  itself, 
which  regarded  the  agreement  as  a  "sell-out"  to  the  kurds. 
However,  Saddam,  for  his  part  gained  the  following  from 
this  move  demarche: 
To  acquire  a  progressive  image  and  exaggerate  his 
ability  of  being  capable  of  devising  a  solution  to  the 
complex  Kurdish  problem.  (89) 
To  gain  time,  in  order  to  establish  himself 
sufficiently  to  be  able  to  recast  the  Kurdish 
agreement  more  to  his  own  advantage. 
(3)  To  give  him  the  opportunity  to  deal  with  his  enemies 
on  the  other  fronts  within  the  Party  and  the 
goverment. 
To  free  his  hands  to  face  Iranian  pressure,  once  he 
had  al-Barazdn!  on  his  side. 
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accepted  Saddam's  reconciliation  in  order  to  obtain  some 
National  Rights  for  the  Kurdish  people  by  exploiting 
Saddam's  concessions.  However,  according  to  the  Manifesto, 
al-Barazdn7i  cut  off  his  relations  with  Iran  and  disbanded 
his  Guerrilla  Force  11the  Peshmerga".  Five  of  this 
supporters  were  taken  into  the  Cabinet,  and  support  for  the 
Kurdish  faction  that  opposed  al-Baraz5n!  was  withdrawn. 
Saddam,  however,  was  not  seriously  concerned  to  implement 
Kurdish  autonomy  and  had  no  intention  of  continuing  the 
agreement  when  circumstances  had  altered  to  his  favour.  A 
few  month  after  the  announcement  of  the  March  Manifesto, 
the  cracks  appeared  in  the  facade,  particularly  after  the 
failure  of  an  attempt  to  assassinate  al-Baraz5n!,  in 
September.  It  was  claimed  that  this  was  executed  by  Kizdr, 
but  more  likely  it  was  planned  by  Saddam,  who  gave  Kizdr 
full  support  and  protection  at  that  time.  In  addition,  the 
deportation  of  Shilite  Kurds  FaylTs  to  Iran,  in  late  1971 
and  early  1972,  was  regarded  by  al-BarazdnT  as  an  attempt  to 
reduce  the  number  of  the  Kurds  in  Iraq.  Al-Baraz5ri7i  also 
asked  for  prohibitive  conditions,  e.  g.  he  demanded  that 
Kirkuk  should  be  the  capital  of  the  autonomous  area, 
instead  of  Irbil,  which  was  the  regime's  choice. 
This  unsettled  situation  continued  throughout  1971, 
despite  the  regime's  ostensible  attempt  to  promote 
friendly  relationship  with  the  Kurds.  By  spring  of  1972, 
al-Baraz5n!  had  resumed  contact  with  Iran,  and  had  had 
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appeared  to  him  better  ally  than  his  former  host,  the 
Soviet  Union,  in  its  capacity  as  Iran's  foremost  ally.  (90) 
This  circumstance  made  al-Barazdri7i  more  challenging 
than  ever.  In  his  statement  to  the  Washington  Post  in  the 
Summer  of  1973,  he  gave  Saddam  an  indication  that  his  aim 
was  more  than  autonomy: 
J',,,.  we  are  ready  to  do  what  goes  with 
American  Policy  in  this  area  if  America  will 
protect  us  from  the  wolves  ...  if  support  were 
enough,  we  could  control  the  Kirkuk  field  and 
give  it  to  an  American  company  to  operate.  "(91) 
There  was  thus  little  prospect  of  Kurdish 
participation  in  a  Front  with  the  Ba'th  regime.  This 
deterioration  of  relations  with  the  Kurds  led  Saddam  to 
pursue  a  clearer  Policy  of  co-operation  with  the 
Communists,  he  invited  them  to  join  the  regime  in  a 
National  Front,  and  he  also  drew  closer  to  the  Soviet 
Union.  It  seems  clear  that  relations  between  the  regime 
and  the  Communists  were  conditioned  by  relations  between 
the  regime  and  the  Kurds.  Any  rapprochement  with  the  Kurds 
lessened  the  urgency  for  an  alliance  with  the  Communists, 
and  any  deterioration  of  relations  with  the  Kurds  made  the 
regime  more  reliant  on  the  Communists. 
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announced  the  National  Action  Charter,  which  stressed  its 
intention  of  seeking  a  broad  coalition  of  all  the  national, 
patriotic  and  progressive  elements  in  a  democratic  popular 
and  unitary  system.  (92) 
This  appeal  was  an  attempt  to  gather  support  for  the 
regime  as  many  quarters  of  the  country  as  possible.  It 
showed  the  regime's  insecurity,  particularly  over  its  oil 
policy.  This  had  caused  the  deterioration  of  relations 
with  the  IPC,  after  the  signing  of  the  agreement  with  the 
Soviet  Union  for  developing  the  North  Rumaila  oil  field,  in 
1969.  These  relations  became  even  more  strained,  after  the 
proclamation  of  the  National  Action  Charter,  which 
suggested  that  the  regime  was  thinking  of  taking  a  stronger 
line  with  the  IPC.  Thus,  before  taking  the  step  of 
nationalisating  the  IPC,  Saddam  took  the  initiative,  in 
February  1972,  and  went  to  Moscow,  to  apply  for  a  solid 
strategic  alliance  with  the  USSR.  (93)  In  April  1972,  the 
Treaty  of  Friendship  and  Co-operation  in  military, 
political  and  economic  matters  with  the  USSR  was 
signed.  (94)  There  were  many  urgent  reasons  for  Saddam  to 
make  this  move: 
To  provide  a  powerful  ally,  for  his  regime,  in  order 
to  improve  its  international  standing. 
(2)  To  supply  his  regime  massively  with  arms,  which  it 
urgently  needed  in  order  to  increase  its  prestige  in 
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order  to  continue  its  conflict  with  the  Kurds,  who 
were  pressing  it  to  implement  the  March  Manifesto,  and 
who  had  resumed  fighting  in  Kurdistan,  with  the  aid 
of  receiving  money  and  weapons  from  Iran. 
(3)  To  pave  the  way  for  the  nationalisation  of  oil.  The 
Soviet  Union  agreed  to  supply  the  regime  with  support 
for  the  oil  industry,  in  both  production  and  training 
at  a  high  level  after  national  isation.  (9  5)  Thus  it 
allowed  the  regime  to  assume  a  militant  position 
regarding  oil.  In  June  1972,  the  regime  nationalised 
the  IPC.  The  move  was  widely  welcomed  and  praised  by 
the  Iraqis.  It  made  Saddam  extremely  popular, 
especially  as  his  wide-spread  propaganda  presented  him 
as  the  "hero  of  nationalisation". 
In  view  of  the  subsequent  record  of  Saddam's  oil 
policy,  and  in  view  of  the  following  evidence,  it  may  be 
suggested  that  the  nationalisation  of  the  IPC,  in  fact, 
served  the  West  Interest  and  did  not  strike  a  blow  against 
imperialism. 
(a)  Any  radical  move  by  any  regime  in  the  area  that 
affected  oil  companies'  interests  led  to 
undermining  that  regime  by  the  west.  The 
collapse  of  the  Iranian  Government,  headed  by 
premier  Mo4ammed  Mossadeq,  and  the  collapse  of 
the  Iraqi  Government  headed  by  'Abd  al-Karlm 
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tolerance  of  the  foreign  oil  companies  extended 
toward  an  Iraqi  Government  could  not  possibly 
have  continued  without  huge  concessions  from  him 
in  return. 
(b)  Iraq  broke  ranks  with  other  Arab  oil  producers  by 
refusing  to  reduce  output  and  sales  after  the 
October  War  and  criticised  the  embargo 
policy.  (96)  In  fact,  this  policy  itself  was  used 
more  for  its  propaganda  value  more  than  for  its 
political  or  economic  effect.  Deliveries  of  oil 
from  the  Arab  States  to  the  United  States  were 
only  7,4  per  cent  below  pre-October  levels.  (97) 
(c)  Saddam  executed  most  of  those  who  had  been 
involved  with  the  negotiations  with  the  IPC  and 
who  had  administrated  the  production  and 
marketing  processes,  in  order  to  conceal  his 
real  oil  policy.  Among  those  executed  were: 
Murtaýd  Sa'ld  ýAbd  al-Bkj,  the  foreign  minister 
and  the  chief  of  the  team  negotiating  with  the 
IPC; 
Gh5nim  ýAbd  al-  Jalll,  a  member  of  the  RCC,  who 
took  over  the  production  process  from  the  IPC  and 
was  probably  privy  to  some  secrets  concerning  the 
negotiation; 
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Secretary  General  of  the  Committee  for  Oil 
agreements,  in  charge  of  oil  contracts  and 
marketing; 
Nfirl  H,  ammddi,  an  oil  expert  on  the  committee  for 
Oil  Agreements. 
(d)  Crude-oil  and  natural-gas  pipelines  to  Turkish 
terminals  were  constructed,  to  be  used  instead  of 
the  Syrian  terminals.  This  violated  one  of  the 
Arab  National  Principles  which  formed  part  of  the 
Ba'th  doctrine.  This  stratagem  was  justified  on 
the  ground  of  the  regimes  need  to  diversify  its 
outlets  for  crude  oil.  (98) 
(e)  At  a  time  when  political  and  economic  relations 
with  Socialist  Countries  were  very  strong,  Saddam 
was  always  careful  to  maintain  solid  links  with 
the  west.  (99) 
From  these  points,  we  may  conclude  that  there  is 
evidence  to  indicate  that  the  nationalisation  of  the  IPC 
was  planned  for  Saddam  in  order  to  allow  him  to  resolve  his 
internal  problems.  To  do  this,  he  required  the  millions  of 
dollars  of  oil  revenue  that  were  placed  at  his  disposal  by 
the  nationalisation.  (100) 
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Soviet's  great  influence  over  the  Iraqi  Communist 
Party.  It  was  the  Soviet  Union's  new  doctrine  of  the 
"non-capitalist  road  to  Socialism"  and  it  acceptance 
of  the  progressive  role  of  the  national  bourgeoisie  in 
this  doctrine  that  persuaded  the  Communists  to  ally 
with  the  Ba'th  Regime,  which  they  regarded  as 
essentially  bourgeois.  (101) 
The  proclamation  of  the  National  Action  Charter,  which 
was  considered  by  the  Communists  as  a  political  concession, 
allowed  them  to  resume  their  dialogue  with  the 
Ba'thists.  (102)  The  Communists  criticised  the  absence  of 
democratic  liberty  and  the  suppression  of  the  struggle  of 
the  masses  for  freedom;  They  also  regarded  Ba'th  policy  as 
contradictory,  because,  while  the  Ba'thists  were  trying  to 
cement  their  relations  with  the  socialist  countries,  they 
were  simultaneously  harassing  the  Communists,  (103)  which 
means  that  the  Ba'th  policy  was  not  out  of  good-will.  The 
Communists,  nevertheless,  praised  the  Ba'thists,  positive 
achievements  in  the  social  and  economic  f  ield  and  their 
anti-Zionist  and  anti-imperialist  stance.  (104)  They  also 
regarded  this  policy  of  friendship  with  the  Soviet  Union, 
their  determination  to  arrive  at  an  appropriate  settlement 
of  the  Kurdish  problem  and  their  taking  of  a  stronger  line 
with  the  IPC,  ending  in  its  nationalisation  as 
representing  proof  that  the  regime  was  moving  to  a  left- 
leaning  political  line.  They,  therefore,  found  it  hard  to 
continue  to  reject  Ba'thist  solicitation. 
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Union,  the  ICP  "central  committee",  after  a  prolonged 
dialogue  with  the  Ba"th  especially  relating  to  the  disputed 
issues,  i.  e.  the  leading  role  of  the  Baýth  Party  and  the 
need  for  democratic  institutions,  took  a  decision  to  enter 
into  an  alliance  with  the  Baýth.  In  May  1972,  the 
Communists  had  two  posts  in  the  Cabinet.  A  year  later, 
following  Kizdrls  plot,  the  DNPF  came  into  being,  in  July 
1973,  (105)  after  the  regime  laid  the  blame  for  the 
harassment  of  the  Communists  at  Kizdrls  door.  (106)  The 
Communists  were  divided  over  the  alliance  with  the  Ba'th, 
but  a  majority  accepted  Moscow's  decision.  This  was  the 
same  party  whose  Central  Committee  had  earlier  described 
the  Baýth  Regime  of  1963  as  "fascist  rule". 
The  Communists,  efforts  to  bring  the  Kurdish 
Democratic  Party  to  join  the  Front  failed,  because  the 
Kurds  pointed  out  the  undemocratic  nature  of  the 
regime.  (107)  Only  in  1974,  did  a  group  of  Kurdish  parties 
opposed  to  al-Barazdn7i  agreed  to  participate  in  the  Front. 
Although  the  Communists,  participation  in  the  affairs 
of  government  was  no  more  than  formal,  because  all  real 
power  remained  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  Ba'th,  they 
nevertheless  gained  in  return  from  this  participation  the 
following: 
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standing. 
(2)  The  Communist  underground  paper  "Tariq  al-Shaýbll,  in 
which  they  could  freely  express  their  opinions  and 
attitudes,  was  given  permission  to  publish  daily.  The 
Qaq.  r  al-Nihayah,  the  ill-famed  torture  prison,  was 
closed  down. 
(3)  The  Communists  entered  the  government  with  two 
representatives,  but  only  symbolic  participation.  The 
Ba'th  retained  the  commanding  role  in  government  and 
banned  all  other  political  organisations,  particularly 
within  the  armed  forces.  However,  the  Ba'th  claimed 
that  the  governmental  authority  who  in  the  hands  of 
the  Front  and  the  members  of  the  Front  bore 
responsibility  for  governing,  along  with  itself.  (108) 
(4)  The  Communists  extended  their  popular  base,  since  the 
legalisation  of  the  Party  gave  it  more  freedom  to 
spread  its  literature  and  to  recruit  new  members.  (109) 
However,  the  Front  also  created  problems  for  the 
Communists: 
(a)  It  enabled  the  Bath  to  incorporate  in  itself 
most  of  the  Communist  mass  organisations,  either 
by  merging  them  with  its  own  associations  or  by 
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organisations. 
(b)  Association  with  the  Ba'th  discredited  the 
Communist  Party,  especially  when  the  Ba'th's 
attitude  changed  and  it  turned  against  them 
after  having  made  use  of  them. 
(c)  The  miscalculation  of  the  most  important 
political  power  in  the  country,  the  Communist 
Party,  in  entering  into  an  alliance  with  the 
Baýth,  owing  to  Moscow's  orders,  served  to 
consolidate  the  position  of  the  Ba'th  regime 
greatly. 
Now  sufficiently  well  established,  it  could  devote 
itself  more-  single-minded  to  the  Kurdish  confrontation. 
Early  in  1974,  it  passed  the  Draft  Law  of  the  Progressive 
National  Front  for  the  Autonomy  of  the  Kurdish  Region  and 
gave  the  Kurds  an  ultimatum  for  accepting  it.  (110)  However, 
the  scheme  was  rejected  by  Al-Barazdn-i,  and  his  ministers 
left  the  cabinet.  (111)  He  enjoyed  the  unconditional  support 
of  the  vast  majority  of  the  Kurdish  community,  even  those 
who  opposed  his  leadership  and  regarded  it  as  feudal  and 
reactionary.  The  new  law  retained  the  complete  hegemony  of 
the  Baghdad  government,  giving  the  Iraqi  head  of  state  the 
right  to  appoint  and  dismiss  the  Kurdish  President  of  the 
legislative  and  executive  council  and  to  dissolve  the 
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make  financial  and  administrative  decisions.  (112) 
Accordingly,  fighting  in  Kurdistan  started  again  and 
broke  out  into  open  warfare  in  March,  after  the  Ba'th  had 
tried  forcibly  to  impose  its  own  autonomy  plan  on  Kurds.  A 
full-scale  offensive  began  in  October  1974,  which  caused 
heavy  casualties  on  both  sides.  (113) 
Under  these  pressures,  Saddam  personally  engineered 
the  most  humiliating  concession  within  his  reconciliation 
process,  in  order  to  impose  his  will  on  the  Kurds,  by 
concluding  the  Algiers  Agreement  with  the  Shah  on  March  6 
1975.  (114)  According  to  this  agreement,  Saddam  gave  up  half 
of  Shaýý  al-'Arab,  Iraq's  sole  access  to  the  Gulf,  with  a 
short  coastline,  only  15  miles  long,  to  Iran.  Iran  has  a 
long  Gulf  coastline  of  about  1,240  miles.  By  this  act, 
Saddam  sealed  Iraq  into  a  corner.  In  return,  Iran  withdrew 
its  financial  and  military  support  for  the  Kurds.  (115)  It 
then  become  possible  for  Saddam  effectively  to  crush 
Kurdish  resistance  within  forty-eight  hours  of  the 
signature  of  the  Agreement.  The  Shah  closed  the  border  to 
Kurdish  insurgents  from  Iraq  and  even  threatened  to  combine 
with  the  Iraqis  in  a  joint  attack  on  the  Kurds,  if  they 
refused  the  conditions  of  the  Agreement.  (116) 
For  Iran  this  action  represented  a  retrograde  step, 
after  its  promise  to  help  the  Kurds.  The  Shah  justified  his 
act  in  terms  of  "Realpolitik",  he  wanted  to  establish  his 
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Kurdish  victory  might  give  encouragement  to  the  Iranian 
Kurds  to  revolt.  (117) 
For  Saddam  the  Agreement  was  a  matter  of  life  and 
death.  The  choice  was  between  national  interests  and  his 
own  political  ends.  He  had  to  fight  on  more  than  one  front. 
The  Kurds  in  the  north  had  caused  the  Iraqi  Army  heavy 
losses,  and  there  had  been  wide  discontent  and  uprising 
among  the  Shiah  in  the  south,  owing  to  the  large  number  of 
funerals  of  Iraqi  soldiers,  most  of  whom  came  from  that 
area.  This  movement  frightened  the  Ba'th  leaders  greatly 
(Saddam  in  particular)  and  led  them  to  return  to  measures 
of  violence.  In  addition,  the  Iranians  had  been  applying 
increasing  pressure  and  had  been  supplying  the  Kurds  with 
massive  weaponry.  If  he  had  found  no  solution  to  the 
internal  problem,  his  whole  future  would  have  been 
endangered,  since  he  was  the  most  likely  person  to  have  to 
pay  the  price  of  failure.  He  chose  his  own  political 
survival  instead  of  the  Iraqi  national  interest;  he  chose 
to  sacrifice  half  of  the  Shaýý  al-ýArab  rather  than  lose 
his  firm  grip  on  Iraq  itself.  (118) 
In  the  case  of  the  USSR,  it  adopted  an  attitude  of 
retreat  f  rom  the  Kurds  as  a  matter  of  priority.  Its  own 
competition  with  the  United  State  led  it  instead,  to  supply 
Saddam  with  massive  quantities  of  arms,  knowing  that  he 
would  use  them  against  the  Kurds.  Moscow  considered  the 
Kurdish  question  less  important  than  increasing  its 
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influence  in  Egypt  and  also  to  balance  the  growing  power  of 
Iran,  backed  by  the  US  which  affected  Russian  interests  in 
the  Gulf  and  the  Indian  Ocean.  (119) 
Thus,  the  interference  of  foreign  powers  in  Iraqi 
internal  affairs,  on  account  of  their  alliances  with  Saddam 
and  their  interest  in  strengthening  his  regime,  caused 
desolation  and  misery  for  the  Kurds. 
Once  Saddam  had  managed  to  find  the  most  effective  way 
of  dealing  with  the  Kurds,  by  making  his  peace  with  Iran, 
through  the  attempts  of  powers  both  inside  and  outside  the 
region,  to  mediate  between  the  two,  in  order  to  contain  the 
situation  and  save  the  Bath  regime,  (120)  he  no  longer  had 
any  pressing  need  for  an  alliance  with  the  Communists,  or 
any  need  for  the  Soviet  Union.  He  repudiated  his  alliance 
with  the  Communists  after  having  exploited  them  in  order  to 
strengthen  his  regime  and  he  cancelled  all  the  Socialist 
resolutions.  An  end  was  put  to  the  radical  period  of  Iraq 
Ba'thism,  and  the  new  era  of  economic  liberation  was 
ushered  in.  He  shifted  his  alignment  to  the  Capitalist 
bloc.  His  new  Policy  was  accompanied  by  a  massive  brutal 
campaign  against  his  former  allies,  once  he  had  made  use  of 
them  to  strengthen  his  basis  of  rule  on  the  one  side  and  to 
discredit  them  in  the  eyes  of  those  who  had  suffered  at  the 
Party's  hands,  on  the  other. 
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Saddam's  earlier  rapprochement  with  the  Soviet  Union 
and  the  Socialist  bloc  and  his  progressive  achievements, 
clearly  appeared  a  tactical  moves  because  the  period  that 
followed  the  Algiers  agreement  in  1975  saw  a  clear  shift 
of  direction  by  the  regime  towards  the  western  bloc  and 
conservative  Arab  states.  This  shift  occurred  only  very 
gradually  and  irregularly,  since  the  Ba'th  still  claimed 
to  be  anti-imperialist  and  progressive.  Thus,  its 
dealings  with  the  west  proceeded  very  secretly  and  were 
kept  away  from  the  public  eye.  (121)  The  nationalisation 
of  the  IPC,  and  the  sudden  oil  price  increase,  after  the 
Arab-Israeli  War  of  October  1973,  enabled  the  regime  to 
achieve  its  new  policy  of  diversification  by  introduce 
major  new  programs  in  many  fields,  i.  e.  education, 
housing,  health  and  welfare.  The  enormous  expenditure 
which  was  required  in  these  projects  had  the  effect  of 
showing  Iraq  to  rely  on  the  Western  and  non-  socialist 
bloc  rather  than  on  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  socialist 
bloc. 
Published  information  indicates  that,  in  the  early 
1970s,  more  than  half  of  development  contracts  went  to 
socialist  countries,  while  in  1974-75,  over  two-thirds  were 
going  to  western  countries  and  other  non-socialist 
countries.  (122)  According  to  one  reference,  Iraq's  economic 
transactions  with  the  Communist  bloc  declined  to  only  5 
percent  of  its  overall  trade.  (123) 
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of  Iraq's  development  contracts  with  western  and  non- 
socialist  countries:  - 
Trade  with  the  United  States  grew  from  $32  million  in 
1971  to  $284  million  in  1974,  (124)  in  spite  of  the 
fact  there  were  no  diplomatic  relations  between  the 
two  countries. 
(2)  Trade  with  Japan  and  west  Germany  expanded 
significantly  over  the  period  from  1971  to  1974.  (125) 
(3)  Economic  and  technical  co-operation  was  given  by 
France  in  many  sectors  of  the  economy,  including 
oil.  (126) 
(4)  General  economic  co-operation  and  training  programs 
with  Italy  were  announced  in  1972,  covering  many  major 
projects  in  all  spheres,  including  petro- 
chemicals.  (127) 
(5)  Economic  and  technical  co-operation  agreements  were 
signed  with  Spain  to  supply  Iraq  with  industrial  goods 
and  to  take  part  in  industrial  projects  in  Iraq.  (128) 
(6)  In  November  1973,  general  economic  and  technical  co- 
operation  agreements  were  signed  with  Austria  and  also 
with  a  large  number  of  other  countries.  (129) 
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time  when  Iraq's  political  and  economic  relations  with  the 
Soviet  Union  and  Socialist  Countries  still  existed.  It 
seems  clear  that  the  Ba'th  policy  was  always  careful  to 
maintain  solid  commercial  links  with  the  west;  at  the  same 
time  it  began  gradually  to  turn  away  from  the  Easter  Bloc, 
to  the  extent  that  the  measure  of  Iraq's  total  foreign 
exchange  with  it  was  down  to  2.67%  in  1981,  (130)  whilst 
imports  from  Japan  and  the  west  formed  about  75%.  (131) 
The  above  information  indicates  a  clear  change  of 
direction  to  the  west,  but  the  Ba'th  tried  to  obfuscate 
this.  According  to  an  under  secretary  in  the  Ministry  of 
the  Economy,  in  an  interview  with  the  International  Herald 
Tribune,  in  April  1975: 
11  0.0  *we  cannot  sacrifice  technology  for 
ideology  ....  of  course.  We  have  to  keep  our 
friends  happy  and  throw  some  business  their 
way.  Thus,  we  buy  your  Boeing  air-craft  and  let 
you  build  our  oil  refineries.  But  a  less 
important  project  like  a  brick  factory  will  go 
to  Bulgaria,  even  though  we  know  we  can  get  a 
better  one  from  France.  " 
As  for  the  Minister  of  Industry  and  Minerals,  Tiffid  al- 
JazrWif,  he  justified  his  regime's  point  of  view  thus: 
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awarding  of  major  development  contracts  to 
western  governments  or  firms  as  a  sign  of 
Iraq's  re-orientation  towards  the  west.  The 
fact  that  'Iraq  is  turning  to  the  western 
companies  is  not  a  sign  of  change  but  of  the 
speed  and  volume  of  development".  (132) 
As  far  as  Iraq's  conservative  neighbours  were 
concerned,  the  Ba'th  regime  improved  its  relations  with 
Iran  and  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  Gulf  Sheikhdoms.  (133)  In 
increasing  moderation,  the  Baýth  cancelled  its  support  for 
the  pro-Soviet  regime  in  south  Yemen,  and  in  1978,  it 
threatened  the  Soviet  Union  with  the  breaking-off  of 
diplomatic  relations,  if  it  continued  to  support  the 
Ethiopian  regime  against  Eritrean  separatists.  (134) 
The  undeclared  reason  for  this  action,  however,  was 
the  coup  in  Afghanistan,  supported  by  the  Soviet  union,  in 
April  1978,  which  it  seemed,  frightened  the  Baýth  regime 
increasingly.  It  now  began  to  move  openly  against  the 
Soviet  Union.  In  an  interview  in  an  American  newspaper, 
Saddam  Husayn  declared: 
11  the  Soviet  Union  will  not  be  satisfied 
until  the  whole  world  is  communist".  (135) 
He  had  forgotten  his  recent  friendship  treaty  with  the 
Soviet  Union. 
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towards  the  west  became  clearer  through  its  changing  its 
source  of  military  materials.  The  first  major  order  of 
western  arms  was  from  France,  in  September  1976.  Other 
orders  were  from  Brazil  and  Italy.  (136)  In  spite  of  this, 
the  Soviet  Union  was  still,  until  the  end  of  the  19701s, 
the  main  supplier  of  the  Iraqi  army's  material,  for  these 
reasons: 
(1)  It  was  difficult  for  Iraq  to  change  immediately  its 
entire  weapons  systems,  which  had  been  of  Soviet 
manufacture  since  the  14  July  1958  Revolution. 
(2)  Western  countries  did  not  wish  to  supply  the  Ba'th 
regime  with  arms  on  a  large  scale,  while  Iraq  was 
still,  apparently,  a  Soviet  satellite.  The  west  could 
not  effect  a  complete  replacement  of  Iraqi  weapons 
systems  until  it  had  greater  control  over  Iraq  than  it 
had  yet  achieved;  there  was  an  important  element  in 
the  leadership  that  disagreed  with  the  policy  of 
diversification  towards  the  west.  This  element  caused 
more  struggles  within  the  Iraqi  leadership,  which  were 
ended  only  by  Saddam"s  rise  to  power.  (137)  In 
addition,  this  new  policy  of  diversification  was 
accompanied  by  a  brutal  campaign,  launched  by  Saddam 
against  the  communists,  Kurds  and  all  other  elements 
of  political  power  in  the  country. 
380 The  SuviDression  of  the  ODDosition 
The  new  circumstances  after  the  Algiers  Agreement  of 
March  1975  and  the  collapse  of  Kurdish  resistance  which 
followed  this  agreement  seriously  changed  the  relationship 
between  the  Baýth  Party  and  its  allies  in  the  NPF, 
particularly  the  Iraqi  Communist  Party. 
After  Saddam  neutralised  the  political  power  of  the 
army,  he  purged  the  unwanted  elements  within  the  Ba'th 
Party.  The  Security  apparatus  evolved  into  a  gigantic 
structure,  working  under  Saddam's  instructions  only.  He 
infiltrated  party  members  into  all  State  organs,  to  be  the 
eyes  and  ears  of  the  Party  or  specifically  of  its 
leadership,  The  way  now  was  paved  for  Saddam  to  take  the 
next  step,  which  was  the  ending  of  his  alliances  in  the 
NPF.  In  1976  Saddam  said,  in  a  meeting  of  the  National 
Patriotic  Front: 
"....  according  to  our  information  some 
brothers,  especially  from  the  Communist  Party, 
still  feel  embarrassed  when  asked:  Are  you  with 
the  regime  or  not?  Are  you  with  Revolution  or 
not?  is  it  embarrassing  for  one  to  side  with 
the  great  Revolution  and  its  regime?  The 
Revolution  is  cherished  by  every  honest  patriot 
and  its  major  achievements  are  obvious  to  all. 
We  should  all  criticise  flawed  details  but 
errors  in  details  should  not  bring  us  into  a 
381 psychological  opposition  to  the  Revolution  and 
its  regime.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the 
errors  of  the  administrative  apparatus  should 
be  neither  a  means  nor  a  justification  for 
pursuing  party  interest  ....  Supposing  we 
Ba'thists  reversed  the  case  and  started 
attacking  the  Communists  in  our  speeches 
through  our  media  ....  The  Communist  Party  would 
regard  these  as  improper  uses  of  the 
administrative  apparatus  and  would  try  to  put 
these  tactics  to  their  own  advantage.  what  do 
you  imagine  would  happen?  Is  such  a  state  of 
affairs  acceptable?  if  it  is,  you  can  imagine 
how  much  you  would  lose....  We  say  this  not  out 
of  vanity,  but  rather  out  of  the  conviction 
that  our  relationship  with  the  masses  is  based 
on  positive  co-operation  and  mutual  trust.  That 
is  why  they  would  listen  to  our  words".  (138) 
From  this  speech,  it  may  be  inferred  that  Saddam.  had 
already  decided  to  take  action  against  the  Communists. 
The  Communists'  policy  of  throwing  their  full  weight 
behind  the  Ba'th  party  has  yet  to  be  recognised  by  some  of 
the  Communist's  leader  for  what  it  is,  (140)  an  erroneous, 
and  at  best,  an  studied  policy,  worked  entirely  in  fdvour 
of  the  Baýthls  strengthening  its  rule.  It  made  use  of  the 
Communists'  experience  in  many  matters,  particularly  in 
controlling  the  mass  organisations  that  had  been  under 
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Ba'th  eventually  weakened  the  communists  by  changing  the 
regulations  of  these  organisations  in  such  way  that  it 
became  impossible  for  a  non-Baýthist  to  become  a  member  of 
the  union  leadership. 
Thus,  these  organisations  were  turned  into 
bureaucratic  institutions  under  the  regime's  control.  Most 
of  the  union  officers  were  not  representatives  of  the  work 
force  but  were  full-time  Ba'th  party  or  security  service 
members.  (141)  In  addition,  these  deceitful  Ba'th  policies 
were  followed  by  continual  obligations  on  the  Communists  to 
restrict  their  activities  to  the  Baýth  Party  alone.  They 
were  stopped  from  working  with  popular  organisations,  which 
put  them  at  a  great  disadvantage,  and  led  them  to  question 
the  wisdom  of  their  association  with  the  Bath.  Thus, 
through  the  mechanism  of  the  NPF,  grass-roots  support  for 
the  Ba'th  was  generated. 
At  the  end  of  1975  and  over  the  next  few  years,  the 
Ba'th  launched  an  indiscriminate  process  of  arrest  and 
persecution  against  the  Communists.  This  reached  its 
highest  point  with  the  execution  of  twenty-one  Communists 
on  charges  of  organising  communist  cells  within  the 
army.  (142)  Subsequently  the  Bath  instigated  further 
extremely  brutal  campaigns  against  the  Communists,  which 
drove  many  of  their  leaders  to  leave  the  country.  Thus,  by 
1979,  the  Communist  Party  was  removed  from  the  political 
scene  as  an  effective  factor. 
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tried,  following  the  1975  catastrophe  of  the  Algiers 
Agreement.  The  Baýth  attempted  forcibly  to  impose  its  own 
autonomy  plan  on  Kurdistan,  after  the  rejection  of  its 
scheme  by  the  Kurds.  To  put  this  forced  autonomy  into 
effect,  a  series  of  shadowy  administrative  and  economic 
measures  were  taken  by  the  Baýth.  Most  of  the  refugees  had 
been  repatriated  from  Iran  under  an  amnesty  resolution.  A 
special  budget  was  given  to  the  autonomous  region,  but  it 
went  into  industrial  projects  which  enabled  the  government 
to  control  the  area.  At  the  same  time,  the  Ba'th  launched  a 
large  scale  deportation  of  the  Kurds,  and  an  Arabizing  of 
the  area.  The  reason  for  this  policy  was  to  change  the 
Kurdish  balance  in  the  north.  Under  this  new  resettlement 
scheme,  thousands  of  Kurdish  families  were  deported  from 
Kurdistan  to  the  lower  Euphrates  region.  (143) 
These  measures  were  succeeded  by  the  co-operation  of 
some  Kurds  who  disagreed  with  Barazdnll  s  leadership  or 
served  their  own  interests.  The  Kurds  who  were  appointed  by 
the  Baýth  to  the  Central  government  and  the  National 
Progressive  Front,  such  as  ýAzlz  'Aqr5wI,  Hdshim  AqrdVI  and 
Ismd'11  ýAzlz,  formed  the  new  KDP.  ýAbd  al-Sattdr  T54ir 
Shat-if  formed  the  Kurdish  Revolutionary  Party.  ýAbd  Alldh 
Ism5'Il  Ahmad  formed  the  Progressive  Kurdish  movement.  (144) 
These  elements  gave  the  regime  the  Kurdish  apparatus  which 
it  needed  to  put  its  autonomy  plan  into  affect. 
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1976  and  continued  throughout  the  second  half  of  the  1970s. 
However,  the  Kurdish  movements  showed  signs  of  strong 
factionalism,  splitting  into  the  following  groups. 
The  Patriotic  Union  of  Kurdistan  (PUK),  led  by  Jaldl 
al-Talabdri-i,  backed  by  Syria  and  professing  Marxist- 
Leninist  ideology.  (145) 
(2)  The  Kurdish  Democratic  Party  (KDP)  ,  led  by  Barzdn7i  Is  son 
Mas'fid,  a  traditional  nationalist  who  claimed  to  be 
more  radical  than  his  father.  The  KDP  had  sympathy  for 
the  Iranian  revolution,  while  the  Ba'th  government 
supported  the  Iranian  KDP  and  corrupted  some  Kurdish 
tribal  elements  hostile  to  the  Iraqi  KDP. 
(3)  A  group  split  from  the  (KDP)  under  Muhqmmad  'Uthm5n, 
critical  of  its  policy  of  trusting  Iran  and  adopting 
confrontational  military  tactics  rather  then  guerrilla 
operations. 
Thus,  the  main  armed  struggles  of  these  factions  were 
between  themselves  for  influence,  rather  than  against  the 
Central  Government  which  increasingly  encouraged  the 
disunity  between  the  Kurdish  movements  by  attaching  one  of 
them  to  its  own  interest  against  the  others.  However, 
during  the  last  years  of  the  second  half  of  the  1970s, 
Kurdistan  transferred  the  focus  of  its  opposition  to  the 
Central  Government;  in  particular  after  the  Baýth 
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the  Communists.  (146)  The  Communists  attached  themselves  to 
the  Kurdish  resistance  and  declared  armed  struggle  in 
Kurdistan. 
In  general  terms,  the  opposition  movements  in  Iraq 
became  more  bitter  throughout  1978-1979,  because  of  the 
brutal  Baýthist  repression  campaign  against  not  only  the 
Kurdish  nationalist  movements  and  the  communists  but 
against  the  whole  Iraqi  people,  all  sects  and  ethnic 
minorities  alike. 
A  variety  of  Islamic  movements  from  both  sects,  Sunni 
and  Shi'i,  faced  the  same  ruthless  repression  by  the  Ba'th 
Regime.  The  Islamic  movements,  in  particular  the  Shiýite 
movements,  came  into  existence  as  an  organised  political 
force  in  the  aftermath  of  the  July  Revolution  of  1958. 
Their  declared  purpose  was  to  face  the  rising  tide  of 
Communism,  which  had  great  influence  throughout  Qdsim's 
rule.  (147)  Some  leading  divines  from  the  Shi'ite  cities  of 
Karbald'  and  Najaf  gave  Fatwas  which  declared  all  the 
democratising  reforms  issued  by  Qdsim's  government  as 
"haram"  and  legalised  the  killing  of  Communists.  (148) 
These  measures  were  given  encouragement  and  massive 
support  by  the  Baý  th  party  at  the  time  when  the  term 
Communist  was  used  to  describe  all  supporters  of  the  July 
Revolution.  These  Shi'ite  religious  movements  played  an 
active  role  in  the  political  struggle  which  was  spreading 
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which  carried  out  the  coup  and  threw  out  Osim's 
government.  (149) 
Most  political  analysts  point  out  that  the  Baý  th 
government  represented  the  Sunni  interest  and  increased  its 
discrimination  against  the  majority  Shi'ite  sect,  as  a 
sectarian  campaign.  (150)  These  views  are  wide  of  the  mark, 
because  the  Ba'th  regime,  backed  by  Saddam,  had  in  fact 
assailed  the  Sunni  Islamic  movement  from  the  early  years  of 
its  rule,  and  had  executed  from  the  Sunni  sect  probably 
more  than  from  the  Shi'i.  The  threat  to  Saddam's  rule  came 
more  from  the  Sunni  sect  which  had  the  key  posts  in  the 
army  and  the  Party,  than  from  the  Shilite  sect,  (151)  except 
for  Kizdrls  plot.  However,  the  Baýth  party  policy,  which 
meant  Saddam's  policy,  was  simply  to  attack  any  movement, 
from  any  sect  in  Iraq,  even  from  among  his  own  family,  if 
it  posed  any  danger  to  his  political  survival. 
Another  view  maintains  that  the  Shilite  sect  in  Iraq 
was  not  attracted  to  the  Baýthist  ideology,  because  of  its 
fear  that  it  might  be  swamped  by  the  Sunni  sect  if  any 
unity  was  established  between  the  Ba'th  regime  and  another 
Arab  country.  (152)  This  seems  implausible,  because  most  of 
the  Ba'thist  leaders  and  active  members  in  the  1950s  and 
1960s  were  from  the  Shi'ite  sect.  (153)  The  decrease  of  the 
Shiýate  sect  in  the  second  Ba'th  regime  was  due  to  Saddam's 
policy  of  relying  specifically  on  the  strength  of  Tikr-1tT 
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role  in  the  second  Ba'th  regime,  as  follows: 
The  internal  security  of  the  early  years  of  the  Ba"th 
was  run  by  Ndýim  Kizdr,  who  had  great  power  and  was 
the  right  hand  of  Saddam. 
(2)  The  intelligence  apparatus  Ld'irat  al-Mukhdbardt  was 
headed  by  Sa'dfin  ShAir,  another  right  hand  man  of 
Saddam,  who  is  still  in  Saddam's  service. 
(3)  Iýasan  ýAli,  another  shiýi,  a  cell-mate  of  Saddam's 
during  the  'Arif  regime,  was  one  of  the  most  effective 
members  of  the  Baýth  party  throughout  the  1970s  and  is 
still  in  Saddam's  service. 
(4)  Gh5nim  ýAbd  al-Jaldl  was  a  member  of  the  Regional 
Command  of  the  Ba'th  Party,  a  member  of  the  RCC,  and 
General  Director  of  Saddam's  office. 
(5)  'Adndn  al-VamcUni  who  a  member  of  the  Regional  Command 
of  the  Baý  th  Party,  a  member  of  the  RCC,  Planning 
Minister  and  Secretary  General  of  the  Committee  for 
Oil  Agreements  and  in  charge  of  oil  contracts  and 
marketing.  From  their  sensitive  positions,  we  can 
infer  that  al-JalIl  and  al-]ýamd1n-i,  both  of  them  from 
the  Shiýite  sect,  were  among  Saddam's  most  intimate 
associates. 
388 (6)  Hdmid  al-Jabfirl  was  another  Shi'i  member  of  the 
Regional  Command  of  the  Baýth  Party,  a  member  of  the 
RCC,  and  Minister  of  Information. 
(7)  Sa'd5n  H5mmddi  was  a  member  of  the  Regional  Command  of 
I 
the  Ba'th  Party,  a  member  of  the  RCC,  and  Foreign 
Minister.  He  then  became  Prime  Minister,  after  the 
second  Gulf  War.  He  is  still  in  Saddam's  service. 
(8)  Muhammad  ýIamzah  was  a  member  of  the  Regional  Command 
of  the  Baýth  Party,  a  member  of  the  RCC,  and  Minister 
of  Communication  and  Transport.  He  was  then  promoted 
to  be  Prime  Minister  after  his  participation  in 
crushing  the  March  revolt  in  1991,  which  followed  the 
Gulf  war. 
(9)  Fylayyih  Hasan  al-Jasim  was  a  member  of  the  Regional 
.I 
Command,  a  member  of  the  RCC,  Minister  of  Industry, 
then  Minister  of  State  for  Kurdish  Affairs.  He  was 
appointed  with  Uasan  'Ali,  the  Minister  of  Trade,  to 
be  a  member  of  the  special  court  set  up  to  investigate 
the  incidents  in  Karbal5'  and  Najaf  and  to  punish 
those  responsible  from  the  Shi'ite  sect  -  which  will 
be  discussed  later  in  this  section.  Saddam  practised 
this  tactic  according  to  his  special  policy:  "the 
Shi'is  kill  the  Shi'is,  the  Sunnis  kill  the  Sunnis, 
the  Kurds  kill  the  Kurds,  the  Baýthists  kill  the 
Ba'thists  and  so  on". 
389 (10)  Most  of  the  journalists,  artists,  singers  and 
poets  who  worked  in  Saddam's  propaganda  apparatus  and 
praised  Saddam's  rule  highly  were  from  the  Shiýite 
sect. 
Apart  from  these  names,  there  were  a  number  of  other 
Shi'is  in  key  military  and  security  posts,  and  the  most 
active  membership  of  the  Baýth  party  throughout  the  second 
Ba'th  regime  was  from  the  Shi'ite  sect.  They  wrote  reports 
and  spied  for  the  Baýth  government  even  on  their  own 
relatives  and  friends. 
As  a  result,  the  Baýth  party  greatly  depended  on  the 
Shi'ite  sect  during  its  first  and  second  periods  of  rule. 
one  of  the  reasons  which  led  the  Ba'th  government  to 
initiate  large  scale  arrests  and  executions  against  divines 
from  the  religious  centres  of  Karbald'  and  Najaf,  was  the 
serious  unrest  and  wide  discontent  caused  by  the  high 
casualties  among  Iraqi  soldiers  in  the  Kurdish  war,  before 
the  Algeria  Agreement,  which  the  Ba'th  could  not  conceal 
from  the  public. 
As  a  result  of  these  events,  the  Baýth  executed 
secretly  five  of  the  prominent  religious  leaders  in 
December  1974.  (154)  However,  the  most  important  factor  in 
provoking  the  Baýthls  intolerance  of  the  Shi'ite  forces  was 
the  announcement  of  the  armed  struggle  by  these  forces  to 
overthrow  the  Baý  th  government.  (155)  The  Ba'th  regarded 
Ayatollah  al-Khomayni,  exiled  in  Najaf,  as  the  moving 
390 spirit  behind  the  outbreak  of  this  violence,  in  particular 
the  massive  demonstration  of  February  1977,  which  resulted 
in  further  executions  of  religious  leaders.  (156)  The  Baýth 
government  accused  them  as  well  of  associating  with 
neighbouring  governments  like  Syria  and  Iran  to  overthrow 
their  rule.  The  regime  expelled  Ayatollah  Khomayni  in  1978. 
The  Ba'th  applied  its  familiar  tactics  of  repression 
and  conciliation  to  hold  down  these  movements.  They  paid 
ostentatious  attention  to  these  religious  centres,  granting 
them  large  sums  of  money  for  religious  purposes,  and  Saddam 
himself  arranged  many  visits  to  the  Shi'ate  centre  in 
Baghdad  and  to  the  holy  cities.  At  the  same  time,  a 
ruthless  campaign  was  launched  against  the  Shi'ite 
movements,  in  particular  the  Da'wah  party,  the  strongest 
group  within  the  Shi'ate  underground  force.  (157)  A  large 
number  of  Dawah  members  were  arrested  and  the  active 
members  were  executed.  (158)  The  leader  of,  the  Da'wah  party, 
Sayy1d  Mu4ammad  Bdqir  al-ýadr  was  put  under  house  arrest, 
then  eventually  executed,  with  his  sister  Bint  al-Hudda,  on 
the  excuse  of  an  alleged  attempt  by  an  Iranian  on  the  life 
of  Tariq  ýAziz  at  al-mustanýiriyyah  University  in  April 
1980. 
As  a  consequence  of  the  regime's  ruthlessness,  no  more 
Shi'ite  demonstrations  were  reported.  The  potential  Shi'ite 
opposition  seems  to  have  become  less  effective  after  it 
lost  its  credibility,  owing  to  its  loyalty  to  Iran  rather 
than  to  Iraq.  This  period  also  witnessed  an  increase  in 
391 Saddam's  initiative  to  decrease  the  distance  between  him 
and  the  Iraqi  masses,  in  an  attempt  to  build  his 
personality  cult. 
392 The  emergence  of  personal  rule 
The  second  part  of  the  1970s  marked  another  increase 
in  the  control  of  the  state  machinery,  in  particular  the 
military,  security,  education  and  information  departments. 
it  was  brought  about  in  two  ways:  - 
(1)  The  Baýthization  of  every  sphere  of  political  life  and 
the  outlawing  of  other  political  forces. 
(2)  The  monopolisation  of  sensitive  command  positions  by 
Saddam's  close  relatives  and  other  trusted  men  from 
the  tribes  of  Tikrit. 
These  well  planned  processes  were  accompanied  by  a 
ruthless  campaign  of  repression  and  blanket  propaganda 
which  eulogised  Saddam's  domestic  and  foreign  policy.  It 
witnessed  also  the  high  point  of  Saddam's  effort  to  project 
himself  as  Iraq's  primary  figure. 
Meanwhile,  al-Bakr's  rule  became  purely  ceremonial, 
his  only  job  being  to  sign  orders  presented  to  him  by 
Saddam.  Saddam's  advance  came  gradually  and  was  fully 
calculated.  It  started  with  the  gradual  withdrawal  of  al- 
Bakr's  power  and  his  removal  as  an  active  political  ruler, 
under  the  pretext  of  his  poor  health. 
The  various  justifications  for  these  moves  were  far 
removed  from  the  truth;  (159)  Saddam's  arrangements  since 
393 the  Baýth  took  over  power  in  1968  showed  his  preparation 
for  assuming  the  Iraqi  leadership,  and  his  pushing  aside  of 
al-Bakr,  his  last  rival,  was  only  the  culmination  of  this 
process,  as  events  proved  in  the  long  term.  Saddam's 
preparations  at  this  stage,  the  second  half  of  the  1970s, 
were  as  follows:  - 
He  fused  the  identities  of  the  state  and  the  party 
into  one,  by  appointing  all  the  members  of  the 
party's  regional  command  as  members  of  the 
Revolutionary  Command  Council  (RCC).  This  meant  that 
he  could  use  the  Baýth  Party  as  a  tool  to  affirm  the 
authority  of  the  state,  which  was  indeed  his  own 
authority.  Moreover,  he  gave  comprehensive  power  to 
his  secret  units,  which  were  partly  within  the  Ba'th 
party,  to  fulfil  any  order  from  himself.  (160) 
(2)  He  implemented  the  policy  of  "Bathization",  imposing 
the  total  domination  of  the  Ba'th  party  on  all  spheres 
of  life,  especially  the  military,  security,  education 
and  information.  A  network  of  cells  of  secret  units 
and  Ba'th  party  organisers  was  set  up  in  every  army 
unit.  Their  reports  on  any  moves  by  hostile  elements 
were  sent  to  Saddam  immediately.  These  units  were 
linked  directly  with  him  and  moved  by  his  order 
only.  (161) 
Some  accounts  indicate  that  it  was  al-Istikhbdrdt 
al-ýAskariyyah  that  carried  out  this  task.  The  duties 
394 of  al-Istikhbarat  al-"Askariyyah,  or  military 
intelligence,  are  to  control  military  information 
about  other  countries  I  armies  and  so  on;  it  employs 
for  this  purpose  the  military  attaches,  offices  in 
Iraqi  embassies  abroad,  which  are  linked  with  the 
Ministry  of  Defence.  The  secret  unit  called  the  Fifth 
Branch  al-'Amn  al-'Askari  was  responsible  for  the 
above  task.  There  is  another  branch  called  Jihdz  al-Amn 
al-KhadrijT  which  is  responsible  for  terrorist 
operations  abroad,  in  addition  to  other  duties,  such 
as  spying  on  Iraqi  and  other  nationals  resident 
abroad,  embassy  officials  and  even  security  unit 
members  themselves.  These  units  appear  to  belong  to 
the  al-lstikhbarat  al-"Askariy_vah,  but,  in  fact,  they 
are  linked  with  Saddam  only  and  orders  are  given  by 
him  directly.  (162) 
(3)  He  reinforced  the  position  of  the  party  and  the 
government  with  a  network  of  kinship  and  personal 
ties.  All  sensitive  command  positions  were  occupied  by 
people  of  Tikt-It  and  cities  around  it,  in  particular 
in  the  military  and  security  forces. 
In  1977,  "Adn5n  Khayr  Alldh  Talfffiý,  Saddam's  cousin  and 
brother-in-law,  was  elected  to  the  Regional  Command  of  the 
party  and  appointed  to  the  RCC,  and  became  Minister  of 
Defence.  BarazAn  al-Tikriti,  Saddam's  half-brother  was 
appointed  head  of  M'irat  al-Mukhabarat  al-"Ammah,  which  had 
been  Jih5z  1pn7in  before  1968,  and  then  the  Bureau  of  General 
395 Relations  after  the  second  Ba'th  coup.  This  was  accompanied 
by  a  process  of  liquidation  of  the  majority  of  al-Bakr's 
supporters,  both  military  and  civilian,  leaving  al-Bakr 
totally  isolated.  The  elimination  of  two  members  of  the 
Regional  Command  of  the  Baýth  party  and  the  RCC,  Flayy4 
Hasan  al-idsim  and  ýIzzat  Mustaft,  owing  to  their  lenient 
sentences  on  the  Shi'ite  rebels  during  the  events  at 
Karbal5'  and  Najaf  in  February  1977,  (163)  was  an  attempt  to 
exert  pressure  on  al-Bakr  because  they  were  close  friends 
of  his,  on  the  one  side,  and  to  smash  the  Shi'ite  sect,  on 
the  other. 
4-  The  twin  apparatus  of  the  media  and  terror  were  highly 
developed  at  this  stage  by  putting  huge  budgets  at 
their  disposal  from  the  massive  income  of  the  oil 
revenues.  The  first  was  activated  by  getting  Iraqi 
journalists  to  praise  the  Ba'th  and,  in  particular, 
Saddam's  economic  and  social  achievements,  especially 
his  wide-ranging  campaign  to  eradicate  illiteracy.  The 
mass  organisations  also  played  an  important  role  in 
Ba'thist  propaganda,  such  as:  the  General  Federation 
of  Iraqi  women;  the  National  Federation  of  Iraqi 
Students;  the  General  Federation  of  Peasant 
Organisations. 
The  second  was  effected  by  the  brutal  intimidation  of 
any  opponent  who  would  not  be  silenced,  carried  out  by 
Saddam's  security  and  intelligence  units;  the  organisations 
listed  above  took  part  in  this.  (164) 
396 5-  Saddam's  character  as  the  father  of  the  Iraqi  Nation 
was  emphasised.  He  exercised  this  policy  by  providing 
open  phone  lines  for  public  complaints  and  arranging 
televised  visits  to  many  populous  areas,  such  as 
Madinat  al-Thawrah,  which  was  later  called  Madinat 
Saddam.  Also  his  photographs  were  displayed  everywhere 
alongside  those  of  al-Bakr. 
However,  the  golden  opportunity  for  Saddam  to  pose  as 
an  Arab  leader  came  after  Sadat's  peace  initiative  and  his 
visit  to  Israel.  Through  his  propaganda  machine  and  his 
political  manoeuvres,  Saddam  was  enabled  to  take  a  leading 
part  in  co-ordinating  opposition  to  Saddt.  (165)  According 
to  one  of  Saddams's  previous  press  organisers,  1ýasan 
'Alawi,  at  the  time  of  Saddam's  fierce  attack  on  Saddt's 
peace  policy  with  Israel,  he  tried  to  make  underground 
contact,  through  Oman,  with  the  Saddt  regime.  This  suggests 
that  Saddam  was  not  concerned  about  Saddt's  political 
stance  and  that  he  made  his  heroic  stand  not  for  the  Arab 
cause  but  because  of  his  need  to  be  recognised  on  an 
international  Arab  level.  (166) 
Another  golden  opportunity  for  Saddam  to  play  an 
international  role  came  with  the  fall  of  the  Shah  of  Iran 
and  his  decision  to  assume  the  function  of  the  United 
Nations,  policeman  in  the  area. 
N 
397 By  these  measures,  Saddam  proved  that  he  had  planned 
since  the  first  years  of  the  Ba'th  rule  to  be  the  leader  of 
Iraq;  however,  owing  to  his  lack  of  power  in  the  Party  and 
the  State  at  that  time,  and  the  difficult  domestic  problems 
that  faced  the  Ba'th  government,  he  decided  to  wait  a  few 
more  years. 
Briefly,  the  next  chapter  will  discuss  Saddam's 
domestic  policy  when  he  became  President,  his  systematic 
invasion  of  every  Iraqi's  privacy,  and  his  creation  of  a 
generation  of  fear. 
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420 165-  Arabic  Report  Record  (ARR),  17  April,  12  August,  9 
September  and  1  October  1978. 
166-  See  Vasan  ýAlavd,  Ibid.,  pp.  94-95. 
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SADDAM  IN  POWER The  political  climate  prior  to  Saddam's  presidency 
There  are  significant  developments  that  characterise 
the  years  before  Saddam's  attainment  of  Power  in  July  1079, 
such  as  Saddt's  visit  to  Jerusalem,  the  rapprochement  with 
Syria  in  late  1978  and  early  1979  and  the  domestic  strife 
in  Iran  which  by  the  end  of  1978  had  turned  into  a  popular 
uprising  and  overthrown  the  Shah's  regime.  These  events, 
accompanied  by  the  Soviet  intervention  in  Afghanistan, 
which  increased  Soviet  influence  in  an  area  that  was 
regarded  as  one  of  western  influence,  allowed  the  political 
circumstances  in  the  region  to  produce  an  atmosphere  for 
Saddam  to  play  a  more  vigorous  part  in  its  politics. 
The  inter-Arab  Crisis  caused  by  Saddt's  visit  to 
Jerusalem,  the  Camp  David  Accord  of  1978  and  the  Peace 
Treaty  of  1979  gave  Saddam  the  opportunity  to  play  a  role 
in  the  Arab  political  affairs.  In  March  1979,  immediately 
after  Saddt's  conclusion  of  the  Peace  Treaty  with  Israel, 
Saddam  organised  an  Arab  Conference  in  Baghdad,  which  ended 
with  a  boycott  decision  against  Egypt.  Saddam  was  pursuing 
political  aims  with  this  conference.  He  attempted  to  play  a 
key  role  in  exerting  influence  on  the  composition  of  the 
Arab  resolution,  more  to  be  able  to  lay  emphasis  on  his 
claim  to  a  position  of  Arab  leadership  than  to  punish  Egypt 
for  its  treaty  with  Israel.  (l)  What  proved  this  was 
Saddam's  refusal  to  participate  in  the  militant  grouping 
which  established  the  anti-Sadat  Front,  Jabhat  al-.  ýuznad  wa 
al-TaqaddT  (Steadfastness  and  Resistance  Front).  This 
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countries,  like  Algeria,  Syria  and  Libya,  to  take  strong 
measures  against  Egypt.  He  even  adopted  measures  to  impede 
the  creation  of  this  Front,  on  the  grounds  that  it  was  too 
lenient  towards  Egypt.  He  did,  however,  succeed  in  having 
Egypt  expelled  from  the  Arab  League,  which  his  media 
presented  as  a  great  success  for  him.  He  was  then  able  to 
achieve  his  ambition  of  playing  a  leading  role  in  Arab 
politics  by  posing  as  the  champion  of  the  Arabs,  under  the 
banner  of  Ba'thist  pan-Arabism. 
In  this  period,  another  tactical  move  took  place.  A 
rapprochement  was  announced  between  Baghdad  and  Damascus, 
with  the  avowed  aim  to  unifying  the  two  countries.  Before 
this  rapprochement,  relations  with  Syria  had  remained  as 
turbulent  as  ever.  Since  July  1968,  when  the  Ba'th  took- 
over  power  in  Iraq,  the  country  was  ruled  by  a  regime 
claming  to  represent  the  Baýth  values  and  to  pursue 
Ba'thist  policies.  This  claim  heavily  compromised  relations 
with  Baýthist  Syria.  Their  bilateral  relations  were 
dominated  by  disputes  over  Baýthist  legitimacy  and 
competition  for  regional  influence  and  resources.  (2)  one 
accused  the  other  of  employing  imperialist  power  and  its 
agents  in  the  area.  But  despite  the  fact  that  each  of  them 
aimed  to  undermine  the  other,  neither  of  them  resorted  to 
sectarian  propaganda  as  a  weapon.  The  reason  for  this  was 
that  the  two  regimes  wished  to  deny  the  sectarian  practices 
that  both  of  them  clearly  employed. 
423 Against  this  backdrop,  it  is  highly  doubtful  whether 
the  two  regimes  would  have  been  able  to  patch  up  their 
mutual  diffrences;  this  temporary  rapprochement  was 
nothing  more  than  the  pursuit  of  the  same  competition  for 
influence  between  the  Ba'thist  leaders  but  by  different 
means.  The  rapprochement  was  not  viewed  favourably  by  many 
forces  in  the  region,  in  particular  Israel,  which  regarded 
it  as  a  threat  to  its  national  security,  since  it  resulted 
in  a  marked  shifting  in  power  in  favour  of  those  two 
countries. 
However,  discussion  of  the  motives  behind  the 
rapprochement  between  Iraq  and  Syria  is  still  surrounded  by 
contradictions.  Several  explanations  have  been  given  for 
it.  According  to  Marr,  there  were  strong  indications  that 
Saddam  opposed  the  scheme,  because  a  union  headed  by  al- 
Asad,  in  which  Saddam  would  have  played  a  lesser  role, 
threatened  his  power  base.  (3)  It  is  also  said  that  al-Bakr 
was  to  become  the  President  of  the  unified  State  and  the 
Head  of  the  unified  Ba'th  Party,  while  al-Asad  was  to  be 
his  deputy,  leaving  Saddam  without  any  real  position  of 
power.  (4) 
Most  sources  suggest  that  the  Unity  Scheme  was  not 
Saddam's,  and  that  he  was  dragged  into  the  negotiations 
against  his  will,  by  President  al-Bakr.  Many  Baýthists  who 
suspected  Saddam's  growing  ambitions  tried  to  warn  al-Bakr 
and  made  suggestions  to  him  that  a  new  pact  with  Syria 
might  serve  to  curtail  Saddam's  power.  But  it  was  too  late, 
424 because  Saddam  had  achieved  a  position  to  discover  any 
plans  before  any  move  could  be  made  to  threaten  him,  having 
attained  supremacy  over  the  Party  and  the  State.  From  early 
1970,  he  effected  the  total  monopolisation  of  all  media, 
and  the  nationalisation  of  the  public  facilities.  He 
introduced  laws  which  facilitated  an  extension  of  State 
terror.  The  Iraqis  were  made  loyal  to  his  leadership 
through  his  massive  propaganda  machine.  Any  institution  in 
the  Party  and  the  State,  including  the  armed  forces  and  the 
intelligence  services,  simply  became  a  further  means  of 
asserting  his  authority.  He  imposed  a  system  of  State 
terror  through  the  security  apparatus,  in  order  to 
discourage  any  real  or  potential  threats  to  his  power. 
Thus,  Saddam  played  the  key  role  in  eliminating  the 
Scheme.  But  in  order  not  to  be  thought  to  be  less 
interested  in  it  than  al-Bakr,  he  introduced  points  that 
the  Syrians  would  fined  objectionable,  thus  making  them 
apparently  the  ones  to  reject  the  scheme;  for  example,  he 
asked  for  full  union  which  did  not  suit  the  Syrians,  since 
Syria,  as  the  inferior  power,  would  thus  have  come  under 
Iraqi  control.  (5) 
The  other  underlying  cause  for  the  failure  of  the 
Unity  Scheme  was  some  developments  which  affected  the 
strategic  balance  in  the  region,  such  us  the  domestic 
strife  in  Iran  and  the  Soviet  intervention  in  Afghanistan. 
Syria,  which  was  Moscow's  ally,  took  a  positive  attitude 
towards  the  Soviet  invasion  of  Afghanistan,  while  Iraq 
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towards  the  western  bloc  and  the  moderate  States  in  the 
region.  Also,  when  conflict  between  Iraq  and  Iran  broke  out 
Syria  supported  Iran,  delivered  arms  to  it,  (6)  and  was 
even  accused  of  sending  military  experts.  (7)  This  gave 
Saddam  credibility  for  his  claim  of  Arab  legitimacy,  and 
gave  him  justification  for  accusing  the  Baýthist  Syrians  of 
stabbing  Arab  solidarity  in  the  back  by  supporting  Iran, 
which,  by  refusing  to  end  the  War,  prevented  Iraq  from 
fighting  Israel.  (8) 
To  meet  the  new  challenge  in  the  region,  a  new 
strategy  had  to  be  designed.  Saddam,  played  the  card  of 
Iraq's  strategic  importance  to  regional  and  international 
interests.  He  was  thus  also  to  serve  his  political 
interests  by  assuming  the  role  of  policeman  of  the  area 
instead  of  the  Shah  of  Iran. 
Fortunately  f  or  Saddam,  the  new  regime  in  Teheran 
pursued  fundamentalist  policies  and  demonstrated  their 
intention  to  overthrow  the  neighbouring  secular  regimes  and 
to  export  the  Islamic  Revolution  to  the  whole  region.  In 
particular  they  directed  their  efforts  toward  the  Gulf 
States. 
Saddam's  position  as  a  deputy  did  not  suit  his  new 
mission,  which  required  him  to  be  the  first  man  in  Iraq,  in 
order  to*unify  the  Iraqis  and  then  the  Arabs  behind  his 
leadership.  This  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  section. 
426 The  transfer  of  Power 
As  events  in  the  last  chapter  revealed,  Saddam  Husayn 
had  been  the  real  power  in  Iraq  for  many  years.  He  had  been 
the  strong  man  of  Iraq  since  the  Baýth  took  over  power  in 
1968.  He  alone  occupied  a  decision-making  role,  even  when 
the  decision  was  declared  formally  by  President  al-Bakr.  (9) 
In  addition,  Saddam's  huge  propaganda  machine  tirelessly 
presented  him  as  the  one  who  was  building  up  Iraq:  the 
Struggler  with  a  strategic  mind  and  a  precise  calculation. 
These  measures  of  preparation  increased  in  the  second 
half  of  the  1970s,  which  marked  the  culmination  of  Saddam's 
attempt  to  make  himself  the  leading  statesman.  He  had  taken 
all  possible  measures  to  guard  his  power  base,  in  order  to 
achieve  this  objective,  and  it  expanded  to  such  a  degree 
that  the  Iraqi  people,  and  even  the  other  Arab  and 
international  media,  began  to  comment  that  Saddam  was  the 
leader  of  Iraq,  not  al-Bakr.  This  was  confirmed  by  Saddam's 
biographer: 
-...  When  he  assumed  overall  responsibility  for 
the  State  and  the  Party  on  17  July,  the  Iraqi 
People  showed  no  surprise,  as  he  had  been  the 
leader  for  many  years.  As  for  Arab  and  foreign 
states,  whether  friendly  or  unfriendly  to  Iraq, 
they  simply  said  that  the  "strongman"  of  Iraq 
since  1968  had  now  become  the  Head  of 
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Thus,  Saddam  gave  instructions  to  his  media  to  refer 
to  President  al-Bakr  as  "President  and  Commander",  while  he 
was  to  be  referred  to  as  "Comrade  Secretary-General  of  the 
Regional  Command".  (11)  This  was  mainly  an  attempt  to  hide 
the  fact  that  Saddam  was  indeed  the  real  power  in  Iraq  and 
that  al-Bakr  was  just  a  shadow. 
A  cult  of  personality  grew  up  around  him  to  the  extent 
that  an  advertisement  in  New  York  Times  was  wondering 
wither  Iraq  under  Saddam  leadership  would  repeat  the  former 
Iraqi  glories  of  Hammurabi,  Ashurbanipal,  al-Mansfir  and 
Hdrfin  al-Rashid.  (12) 
As  the  time  for  Saddam  to  take  over  power  had  not  yet 
arrived,  he  always  behaved  in  an  exemplary  manner  toward 
al-Bakr;  he  continued  until  the  last  day  of  al-Bakr's 
presidency  fully  to  acknowledge  him.  (13)  Saddam's  attempts 
gradually  to  restrict  al-Bakr's  role  and  to  lessen  his 
influence  over  the  whole  of  the  second  decade  of  their 
partnership  in  power  clearly  revealed  his  plot  against  him; 
this  ended  in  his  forced  resignation  under  the  pretext  of 
poor  health  on  16  July  1979,  after  much  pressure  from 
affected  elements  of  the  Party,  State  and  family,  such  as 
the  founder  of  the  Ba'th  Party,  Comrade  Michel  ýAflaq, 
Shafiq  al-Dardjl,  the  ambassador  of  Iraq  to  the  Arab  League 
and  Khayr  Alliih  Talf5h,  Saddam's  uncle.  (14) 
428 It  might  be  asked  here  why  Saddam  did  not  take  over 
power  in  the  first  place  at  the  beginning  of  the  Ba'thist 
coup,  in  1968.  The  answer,  as  has  already  been  mentioned  in 
Chapter  Five,  is  that  he  did  not  wish  to  push  himself 
forward  at  the  beginning,  since  this  might  have  caused  him 
trouble  with  the  main  element  in  the  Baýth  Party  and  the 
State,  especially  since  he  had  not  yet  proved  that  he  was  a 
capable  man  for  serious  missions.  He  also  wanted  to  give 
himself  the  chance  to  concentrate  on  the  security  and 
intelligence  organs  of  the  Party  and  the  State,  his  power 
base,  together  with  the  propaganda  machine. 
The  rapidly  changing  political  circumstances  in  the 
Middle  East,  such  as  the  Soviet  intervention  in 
Afghanistan,  which  increased  Soviet  influence  in  the  area 
that  was  regarded  as  one  of  western  influence,  and  the 
complete  success  of  the  Islamic  Revolution  in  Iran,  which 
put  an  end  to  the  rule  of  the  Shah,  the  guardian  of  western 
interests  in  the  Gulf  Region,  made  it  necessary  for  Saddam 
to  time  his  arrival  in  power  very  carefully  in  order  to 
close  ranks  against  a  variety  of  internal  and  external 
threats. 
As  inevitably  happened  throughout  Saddam's  eleven 
years  of  rule  with  al-Bakr,  when  an  important  event  had 
been  planned  behind  closed  doors,  some  ostensible  reason 
was  publicly  announced.  The  ostensible  reason  for  al-Bakr's 
resignation,  announced  by  Saddam's  media  on  16  July  1979, 
on  the  eve  of  the  anniversary  of  the  Ba'th  17  July  1968 
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permitted  him  to  carry  the  responsibilities  of  the 
leadership  of  the  Party  and  the  Revolution. 
To  make  this  transfer  of  power  more  acceptable  to  the 
Iraqi  Nation,  to  retain  his  image  as  "a  good  Son"  to  al- 
Bakr  and  to  render  this  chosen  role  crystallised  in  him, 
Saddam  declared  in  his  first  speech,  on  17  July  1970,  after 
assuming  all  Party  and  State  responsibility: 
'".  99  It  has  never  happened  before,  either  in 
ancient  history  (including  that  of  our  nation 
since  its  dawn)  or  in  modern  times,  that  two 
leaders  have  been  in  power  for  eleven  years 
within  one  Command  without  this  resulting  in  a 
dangerous  moral  or  practical  imbalance  in 
leadership  and  without  their  relation  ending  in 
one  of  them  driving  the  other  out.  -(15) 
Saddam's  speech,  of  course,  was  an  example  of  the 
"double  speak"  that  he  had  so  regularly  practised.  (16)  He 
liquidated  members  of  al-BakrIs  family,  (17)  and  after  his 
retirement,  placed  him  himself  under  house-arrest  and 
prevented  anybody  visiting  him;  two  years  after  his 
retirement  he  was  reported  dead  from  natural  causes'.  (18) 
Al-Bakr's  resignation  was  accompanied  by  an  extensive 
purge  of  some  elements  in  high  positions  within  the  Baýth 
Party  leadership  itself  who  had  tried  to  put  an  end  to 
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another,  and  his  plan  to  drive  out  al-Bakr  and  claim  power 
became  clear. 
Obviously  they  had  tried  to  obtain  a  degree  of 
influence  in  the  decision-making  process  in  both  the  Party 
and  the  Government,  in  order  to  prevent  Saddam's  attainment 
of  power,  since  they  were  understandably  afraid  that  if 
this  occurred  their  own  lives  would  be  in  danger.  Their 
clear  opposition  to  him  made  it  necessary  for  him  to 
liquidate  them.  Thus  Saddam  began  his  rule  with  the 
execution  of  the  main  elements  in  the  Party,  the  RCC  and 
the  armed  forces;  this  was  reminiscent  of  the  1969 
executions  with  which  the  Ba'th  began  its  rule.  All 
Saddam's  legitimising  and  reconciliation  measures 
throughout  this  period,  were  prerequisites  for  his  regime 
of  terror  that  followed.  Saddam's  gaining  of  full  control 
over  Iraq  and  the  Ba'th  ended  one  era  of  Iraqi  history  and 
began  another;  this  gave  a  severe  blow  to  the  Iraqi  State 
and  the  Iraqi  people.  The  next  section  will  discuss  the 
major  purge  with  which  Saddam  started  his  presidency,  and 
the  motives  behind  it. 
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After  he  became  President  in  July  1979,  Saddam 
exercised  absolute  monopoly  in  the  decision-making  process, 
since  he  became  President  of  the  RCC,  Secretary  General  of 
the  Baýth  Party,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  army,  Chairman 
of  the  Supreme  Planning  Council,  Chairman  of  the  Committee 
on  Agreements,  Chairman  of  the  Supreme  Agricultural 
Council.  However,  still  Saddam's  power  base  could  not  come 
into  existence,  until  he  had  won  another  power  struggle 
within  the  Ba'th  leadership  and  ousted  the  last  major 
opponents  of  his  hegemony.  Thus,  there  were  strong 
indications  that  the  executions  of  1979  may  have  been 
connected  with  al-Bakr's  departure  and  Saddam's  final 
elevation  to  the  pinnacle  of  Power. 
However,  little  was  announced  publicly  about  the 
alleged  Coup,  and  its  real  motivation  remained  obscure.  The 
official  story  suggests  that  there  was  a  plot  to  overthrow 
the  government  by  a  number  of  the  Bath  Party  Leaders, 
including  five  members  of  the  Revolutionary  Command 
Council,  with  outside  aid.  It  was  said  that  those  elements 
were  enormously  afraid  of  Saddam's  attaining  complete 
power.  (19)  It  is  difficult  to  trace  the  actual  Pressures 
and  manoeuvres  that  were  taking  place  behind  closed  doors. 
The  most  important  factor  for  many  within  the  Baýth 
leadership  was  the  threat  posed  by  Saddam's  gradual 
acquisition  of  one  position  of  power  after  another.  They 
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find  themselves  more  unable  to  protect  their  own  lives. 
Therefore  they  tried  to  achieve  a  degree  of  influence 
within  the  decision-making  process  by  raising  an  objection 
to  the  decision  to  transfer  power,  which  would  otherwise 
have  been  decided  unanimously.  (20) 
In  fact,  the  characterisation  of  the  bitter  struggle 
for  supremacy  within  the  higher  echelons  of  the  Ba'th  Party 
which  accompanied  the  rise  of  Saddam,  as  analysed  by  the 
Baýth  Party  Political  Reports,  almost  obscures  rather  than 
clarifies  the  real  nature  of  what  was  taking  place 
throughout  the  period  of  the  Ba'th  rule.  Mostly  it  was 
analysed  in  ideological  terms.  other  Pro-Baýth  sources  give 
a  similar  account.  (21)  But,  in  realty  the  struggle  was 
centred  primary  around  the  person  of  Saddam.  In  other 
words,  any  other  individual  to  remain  in  a  position  of 
power  in  the  Party  or  in  the  State  apparatus  had  to  submit 
to  Saddam's  orders,  and  his  position  was  entirely  dependent 
on  the  degree  of  his  acceptability  to  Saddam.  Thus,  those 
who  disagreed  with  him,  or  posed  a  threat,  actual,  or 
potential  to  his  position,  were  dismissed  at  once,  under 
the  pretence  of  a  plot  against  the  Party  and  the  Revolution 
or,  if  they  had  a  major  power  base  of  their  own,  they  were 
eased  out  gradually. 
However,  according  to  Saddaml  s  account,  he  was  not 
astonished  by  his  comrades'  attitude;  he  had  suspected  them 
for  some  time.  He  based  his  suspicions  on  the  fact  that  he 
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displayed,  and  he  knew  that  those  elements  wished  to  play  a 
leading  role  in  the  Baýth  Party  and  the  Command  for  which 
they  were  not  qualified.  (22)  The  reason  why  they  had  risen 
to  their  high  positions  in  the  Party  and  the  State  was  that 
they  had  been  active  members.  Thus,  he  claimed,  he  put  them 
under  observation.  (23) 
According  to  the  assessment  of  many,  Saddam  arrested 
half  of  the  families  of  those  suspicious  elements  as 
"hostages"  in  order  to  extract  admissions  from  them,  under 
this  painful  pressure,  that  they  had  participated  in  a  plot 
against  the  Baýth  Party,  the  Revolution  and  Iraq.  (24)  On 
July  15,  the  regime  revealed  that,  MuWI  'Abd  al-Uusayn  al- 
Mashhaddn7i,  Secretary  of  the  Revolutionary  Command  Council 
and  a  Shi"ite  Party  member  for  over  twenty  years,  had  been 
relieved  three  days  earlier  of  all  his  duties,  without 
mentioning  the  reason.  (25) 
Then,  at  the  Extraordinary  Regional  Conference  of  the 
progressive  cadre  and  popular  leaders  of  the  Ba'th  Party 
which  was  held  in  Baghdad  on  22  July  1979,  'Abd  al-Husayn 
al-Mashhad5n!  read,  and  looking  like  a  broken  person, 
"instructed",  a  fabricated  confession  detailing  his 
participation  in  Syrian-backed  plots  to  overthrow  the  Ba"th 
Government  and  its  leadership.  He  named  the  other  supposed 
ringleaders  as'Adndn  ýIusayn  al-Iýamdadnil,  Mu4ammad  Ma4jfib, 
Ghdnim  'Abd  al-jalil  and  Muýammad  'Ayish. 
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began  his  speech  to  rally  the  remaining  members  of  the 
Ba'th  Party  and  the  Command  to  his  leadership,  claiming 
that  he  had  been  betrayed  by  his  closest  associates,  five 
of  whom  were  members  of  the  Revolutionary  Command  Council. 
He  then  ordered  all  the  people  who  had  been  named  by  al- 
MashhaffinI  to  be  led  away  one  by  one  from  the  meeting  hall. 
This  made  the  remaining  members  in  the  hall  faint  with 
terror  and  caused  them  to  acclaim  Saddam  and  call  for  the 
death  of  the  conspirators  and  traitors.  Meanwhile  Saddam 
broke  down  in  tears  and  then  took  a  handkerchief  from  his 
pocket  to  wipe  his  tears  away  and  hide  his  emotions. 
According  to  his  instructions  the  meeting  was  filmed,  and  a 
videotape  was  distributed  to  the  principal  members  of  the 
Ba'th  Party  and  the  military  forces;  it  was  even 
distributed  outside  the  country.  (26) 
This  was  a  highly  skilful  psychological  game  played  by 
Saddam,  which  gave  warning  to  everyone  that  nobody  would  be 
safe.  All  should  be  subservient  to  him  or  face  death. 
Everybody  should  be  an  extension  of  his  will.  He  said: 
we  are  now  in  our  Stalinist  era.  We  shall 
strike  with  an  iron  fist  against  the  slightest 
deviation  or  backsliding,  beginning  with  the 
Ba'thists  themselves.  "  (27) 
A  special  Ba'thist  court  was  set  up,  headed  by  Na'Im 
Hadd5d,  a  Shi'ite  and  member  of  the  Revolutionary  Command 
I 
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Minister  of  Communication  and  Transport,  T5yah  ýAbd  al- 
Karim,  a  RCC  member  and  Minister  of  Oil,  Hasan  ýAli,  a 
Shiýite,  a  RCC  member  and  Minister  of  Trade,  Saýdgn  Sh5kir, 
a  Shi'ate,  RCC  member  and  Minister  of  the  Interior,  to  try 
the  alleged  plotters.  (28)  The  court  condemned  twenty-two  to 
death,  including  the  five  members  of  the  RCC.  The  members 
condemned  by  the  RCC  represented  almost  quarter  of  the 
Council.  Also,  Unit  Commander  Walid  Ma4mfid  Sirat  and 
Saddam's  old  enemy,  and  'Abd  al-Khdliq  al-Samarr51,  who  had 
been  held  in  prison  since  1973  for  being  implicated  in 
K11z5r1s  coup.  Thirty-three  were  sentenced  to  imprisonment 
for  different  periods,  ranging  from  one  to  fifteen  years. 
Thirteen  were  released.  (29)  The  Regional  Command  and  RCC 
issued  on  28  July  1979  a  declaration  that  the  plotters 
were: 
-...  a  group  of  people  who  had  infiltrated  the 
Party  Leadership  and  the  Revolution  and  included 
traitors  belonging  to  the  Party.  This  group  had 
for  some  years  been  preparing  an  ugly  plot  aimed 
at  hitting  the  Party,  the  Revolution  and  the 
achievements  of  our  socialist  and  democratic 
people,  in  order  to  force  Iraq  to  take  part  in 
the  defeatist  plans  drawn  up  by  American 
imperialism  in  the  service  of  Zionism  and  the 
forces  of  darkness.  - 
As  part  of  Saddam's  devious  plan  to  remove  any  doubts 
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the  alleged  plotters,  ýAdndn  Husayn  al-Hamddni  for  twenty 
four  hours  only,  to  a  key  government  position  as  Deputy 
Prime  Minister  and  Head  of  the  President's  Office.  On  his 
way  back  from  his  official  visit  to  Syria,  carrying 
Saddam's  message  to  President  Asad  about  the  alleged  plot, 
he  was  arrested  at  the  airport  and  tortured  with  the  other 
alleged  plotters-(30)  This  was  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
some  former  Ba'thists,  reports  indicated  that  al-Uamddni 
had  never  been  among  Saddam's  enemies  and  that  this  purge 
was  because  of  his  being  a  potential  overachiever.  (31) 
From  Saddam's  point  of  view,  the  plot  was  more  serious 
than  that  of  K7izdr  against  the  Party  in  1973,  because  it 
caused  an  uneasy  atmosphere  in  the  Party  ranks  and  a 
feeling  of  defeat,  since  the  plotters  all  held  high 
positions  and  had  participated  in  running  the  Party  and  the 
State.  It  was  for  this  reason,  he  claimed,  that  he  followed 
the  reading  of  the  confession  by  his  speech  to  the  Ba'th 
Party  Leaders,  which  was  designed  to  raise  their  morale  and 
strengthen  their  resolution.  (32)  The  reasons  for  Saddam's 
making  al-Mashhaddrd  confess  before  the  meeting  and  having 
the  event  filmed  were  that: 
Many  reports  indicated  that  the  alleged  plotters  did 
indeed  wish  to  prevent  Saddam's  rise  to  power,  because 
of  his  savage  violence,  the  way  he  liquidated  his 
opponents  and  his  unthinking  policies.  These  might 
bring  disaster  to  Iraq,  if  he  obtained  absolute  power. 
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throughout  the  whole  region,  which  presaged  the 
occurrence  of  something  disastrous,  (33)  but  it  was  not 
an  attempt  to  overthrow  the  government,  as  Saddam 
claimed.  It  seems  probable  that  Saddam.  managed  to 
record  some  of  the  conversations  and  discussions  of 
al-Mashhaddn!  and  his  group  concerning  the  means  of 
preventing  his  attainment  of  power.  Such  recordings 
would  have  been  made  by  his  intelligence  men,  who  had 
taken  hold  of  all  the  State  apparatus  and  the  Ba'th 
Party  itself.  Apparently,  he  used  these  recordings  to 
condemn  the  alleged  plotters. 
In  the  Mzdr  affair,  Saddam  did  not  prepare  public 
confessions  or  a  trial,  he  did  not  allow  anyone  to 
meet  K-izdr,  not  even  President  al-Bakr,  and  the 
execution  was  carried  out  by  him  personally.  This 
indicates  that  he  was  one  of  those  who  had  plotted 
with  K-izdr  to  get  rid  of  al-Bakr  and  to  take  over  the 
State. 
(2)  He  intended  to  create,  at  the  beginning  of  his  rule, 
a  particular  atmosphere  of  fear  among  the  Ba'th 
Party  members.  This  fear  influenced  them  deeply; 
after  the  actual  spectacle  of  al-Mashhaddri-i  and  his 
group  of  alleged  plotters  being  arrested  in  the 
meeting  hall  and  being  executed  receded  from  their 
minds,  the  fear  inspired  by  the  spectacle  has 
continued  ever  since.  This  dictatorial  style  of 
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period  of  Saddam's  rule.  (34) 
(3)  He  intended  to  have  passed  the  resolution  of  the 
Extraordinary  Conference  -in  fact,  his  own  resolution- 
to  the  effect  that  all  the  Ba'th  Party  leadership  had 
to  take  a  unanimous  decision  on  the  fate  of  the 
alleged  plotters.  Party  Members  should  carry  out  the 
executions;  as  the  alleged  plotters  had  been  members 
of  the  Party  and  had  betrayed  the  Party,  so  the  Party 
should  punish  them.  (35)  By  this  move  Saddam  involved 
all  the  Baýth  Party  in  his  crime,  under  the  pretext  of 
his  desire  to  improve  Party  morale  after  it  had  been 
shaken  by  the  plot;  in  fact  it  had  been  shaken  by  the 
fear  inspired  by  Saddam's  violence.  (36)  His  action 
achieved  the  following  results: 
(a)  It  helped  Saddam.  to  realise  the  ambition  that  he 
had  held  from  the  early  years  of  the  1970s,  i.  e. 
to  become  the  Head  of  State. 
(b)  Saddam  turned  fear  into  the  foundation  of  his 
legitimacy  and  his  consolidated  power,  which  was 
born  and  sustained  through  complicity.  He  tried 
to  rally  the  masses  behind  his  leadership  by 
mobilising  popular  sentiment;  thousands  gathered 
in  the  streets  of  the  capital  -most  of  them 
Saddam's  intelligence  servants  and  Baýthist 
elements  who  had  been  told  to  demonstrate-  giving 
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long  life  to  Saddam,  the  Party  and  the 
Revolution.  (37)  This  popular  demonstration  was 
similar  to  that  with  which  the  Ba'th  Party  began 
its  rule,  the  popular  spectacle  of  the  executions 
of  1968-69.  The  difference  between  the  two  events 
was  that,  in  the  1968-69  purge  most  of  the 
demonstrators  were  amazed  at  the  unprecedented 
act,  especially  as  it  was  done  in  the  name  of 
patriotism.  The  1979  purge  demonstrators 
participated  out  of  fear,  wishing  to  show  their 
absolute  loyalty  to  Saddam.  in  order  to  save  their 
lives. 
(c)  Saddam.  implicated  the  Ba'th  Party  and  the  RCC  - 
even  his  harshest  critics  -  in  his  crime,  in 
order  to  make  them  a  party  to  his  system  of 
violence,  so  that  they  might  be  obliged  to  defend 
his  regime  for  their  lives,  sakes,  since  they 
shared  responsibility  for  the  regime's  crime. 
This,  was  probably  the  reason  for  the  failure  of 
all  the  attempts  to  overthrow  his  regime.  (38) 
(d)  Saddam  like  Stalin  always  concealed  his  role  in 
every  purge.  He  openly  proclaimed  that  the  1979 
purge  and  the  suppression  of  the  opposition  were 
acts  of  State  in  which  he  had  act,  as  the  supreme 
Judge  of  the  'Iraqi  People.  (39) 
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remaining  members  of  the  RCC  to  unquestioning 
subservience;  they  lacked  any  ability  to  come  to 
an  independent  decision.  The  Party  and  the  state 
simply  became  useful  executive  instruments  which 
carried  out  Saddam's  orders  and  protected  his 
power  base. 
He  tried  to  give  his  regime  a  patriotic  image  in 
the  eyes  of  the  Iraqi  people  by  linking  the 
alleged  plot  with  American  imperialism  and 
Zionism.  He  said: 
Comrades,  do  not  give  in  to  a  feeling  of 
defeat.  This  is  a  Revolution  which  aims  to 
destroy  the  base  of  imperialism,  to  shine  over 
the  whole  'Arab  world,  to  make  it  a  new  power 
on  the  world  scene,  to  involve  every  IArab  and 
change  his  life  radically,  to  make  him  a 
progressive  element  ....  cannot  such  a  Revolution 
stand  up  to  such  despicable  plotters?  The 
whole  people  is  with  you  now,  and  your 
organisation  has  over  one  million  members.  in 
this  case,  where  can  the  plotters  come  from? 
Can  they  arrange  a  military  invasion  to 
overthrow  the  Revolution?  This  is  impossible 
now,  and  they  will  not  achieve  their  goal.  Even 
America  cannot  carry  out  such  an  operation, 
except  by  hurling  an  atomic  bomb,  and  then  it 
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is  the  only  way,  then,  in  which  outsiders  can 
hurt  us:  to  find  traitors  in  the  Party  ranks 
who  occupy  sensitive  positions  and  to  extend 
material  assistance  to  them.  "(40) 
(g)  Saddam  managed  to  get  rid  of  the  plan  for  unity 
which  had  been  under  way  between  Iraq  and  Syria 
for  some  time  by  declaring  that  the  plot  was 
masterminded  by  Syria,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
Syria  declared  its  innocence  and  affirmed  that 
the  plot  was  not  in  Syria's  interests.  (41)  Saddam 
accused  the  plotters  of  betraying  the  principles 
of  the  Party  and  the  revolution  by  having  built 
up  secret  connections  with  the  rival  Syrian  Ba'th 
Party  to  pull  down  the  Party  from  power  in  Iraq. 
This  despite  the  fact  that  Saddam  himself 
depended  largely  throughout  his  period  in  the 
political  field,  before  and  after  he  reached 
power,  on  this  kind  of  connection  and  intrigue  to 
maintain  his  position  of  Power  in  the  Party,  then 
in  the  State,  and  very  probably  profited  from 
sectarian,  regional  and  tribal  loyalties  to 
strengthen  those  positions. 
(h)  As  far  as  Shi'ism  was  concerned,  Saddam  created 
internal  dissension  by  appointing  the  shiýite 
Na'Im  Hadd5d  head,  and  the  Shiýte  Hasan  ýAli  and 
Sa'd5n  Shdk7ir  as  members  of  the  special  court  to 
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Shi'ites  in  the  Baý  th  Party,  al-Mashhaddri-i  and 
al-Iýamddn7i.  By  this  move,  Saddam  isolated  Vadddd 
and  the  two  other  members;  they  lost  credit  among 
the  Shi'ite  community,  and  this  led  them  to 
increase  their  dependence  on  their  master  and 
become  a  tool  in  his  hand. 
He  gave  a  signal  to  everybody,  since  most  of  the 
executed  group  were  very  close  personal  friends 
of  his,  that  no  opposition  whatsoever  would  be 
tolerated  either  inside  or  outside  the  Party. 
He  regarded  the  uncovering  of  the  plot  as  one  of 
the  greatest  achievements  of  the  Baýth  Party 
under  his  leadership.  So  he  gave  extraordinary 
power  to  the  Baýth  Party,  meaning  extraordinary 
power  for  himself.  (42) 
Saddam,  was  thus  successful  in  organising  the  entire 
Baýth  Party  and  the  RCC  under  his  own  absolute  power.  The 
f  ear  he  created  caused  an  absolute  loss  of  identity  and 
collapse  of  self-confidence  for  the  Baýth  Party  and  the 
remaining  members  of  the  RCC,  who  now  competed  with  one 
another  to  show  Saddam,  their  loyalty,  in  order  to  avoid  his 
violent  purging.  Moreover,  Saddam  took  the  following 
measures  once  he  had  achieved  the  presidency,  in  order  to 
assume  more  power: 
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disguise  this  fact,  he  decreed  that  family  names  would 
be  abolished. 
(2)  He  replaced  eight  Ministers  with  close  confidants, 
like  Sa'dFan  Shlikir,  who  became  Minister  of  the 
Interior. 
He  created  the  post  of  First  Deputy  Premier,  given  to 
T5M  Ydsln  Ramaqjn. 
(4)  He  created  five  posts  of  Deputy  Minister,  which  were 
filled  by  'Adndn  Khayr  Alldh  (Minister  of  Defence  and 
Saddam's  cousin)  ,  Naýlm  Hadd5d,  Tdriq  'AzIz,  Sa'dfin 
Ghayddn  and  'Adndn  4Usayn  al-4amddn7l,  who  was  executed 
soon  after  his  promotion,  which  was  purely  for  show. 
(5)  He  appointed  several  Kurdish  figures,  who  held  pro- 
government  positions  to  senior  Party  roles,  in  order 
to  boost  the  position  of  his  regime  among  the  Kurdish 
people. 
(6)  He  excluded  the  army  from  politics.  This,  is  well 
illustrated  by  the  composition  of  the  RCC  which  after 
June  1982  included  no  member  from  the  ranks  of  the 
army,  while  in  1968  it  was  exclusively  composed  of  army 
officers. 
(7)  He  transferred  the  Ba"th  Party  into  an  instr=ent  for 
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Regional  Command  into  the  RCC.  The  regime  claimed  that 
this  step  was  designed  to  deepen  collective 
participation  and  democracy.  (43)  But  in  reality,  it 
was  part  of  Saddam's  long-term  strategy  of  containing 
anyone  posing  a  real  or  potential  threat,  if  he  could 
not  be  weakened  or  excluded.  This  gives  the  impression 
that  Saddam  and  his  relative  TikrTit!  governed  I  Iraq 
through  the  Ba'th  Party  rather  than  the  reverse. 
8-  He  created  new  social  groups,  who  found  their  fortunes 
were  increasingly  linked  with  him,  and  their  interests 
were  served  by  the  regime's  policies.  Indeed,  Saddam's 
domination  effectively  succeeded  through  his  ability 
to  collect  around  himself  an  inner  core  of  men  whose 
loyalty  was  just  to  him.  These  men  were  either  members 
of  his  family  or  from  his  close  friends  who  had  proved 
their  personal  loyalty  to  him  during  their  association 
with  him  since  the  clandestine  years.  These  people 
owed  their  position  to  their  official  rank  in  the 
State,  not  to  their  position  within  the  ideological 
vehicle  of  the  Ba'th  Party.  This  meant  that  they  did 
not  represent  any  principle  of  formal  authority.  They 
owed  their  high  positions  to  their  personal 
relationships  with  Saddam.  This  allowed  him  to  control 
their  activities  and  they  were  obliged  to  give  him 
their  full  loyalty,  because  they  were  his  creation. 
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were  reported,  such  as  those  of  MunIf  al-Razz5z  (ýAflaqls 
deputy),  Saddam's  old  friend,  'Abd  al-Karim  al-Shaykhl!  and 
Sa'd  'Abd  al-B541-  al-Haditbi,  a  retired  Ba'thist. 
I 
As  he  had  always  done,  since  he  and  al-Ba'th  had 
climbed  to  power  in  1968,  he  accompanied  this  massive 
campaign  of  terror  with  some  reform  measures,  allied  to  a 
huge  personality  cult  campaign,  designed  to  show  the  Iraqi 
people  his  good  will.  These  measures  will  be  discussed  in 
the  next  section. 
446 Saddam's  personality  cult  and  the  Mesopotamian 
heritace 
After  Saddam  assumed  full  responsibility  for  the  State 
and  the  Party  in  July  1979,  he  set  his  nation  on  a  new 
course,  motivated  by  both  fear  and  love.  He  realised  that 
fear  was  not  enough  to  safeguard  his  power  permanently;  he 
had  to  cancel  out  the  effects  of  the  ruthless  policy  with 
which  he  had  begun  his  presidency.  He  decided  to  make  the 
Iraqi  people  admire  him  and  love  him  and,  eventually, 
himself  to  become  Iraq.  (44)  His  speech,  on  the  seventeenth 
anniversary  of  the  revolution  of  February  1963  carried  this 
implication: 
11  western  journalists  say  that  Saddam  Husayn 
is  a  Tikriti.  I  say  to  them  with  pity:  Saddam 
Husayn  was  born  in  a  village  in  the  southern 
part  of  Tikrit  province,  Tikrit  province  is  a 
part  of  the  muhlifaza  of  Sal5h  al-Din,  and  he  is 
an  Iraqi.  Saddam  Husayn  was  born  in  the  muhAfaza 
of  qal54  al-Effn  but  he  is  not  only  a  son  of  the 
mu45fa:  ýa  of  qa154  al-Din,  because  he  is  a  son  of 
the  province  of  Arbil,  of  Sulaimaniya,  he  is  a 
son  of  Anb5r,  a  son  of  the  Tigris  and  Euphrates, 
a  son  of  Baradd,  and  Jordan,  and  of  the  Nile,  of 
Damascus  and  Amman,  Cairo  and  Casablanca,  a  son 
of  every  Iraqi  city  and  a  son  of  the  Iraqi 
People,  of  the  Iraqi  soil  and  of  the  Iraqi  air 
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He  achieved  this  aim  by  the  following  measures,  on 
which  he  spent  considerable  funds  from  the  massive  oil 
revenues,  which  had  increased  many  times  since  1968.  (45) 
Iraqi  oil  revenues  in  1980  reached  $21.3  billion,  and 
foreign  reserves  amounted  to  $35  billion.  These  unlimited 
funds  became  available  to  Saddam  to  expand  and  strengthen 
his  organs  of  repression,  and  at  the  Same  time  to  seek 
popularity  by  the  following  steps: 
He  established  an  absolute  monopoly  of  the  media.  He 
had  realised  the  importance  of  the  media  from  the  time 
that  he  shared  power  with  al-Bakr.  When  he  became 
President,  the  Iraqi  nation  had  already  become 
habituated  to  the  effect  of  his  media,  which  expanded 
into  a  gigantic  structure  once  he  took  total  control 
of  it.  The  propaganda  machine,  -radio,  television, 
newspapers,  the  State  news  agency,  advertising  and 
press  distribution-  made  for  the  greater  glory  of 
Saddam,  helped  him  to  consolidate  his  power  base  and 
provided  him,  together  with  his  agencies  of  terror, 
with  greater  internal  stability  than  at  any  other  time 
in  the  history  of  modern  Iraq.  He  has  continued  to 
make  the  Iraqis  happily  accept  any  humiliating 
concession  that  he  has  made.  Indeed,  his  ability  has 
gone  beyond  any  that  previous  dictators  have  shown, 
either  in  ancient  nor  in  modern  history. 
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analysts  have  rationalised  in  terms  of  a  personality 
cult,  portrayed  Saddam  as  the  stern  paternalistic 
guardian  of  the  Iraqi  nation,  the  Leader  of  pan- 
Arabism,  the  Guardian  of  the  Eastern  Gate  of  the  Arab 
world-  the  Arab  empire  which  he  wishes  to  lead  -  and 
the  creator  of  the  Baýth  Party,  a  role  which  he 
assumed  on  his  accession  to  power  in  1968.  (46) 
His  life  story,  filmed  and  presented  on  Iraqi 
Television,  tells  of  his  bravery  and  struggle  during 
his  underground  activities.  His  appearance  on 
television  every  day  for  several  hours  portrays  him  in 
different  aspects,  in  uniform,  in  Kurdish  dress,  in 
designer  sunglasses,  opening  new  buildings,  fondling 
babies,  visiting  nurseries,  schools,  factories  and 
families,  sharing  food  with  people  as  a  family  man, 
praying  in  the  mosque,  reading  the  Qurlan,  meeting 
faithful  Shiýite  religious  figures,  giving  lectures  to 
undergraduate  students  as  a  university  teacher,  giving 
lectures  on  architecture  as  an  architect  and  giving 
lectures  on  economics  as  an  economist.  His  inventor, 
the  media,  simply  presents  him  as  one  who  is  not  to  be 
underestimated  in  any  field  of  life.  He  is  the 
consummate  politician,  the  skilful  negotiator,  the 
publicist  and  the  successful  administrator.  He  is  the 
"Genius".  (47) 
The  media  put  a  huge  fence  between  him,  and  the 
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dissatisfaction  with,  his  Command  or  his  Policy  on  the 
part  of  an  individual  is  taken  as  high  treason  against 
the  Homeland,  the  Revolution  and  the  Iraqi  People. 
His  image  has  sprung  up  everywhere.  Numerous 
statues  have  been  erected  to  him  up  and  down  the 
country;  immense  posters  of  him  have  covered  the  walls 
in  Baghdad  and  all  other  Iraqi  cities,  showing  him  in 
his  various  preferred  images.  A  government  department, 
the  Special  Projects  Implementation  Authority,  has 
been  created  merely  to  oversee  his  posters  and  murals 
and  has  had  large  funds  put  at  its  disposal. 
(2)  He  has  made  an  effort  to  travel  regularly  around  the 
country  visiting  urban  and  rural  population  centres, 
military  camps,  Party  branches,  Shi'ite  and  Kurdish 
community  areas,  seeking  support;  this  has  eventually 
developed  into  invitations  to  visiting  Heads  of  State 
to  accompany  him  on  his  tours.  In  addition,  he  has 
singled  out  in  his  visits  working-class  people  and 
children  for  the  following  purposes: 
(a)  To  give  him  the  opportunity  to  test  the  mood  of 
the  Iraqi  people  and  to  see  how  they  think,  in 
order  to  take  the  appropriate  measures  to  deal 
with  them. 
(b)  To  remind  people  on  his  widely  reported  -on 
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Baghdad  and  around  the  country,  of  the  many 
favours  he  has  bestowed  on  them  and  of  the  poor 
quality  of  life  that  they  would  have,  but  for 
him.  He  also  appears,  criticising  and  humiliating 
other  social  groups,  in  particular  the  educated, 
reproaching  them  for  their  lack  of  responsibility 
and  their  failure  in  their  duty. 
(c)  To  continue  to  dupe  ordinary  gullible  working 
class  people  and  children  into  believeing  that  he 
is  their  benefactor.  This  policy  has  produced  a 
subservent  people  who  follow  the  lines  that 
Saddam  has  laid  down  for  them.  They  had  submitted 
to  his  orders  to  the  extent  that  a  large  number 
of  Iraqi  men  have  began  to  imitate  him  in  the  way 
he  walks,  dresses,  talks  and  styles  his 
moustache.  (48) 
His  frequent  visits  to  schools  and  nurseries,  which 
have  been  copied  also  by  his  Cabinet  and  Members  of  the 
Party,  are  based  on  his  belief  that  the  younger  generation, 
having  longer  to  live,  can  be  more  valuable  to  the  Ba'th 
and  to  the  Revolution,  if  they  are  organised  early 
according  to  Ba'thist  principles.  (49)  In  accordance  with 
this  policy,  children  are  organised  from  the  primary 
school  in  the  Ruwwad  (Pioneers).  Those  between  the  ages  of 
ten  and  fifteen  are  the  Taldliý  (Vanguards).  Between 
fifteen  and  twenty  they  belong  to  the  youth  organisation 
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thought  in  these  organisations,  which  are  grouped  under  the 
so-called  "General  Federation  of  Youth".  These 
organisations  belong  to  the  State;  the  Party  has  its  own 
youth  front  organisation  called  Ansdr  (Partisans),  who  are 
instructed  in  Party  ways  by  high-ranking  Party  Members  and 
are  asked  as  well  to  write  reports  and  provide 
information.  (50)  This  policy  has  caused  a  loss  of  identity 
for  the  Iraqi  people;  along  with  this  has  been  eroded 
national  sovereignty  and  individual  freedom.  Stalin  and 
Hitler  employed  the  same  policy  to  take  over  the  system  of 
education  by  reorganisation  of  the  school  system  and 
teacher  training  and  reworking  of  text  books  in  line  with 
the  Nazi  and  the  Communist  ideologyies. 
During  his  visiting,  his  speeches  focus  on  one  issue, 
his  own  glorification. 
(3)  A  weekly  meeting  in  the  Presidential  Palace  is 
arranged  with  the  citizens,  so  that  Saddam.  may  see  and 
hear  for  himself  what  the  people's  problems  are,  and 
discuss  their  needs  -  or  so  his  media  claim. 
(4)  He  has  imposed  his  name  as  follows: 
(a)  Baghdad  International  Airport  has  become  Saddam, 
International  Airport. 
(b)  Revolution  City,  the  working-class  Shi'ite  suburb 
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(c)  The  Military  Institution  for  the  building  of 
factories  has  become  Saddam's  Military 
Institution  for  the  building  of  factories.  (51) 
(d)  The  Established  College  of  Medicine  in  Baghdad 
has  been  renamed  Saddam's  College  of  Medicine;  it 
accepted  its  first  students  on  17  August  1987. 
(e)  The  Established  College  of  Law  in  Baghdad  has 
been  renamed  Saddam's  College  of  Law;  it  accepted 
its  first  students  on  24  August  1987; 
The  Seventh  Marbad  Poetry  Festival  has  introduced 
Saddam's  Medal  for  Literature,  value  $30,000,  to 
encourage  authors  and  poets  to  praise  and  glorify 
him. 
(5)  Each  year  his  birthday  is  celebrated  on  28th  April, 
which  is  regarded  as  a  National  Day;  he  is  the  first 
Iraqi  leader  officially  to  celebrate  his  birthday. 
(6)  Iraqi  Television  and  Baghdad  Radio  have  produced  about 
three  hundred  songs  glorifying  Saddam's  personality. 
He  has  also  announced  various  liberalising  measures 
(a)  He  established  the  National  Assembly  in  March 
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to  be  elected  from  both  sexes.  Na'Im  Iýadddd  was 
made  the  Speaker  of  the  Assembly.  From  the  long 
list  of  requirements  for  candidates,  it  was  clear 
that  the  election  of  non-Ba'thists  was 
impossible;  (52)  the  results  of  the  election, 
which  took  place  on  20  June  1980,  indicated  that 
all  the  votes  were  for  the  Ba'thist  candidates. 
other  political  representatives  in  the  Assembly 
were  defined  by  the  Baý  th  Party  as  subordinate 
only.  This  Assembly  was  another  creation  employed 
by  Saddam  to  impart  a  semblance  of  democracy  to 
his  personal  rule  and  to  improve  his  hold  on  the 
levers  of  power.  Under  its  aegis,  Saddam.  was 
enabled  to  pension  off  and  replace  any 
disagreeable  political  elements  and  to  declare  or 
abrogate  any  of  his  tactical  decisions.  Moreover, 
it  is  part  of  the  framework  of  Saddam's 
personality  cult,  another  aspect  of  which  is 
described  in  the  account  of  a  foreign  journalist: 
-....  here  in  Najaf,  a  city  near  the  banks  of 
the  Euphrates,  sacred  to  Shi'ite  muslims,  the 
Governor,  Mizb5n,  greeted  visitors  in  an  office 
equipped  with  eight  telephones  and  six 
portraits  of  President  Husayn.  Telling  them 
that  he  expected  a  large  turnout  to  give  thanks 
to  the  leadership  of  the  Party  and  Revolution' 
he  said:  "They  will  show  that  they  like  and 
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of  the  'Arab  Nation  and  the  Arab 
Homelandl".  (53) 
(b)  A  general  amnesty  was  declared  for  all  political 
prisoners  in  Iraq,  except  for  those  who  had  taken 
part  in  plots  against  the  regime. 
(c)  A  call  was  made  to  the  Iraqi  Communist  Party 
abroad  to  enter  into  a  dialogue  with  the  National 
Progressive  Front,  claiming  that  the  Ba'th  had 
not  taken  a  decision  to  expel  the  Communist 
Party. 
(d)  Increases  were  announced  for  a  wide  range  of  wage 
earners,  and  a  large  pay  rise  was  given  to  all 
members  of  the  armed  forces. 
(e)  In  order  to  boost  Kurdish  confidence,  the  RCC 
issued  a  decree  on  24  December  1979  providing 
special  incentives  for  Kurds  wishing  to  return  to 
Iraq.  Any  Kurd  who  wanted  to  return  was  allowed 
to  bring  in  a  car  without  paying  tax  or  duty  and 
to  bring  furniture  up  to  the  value  of  E5,000 
without  paying  duty. 
Briefly,  Saddam  largely  succeeded  in  taking  the  Iraqi 
Nation  in  by  these  measures,  which  were  accompanied  by  the 
Balthisation  campaign,  designed  to  make  every  Iraqi  citizen 
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the  Baýthisation  of  the  State  organs,  the  social 
organisation,  the  education  system,  the  armed  forces  and 
the  cultural  life  of  the  whole  country.  A  campaign  of 
terror  was  launched  to  force  people,  especially  civil 
servants,  to  join  the  Baýth  Party.  Non-Baýthists  were 
banned  from  employment  in  good  posts,  and  they  were  denied 
scholarships  to  study  abroad.  They  were  also  denied 
admission  in  particular  to  the  Military  College,  Teacher 
Training  Colleges,  and  the  Ministries  of  Culture, 
Information  and  Foreign  Affairs.  Thousands  of  officials 
were  dismissed  from  these  offices  and  replaced  by 
unqualified  Ba'thists,  especially  in  the  teaching  field, 
causing  a  severe  decline  in  the  standards  of  education.  The 
outcome  of  this  policy  was  that  the  Iraqi  people  either 
submitted  to  Saddam's  orders  or  faced  arrest,  torture  and 
disappearance-(54) 
In  addition  to  all  these  measures  on  the  domestic 
level,  he  went  further.  He  placed  thousands  of  journalists 
all  over  the  Arab  world  and  even  took  some  foreign 
journalists  on  his  payroll  in  order  to  build  up  his  image 
outside  Iraq.  He  structured  his  media  to  emphasise  Iraqism, 
in  particular  during  the  period  before  he  began  the  war 
with  Iran,  attempting  to  make  Iraq,  under  his  leadership, 
the  dominant  power  in  the  Gulf  region  and  the  Arab  world, 
and  to  make  himself,  rather  than  the  other  Arab  leaders, 
the  principal  focus  of  attention.  He  expressed  this  motive 
clearly  in  a  hyperbolic  speech  in  a  southern  Shi'ite  city, 
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President: 
The  glory  of  the  Arabs  stems  from  the  glory 
of  Iraq  ....  throughout  history,  whenever  Iraq 
became  mighty  and  flourished,  so  did  the  Arab 
nation.  This  is  why  we  are  striving  to  make  Iraq 
mighty,  formidable,  able  to  develop,  and  we 
shall  spare  nothing  to  improve  welfare  and  to 
brighten  the  glory  of  Iraq.  "(55) 
Under  his  cultural  campaign,  his  claim  to  make  Iraq  a 
"shining  light",  which  had  been  noted  earlier  in  the  1970s, 
gained  more  attention  after  he  took  full  responsibility  in 
Iraq.  (56) 
Saddam  restored  and  preserved  historic  sites  and 
Arabised  the  various  Mesopotamian  periods  to  suit  his  own 
purposes.  He  claimed  to  have  retrieved  the  heritage  stolen 
during  the  Ottoman  and  British  occupations  of  Iraq.  Iraq's 
stolen  heritage  includes  Ashurbanipal's  library,  which  was 
taken  at  the  end  of  the  last  century  to  the  British  Museum; 
ýAshtdrls  door  from  King  Nebuchadnezzar's  Palace  in 
Babylon,  which  is  in  Berlin.  Iraq  has  only  a  copy  of  the 
original;  the  Law  code  of  4ammfirdbi  engraved  on  stone, 
which  is  in  the  Louvre,  and  many  other  valuable  pieces 
which  are  scattered  around  the  museums  of  the  world.  (57) 
Saddam  presented  a  new  ideology,  based  on  his 
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golden  eras  of  Iraq's  history,  from  the  time  of  the 
Sumerians,  Chaldeans,  Babylonians  and  Assyrians.  The 
ancient  rulers  of  Iraq  recorded  their  battles  and  carved 
their  images  on  huge  stones,  to  immortalise  themself  and 
their  power.  Saddam's  personality  cult  served  the  same 
purpose.  Saddam  used  as  well  the  glories  of  the  'Abassid 
Empire  in  the  eighth  century  AD,  which  reached  the  highest 
point  of  Iraqi  political  and  cultural  development,  ruling 
the  area  from  present-day  Afghanistan  to  North  Africa.  He 
desired  to  revive  the  dream  of  a  Muslim  Arab  empire  ruled 
by  a  strong  man  from  Baghdad,  as  it  had  been  in  the  past. 
His  autobiographical  fragment  below  clearly  expresses  this 
motive: 
Abu  Ja'far  was  the  architect  of  the 
Abbasid  State  and  he  was  succeeded  by  thirty- 
five  caliphs.  Abfi  Uday  is  the  architect  of  the 
Ba'thist  state  and  he  has  travelled  a  long  way 
along  this  road.  History  is  repeating  itself  in 
Iraq.  -(58) 
Thus  in  his  attempt  to  be  an  Arab  leader,  he  started  to 
represent  himself  as  a  successor  of  the  ancient  Iraqi 
rulers,  like  1ýammfirdbi,  Nebuchadnezzar  and  Harfin  al-Rashd. 
He  used  this  policy  as  a  means  to  mobilise  the  Iraqi  masses 
as  well  as  the  other  Arabs.  At  the  same  time,  he  explioted 
the  Palestine  question  as  another  means  to  mobilise  the 
nation;  Arab  leadership  always  implies  a  certain 
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Saddam's  associates  have  participated  in  this 
intensive  campaign  as  well.  In  an  article  in  al-jumhuriyyah 
newspaper  on  4  April  1980,  Tdriq  1ýamad  al-'Abdallah,  a  RCC 
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member  and  Director  of  the  President's  Office,  writes: 
Our  Leader  and  the  Justice  of  'Umar,  the 
Principles  of  'Ali  and  the  Courage  of 
Khfilid".  (59) 
Saddam's  propaganda  went  further  than  this  in  an 
attempt  to  introduce  him  to  a  foreign  audience.  An  official 
statement  by  the  Iraqi  Government,  which  was  published  in 
the  London  Times,  reads: 
A%  and  the  question  is  now  pertinently  asked, 
with  a  leader  like  this  man,  the  wealth  of  oil 
resources  and  a  forceful  people  like  the  Iraqis, 
will  she  repeat  her  former  glories  and  the  name 
of  Saddam  Husayn  (sic)  link  up  with  that  of 
Hammfirfibl,  Ashurbanipal,  al-Mansfir  and  Harfin  al- 
Rashid?  To  be  sure,  they  have  not  really  achieved 
half  of  what  he  has  already  done  at  the  helm  of 
the  Ba'th  Arab  Socialist  Party  and  he  is  still 
only  forty-three.  "  (60) 
Saddam  wished  to  create  from  the  Iraqi  man,  who 
developed  from  the  great,  ancient  Iraqi  man,  a  new  man 
459 called  the  Ba'thist  man,  al-Insan  al-Ba'thi,  of  whom  he 
himself  was  to  be  the  shining  example.  (61)  He  stressed  the 
importance  of  Arab  unification  and  the  part  to  be  played  in 
this  by  the  Bath  Party,  under  his  leadership. 
These  grandiose  statements,  emphasising  the  rule  of 
the  great  leader  who  was  to  revive  this  great  historical 
nation  as  a  mighty  power  in  this  sensitive  part  of  the 
world  were  part  of  the  preparations  for  the  next  stage  of 
Saddam's  campaign,  the  Iraq-Iran  war. 
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From  the  Algiers  Agreement  untill  Saddam's  take-over 
power  of  in  July  1979,  his  policy  was  to  strengthen  his  own 
internal  and  regional  position  economically  as  well  as 
politically,  as  noted  above.  As  his  hold  on  power 
heightened,  his  influence  in  the  region  increased.  After  he 
became  president,  he  increasingly  adopted  the  stance  of 
champion  of  Iraq's  rights  and  sovereignty,  as  well  as  of 
the  rights  and  sovereignty  of  the  Arab  Nation. 
In  order  to  conceal  his  visible  shift  of  policy  at 
this  time  towards  the  western  camp  and  the  pro-western  Arab 
states,  he  tried  to  show  a  policy  independent  of  both  super 
Powers.  He  claimed'  he  would  free  the  Arab  World  from 
dependence  on  the  two  blocs.  Therefore,  he  criticised  the 
close  military  co-operation  of  Oman  with  the  United  States. 
This  new  tactic  appears  very  obvious  through  Saddam's 
effort  to  hold  the  non-aligned  summit,  which  was  due  to 
take  place  in  Baghdad  in  late  1982.  Saddam's  view  of  the 
possibilities  of  a  leading  role  in  Arab  politices  became 
very  clear  from  the  Pan-Arab  Declaration,  which  was 
published  on  8  February  1980.  According  to  some  of  these 
declarations: 
Rejection  of  the  presence  of  all  foreign  armies, 
military  forces  and  bases  on  Arab  soil,  or  extension 
of  facilities  to  such  forces  in  any  shape  or  form. 
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against  any  other  Arab  state.  Conflicts  between  Arab 
states  were  to  be  settled  by  peaceful  means. 
(3)  Arab  states  would  co-operate  in  order  to  repel  any 
attack  or  any  aggression  carried  out  by  a  foreign 
party  against  the  regional  sovereignty  of  any  Arab 
country. 
The  richer  states  should  render  economic  aid  to  the 
poorer  ones.  (62) 
Saddam  attempted  to  gain  regional  influence,  by 
initiating  regional  alliances  that  pretended  to  serve  the 
Arab  cause,  especially  with  the  conservative  countries, 
which  all  feared  the  danger  of  the  Islamic  revolution  of 
Khomeini,  since  he  regarded  himself  the  defender  of  the 
Arabs  against  the  Persian  peril,  according  to  pan-Arab 
principles  and  aims  of  the  Bath  Party  which  was  to  bear 
the  heaviest  burdens  in  protecting  the  Arabs  against 
dangers  and  encroachment.  (63) 
on  the  Palestinian  question,  Saddam's  shift  was  most 
noticeable.  He  ended  his  support  for  the  extreme  faction  of 
the  Abu  Niýdl  group,  and  restored  his  relation  with  'Arafdt. 
He  reversed  his  support  for  the  pro-Soviet  regime  in  South 
Yemen. 
In  several  speeches,  Saddam  stressed  the  significatce 
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leadership  in  this  question.  In  his  view,  the  united  Arabs, 
particularly  on  account  of  their  oil  reserves  which  were 
vital  to  the  western  industrial  nations,  might  play  as 
important  a  role  as  the  United  States,  Europe,  the  Soviet 
Union  and  Japan.  He  said: 
11  ...  we  are  called  to  influence  the  course  of 
Arab  Policies  effectively,  in  accordance  with 
our  conception.  it  will  be  extremely  important 
and  valuable  for  the  future,  if  the  Arabs  show 
their  ability  to  unite  at  least  at  a  minimum 
level  in  politics  and  attitudes  and  thereby 
influence  the  process  of  international 
politics".  (64) 
This  kind  of  policy  is  also  illustrated  by  the  effort 
which  Saddam  made  to  manoeuvre  himself  into  a  position  to 
act  as  the  policeman  of  the  region,  following  the 
overthrow  of  the  Shah  of  Iran,  and  the  establishment  of  the 
Islamic  Republic.  This  policy  was  encouraged  by  the  Western 
powers,  in  particular  the  United  States,  because  it  suited 
their  interests  in  the  region.  In  brief,  Saddam  was  able  to 
swing  the  regional  balance,  as  well  as  the  internal,  in  his 
favour,  and  he  demonstrated  his  ability  to  unify  an  Arab 
Front  to  face  the  Iranian  challenge.  This  will  be  the 
subject  of  the  next  chapter. 
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In  the  light  of  the  record  of  the  Ba'th  in  power,  we 
may  make  the  following  observations  about  its  practices  and 
authority: 
The  absence  of  any  clear  political  line  for  the  Ba'th 
leaders,  because  they  had  no  true  faith  or  doctrine. 
Ideological  purity  was  not  their  chief  object.  It  was 
just  a  slogan  to  achieve  their  ends. 
(2)  The  prevention  of  any  division  within  the  ranks  of  the 
Party,  as  their  experience  had  shown  that  their  loss 
of  power  in  November  1963  had  occurred  because  the 
Party  had  split  into  two  wings. 
(3)  The  destruction  of  Iraqi  civil  society  in  all  its 
aspects,  so  as  to  prevent  the  emergence  or  the 
continuation  of  any  centres  of  alternative  power.  Thus 
the  Baýth  regime  had  to  destroy  the  market,  then  the 
education  system,  and  then  the  health  services,  and 
replace  all  these  with  their  own  creations;  a  state- 
run  economy  on  the  Soviet  model,  a  Bathist 
educational  system,  including  such  things  as  the 
Arabisation  of  medical,  engineering  and  science, 
subjects  at  university,  which  meant  using  Egyptian 
textbooks  instead  of  the  British  and  American  ones 
that  previous  Iraqi  students  were  used  to  and, 
finally,  the  syphoning  off  of  the  best  medical  skills 
464 and  equipment  into  elitist  hospitals  that  only  cared 
for  the  Ba'th  leadership  and  their  non-Iraqi  friends, 
excluding  ordinary  Iraqis.  The  Baýth  regime  of  1968 
was  highly  inferior  intellectually  to  that  of  1963, 
because  it  was  made  up  of  the  dredgs  of  Iraqi  society 
from  Tikr1t,  Ddr,  'Anah  and  Sdmmard'.  The  Iraqi 
communists,  as  expected,  went  along  with  this 
Sovietisation  of  Iraq,  particularly  following  the  1972 
signing  of  the  Iraqi-Soviet  treaty.  This  enabled  the 
Ba'th  regime  to  enjoy: 
(a)  The  relative  political  stability  and  durability 
of  the  regime,  which  allowed  them  further  to 
tighten  their  grip  on  Iraq. 
(b)  The  establishment  of  a  front  with  the  Iraqi 
Communist  Party,  named  the  (Nationalist  and  Pan- 
Arabist  Progressive  Front)  'progressive,  being  a 
communist  catch-word  and  not  necessarily  used 
literally.  By  this  dubious  procedure  the 
Baýthist  regime,  as  did  the  communist  regimes 
that  it  emulated,  painted  a  false  picture  of 
pluralism,  while  the  truth  was  that  the  Ba'th 
regime  was,  in  all  its  aspects,  in  the  hands  of 
one  man.  The  Iraqi  Communist  Party,  being  totally 
subservent  to  the  Soviet  Union,  was  ordered  by 
its  masters  to  support  the  Baýth  regime,  with  all 
the  terrible  consequences  that  this  support 
inflicted  on  the  people  of  Iraq. 
465 (c)  The  subjugation  of  all  other  ideologies, 
including  Marxism,  to  the  service  of  the  regime. 
(4)  The  grouping  of  all  essential  elements  of  the  regime 
in  one  coherent  structure,  impervious  to  social  and 
political  change  outside  that  structure,  and  making 
all  social  and  political  changes  flow  from  that 
structure  itself.  This  explains  why  the  regime  has 
survived  for  such  a  long  period,  despite  two  wars. 
(5)  The  Bathisation  of  the  Iraqi  armed  forces.  The 
Ba'thist  leaders,  particularly  Saddam,  saw  the  supreme 
necessity  of  concentrating  all  their  efforts  towards 
the  implementation  of  the  "Ba"thist  theory  of  Action" 
in  the  armed  forces.  This  meant  the  replacement  of 
non-Ba'thist  officers  by  Baýthists,  even  if  they  were 
of  lower  rank  and  lower  calibre.  Thousands  of  non- 
Baýthist  officers  were  pensioned  off,  while  new 
recruitment  to  military  colleges  was  strictly  limited 
to  Ba**thist  teenagers.  Thus  the  Iraqi  armed  forces 
became  a  tool  for  suppressing  the  people. 
(6)  The  militarisation  of  Iraqi  society:  This  was 
implemented  through  the  institutionalisation  of 
military  codes  in  civil  society.  Thus,  severe 
discipline,  compulsion,  and  group  ideology  became  the 
order  of  the  day  in  Iraq.  This  was  justified  by  the 
Ba"  thists  on  the  grounds  that  Iraqi  society  was 
466 fragmented,  ignorant,  undisciplined  and,  even, 
anarchic,  and  that  only  militarisation  could  transform 
Iraq  from  a  backward  state  to  a  modern  one.  In  fact 
this  particular  Ba'thist  policy  was  similar  to  the 
Stalinist  policy  of  the  1930s  in  the  Soviet  Union. 
Just  as  Stalinism,  in  its  cultural,  political  and 
economic  arrangements,  failed  to  deliver  its  promises, 
but  created  tens  of  millions  of  victims  instead. 
Ba'thism  had  a  similar  result,  but  smaller  in  scale. 
(7)  The  destruction  of  those  non-Ba'thist  Iraqis  who  were 
accomplished,  educated  and  intellectual,  so  as  to 
prevent  society  from  stumbling  on  any  alternative  to 
Ba'thism.  The  Ba'th  regime  was  particularly  zealous  in 
destroying  the  middle  classes  in  Iraq. 
(8)  The  centralisation  of  power  around  the  presidency, 
personified  by  the  president  himself:  The  president 
was  awarded  a  standing  identical  to  that  given  to  the 
leader  in  Fascism,  as  he  became  above  suspicion. 
Everyone  had  to  approve  of  his  decisions,  which  had  to 
be  carried  out  without  objection,  however  ill-advised. 
During  the  1970s,  al-Bakr  was  the  president,  but 
Saddam  was  actually  more  powerful,  controlling  all 
security,  the  armed  forces  and  the  state  apparatus. 
Saddam  was,  then,  like  Stalin,  preparing  the  ground  to 
seize  power  when  the  time  was  right.  When  Saddam 
seized  power,  this  centralisation  served  him  well,  as 
he  was  immediately  elevated  to  the  status  of  an 
467 infallible  holy  leader.  Consequently,  decrees  were 
issued  by  Saddam,  imposing  the  death  penalty  on  any 
Iraqi  who  even  doubted  his  abilities,  let  alone 
criticised  him. 
(9)  The  ending  of  the  previous  duality  of  power 
llzdiwdjiyyat  al-qulýah  between  the  Party  and  the 
army,  and  replacement  with  the  singularity  of  state 
security,  which  would  prove  far  more  repressive.  The 
reasons  for  this  transfer  from  duality  to  singularity 
were: 
(a)  To  avoid  the  danger  that  the  army,  even  though  it 
was  Ba'thist,  might  still  strike  at  the  civilian 
Ba'thists,  as  happened  in  November  1963,  and  then 
in  Syria  in  February  1966.  The  regime  had  to  be 
in  trusted  to  a  security  apparatus  that  would 
turn  the  army  into  a  subservient  tool  in  the 
hands  of  Saddam. 
(b)  To  create  military  and  party  discipline  which 
ended  the  previous  struggle  for  power.  This 
allowed  the  regime  to  enjoy  a  period  of  political 
stability. 
(c)  To  end  all  the  f  euds  within  the  party  that  had 
led  to  the  Ba'th  losing  power  in  November  1963  in 
Iraq,  and  the  ýAflaq  wing  losing  power  to  the 
Alawite  wing  in  Syria  in  1966,  and  to  al-Asad 
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convinced  Saddam  that  neither  the  Party  nor  the 
Army  could  safeguard  the  continuation  of  his 
regime,  but  only  a  central  repressive  and 
authoritarian  security  apparatus.  He  was  helped 
in  this  by  foreign  experts  from  the  Soviet  Union 
and  the  former  East  Germany,  who  were  adroit  in 
the  Stalinist  method  of  rule  by  terror.  During 
1963,  the  first  period  of  Ba'thist  rule,  it  was 
al-Ha.  ras  al-QawmT  who  were  the  Party's 
repressive  apparatus.  In  1968,  it  changed  to  a 
security  apparatus,  to  which  both  the  party  and 
the  military  apparatus  had  to  answer.  Saddam 
headed  the  security  apparatus,  which  had  been 
designed  and  built  by  him  with  substantial  and 
crucial  help  from  the  Soviet  Union  and  East 
Germany.  This  was  the  real  authority  in  the 
country,  while  the  Party  and  the  army  were  mere 
tools  in  its  extremely  repressive  hands.  The 
other  establishments  of  the  state,  the  various 
ministries  and  utilities,  each  played  their  roles 
in  the  overall  security  plan.  The  ministries  and 
public  utilities  began  to  work  like  secret  police 
organisations,  even  though,  they  were  part  of 
society,  rather  than  the  state.  The  various 
unions  and  professional  associations  were  all 
Baýthistised  and  then  given  their  respective 
roles  in  the  regime's  security  plan.  The  Baýth 
regime,  in  fact,  destroyed  the  Iraqi  state  and 
469 society  that  it  had  inherited  from  the  previous 
regime,  exactly  as  happened  in  Soviet  Russia  and 
Nazi  Germany.  Saddam  in  a  Party  meeting  confirmed 
that: 
vt  00. 
*we  want  you,  dear  comrades,  to  follow 
Party  principle  at  every  turn  when  you  are  in 
authority,  and  to  apply  them  in  your  everyday 
work  so  that  these  may  be  the  principles  of  a 
progressive  and  developed  nation.  There  is  a 
difference  in  substance  between  State  and  the 
political  structure  and  the  organisation, 
although  the  State  is  the  Party's  State.  If  the 
difference  between  ...  State  authority  and 
Party  authority  disappears  then  the  Party  will 
become  the  State's  Party,  instead  of  the  State 
being  the  Party's  State,  and  our  role'  as 
revolutionaries  bringing  progressive  change 
will  be  over.  This  role  will  become  so  weak 
that  the  Party  will  become  one  of  the 
traditional  institutions  of  the  State  and  the 
State  will  no  longer  be  guided  and  activated  by 
a  Party  conscience  and  intellect.,,  (65) 
This  is  a  Hitlerian  concept,  the  unity  of  the 
party  and  the  state:  the  party  now  becomes  the  state. 
In  Russa,  the  meaning  of  a  one-party  state  was  clear 
enough.  The  party  decided  policy  and  issued  orders  to 
the  state.  (66) 
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those  concerned  about  the  true  nature  of  the  Baýth 
regime.  The  regime  does  not  represent  Party  authority, 
army  authority,  civilian  executive  authority,  or  a 
conglomeration  of  all  of  these:  it  is,  rather,  the 
authority  of  an  all-embracing  security  apparatus, 
consisting  of  al-Mukhabarat  (General  Intelligence), 
al-  Amn  al-Khds  (special  security),  al-istikhbarat  al- 
ýAskariyyah  (Military  Intelligence),  Amn  al-Ht-zb 
(party  security)  and  al-Amn  al-'Amm  (General 
Security).  Thus  the  security  apparatus  is  not  merely  a 
political,  but  also  an  economic,  social,  and  cultural 
apparatus  headed  by  none  other  than  Saddam. 
Saddam  built  up  this  all-embracing  body  from 
elements  that  were  carefully  selected  and  taught  to 
recognise  no  loyalty  other  than  loyalty  to  him 
himself.  But  even  these  selected  elements  are  not 
taken  into  Saddam's  confidence.  He  works  on  the 
principle  that  each  one  who  works  with  him  should  know 
no  more  than  is  required  to  carry  out  orders. 
Gellner  describes  the  relation  between  Saddam  and 
the  members  of  the  above  structure  as  like  the 
relation  between  "patron  and  client",  (67)  because 
these  members  gain  their  actual  authority  from  him 
only.  He  supplies  them  with  his  protection  and  high 
standard  of  life,  in  exchange  for  their  loyalty.  But 
471 they  can  lose  their  position  and  even  their  lives  if 
they  lack  in  loyalty  to  him.  The  elimination  of  Husayn 
I 
and  Saddam  K5mil  (Saddam's  sons  in  law)  is  the  obvious 
example.  At  the  same  time,  he  depends  on  their  service 
to  protect  his  position;  any  lack  of  obedience  will 
threaten  the  regime.  By  this  kind  of  system,  Saddam 
has  continued  to  remain  in  power. 
Thus,  it  is  true  to  say  that  the  Baýth  regime 
rests  on  the  basis  of  an  organisational  apparatus, 
rather  than  on  a  social  base.  In  fact,  the  base  of  the 
regime  can  be  considered  an  alternative  society  to 
civil  Iraqi  society,  which  Saddam's  regime  smashed. 
The  elements  that  Saddam  recruited  to  his  all- 
embracing  security  apparatus  have  to  begin  a  new  life, 
rather  than  continue  their  previous  life,  i.  e.  a  new 
history  charted  for  them  by  Saddam,  for  he  and  he 
alone  will  decide  whether  these  elements  in  his 
service  will  live  or  die.  Thus  Saddam  established  a 
new  class  in  Iraq,  i.  e.  the  class  of  authority,  which 
is  primarily  security,  that  he  superimposed  on  top  of 
the  Iraqi  society  that  he  inherited  from  the  previous 
regime. 
He  recruited  his  security  apparatus  mainly  from 
those  with  a  poor,  under-privileged  background,  who 
were  also  uneducated  and,  in  most  cases,  thugs, 
criminals  and  psychopaths.  However,  this  was  seen  by 
some  outsiders  as  an  indication  of  the  regime's 
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under-privileged  and  poor  to  build  a  modern,  secular 
state.  of  course  the  reality  of  the  situation  was  the 
reverse  as  Saddam  is  highly  sectarian  and  he  only 
relies  on  his  relations  from  Tikrit  and  the  nearby 
villages,  such  as  al-DUr.  It  also  so  happened  that 
Saddam's  relatives  were,  in  the  main,  the  scum  of 
Iraqi  society.  They  came  to  form,  as  the  years  and 
decades  went  by,  a  class  in  their  own  right. 
(11)  The  fabrication  of  an  ideological  raison  dletre  for 
the  regime  that  had  a  certain  popular  appeal,  while, 
at  the  same  time,  serving  as  a  justification  for  the 
terror  and  repression  that  the  regime  intended  to  rely 
on  as  the  real  tools  of  maintaining  its  grip  on  power. 
Thus  the  regime  fabricated  a  short-list  of  ideological 
catch-phrases  that  are  available  in  Baýth  literature 
and  the  literature  of  the  Iraqi  Communist  Party.  This 
short  list  of  ideological  catch-phrases  was,  in  the 
main,  that  of  Stalinism,  which  the  Iraqi  Communist 
Party  adheres  to  until  today.  It  is  a  stark  irony  of  a 
regime  that  preaches  socialism  while,  in  reality,  it 
is  a  regime  of  thieves  and  get-rich-quick  schemers, 
who  were  former  primary  school  teachers  and  former 
shepherds  from  Tikr1t  and  Dur  and  who,  later  on, 
became  non-commissioned  army  and  police  officers;  a 
stark  irony  of  a  regime  that  claimed  to  be  secular, 
while  being  blatantly  sectarian  in  favour  of  the 
Sunnis;  a  stark  irony  of  a  regime  that  preaches  pan- 
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tiny  sub-tribe  or,  in  fact,  an  alliance  of  a  few 
barbaric  families  fromTikr-it. 
(12)  The  seizure  of  financial  resources  that  were  necessary 
to  build  such  a  security  apparatus,  i.  e.  oil 
resources.  Previous  Iraqi  governments  had  to  abide  by 
a  certain  procedure  in  spending  this  money,,  by 
allocating  a  certain  percentage,  e.  g.  50%-70%,  to 
development.  Saddam  cancelled  this  and  took  control  of 
all  oil  revenues,  which  allowed  him  to  spend  them 
without  any  restriction  whatsoever. 
The  Nature  of  Baýth  Authority:  Many  writers  find  it 
difficult  to  figure  out  the  decision  making  process  within 
the  Iraqi  leadership.  (68)  It  is  puzzling  for  them  to  tell 
whether  it  is  in  the  hands  of  the  RCC,  of  the  Cabinet,  of 
the  National  Assembly,  of  the  Ba'th  Party  or  of  a  Tikr-iti 
group  which  controls  the  Party  and  the  State.  The  fact  is 
that  neither  these  institutions  nor  the  Tikr-iti  elements 
(military  or  civilian)  have  any  real  power.  It  is  in  the 
hands  of  Saddam  and  his  security  apparatus.  ostensibly,  he 
takes  decisions  in  the  name  of  all  these  structures.  In  an 
interview  with  Helms,  he  said: 
11  the  Revolutionary  Command  Council  is  a 
constitutional  body  with  vested  authority.  it 
has  an  agenda  which  is  distributed  a  sufficient 
time  before  meeting  convene.  Decisions  are 
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through  discussions,  so  it  is  rare  that  an 
actual  vote  must  be  called.  In  f  act  1  can  count 
these  occasions  on  less  than  the  fingers  of  my 
hands.  We  are  mostly  interested  in  unanimous 
decisions,  but  not  necessarily  identical 
mentalities.  1  have  no  veto  power,  but  my 
opinion  as  a  question  of  courtesy  is  viewed  in 
a  different  way.  "(69) 
In  fact,  duality  is  the  true  description  of  the  actual 
mechanism  of  the  way  authority  is  practised  in  Iraq.  On  the 
surface  there  is  a  State  with  a  President,  a  party,  then  a 
Revolutionary  Command  Council,  a  Cabinet  of  Ministers  and  a 
Parliament.  But  all  these  institutions  and  structures  are  a 
facade,  built  up  on  the  principle  of  obedience  to  the 
president's  will.  Even  the  Party  and  the  entire 
administrative  strata  are  a  sham.  The  real  authority  is 
obviously  something  else  -  the  person  of  Saddam,  his  sons, 
and  his  family,  aided  by  the  all-powerful,  all-embracing 
total  authority  of  the  security  apparatus.  The  security 
apparatus  is  ubiquitous.  The  commander  of  an  army  unit  is 
less  important  that  the  representative  'of  the  security 
apparatus  in  that  unit,  because  it  is  he  who  is  the  real 
commander.  This  is  something  very  similar  to  the  Stalinist 
type  of  political  commissars  that  he  placed  everywhere  in 
the  Soviet  Union.  In  fact,  Saddam  uses  the  Stalinist  term 
,,  political  guidance  officers",  i.  e.  political  commissars. 
Hence  it  is  clear  now  that  the  real  authority  in  Iraq  is 
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ranking  members  also  serve  as  members  of  the  bogus 
authority,  such  as  Saddam  himself  and  his  son,  'Uday,  whose 
formal  capacity  is  that  of  the  Chairman  of  the  Iraqi 
Olympic  Committee,  and  director  of  a  newspaper  and  TV 
station.  Yet  his  real  authority  is  greater  than  that  of  any 
of  Saddam's  vice-presidents. 
Any  blows  that  members  or  institutions  of  the  bogus 
authority  might  receive  will  not  materially  affect  the 
regime's  ability  to  maintain  its  grip  on  power.  This  has 
been  proved  beyond  the  shadow  of  a  doubt  following  the  Gulf 
War.  The  regime  will  only  collapse  when  its  real  authority 
is  destroyed,  i.  e.  when  the  security  apparatus  is 
completely  crushed. 
Turning  to  the  regime's  Arab  relations,  it  has  been 
very  disruptive  and  guilty  of  seriously  harming  the 
interests  of  the  Palestinians,  as  happened  when  it 
encouraged  them  to  confront  King  Iýusayn  in  1970.  When  they 
did  so,  the  faith  regime  decided  to  pull  out  of  Jordan 
altogether.  Then,  again,  during  the  Lebanese  civil  war, 
when  the  regime  was  nominally  on  the  side  of  the 
Palestinians  and  Lebanese  Muslims,  and  Syria  was  on  the 
side  of  the  Christians,  owing  to  'Aflaqls  influence  on  the 
pan-Arab  leadership,  Saddam  was  even  more  pro-Lebanese 
Christian  than  Syria,  as  he  supplied  weapons  to  the 
Christian  General  Michel  ýAoun  and  his  militia  during  1980- 
1990.  Saddam's  regime  was  a  major  weakness  in  Arab  efforts 
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extreme  verbal  rhetoric  played  into  the  hands  of  extreme 
fascist  Zionists,  such  as  Menahem  Begin.  In  the  same  way 
his  confrontation  with  the  Gulf  Shaykdoms  and  Saudi  Arabia 
drove  them  into  the  arms  of  the  US,  Britain  and  Israel.  The 
regime's  fear  of  Khomayni's  revolution  being  exported  to 
Iraq  was  a  supreme  example  of  the  regime's  stupidity  and 
ignorance  of  Iraqi  society,  as  the  majority  of  Iraqis, 
including  the  Shi'ah,  would  not  accept  rule  by  a  non-Iraqi, 
whether  Iranian,  Syrian  or  Egyptian,  as  Nasir  himself 
discovered  much  earlier  than  Khomayni.  The  sum  total  of 
Saddam's  regime's  efforts  in  the  Arab  world  has  been  to  the 
advantage  of  anti-Arab  and  Anti-Islamic  forces,  as  the 
Iraq-Iran  war  and,  even  more  obviously,  the  Gulf  War,  have 
shown. 
More  serious  than  this  was  the  destruction  of  Iraq  as 
a  unified  State  and,  increasingly,  as  a  coherent  society. 
The  order  of  the  day,  is  now  that  the  US  and  Britain, 
particularly,  treat  Iraq  as  bits  and  pieces  of  lands  and 
sects,  encouraging  each  of  these,  using  the  excuse  of 
Saddam's  threatening  behaviour,  to  follow  their  own 
objective  which  is  the  dismemberment  of  Iraq,  as  perhaps 
desired  by  the  US  and  Britain,  so  as  to  safeguard  their 
long-term  interests  in  the  Gulf  Shaykdoms. 
The  consequences  of  the  wedge  that  the  Ba  %  th  regime 
has  driven  between  the  State  and  society  has  been 
catastrophic  for  Iraq  and  its  people.  As  the  wedge  has  been 
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more  an  exercise  of  absolute  terror,  which  has  stretched 
from  the  Presidential  Palace  to  the  smallest  village.  The 
destruction  of  Iraq's  civil  society  by  the  Ba'th  regime  has 
inevitably  led  to  the  destruction  of  the  Iraqi  state 
itself.  Thus,  values  such  as  honesty,  dedication  to  one's 
profession,  justice,  law,  order,  human  rights,  rights  of 
citizenship  and  neighbourhood  rights  have  become 
meaningless,  as  Saddam's  will  has  overwhelmed  Iraqi  life. 
Once  a  society  has  lost  all  its  value  system,  it 
becomes  very  difficult  for  its  citizens  to  agree  on  a 
common  proposal  for  saving  their  country  from  extinction. 
This  is  the  very  difficulty  faced  by  Iraqis  who  are  now 
increasingly  rediscovering  'Abd  al-Kar"i*m  Qdsim  as  the  first 
true  pioneer  of  the  Iraqi  nation.  The  future  of  Iraq,  if  it 
is  left  to  the  nationalist  Iraqis,  will  most  certainly 
follow  the  path  of  Iraqism  as  opposed  to  Arabism, 
fulfilling  Qdsim's  wishes  even  fifty  years  after  his  death. 
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489 CHAPTER  SEVEN 
THE  FIRST  GULF  WAR 
THE  IRAQ-IRAN  WAR Political  development  in  the  area  before  the  war 
Iran's  ancient  and  contemporary  history  has  affected 
the  Middle  East  and  Iraq  in  particular.  In  this  chapter  I 
will  discuss  events  in  Iran  so  as  to  clarify  the  political 
circumstances  and  conflicting  foreign  interests  that  lay 
behind  Saddam's  decision  to  go  to  war.  His  reasons  for  the 
war  were  unreal  and  could  not  justify  such  a  gamble, 
serving  the  interests  only  of  other  regional  and  outside 
powers,  particularly  Israel.  There  is  a  thesis  that 
considers  the  Islamic  Revolution  in  Iran  as  a  preliminary 
stage  for  a  coup,  intended  to  attack  stability  in  the 
area,  (1)  made  by  persons  such  as  Ibrdhim  Yazdi,  Sadegh 
Ghotbzadeh,  Bani  Sadr  and  Amir  Intizdm,  Khomeini's 
supporters.  It  accuses  Yazdi  of  being  an  American  agent  and 
of  being  in  continuous  contact  with  Richard  Katum, 
Professor  ofýPolitical  Science  at  Pittsburgh  University.  It 
also  considers  that  the  basic  role  in  this  plot,  on  behalf 
of  Arab  Governments,  was  played  by  a  secret  organisation 
called  the  Brotherhood,  which  adopted  Islamic 
fundamentalism  as  a  strong  weapon  for  implementing  its 
programme  in  the  third  world.  It  chose  Iran  as  the  first 
place  to  implement  its  plans,  because  of  its  favourable 
circumstances,  and  then  planned  to  work  in  other  parts  of 
the  area. 
The  f  act  that  such  great  powers  as  America  did  not 
take  any  position  vis-a-vis  events  in  Iran,  particularly 
after  opposition  to  the  Shah  increased,  and  that  they 
490 declined  to  help  the  Shah  seriously,  as  they  did  in  1953, 
suggests  that  his  downfall  was  due  to  external 
circumstances  and  that  foreign  interference  had  a  hand  in 
Iran's  revolution.  The  corruption  of  the  Shah's  Regime  and 
its  repression  was  not  the  real  reason  for  its  fall.  Most 
third  world  countries  have  repressive  regimes.  Hence,  there 
may  be  occasions  for  subscribing  to  this  thesis,  but  it  is 
not  in  accordance  with  the  already  mentioned  American 
strategy  during  the  Nixon  Administration,  with  Kissinger, 
during  the  seventies,  which  was  to  support  the  Shah  and  to 
supply  him  with  weapons,  (2)  so  as  to  make  him  the  defender 
of  Western  interests  in  the  Gulf,  following  the  British 
withdrawal  in  1971.  The  Shah's  deal  with  Britain  gave  him 
half  of  AbU  Mugsd  and  the  greater  and  lesser  Tumbs  in  the 
strait  of  Hormuz,  so  as  to  defend  the  strait  and  become  the 
policeman  of  the  area.  (3) 
It  seems  as  though  the  above  strategies  and  unlimited 
support  of  the  West,  with  the  fourfold  increase  in  oil 
prices  in  1973,  (4)  led  the  Shah  to  become  arrogant, 
conceited  and  megalomaniac,  ignoring  the  feelings  and 
sensitivities  of  regional  and  world  powers,  as  follows: 
The  Shah  continued  until  the  last  days  of  his  regime 
to  say  that  he  would  make  Iran  the  fifth  largest 
industrial  power  in  the  world.  (5)  This  might  explain 
his  fever  in  buying  weapons,  which  made  the  Soviet 
Union  feel  concerned  about  the  Iranian  build-up  and 
the  increase  in  the  United  States,  involvement  in 
491 Iran,  which  it  saw  as  a  threat  to  its  southern  border. 
This  may  have  led  the  Soviet  Union  to  invade 
Afghanistan,  which,  in  turn,  led  the  United  States  to 
arm  Pakistan,  fearing  that  Pakistan  might  follow 
Afghanistan.  (6) 
(2)  In  his  book,  Towards  a  Greater  Civilisation,  the  Shah 
painted  a  picture  of  his  regime  and  his  society  as 
unparalleled,  superior  even  to  Western  society,  which 
the  Shah  considered  to  be  dying;  he  criticised  western 
leaders,  their  policies  and  their  societies  openly  on 
several  occasions.  (7) 
(3)  The  Shah  began  to  expand  his  influence  by 
strengthening  his  relationship  with  the  South  African 
regime,  ignoring  the  feelings  of  the  Black  African 
nations,  which  were  beginning  to  have  some  importance 
on  the  world  scene  at  that  time. 
(4)  His  dealing  with  Arab  States,  in  particular  the  Gulf 
States,  was  based  on  arrogance,  and  he  made  continuous 
efforts  to  interfere  in  their  internal  affairs,  so  as 
to  impose  his  expansionist  aims,  which  were  contrary 
to  western  interests.  (8)  In  fact  the  CIA  described  the 
Shah  in  a  report  in  1976  as  megalomaniac.  Hence  the 
great  powers  and  their  allies  in  the  area,  through 
their  agents  inside  Iran,  in  addition  to  a  western 
media  campaign,  worked  against  the  Shah  and  weakened 
him,  each  according  to  its  own  interests,  as  follows: 
492 (a)  A  radio  station  in  Baku,  the  Capital  of 
Azerbaijan  in  the  Soviet  Union,  under  the  name  of 
the  Voice  of  Nationalist  Iran,  began  broadcasting 
to  inflame  revolution  against  the  Shah.  This 
radio  station  called  for  an  Iranian  revolution  to 
destroy  American  Imperialism,  whose  interest  the 
Shah  served.  It  followed  the  Khomeini  line  until 
the  Shah  fell,  so  as  to  spite  the  Americans. 
(b)  The  BBC,  in  its  broadcasts  to  the  Middle  East, 
completely  covered  Khomeini's  announcements 
during  his  stay  in  Paris.  The  BBC  was  probably 
moved  by  a  desire  to  take  revenge  on  the 
Americans  who  had  taken  the  British  position  in 
Iran.  (10)  Such  news  of  Khomeini  as  the  BBC 
broadcast  was  extremely  popular  and  was  a  source 
of  considerable  profit,  in  accordance  with  the 
capitalist  logic  that  the  media  are  a  commodity. 
The  BBC  was  very  effective  in  discomfiting  the 
Shah  and  his  Generals  and  so  nourished  the 
revolution. 
(c)  The  reports  of  the  United  States  President,  his 
adviser  zbigniew  Brzezinski  and  the  CIA  affirmed 
a  few  months  before  the  Shah's  downfall,  that  the 
situation  in  Iran  was  no  cause  for  worry,  and 
that  they  were  in  full  control.  (11) 
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day  with  the  British  and  American  Ambassadors  to  discuss 
the  situation  and  events  that  frightened  him.  This  policy 
was  to  prevent  the  Shah  from  rescuing  the  situation  before 
it  was  too  late.  They  were  encouraging  him  purposely  to 
make  mistakes  which  would  lead  to  his  further  weakness  in 
the  eyes  of  the  Iranian  People,  who  had  begun  to  mock  the 
regime  openly.  (12)  America's  superficial  support  for  the 
Shah  during  the  uprising  was  to  deceive  the  Saudis  and 
friendly  Gulf  Sheikhs  into  believing  that  America  did  not 
abandon  its  allies  for  its  own  interests.  What  confirms 
America's  lack  of  serious  support  for  the  Shah  is  the 
meeting  held  on  5  January  1979  in  Guadeloupe  between 
Britain,  western  Germany,  the  United  States  and  France,  to 
discuss  events  in  Iran  and  the  situation  of  the  Shah,  so 
as  to  take  a  united  stand  which  would  enable  them  to  serve 
their  interests.  (13)  Sources  close  to  the  French  President 
announced  that  the  United  States  had  known  of  the  serious 
developments  in  Iran  since  November,  but  had  failed  to 
alert  the  Shah.  General  Huyser  (Deputy  Commander  of  NATO 
forces  in  Europe)  was  sent  to  Tehran  on  7  January  1979, 
two  days  after  the  Guadeloupe  meeting  to  implement  the 
plan  that  had  been  drawn  up  by  America  and  its  allies,  so 
as  to  save  the  situation  in  Iran. 
All  the  above  clearly  show  that  America  and  its  allies 
wanted  to  get  rid  of  the  Shah  by  helping  the  Islamic 
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destroy  it  in  the  future.  But  it  seems  that  they  overshot 
their  target  and  that  the  Islamic  Revolution  became  a 
serious  threat  to  their  interests.  So  the  great  Powers  and 
all  their  allies  began  to  move: 
The  Soviet  Union  invaded  Afghanistan  on  27  December 
1979,  to  prevent  any  American  military  action  and  to 
force  America  to  share  their  influence  in  Iran  in  just 
the  same  way  as  they  had  shared  it  with  the  British 
before.  What  supports  this  thesis  is  President 
Carter's  statement  after  the  invasion: 
"..,,  we  knew  of  the  importance  of  the  Soviet 
Union's  military  preparations,  we  were  not 
taken  by  surprise.,, 
This  means  that  they  knew  of  the  invasion,  but 
could  not  reach  an  understanding  with  the  Soviet 
Union.  (14)  The  Soviet  Union  also  took  military  steps 
in  the  Caucasus,  on  the  border  with  Iran.  There  was 
also  Soviet  mobilisation  on  the  Soviet/Afghan  border. 
This  measure,  in  particular,  has  a  strong  significance 
because  the  main  part  of  the  Islamic  Resistance  in 
Afghanistan  was  during  that  period  in  the  Eastern 
area.  It  confirms  that  the  Soviet  Union  would  not 
allow  the  Americans  to  turn  Iran  again  into  a  large 
base  for  listening  and  observation  directed  against 
the  Soviet  Union.  (15)  It  also  prevented  Iranian 
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rebels.  Thus,  American  hands  were  tied  af  ter  the 
Soviet  Union  adopted  such  measures;  they  were  taken  to 
deter  the  Americans  from  interfering  in  Iran,  when 
they  seemed  likely  to  refuse  to  share  influence  in 
Iran  and  to  consider  it  as  American. 
(2)  For  the  United  States  the  situation  was  highly 
complex,  with  Brzezinski  favouring  a  military 
intervention  to  save  the  situation,  particularly  after 
the  taking  of  the  American  hostages  in  the  American 
Embassy  in  November  1979.  (16)  This  was  a  cause  of 
disagreement  with  Cyrus  Vance,  the  Secretary  of  State, 
who  preferred  a  peaceful  solution.  Since  the  Americans 
did  not  want  to  share  Iran  with  the  Soviet  Union  and 
could  not  bring  down  the  Islamic  regime  in  a  coup,  so 
as  to  bring  back  stability  in  the  area,  the  question 
was  how  the  situation  of  the  American  hostages  was  to 
be  solved,  without  compromising  American  interests,  in 
accords  with  Carter's  announcement,  (17)  while  also 
making  a  stand  against  the  Islamic  Revolution  and  the 
Soviet  threat. 
This  will  be  analysed  in  the  next  section,  Interests  in  the 
War. 
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Evidence  in  the  last  section  confirmed  that  the  great 
powers  and  their  allies  contributed  to  the  development  of 
the  Islamic  Revolution  in  Iran,  in  order  to  bring  down  the 
Peacock  Throne  and  force  Shah  Mu4ammad  Reýa  Pahlavi,  after 
a  prolonged  struggle  throughout  1978,  to  leave  the  country 
on  16  January  1979. 
The  Ayatollah  took  over  power  in  Iran  in  February 
1980,  backed  by  the  entire  Iranian  people,  who  were  amazed 
by  the  overwhelming  victory  over  the  Shah.  (18) 
Soon  after  assuming  power  the  Iranian  mullahs  took  the 
following  steps: 
(1)  They  tore  up  the  Shah's  agreements  with  the  United 
States  and  Israel. 
(2)  They  broke  off  diplomatic  relations  with  Israel  and 
stopped  the  flow  of  oil  to  it. 
(3)  They  withdrew  from  the  Central  Treaty  Organisation 
(CENTO)  . 
(19) 
(4)  They  stopped  the  flow  of  oil  to  South  Africa. 
(5)  They  turned  over  the  Israeli  embassy  in  Tehran  to 
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In  addition  they  announced  that  the  Islamic  Revolution 
in  Iran  was  an  indigenous  movement,  determined  to  affirm 
itself  against  outsiders,  eastern  or  western.  The  Mullahs 
then  went  further  by  denouncing  the  United  States  as  the 
"Great  Satan",  seizing  the  US  embassy  in  Iran  and  holding 
its  diplomats  hostage.  Moreover,  the  radical  clerics  in 
Iran  began  to  call  for  the  exporting  of  Iran's  Islamic 
Revolution  and  to  campaign  for  the  rights  of  disadvantaged 
Shi'ite  communities  in  the  Muslim  world.  On  the  regional 
level,  al-Asad  made  moves  to  ally  himself  with 
Revolutionary  Iran  and  stepped  outside  the  Arab  National 
mainstream.  (20) 
The  extremist  policies  of  revolutionary  Iran  and  the 
clerics,  demands  caused  tremors  in  the  regional  balance  of 
power,  and  gave  rise  to  many  uprisings  in  the  region,  as 
follows: 
In  November  1979  the  grand  mosque  at  Mecca  was  seized 
by  some  Muslim  extremists.  This  event  alarmed  the 
Saudi  Royal  Family,  who  asked  for  western  protection, 
to  contain  Khomeini's  Iran,  which  had  begun  greatly  to 
threaten  their  regime.  Also,  widespread  riots  exploded 
in  the  oil-rich  Saudi  province  of  Hasad',  causing  I 
severe  casualties,  which  led  the  Saudi  authorities  to 
close  the  Shi'ite  areas.  Similar  disorders  took  place 
in  Bahrain  during  the  summer  of  1979  and  the  spring  of 
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occurred.  (21)  On  I  December  1981  a  massive  revolt 
broke  out  again  in  Bahrain.  The  Sheikh  of  Bahrain 
would  have  fallen  if  the  riots  had  not  been  ruthlessly 
suppressed  with  the  help  of  the  British  officer  on  the 
Island.  Three  thousand  were  arrested,  in  addition  to 
many  casualties. 
(2)  Iranian  appeals  fomented  the  Muslims  in  Turkey. 
Disorder  increased  to  such  an  extent  that  it  started 
to  threaten  the  regime.  So  the  United  States  planned  a 
coup  on  12  September  1980,  ten  days  before  the  Iraq- 
Iran  war,  to  bring  Turkish  generals  to  power  in  order 
to  control  the  Islamic  uprising.  (22) 
(3)  The  Muslims  in  the  Soviet  Republics  insisted  on 
showing  their  support  for  Revolutionary  Iran  by 
relaying  Khomeini's  addresses  and  contributing  to  his 
cause.  This  led  Soviet  officials  to  encourage  the 
minorities  in  Iran  against  the  Islamic  Revolution.  (23) 
(4)  The  Afghan  Muslims,  who  had  received  aid  and  support 
from  the  Americans  and  their  agents  in  the  area 
against  the  communist  regime  in  Afghanistan,  rebelled 
and  established  an  Islamic  Republic  on  the  model  of 
Pakistan.  They  began  to  change  their  minds  after  the 
coming  to  power  of  the  Mullahs,  who  encouraged  them  to 
reproduce  the  situation  in  Iran.  (24) 
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Ayatollah  al-Sadr  were  galvanised  by  the  Iranian 
Revolution  at  first  and  showed  their  support  for  the 
new  regime.  In  an  unthinking  congratulatory  telegram 
to  Khomeini  al-Sadr  expressed  his  opinion  openly, 
challenging  the  Ba'th  regime: 
11  other  tyrants  have  yet  to  see  their 
day  of  reckoning.  "  (25) 
People  demonstrated  in  the  holy  cities  of  Najaf  and 
Karbald'  in  favour  of  Ayatollah  Khomeini  and  al-Sadr, 
followed  by  armed  operations  throughout  Iraq,  particularly 
in  Baghdad,  against  some  prominent  Iraqi  officials. 
Saddam's  response  to  the  event  was  quick  and  ruthless.  He 
effectively  crushed  the  Shi'ite  unrest  on  19  April  1980. 
Al-Sadr  and  his  sister,  Bint  al-Hudd,  were  executed,  after 
being  held  under  house  arrest  in  Najaf,  and  hundreds  of 
Shi'ite  political  prisoners,  most  of  them  members  of  the 
Da'wah  party,  were  also  executed.  By  this  move,  Saddam 
seemed  to  be  seeking  to  exploit  these  riots,  to  provoke 
rivalry  with  the  new  Iranian  regime.  Indeed,  as  soon  as  the 
news  about  the  executions  of  al-Sadr  and  his  sister  reached 
Iran,  there  were  prolonged  demonstrations  there.  Khomeini 
called  on  the  Iraqi  Shi'ites  to  overthrow  Saddam's 
government. 
In  the  political  circumstances  caused  by  the  Islamic 
Revolution  in  Iran,  the  instability  of  the  new  regime 
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to  meddle  further  in  Gulf  affairs,  in  particular  after  the 
invasion  of  Afghanistan  and  the  failure  of  many  American 
attempts  to  change  the  regime  and  to  save  the  American 
situation  in  Iran.  (26) 
The  Soviet  Union  seemed  to  be  deliberately  exploiting 
this  political  dilemma  to  challenge  America,  by  not 
supporting  the  American  call  for  the  upholding  of 
International  Law,  after  Iran  had  seized  its  embassy,  and 
also  seeking  a  further  resolution  threatening  Iran  with 
economic  sanctions  if  it  did  not  release  the  hostages. 
Moreover,  the  Soviet  Union  took  military  steps  in  the 
Caucasus  on  the  border  with  Iran,  and  mobilised  its  66th 
armoured  division  in  the  area  of  Herat  on  the  Afghanistan 
border,  as  noted  in  the  last  section.  (27) 
These  Soviet  manoeuvres,  the  tipping  of  the  strategic 
situation  in  this  vital  region  against  American  interests 
and  concern  for  the  lives  of  the  American  hostages  in 
Tehran,  led  American  policy-makers  to  look  for  a  way  out  of 
the  impasse.  In  their  attempts  to  shape  a  regional  security 
framework  to  rescue  the  American  situation,  they  had  the 
strongest  external  interest  in  stirring  up  war  against 
Iran,  especially  if  such  a  war  would  achieve  all  their 
regional  and  international  objectives  with  no  direct 
intervention  on  their  part. 
Thus,  it  seems  that  the  increasing  skirmishes  on  the 
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commitment,  were  the  framework  for  saving  the  US  strategic 
doctrine.  The  following  points  bear  witness  to  this  thesis: 
Bani  Sadr,  the  first  President  of  Iran  after  the 
revolution,  told  Eric  Rouleau  of  Le  Monde  that  Iran 
had  been  forewarned  of  the  Iraqi  attack  by  an 
intelligence  report  of  secret  talks  in  Paris  in  the 
summer  of  1980,  in  which  Israelis,  the  United  States 
military  experts,  Iranian  exiles  and  Iraqis  had  taken 
part.  (28) 
(2)  Another  statement  from  Bani  Sadr  claimes  that  the 
Iraq-Iran  war  was  planned  by  America,  and  that  a 
secret  meeting  took  place  in  Jordan  between  Saddam  and 
President  Carter's  National  Security  Adviser, 
Brzezinski,  to  shape  the  plans.  (29) 
(3)  Brzezinski  announced  that  the  US  was  facing  a  wider 
strategic  challenge  which  would  require  a  similarly 
wide  response:  he  tried  to  concentrate  all  his  efforts 
on  policies  designed  to  pursue  and  maximise  American 
power.  (30)  He  then  admitted  that  the  Iraq-Iran  war 
created  in  Iran  a  need  for  America's  spare  parts,  and 
he  held  out  this  option  as  a  way  of  enticing  the 
Iranians  into  a  prompt  settlement.  (31) 
According  to  an  Iraqi  staff  officer  who  participated 
in  the  preparation  for  the  war,  there  were  secret 
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conclude  secret  military  contracts  and  commitments 
with  the  Iraqi  intelligence  department,  which  was 
headed  by  Barzdn  al-TikrTiti,  whilst  the  Ministry  of 
Defence  was  supposed  to  take  care  of  these  commitments 
and  delegations.  (32) 
The  other  party  mostly  involved  in  activating  the  war 
with  Iran  was  Israel,  for  these  reasons: 
Its  alliance  with  the  Shah  had  collapsed  and  Asad 
had  moved  to  take  its  place  as  Iran's  regional 
ally. 
Khomeini  had  called  on  the  Muslim  world  to 
liberate  Jerusalem.  This  constituted  a  real 
danger  for  Israel's  national  security. 
If  revolutionary  Iran  was  involved  in  some 
external  clash,  it  would  need  arms,  and  because 
of  its  negative  attitude  towards  the  United 
States,  it  was  no  longer  able  to  get  them  from 
it.  It  would  be  looking  for  alternative  supplies. 
This  opportunity  might  enable  Israel  to  establish 
some  sort  of  relationship  with  the  new  regime. 
Thus,  many  Israeli  delegations  paid  numerous 
secret  visits  to  Tehran  to  achieve  this  strategic 
objective  which,  a  few  years  later,  precipitated 
the  United  States  into  the  Iran-gate  scandal.  (33) 
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concentration  of  strength  on  its  eastern  front; 
thus  the  Iraq-Iran  war  would  neutralise  Iraq  and 
divert  its  growing  military  capability  away  from 
Israel. 
As  preparations  f  or  the  Tammaz  attack  on  the 
Iraqi  reactor  began,  a  major  difference  emerged 
among  Israeli  decision-makers,  who  were  conscious 
their  bombing  Baghdad  might  prompt  Iraq  and  Iran 
to  call  of  f  their  war  and  unite  against  them. 
This  threatened  their  national  security.  (34)  This 
was  despite  the  fact  that  Begin's  doctrine 
considered  the  destruction  of  the  Iraqi  reactor 
as  one  of  Israel's  supreme  national  goals,  and  he 
would  not  allow  any  Arab  state  to  develop  an 
offensive  nuclear  capability. 
It  seems  clear  that  a  war  between  Iraq  and  Iran  was 
greatly  in  Israel's  favour.  However,  whatever  foreign  and 
regional  parties  were  involved  in  the  war,  Saddam.  had  his 
own  pressing  reasons  for  challenging  his  eastern  neighbour: 
His  ambitions  played  a  large  part  in  the  war.  He  was 
making  a  bid  to  be  the  principal  focus  of  attention. 
He  wanted  to  be  the  Arabs'  hero  by  subjecting  the  Gulf 
States  to  his  will  and  by  imposing  his  strategy  on 
this  vital  region.  (35)  His  strategy  began  with  the 
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following: 
(a)  His  high  self-esteem  and  his  belief  in  the 
insurmountable  economic  might  of  his  country,  in 
particular  after  the  rise  in  oil  prices  in  1980. 
(b)  His  control  over  the  Iraqi  state,  which  seemed  to 
mark  it  out  for  greatness  at  a  time  when  his 
regional  rivals  were  preoccupied,  Syria  paralysed 
by  internal  terrorism;  Egypt  out  of  line  with  the 
other  Arabs;  Turkey  in  the  hands  of  a  military 
junta;  Iran  struggling  with  revolutionary 
turmoil;  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  Gulf  States  afraid 
of  the  Iranian  threat  and  its  implications  for 
their  own  domestic  security,  In  addition, 
outsiders  could  never  contemplate  the  prospect  of 
a  victorious  Iran.  Thus  Saddam  offered  to  assume 
the  role  of  a  protector  of  the  weak  Arab 
monarchies  and  confused  outsiders. 
(c)  At  the  beginning  of  the  1980s,  a  report  by  an  oil 
expert  was  submitted  to  Saddam,  which  stated  that 
OPEC  had  transferred  its  leadership  to  the  Arab 
States,  because  they  were  the  main  oil  producers. 
But,  because  the  Gulf  oil  producers,  despite 
their  large  oil  production,  did  not  have  the 
political  power  that  would  make  them  effective  on 
the  world  scene,  Iraq  was  the  one  that  could 
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Egypt  because  of  the  Camp  David  accord  with 
Israel.  Therefore  Iraq  could  create  an  Arab  bloc 
to  help  achieve  Arab  economic  and  political 
independence  and  to  help  the  Palestinian  cause. 
This  was  a  goal  that  might  be  exploited  by  Saddam 
to  achieve  primacy  over  the  Arab  world. 
(d)  Many  reports  indicate  that  Saddam  was  trying  to 
create  a  network  of  allies  and  friends  with  third 
world  countries  in  Africa,  Asia  and  Latin 
America.  Saddam  provided  them  with  aid,  loans  and 
oil  for  less  than  the  OPEC  price,  to  strengthen 
iraqi  influence  in  the  world.  (36) 
(2)  Most  outside  observers,  Arab  and  western  alike, 
assumed  that  Saddam  had  an  important  and  pressing 
motive  for  the  war  against  Iran,  since  it  was 
certainly  defensive.  They  described  his  war  as  pre- 
emptive,  since  the  regime  was  fighting  for  its 
survival.  It  is  true  that  the  revolutionary  regime  in 
Iran,  from  its  earliest  days  in  power,  sought  to 
overthrow  the  Baýth  regime.  Even  though  Iran's 
revolutionary  zeal  was  directed  against  the  Gulf 
states  and  other  states  in  the  region,  in  order  to 
export  the  revolution  to  undermine  the  Gulf 
authorities,  it  still  made  Iraq  the  primary  target  for 
the  export  of  its  Islamic  revolution.  Also  Khomeini's 
Shi'ite  revanchisme  was  threatening  the  integrity  of 
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Shi'ite  and  in  sympathy  with  the  Islamic  system  in 
Iran.  Even  so,  Saddam  was  able  to  eliminate  any  kind 
of  political,  religious  or  nationalist  movement 
completely.  Indeed,  he  eliminated  the  Shi'ite 
religious  movement  in  Najaf  and  Karbald'  in  1977,  as 
already  noted.  After  the  Islamic  revolution,  which 
aroused  the  Iraqi  Shi'ites  and  caused  some  unrest  in 
Iraq,  Saddam  moved  quickly  to  eliminate  this  source  of 
disorder  by  executing  al-Sadr,  and  his  sister,  which 
was  a  heavy  blow  to  the  Shi'ite  community  in  Iraq  and 
around  the  Islamic  world,  and  he  discouraged  the 
underground  religious  party,  al-Da'wah.  (37) 
(3)  Many  sources  for  the  conflict  between  Iraq  and  Iran 
refer  to  the  disagreement  over  territory  and  the 
profound  mutual  antipathy  that  is  said  to  characterise 
the  attitudes  of  Iraqis  and  Iranians.  (39)  Indeed, 
Saddam  Husayn  intended  to  wring  territorial 
concessions  from  Iran  by  tearing  up  the  1975  Algiers 
Agreement,  which  was  extorted  from  him  under  the 
pressure  of  the  Kurdish  war,  as  already  noted,  and 
which  forced  him  to  yield  to  the  Shah  partial  control 
of  the  Sh4ý  al-ýArab  waterway. 
However,  the  sequence  of  events  indicates  that  the 
above  factors  were  not  the  dominating  factors.  The  Iraqi 
regime  formally  announced  that  they  were,  in  order  to 
conceal  the  contingency  plan  to  rescue  regional  and 
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from  Revolutionary  Iran;  this  provided  the  real  casus  belli 
of  the  Iraq-Iran  war. 
In  the  next  section  we  will  examine  the  preparations 
for  the  war  and  indicate  how  much  outsiders  were  involved 
and  led  the  Iraqi  regime  to  pursue  their  interests. 
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Tension  between  Iran  and  Iraq  had  been  increasing 
since  February  1979,  after  Ayatollah  Khomeini  took  over 
power  in  Iran,  threatened  the  pro-western  regimes  in  the 
area  and  aroused  the  western  phobia  of  Islamic 
fundamentalism.  According  to  a  Sunday  Times  report,  Saddam. 
attempted  to  attack  Iran  in  July  1979.  (39)  As  he  knew  very 
well,  the  Iraqi  nation,  with  a  Shi'ite  majority,  would  not 
support  him  and  sacrifice  themselves  for  him,  just  to  prop 
up  his  personal  rule.  He  needed  to  pave  the  way  for  this 
big  move,  so  he  made  use  of  his  special  stick  and  carrot 
policy,  a  tactic  he  had  always  used  successfully  since  the 
early  1970s  when  he  made  a  gratuitous  decision  concerning 
his  political  position. 
From  this  standpoint,  we  can  see  clearly  from  the 
following  massive  preparations,  prior  to  the  war  with  Iran, 
that  Saddam  was  planning  something  serious: 
Setting  up  the  Iraqis:  He  directed  all  the  mass  media 
to  give  a  certain  message  to  the  Iraqis,  indicating 
the  direction  in  which  he  wanted  events  to  go.  Apart 
from  the  personality  cult  which  resulted  in  an 
incredible  peak  of  propaganda  and  forced  flattery,  he 
used  the  sectarian  weapon  to  arouse  rancour  and 
hostility  between  the  two  nations.  For  this  reason,  he 
called  his  war  with  Iran  Al-Qadisiyyah,  to  recall 
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637,  under  the  Arab  commander  Sa'd  ibn  Al:  ýl  Waqqdq,  whom 
Saddam  intended  to  replace  in  the  new  Qddisiyyah  and 
teach  the  Magian  Persians  another  lesson.  (40) 
A  series  of  editorials  in  the  Iraqi  press  and 
some  broadcasts  on  the  radio  and  television  set  up 
hatred  and  bitter  feelings  between  the  Iraqi  and 
Iranian  nations,  and  many  books  were  published  and 
theses  written,  focused  on  the  same  subject.  A  film 
was  made  of  the  battle  of  Qddisiyyah,  depicting  the 
Arabs'  victory  over  the  Persians.  To  challenge  the 
Im5m  Khomeini's  pressure  in  accusing  him  of  being  an 
unbeliever,  Saddam  used  the  same  weapon.  He  pointed 
out  that  the  Baýth  party  drew  on  Islam  for  its 
ideology  and  accused  the  Imdm  Khomeini  of  using  the 
weapon  of  sectarianism  to  divide  the  Muslims  instead 
of  uniting  them.  He  paid  frequent  visits  to  various 
Shi'ite  cities  and  holy  places;  he  proclaimed  that  he 
was  a  directed  descendant  of  the  Im5m  ýAli,  hence  of 
the  prophet  Mu45mmad.  He  wore  the  traditional  Shi'ite 
robe  'Abayah.  To  attract  Iraqi  support  for  his  regime, 
he  broadcast  telegrams  from  religious  leaders,  and 
from  Arabs  and  Kurds,  with  their  pledge  to  him  and  his 
revolution.  Thus  once  the  war  broke  out,  the  Iraqis  at 
large  were  convinced  that  they  were  fighting  for  their 
own  territory  against  Iranian  aggression,  together 
with  their  faithful  leader. 
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war,  a  large  and  ambitious  development  programme  was 
carried  out  by  Saddam's  regime.  Construction  projects 
of  all  kinds  began.  Public  spending  rose  from  E21 
billion,  prior  to  the  war,  to  E29  billion,  after  the 
war  broke  out.  The  budget  for  civilian  imports  was 
increased,  to  prevent  commodity  shortages.  (41)  Due  to 
the  world  oil  boom  in  1979  and  1980,  Iraqi  oil  export 
revenues  rose  from  El  billion  in  1972  to  E21  billion 
in  1979  and  E26  billion  in  1980.  (42)  Saddam  wanted  to 
impress  on  the  Iraqi  people  that  when  the  war 
occurred,  it  would  not  affect  ordinary  life,  and  to 
prove  to  his  nation  that  he  could  wage  the  war  and 
maintain  a  strong  business-as-usual  atmosphere  at  the 
same  time. 
(3)  Setting  up  the  military  force:  From  the  mid-1970s, 
Saddam  entered  into  an  arms  race  with  Iran,  with  the 
support  of  outside  powers.  He  worked  out  a  long-range 
plan  that  included  a  massive  build-up  of  conventional 
weapons  and  the  development  of  Iraqi  strategic  weapon 
industries,  intending  to  construct  a  powerful  modern 
Arab  army  and  war  industry.  (43) 
According  to  an  Iraqi  army  officer's  account,  the 
army  was  prepared  for  the  war  two  months  before  its 
outbreak  in  July  1980,  with  discussions  of  the  Iraqi 
plan  for  the  war,  in  particular  the  army  plan,  between 
the  Defence  minister,  'Adndn  Khayr  All5h,  and  the 
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visited  army  units  he  announced  openly  that  war  with 
Iran  had  become  almost  certain.  (44)  Intensive  training 
programmes  were  devised  to  mobilise  the  soldiers  for 
the  war  and  to  get  them  to  accept  the  idea  of  the  war. 
There  was  a  large  re-deployment  throughout  the  army; 
officers  and  commanders  in  sensitive  positions  were 
replaced  with  others  absolutely  loyal  to  Saddam.  (45) 
The  army  received  a  massive  salary  rise,  in  particular 
the  officers,  who  also  obtained  priority  for  a  free 
car,  a  free  plot  of  land  and  a  free  loan  to  build  a 
house.  (46) 
One  of  the  preparations  for  war,  which  the 
International  Journal  of  the  Armed  Forces  noted,  was 
that  Saddam  invited  senior  NATO  officers  to  discuss 
his  war  plans,  informing  them  that  questions  of 
control  of  the  Gulf  for  the  next  fifty  years  had  been 
settled.  (47) 
The  Guardian  also  noted  Iraqi  attempts  to  buy 
anti-tetanus  serum  in  August  1980,  two  months  before 
the  war  started.  The  amount  that  Iraq  sought  was  about 
ten  times  the  annual  United  Kingdom  consumption,  and 
the  population  of  Britain  was  about  four  times  that  of 
Iraq.  (48)  This  indicated  that  Saddam  intended  to  use 
this  serum  for  military  purposes. 
(4)  Focus  on  Iraq's  great  heritage:  Saddam  concentrated  on 
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Islamic  period,  as  noted  before,  to  emphasise  the 
greatness  of  Iraq,  its  special  identity  within  the 
Arab  world,  and  his  role  in  the  effort  to  revive  its 
civilisation.  In  one  of  his  speeches,  eight  months 
prior  to  the  war,  he  represented  Iraq  as  equivalent  to 
a  super-power: 
Iraq  is  as  great  as  China,  as  great  as  the 
Soviet  Union  and  as  great  as  the  United 
States.  "  (49) 
Moreover,  in  his  speech  at  the  Regional  Festival 
of  popular  Arab  poetry  on  23  April,  Saddam  directed  a 
strong  message  to  Bani  Sadr,  who  threatened  Saddam 
with  military  action  because  of  his  interference  in 
Iranian  internal  affairs,  the  deterioration  in  the 
situation  on  the  border,  and  his  harsh  repression  of 
the  Shi'ite  community  in  Iraq.  Saddam  said: 
xxoe.  I  say  to  my  enemies  great  and  small,  if 
they  imagine  the  land  of  Iraq  will  be  open  to 
them  once  they  have  overcome  half  a  million  men 
in  khaki,  they  are  wrong.  Millions  upon 
millions  will  be  born  to  defend  the  soil  of 
Iraq.  Bani  Sadr  deludes  himself  if  he  thinks 
the  Iranian  army  can  walk  into  Iraq.  Not  even 
the  Army  of  the  Soviet  Union  or  the  United 
States  can  walk  into  Iraq.  11 
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to  the  war  marks  the  culmination  of  Saddam's  attempt 
to  rally  the  Arab  States  behind  him.  In  his  speech  on 
8  February  1980,  the  seventeenth  anniversary  of  the 
1963  coup,  he  issued  the  pan-Arab  call  which  sought  to 
solidify  the  Arab  Nation  and  to  rally  Arab  defence 
against  external  aggression.  (50)  This  step  was  a  clear 
indication  that  Saddam  had  decided  to  go  to  war.  He 
had  begun  to  draw  closer  to  Saudi  Arabia,  Kuwait  and 
the  other  Gulf  States  by  the  second  half  of  the  1980s. 
At  the  end  of  February  1979,  one  month  after  the  fall 
of  the  Shah,  he  signed  a  mutual  security  agreement 
with  Saudi  Arabia.  After  the  Soviet  Union  invaded 
Afghanistan  in  late  December  1979,  and  when  President 
Carter  declared  that  the  United  States  was  against 
foreign  aggression,  Saddam  declared  as  well  two  weeks 
later,  that  Iraq  would  never  allow  Saudi  Arabia  to  be 
occupied  by  the  Soviet  Union.  (51)  This  move  indicated 
clearly  Saddam's  new  moderate  stand  and  his  new  role, 
the  pro-western  defender  of  the  Arabs  and  the 
protector  of  western  interests.  (52) 
In  the  Palestinian  cause,  Saddam  moved  from  his  ultra- 
radical  anti-Zionist  stance,  to  a  more  moderate  stance.  His 
relations  with  Jordan  also  improved  significantly. 
Apart  f  rom  these  preparations,  Saddam  welcomed  to 
Baghdad  Iranian  opposition  politicians  such  as  Shahpur 
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from  Iran  in  1979,  and  former  Generals  of  the  Shah,  such  as 
Ali  Oveysi,  the  former  martial-law  governor  of  Tehran.  (53) 
All  were  seeking  the  support  of  Iran's  traditional  enemy  to 
get  rid  of  the  Mullahs1regime  and  return  home  in  triumph. 
Saddam,  also  attempted  to  foment  rebellion  among  minorities 
in  Iran.  He  gave  support  in  weapons  and  money  openly  to 
dissident  groups  in  Khuzistan  and  Iranian  Kurdistan  in 
order  to  put  pressure  on  the  Iranian  Government.  (54)  This 
Iraqi  interference  in  Iranian  internal  affairs  increased  to 
the  extent  that  the  Iranian  Foreign  Minister,  Sadegh 
Ghotbzadeh,  the  Iranian  Minister  of  Defence  and  the  Iranian 
President  Bani  Sadr  warned  him  that  Iran  would  go  to  war  if 
there  was  any  further  provocation  from  the  Iraqi  side.  (55) 
The  most  effective  step  taken  by  Saddam  to  stir  up 
Khomeini's  regime  was  the  execution  of  the  distinguished 
Shi'ite  leader  in  Iraq,  Sayyid  Mu4ammad  Bakr  al-ýadr,  and 
his  sister,  which  was  followed  by  a  ruthless  campaign 
against  the  Shi'ite  religious  movement  and  the  'Ulemd'in 
the  holy  city  of  Najiaf,  as  noted  in  the  last  chapter.  Then 
about  a  hundred  thousand  Iraqis  were  expelled  to  Iran  in 
brutal  conditions,  under  the  pretext  that  they  were  of 
Iranian  origin,  according  to  the  Revolutionary  Command 
Council's  resolution  in  June  1980,  which  announced  that  any 
Iranian  family  which  proved  to  be  disloyal  to  the  Iraqi 
Revolution  and  the  homeland  was  subject  to  deportation, 
even  if  it  held  Iraqi  Nationality  Certification.  (56) 
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claimed,  because  of  the  al-Mustanqiriyyah  attempt  to 
assassinate  the  vice-president,  TZiriq  ýAzlz,  by  a 
naturalised  Iraqi  of  Iranian  origin,  and  were  accompanied 
with  ruthless  measures  against  the  'Ulema'  of  the  Iraqi 
Shi'ite  community.  They  irritated  the  regime  in  Tehran 
increasingly,  in  particular  Ayatollah  Khomeini,  who  called, 
on  4  June  1980,  on  the  Iraqi  Shiýites  to  overthrow  Saddam's 
government.  The  Iranian  regime  also  started  to  support  the 
Kurds  in  the  North.  Clashes  on  the  borders  increased 
between  the  two  sides.  In  August  these  clashes  escalated 
into  heavy  fighting,  involving  tank  and  artillery  duels  and 
air  strikes.  By  this  stage,  Iranian-Iraqi  relations  entered 
a  new  phase,  that  for  which  Saddam  had  paved  the  way  since 
he  had  attained  power;  he  told  the  Iraqi  people,  who  did 
not  know  what  was  secretly  planned,  that  he  had  no 
alternative,  and  that  he  had  to  contain  the  Iranian  threat 
by  resort  to  arms. 
516 The  course  of  the  war 
Relations  between  Iraq  and  Iran  rapidly  deteriorated, 
with  their  armies  periodically  clashing  along  the 
border.  (57)  Claims  and  counter-claims  were  made  by  both 
sides.  on  7  September,  Saddam  accused  Iran  of  shelling 
Iraqi  border  towns  from  territories  that,  according  to  the 
Algiers  Accord,  belonged  to  Iraq,  and  ordered  the  immediate 
withdrawal  of  Iranian  forces  from  these  areas,  such  as  Zayn 
al-Qaws  and  Sayf  Sa'd.  Soon  Saddam  moved  to  "liberate" 
them.  A  week  later  he  announced  the  abrogation  of  the 
Algiers  Accord.  (58)  This  move  was  preceded  by  sabotage  and 
terrorist  attacks  inside  both  countries  -as  we  have  seen  in 
the  last  section-  which  reached  a  critical  point,  with  both 
countries  threatening  war  in  the  case  of  further 
interference  in  internal  affairs  or  frontier  violations. 
Few  could  dispute  that  the  course  of  events  would  escalate 
into  total  war.  From  Saddam's  point  of  view,  a  quick 
military  action  would  seriously  affect  the  Iranian 
Revolutionary  Regime,  whose  response  might  be  in  kind,  or 
perhaps  an  indication  of  willingness  to  reach  a  settlement 
in  accordance  with  his  ambitions  and  make  some  territorial 
concessions,  since  it  was  weak,  divided  and  isolated. 
However,  Iran  had  a  population  three  times  larger  than  that 
of  Iraq,  the  distance  to  Tehran  from  Baghdad  was  850 
kilometres,  -of  which  650  were  inside  Iran,  and  the  common 
border  was  1300  km  long.  It  was  a  critical  error  of 
Saddam's  to  imagine  that  he  would  ever  be  able  to  defeat 
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outbreak  of  hostilities  when  he  was  at  the  height  of  his 
success,  he  admitted: 
11  Despite  our  victory,  if  you  were  to  ask  me 
now  if  we  should  have  gone  to  war,  I  would  say 
that  it  would  have  been  better  if  we  had  not 
gone  to  war.  But  we  had  no  other  choice.  "  (59) 
However,  a  few  days  after  Saddam's  declaration  of  the 
abrogation  of  the  Algiers  Accord,  the  Iraqi  forces  crossed 
into  Iran,  launching  the  Gulf  War  on  a  course  of  many 
phases  of  defeat  and  victory  for  both  sides. 
(1)  The  Iraqi  Invasion  Stage:  This  began  with 
Saddam's  rapid  advances  into  Iranian  territory,  occupying  a 
strip  of  about  800  miles  from  Khurramshahr  in  the  south  to 
Qaqr  Sh7irlin  in  the  north.  Saddam  concentrated  on  taking  and 
holding  the  southern  Iranian  border  province  of  Khuzistan, 
"rich  in  oil",  and  incorporating  it  into  Iraq;  this  would 
have  given  him  access  to  the  Gulf.  Saddam's  main  spokesman, 
Tdha  Ydsin  Ramaýdn,  declared  openly  that  his  underlying 
purpose  was  to  incorporate  Khuzistan  into  Iraq.  (60) 
The  response  to  this  threat,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  was  greater  than  Saddam  had  expected.  Iran  regrouped 
its  forces  and  launched  a  series  of  damaging  air  attacks  on 
Iraq,  in  particular  against  Baghdad,  the  Iraqi  oil 
installation  near  Kirkuk  in  the  North  and  the  industrial 
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unexpected  attacks  caused  the  closure  of  the  oil-producing 
centres,  because  of  varying  degrees  of  damage,  and 
prevented  Iraq  exporting  its  oil  from  its  southern  fields 
throughout  the  rest  of  the  word.  (61)  Thus,  in  late  October, 
Saddam  ordered  his  troops  to  stop  advancing  and  to  take  up 
defensive  positions,  so  that  the  war  became  a  static 
slogging  match. 
Saddam  managed  to  stand  fast  until  the  middle  of  1981, 
when  the  pendulum  swung  in  Iran's  favour,  after  the 
initiation  of  large  scale  Iranian  attacks  on  the  Iraqi 
forces,  which  pushed  them  back  to  the  border.  This  retreat 
was  embarrassing  to  Saddam  personally.  In  June  1982,  he 
ordered,  as  an  attempt  to  save  face,  an  Iraqi  withdrawal  to 
the  international  border,  using  the  Israeli  invasion  of 
Lebanon  as  a  justification.  (62) 
Saddam's  limited  success  at  the  beginning  of  the  war 
appears  to  have  depended  largely  on  the  following  factors: 
(a)  Iraq's  strong  accumulated  foreign  exchange 
reserves; 
(b)  The  weakness  and  divisions  within  the  various 
groups  in  Iran; 
(c)  The  propaganda  war,  which  mobilised  the  Iraqi 
nation,  in  particular  the  Shi'ates,  to  take  the 
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and  which  portrayed  the  war  as  a  struggle  between 
the  forces  of  the  Arabs  and  the  Persians.  Only 
the  most  religious  Shiates  went  over  to  the 
Iranian  side,  especially  after  the  regime  had 
given  generous  financial  compensation  to  the 
families  of  those  killed  at  the  front. 
(d)  Massive  financial  and  political  support  from  the 
Gulf  States  and  the  pro-Western  countries  in  the 
region  such  as: 
Saudi  Arabia,  which  used  its  ports  for  the 
shipment  of  goods  to  and  from  Iraq.  It  also 
allowed  its  territory  to  be  used  for  the 
construction  of  an  Iraqi  pipeline  to  the  Red 
Sea.  (63) 
-  Kuwait,  which  effectively  replaced  Basrah  as 
Iraq's  major  port  and  sold  some  of  Iraq's  oil  on 
Iraq's  behalf. 
-  Jordan,  which  from  the  beginning  of  the  war  urged 
Iraq  to  stand  firm.  The  port  of  Aqaba  was  open  to 
Iraq's  civilian  and  military  suppliers.  Jordan 
regarded  the  Iranian  Revolution  as  a  deadly 
threat  in  the  region.  (64) 
-  Egypt,  which  supplied  Iraq  from  the  beginning  of 
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its  being  isolated  by  the  anti-Egyptian  campaign, 
led  by  Saddam  himself  since  1978,  after  Saddt's 
peace  treaty  with  Israel. 
-  Turkey,.  which  allowed  its  ports  to  be  used  for 
the  shipment  of  goods  from  Iraq,  and  allowed  its 
territory  to  be  used  for  the  construction  of  an 
Iraqi  pipeline  to  export  Iraqi  oil. 
-  Sudan,  from  which  troops  were  sent  by  President 
Numairi,  to  assist  Iraq  early  in  the  war. 
In  general,  without  the  above  support,  in  particular 
the  massive  financial  support  from  Saudi  Arabia,  Kuwait  and 
other  Gulf  states,  which  was  estimated  at  $1  billion  a 
month,  (65)  Saddam's  growing  economic  plight  and 
deteriorating  political  situation  would  have  been  much  more 
serious. 
The  international  attitude  and  that  of  the  Super 
Powers  to  the  conflict  during  this  period  were  as  follows: 
(a)  The  United  States  had  no  desire  to  promote  an 
Iraqi  victory  in  the  war,  fearing  that  too  much 
success  would  increase  Saddam's  ambitions  and 
pose  another  serious  threat  in  the  area,  not  less 
than  that  posed  by  Iranian  fundamentalism. 
Besides,  an  Iranian  defeat  would  increase  the 
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the  Soviet  Union.  Thus,  when  Iran  appeared  to  be 
defeated  on  the  battlefield,  and  because  the 
United  States  had  no  diplomatic  presence  in 
Tehran,  the  Washington  administration  approved 
Israel's  covert  arms  sales  to  Tehran  to  bolster 
the  Khomeini  regime.  (66) 
(b)  The  Soviet  Union's  attitude  to  the  Iraqi  conflict 
with  Iran  was  ambivalent.  It  was  happy  to  see  the 
United  States  expelled  from  Iran,  but  it  was 
panicked  by  the  rapid  advance  of  Iraqi  arms  into 
Iranian  territory  at  the  beginning  of  the  war. 
Its  response  was  to  impose  an  arms  embargo  on 
Baghdad.  At  the  same  time,  the  Soviets  encouraged 
minorities  in  Iran  against  the  Islamic  regime  in 
order  to  weaken  it;  its  security  was  threatened 
by  the  possibility  of  a  fundamental  Islamic 
movement  being  exported  to  the  Soviet  Islamic 
Republics.  (67) 
(c)  France  was  the  second  country  for  Iraqi  military 
supplies  after  the  Soviet  Union.  It  assisted  Iraq 
with  arms  technology,  training  and  logistical 
support  throughout  the  war  period,  including  co- 
operation  in  the  fields  of  intelligence  and 
security.  This  contributed  greatly  to  Iraqi 
success  in  the  early  period,  besides  proving  a 
decisive  factor  in  the  eventual  outcome  of  the 
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(2)  The  Iraqi  Defeat  Stage:  This  began  when  the 
Iranian  regime  started  to  gain  control  and  regrouped  its 
forces,  launching  a  large-scale  counter-offensive  on  all 
fronts  and  pushing  Iraqi  troops  out  of  occupied  territory. 
(69) 
This  Iranian  success  was  largely  due  to  the  following 
factors: 
(a)  Iraq:  military  strategy  was  determined  by  Saddam 
Husayn  only.  The  front-line  commanders  were 
paralysed.  Any  military  action  was  rigidly 
controlled  to  the  last  detail  by  Saddam.  (70)  His 
lack  of  any  military  knowledge  and  experience 
contributed  to  the  inept  strategy  and  tactics  of 
the  Iraqi  forces,  (71)  but  those  who  paid  the 
price  for  his  misjudgements,  which  caused  the 
defeat,  were  the  army  commanders  and  officers. 
Thus,  after  each  Iraqi  defeat,  following  the 
Iranian  incursions,  many  high-ranking  officers 
were  executed  and  many  others  purged.  Saddam 
himself  admitted  having  executed  one  brigade  and 
two  divisional  commanders.  (72) 
(b)  The  morale  of  the  Iranian  army,  both  regular 
troops  and  irregular  revolutionary  guards,  was 
much  higher  than  Iraqi  morale,  despite  the 
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because  the  Iraqis  were  beginning  to  question  why 
they  should  be  sacrificed  in  a  war  pursued  for 
purposes  that  might  be  better  achieved  by  other 
means,  particularly  after  Saddam's  humiliating 
announcement  of  withdrawal  from  occupied  Iranian 
territory,  following  the  Iranian  counter- 
offensive,  and  his  frequent  requests  for  a  cease- 
fire,  which  were  rejected  by  the  Iranian  regime 
unless  he  himself  resigned  his  power.  This  thesis 
is  borne  out  by  the  higher  number  of  Iraqi 
prisoners  of  war  taken  than  Iranian. 
For  Saddam  the  result  was  bitter;  after  severe  human 
losses,  large  numbers  taken  as  prisoners  of  war,  a  damaged 
economy,  dissatisfaction  in  all  quarters,  civilian  and 
military,  with  his  regime,  the  balance  of  power  and  the 
border  were  essentially  what  they  had  been  at  the  start  of 
the  war,  or  even  worse. 
So  Saddam's  dreams  of  defeating  or  weakening  the 
Iranians,  so  that  they  might  be  prepared  to  co-operate  with 
him,  on  similar  lines  to  those  on  which  the  Shah  had  been 
dealing  with  him  before,  were  dashed.  His  dream  of  having 
the  south  of  Iran,  Khuzistan,  with  its  oil  resources  and 
its  access  to  the  Gulf  was  also  dashed.  The  locus  of  the 
Non-aligned  Nations'  conference,  in  September  1982,  was 
changed  from  Baghdad  to  New  Delhi,  after  his  massive 
preparations  for  this  event,  at  which  he  expected  to  become 
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years. 
On  the  domestic  front  the  mood  everywhere  had  become 
sad  and  hopeless.  Feelings  of  bitterness  against  Saddam 
spread  among  Iraqis,  for  having  involved  Iraq  in  a  war 
against  a  nation  well  known  for  its  arrogance  and 
stubbornness.  Saddam  faced  many  attempts  on  his  life.  (73) 
To  deal  with  this  situation  and  to  ensure  his  political 
survival,  he  took  the  following  steps: 
(a)  He  augmented  his  personality  cult-campaign,  which 
had  begun  when  he  took  power  and  had  grown  with 
the  passage  of  time.  In  the  strains  of  the  war, 
this  campaign  was  accompanied  by  a  public- 
relations  campaign  emphasising  his  desire  for 
peace  and  placing  the  responsibility  for  the 
continuation  of  the  war  on  the  Iranian 
leadership. 
(b)  He  called  a  Party  Congress  to  elect  a  new 
regional  command.  The  members  had  a  long-standing 
personal  loyalty  to  Saddam.  (74) 
(c)  There  was  a  new  purge  of  the  RCC.  Eight  of  the 
sixteen  members  were  removed  and  two  of  these 
lost  their  lives,  Sa'dfin  Ghayd5n,  the  Minister  of 
Communications  and  Transport,  and  Riy5d  Ibrdhim 
Vusayn,  the  Minister  of  Health.  (75) 
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announced  a  general  amnesty  for  communists  in  an 
attempt  to  woo  the  Left,  asking  for  an  alliance 
with  them,  as  he  had  always  done  in  his  desperate 
moments,  when  his  position  faced  a  threat,  (76) 
and  at  the  same  time,  to  show  the  Soviet  Union 
his  good  will,  after  its  reversed  attitude  to 
arming  his  regime  again,  following  the  Iraqi 
armed  forces  retreat  and  the  Iranian  incursions 
into  their  territory.  (77) 
(e)  He  made  changes  in  the  Party's  ideology.  The 
commitment  to  socialism  was  significantly 
reduced.  The  issue  of  liberating  Palestine  was 
not  mentioned  any  more.  (78)  Iraqi  nationalism  was 
given  precedence  over  Arab  nationalism. 
on  the  Arab  level,  Saddam  began  to  play  the  role  of  a 
victim,  who  had  sacrificed  his  armed  forces  to  defend  Arab 
interests  against  the  Iranian  threat,  in  order  to  make  the 
Arabs  feel  responsible  for  his  political  survival.  The  war 
had  been  a  serious  drain  on  the  economies  of  the  pro- 
western  states,  in  particularly  the  Gulf  states  such  as 
Saudi  Arabia  and  Kuwait.  It  was  their  duty  to  continue  to 
finance  Saddam's  regime,  since  otherwise  they  would  never 
be  able  properly  to  defeat  Iran.  (79) 
Saddam's  pro-western  neighbours,  Jordan  and  Turkey, 
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retreat,  in  order  to  bolster  his  regime;  (80)  his  relations 
with  Syria  had  deteriorated  to  their  lowest  point,  after 
its  move  to  close  the  oil  pipeline. 
The  Iraqi  reverse  in  the  war  affected  international 
attitudes  at  large.  The  United  States  could  not  accept  any 
Iranian  victory  which  paved  the  way  for  the  establishing  of 
a  fundamentalist  regime  in  Iraq.  Since  it  had  no  diplomatic 
presence  in  Baghdad  at  that  time,  it  took  the  following 
steps: 
(a)  The  Secretary  of  State,  -Alexander  Haig,  warned 
Iran  strongly  against  expanding  the  war; 
(b)  The  US  gave  permission  for  arms  sales  to  Iraq  by 
its  friends  and  allies;  (81) 
(c)  Baghdad  was  removed  from  the  US  government's  list 
of  states  supporting  international  terrorism. 
This  policy  was  adopted  by  America  to  pave  the 
way  for  restoring  trade  relations  with  Iraq  in 
order  to  help  repair  Saddam's  seriously  damaged 
economy.  Saddam,  in  return,  reduced  the  attack  by 
his  media  on  the  United  States  as  the  leader  of 
world  imperialism.  He  also  expelled  the  notorious 
international  terrorist,  Abd  Niddl,  from  Baghdad. 
I 
As  for  the  Soviet  Union,  which  had  responded  to  Iraq's 
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embargo  on  Saddam's  regime,  it  resumed  shipments  in  mid- 
1981,  once  the  Iranians  had  begun  their  counter-offensive. 
A  year  later,  after  the  Iranians  had  expelled  the  Iraqis 
from  their  territory,  the  flow  of  Soviet  arms  turned  into  a 
flood,  in  addition  to  economic  support. 
In  spite  of  their  contradictory  motivations  and 
differing  interests,  the  Super  Power  and  all  foreign 
suppliers  united  for  the  first  time  to  arm  Saddam  against 
the  Iranian  regime,  some  for  commercial,  and  others  for 
strategic  reasons.  France  actually  admired  Saddam's  regime, 
regarding  the  Ba'th  as  reflecting  its  own  revolutionary 
ideals.  (82) 
(3)  The  shift  of  the  war  to  Iraqi  territory:  Af  ter 
the  Iraqi  withdrawal  from  Iranian  territory  in  the  summer 
of  1982,  the  Iranians  declared  that  one  of  their  conditions 
for  ending  the  conflict  had  been  met,  but  not  completely, 
since  Saddam's  regime  still  held  some  Iranian  pockets.  They 
also  stipulated  two  further  conditions: 
(a)  Condemnation  of  Saddam.  as  the  aggressor; 
(b)  Payment  of  compensation; 
Thus  they  refused  all  compromises  attempted  by  the 
international  peace  missions,  which  travelled  many  times 
between  Baghdad  and  Tehran,  and  would  accept  no 
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of  Saddam  from  power. 
Thus,  Ayatollah  Khomeini  managed  to  turn  the  war  into 
an  Iranian  national  crusade,  with  Saddam  as  Satan,  seeking 
to  bring  down  his  regime.  In  summer  1982,  the  Iranians  made 
two  unsuccessful  attempts  to  take  Basrah  city  and  cut  the 
Baghdad-Basrah  highway,  causing  heavy  losses  on  both 
sides.  (83)  Throughout  1983/84  they  launched  attacks  in  many 
areas  using  huge  human  waves,  but  they  failed,  (84)  because 
they  faced  a  formidable  Iraqi  defensive  line,  protected  by 
greatly  superior  air  power. 
The  Iranian  major  offensive  on  the  northern  part  of 
Iraq  occurred  in  summer  1983  at  Haji  'Omran  and  Penjewin. 
I 
In  the  south,  in  February  and  March  1984,  Khomeini  amassed 
some  five  hundred  thousand  Iranians  for  what  was  called 
"the  final  offensive"  in  the  marshlands.  They  succeeded  in 
capturing  the  oil-rich  Majnfin  Island,  together  with  some 
pockets  of  territory  on  the  mainland.  In  summer  1984  the 
Iraqi  forces  made  many  attempts,  using  chemical  warfare,  to 
dislodge  the  Iranians  and  recapture  the  island,  but  they 
managed  only,  at  a  high  cost  in  lives,  to  hold  back  the 
Iranian's  advance;  they  could  not  push  them  back  across  the 
border.  (85) 
For  the  next  year  and  a  half  neither  side  appeared  to 
be  able  to  achieve  a  decisive  advantage  on  the  battlefield, 
despite  heavy  casualties  until  in  early  1986,  the  Iranians 
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significant  advance  into  Iraqi  territory,  and  the  most 
severe  Iraqi  setback  in  the  whole  war. 
obviously,  it  is  difficult  to  gauge  apparent  feeling 
against  the  war  or  Saddam's  continuation  in  power,  because 
the  regime  so  terrorised  the  population  with  its  ruthless 
internal  security  forces  against  any  kind  of  opposition. 
However,  as  the  fighting  continued  year  upon  year,  the 
number  of  casualties  greatly  increased.  The  regime  became 
very  sensitive  to  this  and  stopped  publishing  casualty 
figures.  Because  of  the  pressure  he  was  feeling  from  the 
military  leaders,  in  particular  af  ter  the  Fao  setback, 
Saddam  began  to  deal  somewhat  differently  with  the  army.  He 
limited  still  further  the  authority  of  his  military 
commanders  in  the  conduct  of  the  war.  (86)  For  the  first 
time  he  began  to  allow  the  public  mention  of  army 
commanders,  names;  previously  these  had  been  kept 
secret.  (87) 
In  addition  to  the  lack  of  political  opposition  to  the 
regime  during  this  period,  there  was  also  little  in  the  way 
of  effective  Shi'ite  opposition,  except  what  came  from  the 
Supreme  council  of  Islamic  Revolution  of  Iraq  (SCIRI),  an 
exiled  military  Shi'ite  group  trained  and  operated  in  Iran. 
in  order  to  stop  this  group's  activities,  Saddam  sent  the 
group's  exiled  leader,  Hujjat  al  Islam  Muhammad  Baqir  al- 
1ýakifm,  a  message  from  ninety  members  of  his  family,  some  of 
whom  were  executed.  (88)  The  prominent  Shi'ite  member  of  the 
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National  Assembly,  Na'Im  Hadd5d,  was  expelled  from  his 
position  in  the  Party  and  the  State. 
As  for  the  Kurds,  they  were  hit  extremely  hard  by 
Saddam  during  this  period.  After  the  major  Iranian 
offensive  into  the  north  of  Iraq  in  the  summer  of  1983, 
Mas'fid  al-Barzdh-i's  KDP  joined  the  Iranian  assault  on  the 
central  government  in  Baghdad.  Saddam's  response  was  brutal 
repression.  According  to  one  report  in  March  1985,  eight 
thousand  Kurdish  members  of  the  Barazdrfi  clan,  who  had  been 
imprisoned  in  1983,  disappeared.  Another  eye-witness  report 
claimed  that  about  four  thousand  political  prisoners  in  Aba 
Ghurayb  prison  were  killed  in  1984  in  a  mass  execution.  (89) 
The  other  Kurdish  group,  PUK,  the  Patriotic  Union  of 
Kurdistan,  headed  by  Jaldl  al-TalabWi,  made  a  joint  attack, 
in  collaboration  with  Turkish.  forces,  to  help  Saddam's 
regime  against  the  joint  KDP  and  Iranian  offensive,  which 
took  place  in  Kurdistan  in  summer  1983.  (90) 
In  an  attempt  to  repress  even  his  own  family,  Saddam 
removed  his  half-brother,  Barazdn,  as  head  of  intelligence, 
also  his  other  two  half  brothers,  Watban  and  Sab'Mi.  The 
three  were  placed  under  house  arrest  for  alleged  family 
squabbles,  but  it  seems  that  the  true  reason  was  Saddam's 
dissatisfaction  with  their  loyalty.  (91) 
As  far  as  the  rest  of  the  Arab  world  was  concerned  at 
this  period,  Saddam  developed  much  closer  ties  with  all  the 
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Egypt  tried  to  pave  the  way  for  its  return  to  the  Arab 
community  by  playing  a  considerable  role  in  supplying  the 
aid  that  Iraq  required;  it  sent  volunteers  who  were 
deployed  with  the  Iraqi  armed  forces  and  it  supplied  Iraq 
with  munitions,  tanks  and  spare  parts  for  Iraq's  Soviet- 
supplied  arsenal.  (93) 
As  Saddam's  difficulties  with  Iran  increased  and  his 
need  for  international  support  became  desperate,  the  United 
States  re-established  full  diplomatic  relations  with  Iraq, 
on  27  October  1984,  and  began  supplying  the  Iraqi  armed 
forces  with  satellite  and  intelligence  information,  in 
addition  to  loans  for  food  products  and  agricultural 
equipment  to  diminish  the  pressure  on  Saddam  on  the 
domestic  level.  France,  on  which  Iraq  relied  for  much  of 
its  armaments  and  loans,  increased  its  support  and  credits 
despite  Iraq's  heavy  debt.  According  to  some  sources, 
Saddam's  desperate  need  led  him  to  approach  even  Israel  for 
military  and  intelligence  assistance.  (94) 
However,  in  summer  1986,  all  circumstances  indicated 
that  political  change  in  Iraq  might  be  expected  for  these 
reasons: 
(a)  The  Iranians  had  captured  strategic  Iraqi 
territory,  and  the  Iraqis,  even  after  many  costly 
attempts,  using  chemical  weapons,  had  been  unable 
to  regain  it;  (95) 
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just  Saddam's  head  as  their  price  for  peace, 
refusing  any  other  proposal; 
(c)  The  Iraqi  army  had  become  increasingly  incapable 
of  withstanding  Iran's  superior  numbers,  despite 
the  international  community's  full  support  for 
Saddam's  war  effort; 
(d)  Saddam  had  sophisticated  weapons  technology  and 
military  industry,  which,  if  they  fell  into  the 
hands  of  some  fundamentalist  power  like  Iran, 
would  be  a  real  threat  to  the  area  and  to 
American  interests. 
Therefore,  according  to  many  accounts,  America  tried 
to  remove  Saddam  from  power,  to  save  the  situation.  One 
account  claimed  that  the  fall  of  the  Fao  was  occasioned  by 
the  help  of  American  intelligence  technology  to  the  Iranian 
side,  in  order  to  put  heavy  pressure  on  Saddam  and  to 
compel  him  to  resign  his  power.  (96)  What  supports  this 
account  is  Saddam's  regime's  admission  of  receiving 
incorrect  information  from  the  American  intelligence 
service,  accusing  it  of  deliberately  misleading  Iraq  with 
false  information.  (97)  Also,  Saudi  Arabia,  Kuwait  and  other 
Gulf  States  increased  their  oil  exports;  this  lowered  the 
price  of  oil  from  $27  per  barrel  in  1985  to  $15  per  barrel 
in  early  1986,  (98)  putting  further  pressure  on  Saddam's 
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unsuccessful,  owing  to  the  fact  that  Saddam's  full  control 
of  the  party  and  the  state  machinery,  including  the  armed 
forces,  frustrated  any  attempt  at  his  removal  from  power. 
This  left  the  United  States  and  its  allies  only  one 
alternative,  to  save  the  regime  from  the  undoubted  Iranian 
victory. 
(4)  Internationalisation  Stage:  At  this  stage,  a 
major  shift  in  the  war  took  place.  Saddam  realised  that  the 
west  was  working  for  his  removal,  because  of  his  failure  to 
stop  the  Iranian  threat,  and  he  began  a  new  ferocious 
campaign  to  destroy  Iran's  oil  export  facilities,  trying  to 
cut  off  Iran's  oil  exports  and  deprive  the  Tehran  regime  of 
oil  revenues,  thus  provoking  an  international  crisis  as 
well.  In  summer  1986,  Iraq  started  to  attack  the  Iranian 
oil  terminals  -  the  so-called  "Tanker  War".  (99) 
Saddam,  s  aim  in  this  move  was  to  provoke  Iran  into 
some  extreme  action,  such  as  closing  the  Strait  of  Hormuz, 
in  order  to  draw  the  western  powers  into  the  war  and  to 
generate  international  pressure  on  Iran;  this  would  perhaps 
help  to  bring  about  a  settlement  for  ending  the  war  and 
might  save  his  regime.  However,  Iran's  response  to 
Saddam's  new  strategy  was  the  opposite  of  his  expectations. 
Realising  Saddam's  plan,  in  order  to  avoid  such  a  result, 
Iran  declared  that  it  would  not  close  the  Strait  of  Hormuz 
and  harm  the  west.  (100)  In  order  to  put  pressure  on 
Saddam's  regime  from  its  supporters,  the  Gulf  States  to 
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some  attacks  on  the  shipping  trading  with  Saudi  Arabia  and 
Kuwait.  (101)  However,  in  late  1986  Saddam  increased  his 
attacks  on  Iranian  economic  targets  and  commercial 
shipping,  (102)  compelling  Iran  to  make  a  maximum  response, 
in  particular  against  tankers  shipping  oil  from  Kuwait, 
since  Iraq  had  no  navy  in  the  Gulf.  This  caused  Saudi 
Arabia  and  Kuwait  to  ask  the  two  super  powers  for  naval 
protection.  Foreign  naval  forces  were  rushed  to  the  Gulf 
region.  in  March  1987  the  United  States  declared  that  it 
would  protect  Kuwaiti  oil  tankers  by  putting  them  under  the 
American  flag.  A  month  later  the  Soviet  Union  did  the  same. 
In  addition,  the  American  navy  made  some  attacks  on  Iranian 
shipping  and  Iranian  oil  installations.  (103)  This  policy 
showed  clearly  that  the  United  States  stood  firmly  on  the 
Iraqi  side. 
Besides  this  full-scale  tanker  war,  Saddam  launched 
massive  missile  attacks  against  Iranian  civilian  targets, 
ferociously  continuing  these,  despite  the  United  Nations' 
warning  not  to  attack  civilians.  Iran  did  the  same  against 
Iraqi  cities,  starting  the  so-called  "Cities  War".  The 
Iraqi  intensive  air  raids,  as  well  as  killing  large  numbers 
of  civilians  and  hitting  high-value  economic  targets,  also 
caused  a  blockade  by  cutting  sharply  the  commercial  air 
traffic  entering  Iran.  This  was  another  effective^blow  to 
Iran;  Saddam's  new  policy  was  a  fresh  attempt  to  put  an  end 
to  the  war. 
535 (5)  The  Iraqi  Victory  Stage:  The  Tanker  and  Cities 
Wars  were  launched  by  Saddam  against  Iran  in  the  last  two 
years  of  the  war.  There  was,  besides,  considerable 
international  pressure  on  Iran  and  a  greater  involvement  of 
the  two  super  powers  which  remained  firmly  on  Iraq's 
side.  (104)  In  addition  to  their  substantial  military  and 
intelligence  assistance,  the  two  powers  also  increased 
their  trade  with  Iraq  during  this  period.  The  United  States 
signed  a  five  year  economic  and  technical  agreement  with 
Iraq  on  26  August  1987,  (105)  while  Soviet-Iraqi  trade 
increased  to  $1,200  million,  an  increase  of  46%  over  1986. 
(106) 
Accordingly,  Iran  seemed  to  be  increasingly  weakened, 
and  the  Iranian  people  lost  their  morale.  However,  Iran 
still  had  the  capacity  to  inflict  serious  damage  on  Iraq, 
despite  international  opposition  to  their  regime;  it 
remained  arrogant  and  stubborn.  On  15  March  1988,  Iran 
launched  an  offensive  in  northern  Iraq  with  the  aid  of  the 
two  Kurdish  Parties,  the  PUK  and  the  KDP,  and  captured  the 
city  of  Halabjah.  Saddam.  quickly  retaliated  by  bombing 
Halabjah  with  poison  gas,  causing  some  five  thousand  deaths 
among  the  civilian  population:  a  measure  of  revenge  against 
the  Kurdish  opposition  for  its  aid  to  Iran  against  the 
central  Government.  (107) 
However,  as  a  result  of  a  series  of  military  attacks, 
in  which  there  was  wide-scale  use  of  chemical  weapons, 
which  caused  a  total  breakdown  of  Iranian  resistance,  Iran 
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captured.  (108)  A  further  blow  to  Iranian  morale  was  the  new 
American  policy  of  naval  engagement  in  the  Gulf  to  protect 
the  right  of  free  passage  in  the  war  zone;  this  resulted  in 
the  shooting  down  of  an  Iranian  Airbus.  The  United  States 
claimed  that  this  incident  was  due  to  a  tragic  error,  thus 
placing  the  responsibility  on  the  Iranian  side,  for 
allowing  a  passenger  aircraft  to  fly  in  a  war  zone. 
Soon  after  the  airbus  episode,  Ayatollah  Khomeini 
accepted  United  Nations'  Resolution  598  without  conditions 
and  a  cease-fire  came  into  effect.  Many  commentators,  as 
well  as  most  of  the  Iraqi  people,  had  not  expected  that  the 
long,  bloody  Iraq-Iran  war  would  come  to  an  end,  but  it 
seems  that  Ayatalldh  Khomeini's  acceptance  of  the  cease- 
fire  was  due  to  these  factors: 
(a)  Saddam's  campaign  of  missile  attacks  on 
population  centres  caused  Iranian  pro-war  and 
pro-government  sentiments  to  diminish  sharply. 
(b)  Saddam's  chemical  weapons  warfare  diminished  the 
military  fighting  spirit,  as  was  demonstrated  by 
the  drop  in  the  number  of  volunteers. 
(c)  Saddam's  campaign  against  Iranian  economic 
targets  and  commercial  shipping,  besides  the 
international  blockade,  totally  paralysed  the 
Iranian  economy. 
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confront  the  multinational  armada;  Khomeini  was 
anxious  to  disengage  from  this,  in  particular 
after  the  Iranian  Airbus  tragedy. 
(e)  Most  importantly,  the  high  human  and  political 
cost  which  caused  the  Ayatollah's  regime  to  be 
questioned,  in  particular  the  logic  of  taking  the 
war  to  Iraqi  soil,  by  the  Iranian  people  and  even 
by  the  Iraqi  Shi'ites,  who  had  sympathised  with 
the  Islamic  revolution. 
The  Iranians  came  to  realise  subsequently  that  their 
victories  against  the  Shah  and  in  the  first  year  of  the  war 
were  not  the  result  of  their  capacity  or  their  faith,  as 
they  had  thought,  but  of  the  Super  Powers'  toleration  of 
the  Islamic  revolution,  in  order  to  break  the  hold  of  both 
the  ambitious  Shah  and  Saddam,  and,  at  the  same  time,  to 
weaken  both  the  Iraqi  and  Iranian  armed  forces;  when  Iran 
started  to  present  a  real  threat  to  their  interests,  their 
efforts  to  restrict  its  role  were  very  severe, 
notwithstanding  the  economic  and  human  destruction  that 
ensued.  The  United  States'  policy  followed  Brzezinski's 
contingency  plan  to  protest  the  interests  of  America  and 
its  allies.  In  the  next  section,  the  destructiveness  of  the 
war  on  both  sides  will  be  described. 
538 The  Impact  of  the  war 
Both  countries,  Iraq  and  Iran,  were  heavily  damaged  by 
the  war,  and  needed  extensive  infrastructure  repairs. 
Estimates  of  war  damage  ranged  from  $200  billion  to  $500 
billion.  Most  accounts  agreed  that  the  war  had  hit  Iran 
much  harder  than  Iraq.  Casualties  were  high  and  involved 
almost  all  classes  of  the  two  countries.  Casualty  figures 
for  the  War  came  to  one  million  altogether.  The  Iranian 
losses  were  20%-30%  more  than  the  Iraqi  losses,  (110) 
although  the  war  created  for  Saddam's  regime  serious  labour 
shortages  as  all  available  manpower  was  mobilised  for  the 
front.  (111) 
Both  sides  suffered  economic  disasters.  The  monthly 
running  cost  of  the  war  was  about  $1  billion.  By  the  end, 
Iraq  was  in  severe  financial  difficulties,  owing  about  $80 
billion,  nearly  half  of  it  to  Arab  States,  mainly  Gulf 
States.  But  the  greater  economic  damage  was  suffered  by  the 
Iranians  who  were  drastically  hit,  in  particular  in  the 
last  two  years,  when  an  attempt  was  made  to  force  Iran  to 
end  to  war.  In  terms  of  war  materiel,  Iraqi  losses  were  50% 
greater  than  Iranian.  (112) 
Throughout  the  period  of  the  war,  the  Iranians'  morale 
was  higher  than  that  of  the  Iraqis.  This  fact  is  shown  by 
the  large  numbers  of  Iraqi  prisoners  of  war,  estimated  at 
about  75,000  -  80,000,  while  those  of  the  Iranians  were 
539 30,000,  most  of  whom  were  taken  in  the  final  offensive, 
which  was  launched  by  Saddam's  army  after  the  cease- 
fire.  (113) 
For  Saddam,  however,  not  all  the  results  of  the  war 
were  negative.  It  brought  him  certain  advantages,  such  as 
the  following: 
The  personality  cult  of  Saddam  throughout  the  course 
of  the  war  continued  unabated;  in  fact,  it  increased. 
His  media  depicted  him  to  the  Iraqis  as  the  hero,  who 
brought  victory  over  Iran  and  defended  the 
homeland.  (114)  His  media  misled  other  Arab  nations  as 
well.  The  pro-Saddam  Arab  press,  inside  and  outside 
Iraq,  shaped  the  collective  mind  of  the  Arabs  into 
believing  that  it  was  he  who  had  saved  the  security 
and  the  stability  of  the  region  and  protected  them 
from  the  unknown  flood  coming  from  Iran.  Simply,  he 
became  the  new  Saladin,  the  Muslim  warrior  who  drove 
the  Christian  crusaders  out  of  the  holy  lands  in  the 
twelfth  century. 
(2)  The  war  provided  for  Saddam  the  justification  for 
tightening  his  grip  even  more  on  the  military  forces, 
the  Baýth  Party  and  the  State  machinery  in  general; 
this  strengthened  his  position  greatly  from  what  it 
had  been  before  the  war. 
(3)  The  most  serious  advantage  he  obtained  from  the  war 
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chemical  and  biological  weapons,  which  had  been 
supplied  to  him  by  both  Eastern  and  Western 
blocs.  (115)  An  objective  which  Saddam  had  long  been 
trying  to  achieve  was  to  obtain  weapons  of  mass 
destruction  Aslihat:  al-DbrOr  al-Shdmil,  which  included 
a  nuclear  capability,  and  chemical  weapons,  which  he 
already  possessed.  Thus,  by  the  end  of  the  war,  he  was 
in  possession  of  the  most  powerful  war  machine  in  the 
Middle  East,  after  Israel. 
Moreover,  the  war  provided  Saddam  with  the  opportunity 
to  gain  experience  in  the  use  of  his  weapons  of  mass 
destruction;  he  exploited  the  muted  international  attitude 
to  the  full  for  his  own  purposes.  (117) 
History  as  well  produced  for  Saddam  another 
opportunity  which  he  fully  exploited,  using  the 
historically  based  feeling  of  enmity  between  the  Arabs  and 
the  racist  Persians  (as  the  Ba'th  began  to  call  them, 
instead  of  "Iranians"  when  the  war  started).  Saddam's  chief 
aim  in  this  move  was  to  convince  the  Iraqis,  in  particular 
the  Shi'ah,  that  the  Iranians  did  not  represent  Islam, 
accusing  them  of  being  MajOs  "Zoroastrians"  working 
together  with  the  Jews  to  further  the  imperialist  designs 
of  Persia.  He  accused  them  as  well  of  using  the  cover  of 
religion  to  affirm  their  fundamental  hostility  to  the  Arab 
Nation,  in  particular  the  Iraqis,  the  inhabitants  of 
mesopotamia,  the  centre  of  the  Abbasid  Empire,  which  was 
541 challenged  by  Persian  movements,  such  as  the 
Shu'abiyyah.  (118)  So,  Saddam  presented  the  Iranians  as  no 
more  than  the  new  Shu'abTs.  Thanks  to  this  concept,  based 
largely  on  the  idea  of  the  enemy  within,  which  became  the 
main  focus  of  Saddam's  propaganda,  thousands  of  Iraqis  were 
ousted  from  Iraq,  as  has  already  been  mentioned.  By  means 
of  this  racist  language,  which  was  introduced  at  the  start 
of  the  war  and  continued  throughout  its  eight  years.  Saddam 
created  a  racist  and  ethnic  hatred  between  the  two 
neighbouring  Muslim  countries.  (119) 
Another  impact  of  the  war  was  to  produce  an  effect 
upon  oil  production  and  oil  prices;  the  fall  in  oil 
production  in  both  Iraq  and  Iran,  due  to  the  war,  led  other 
oil  producing  states,  in  particular  the  Gulf  States,  to 
increase  their  production,  which  resulted  in  the  fall  of 
oil  prices  by  half.  The  statement  of  the  Brookings 
Institute  in  1984  confirmed  that  the  scenario  of  the 
prolonged  stalemate  probably  helped  to  ensure  a  relatively 
soft  oil  market  for  the  next  few  years.  Thus,  the  war 
favoured  both  producers  and  consumers  of  oil.  (120) 
The  most  serious  impact  of  the  war  was  to  demonstrate 
Iraq's  vulnerability  as  a  state,  comprising  different 
ethnic  groups,  of  whom  two,  the  Shiah  in  the  south  and  the 
Kurds  in  the  north,  were  allied  with  Iran  throughout  its 
course.  This  phenomenon  became  more  apparent  as  the  war 
developed:  the  reason  for  this  serious  disloyalty  to  the 
Iraqi  State  was  Saddam's  deliberately  discriminatory 
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war.  In  addition  it  was  compounded  with  his  ruthless 
campaign  to  gain  control  over  all  political  movements  in 
Iraq,  notwithstanding  the  reverse  consequences  of  this 
frequently  mindless  policy,  which  would  undoubtedly  affect 
Iraq's  unity,  provoke  guerrilla  warfare  against  the  regime 
and  create  separatist  movements  calling  for  independence. 
This  would  bring  about  the  break-up  of  the  Iraqi 
State.  (121) 
Also,  the  war  clearly  showed  the  importance  of  a 
coast-line  for  the  country's  independence.  Iraq  has  been 
deprived  of  a  long  coast-line  on  the  Gulf;  this  has  made  it 
a  hostage  to  its  neighbours  and  affected  its  political  and 
economical  position  very  badly.  At  any  rate,  as  far  as 
Saddam  was  concerned,  both  the  negative  and  positive 
outcome  of  the  war  encouraged-  him  to  undertake  another 
adventure  and  another  disaster  for  the  Iraqi  nation  and  the 
area  at  large. 
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From  an  analysis  of  this  Chapter,  it  is  clear  that  the 
Iraq-Iran  war  was  an  element  in  the  emergency  plan  that  was 
drafted  by  Brzezinski,  the  United  States  National  Security 
Adviser,  in  response  to  the  United  States-Iran  crisis  that 
was  threatening  American  interests  in  the  Gulf.  Also,  Iraq, 
according  to  Saddam's  own  admission  and  that  of  some  of  his 
men,  was  pushed  into  the  war,  in  the  hope  that  he  would 
become  the  policeman  of  the  Gulf,  in  place  of  the  Shah. 
From  the  actual  development  of  events,  there  is  an 
indication  that  Saddam  plunged  into  the  war  because  of  this 
false  hope.  He  was  used  as  a  tool  with  no  gains  for  Iraq  or 
its  people.  In  many  of  his  speeches,  he  said  that  he 
sacrificed  his  people  and  his  army  in  the  cause  of  the 
defence  of  the  Arab  Nations  and,  in  particular,  the  Gulf 
States,  while,  in  fact,  the  Gulf  States  were  no  more  than 
American  bases. 
Saddam  obviously  tried  to  use  the  international 
support  that  he  received  during  the  war  to  achieve  the 
expansionist  plans  that  he  was  unable  to  achieve  during  the 
war.  He  emerged  from  the  Iraq-Iran  war  with  massive 
military  capabilities  that  the  United  States  and  its  allies 
in  the  area,  particularly  Israel,  could  not  accept.  He  did 
not  benefit  from  the  Shah's  experience,  and  so  he  repeated 
the  Sahah's  mistakes;  thus  Iraq  became  a  threat  to  the 
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interests  in  the  Gulf  and  the  security  of  Israel. 
United  States  strategy  was  primarily  based  on  the 
recommendations  of  the  fact-finding  mission,  headed  by 
Senator  Bradley,  that  was  sent  to  the  Gulf  area  on  2 
January  1981  to  survey  the  area  and  to  gather  as  much  real 
information  as  possible  about  political,  economic  and 
military  factors  in  the  Middle  East,  particularly  the  Gulf, 
and  the  effect  of  these  on  oil  and  on  the  consolidation  of 
United  States  interests  in  the  area.  This  meant,  as  far  as 
the  Iraq-Iran  war  was  concerned,  that  neither  side  should 
be  allowed  to  achieve  a  victory.  The  United  States  worked 
hard  to  achieve  this  objective,  by  supplying  both  sides 
with  weapons.  This  helped  the  American  economy  with 
billions  of  dollars  while  destroying  the  capabilities  of 
the  two  strongest  powers  in  the  area  economically, 
militarily  and  demographically.  Irangate  and  Iraqgate  were 
proofs  of  this  policy. 
When  the  military  situation  tilted  in  Iran's  favour, 
and  Iran  began  to  win,  despite  the  huge  support  that  was 
received  by  Iraq  and  despite  Iraq's  use  of  chemical  weapons 
which  were  internationally  banned,  the  United  States  began 
to  be  actively  involved  against  Iran.  This  helped  to  force 
Iran  to  submit,  after  both  countries  had  experienced  great 
destruction. 
Iraq  actually  achieved  military  victory,  but  this  was 
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Iranians  out  of  Iraqi  territory,  to  destroy  much  of  Iran's 
military  machine  and  to  emerge  with  a  huge  military  machine 
of  its  own  much  larger  than  what  remained  in  Iran's 
possession.  However,  the  borders  and  the  situation  in  the 
Shatt  al-Arab  remained  as  they  were.  Saddam  even  declared 
that  he  would  be  ready  to  pay  compensation  to  Iran,  if  it 
would  ignore  his  responsibility  for  the  aggression.  Thus, 
Saddam  achieved  none  of  the  objectives  of  his  war  with 
Iran,  and  became  responsible  for  the  death  and  destruction 
that  was  experienced  during  the  eight  years  of  the  war.  A 
major  element  of  United  States'  strategy  after  the  Iraq- 
Iran  war  was  to  destroy  Iraq's  military  power  and  to  smash 
Saddam's  ambitions.  The  United  States  began  to  plan  its 
strategy  for  that  major  objective  immediately  after  the 
war. 
This  is  affirmed  by  General  Schwarzkopf  in  his 
memoirs.  He  refers  to  the  pressures  and  the  provocation 
applied  by  the  United  States  and  its  allies,  in  order  to 
drag  Saddam  once  again  into  a  new  war,  this  time  with  the 
United  States,  so  as  to  destroy  Iraq  and  its  military  power 
as  well  as  Saddam's  ambitions.  This  is  proved  by  subsequent 
events,  which  will  be  the  subject  of  the  next  chapter,  that 
is  psychological  warfare  between  the  first  and  second  Gulf 
wars. 
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and  his  control  over  the  area,  in  accordance  with 
Nixon's  policy  of  "strengthening  America's  friends 
so  as  to  enable  them  to  defend  themselves.  "  This 
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they  considered  the  Shah  as  the  best  guarantor  of 
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stand  up  to  and  counter  the  Shah. 
9-  Af  ter  Khomeini  Is  return  to  Iran  and  his  f  amous 
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the  one  hand,  and  the  saf  ety  of  the  hostages. 
I  have  never  had  to  face  any  difference 
between  those  two  and  I  try  in  my  own  mind  to 
keep  them  compatible  and  I  think  every  action 
that  I've  taken  so  far  and  every  action  that 
I  would  contemplate  in  the  future  would  not 
be  to  abandon  either  one  of  these  commitments 
of  mine,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  hostages 
lives,  safety  and  freedom,  on  the  other.  " 
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Makina  of  the  War  Machine,  London,  1991. 
117-  Saddam's  thwarting  of  the  Iranian  threat  and  the 
protection  of  international  interests  in  the  region 
at  the  root  of  the  United  Nations'  hesitation  in 
adopting  a  critical  stance  against  him  and  its 
failure  to  take  any  real  action  against  his  regime. 
The  Iranian  threat  and  international  interests  were 
considered  the  most  pressing  priorities  by  the  West 
and  even  the  Eastern  Bloc,  which  raised  socialist 
slogans  in  defence  of  tyrannised  nations  against 
imperialism.  This  left  Saddam.  somewhat  free  to 
abuse  human  rights  and  violate  national  and 
international  laws. 
118-  The  Shu'ubiyyah  was  a  movement  which  appeared  under 
568 the  Abbasid  Empire  and  was  centred  largely  among 
the  Pers  ian-  speaking  subjects  of  that  Empire.  It 
was  mainly  a  literary  and  cultural  movement  which 
challenged  the  Arabs,  claim  to  primacy  within  the 
Islamic  dispensation  and  championed  the  cause  of 
non-Arab,  and  especially  Persian,  culture. 
119-  Report  by  Amir  Taheri  in  International  Herald 
Tribune,  10  October  1980. 
120-  "Oil  and  the  Outcome  of  the  Iraq-Iran  War"  in  the 
Merip  Report,  No.  125  -  126,  -July/September  1984, 
pp.  40-42. 
121-  Despite  Saddam's  ruthlessness,  the  war  caused  the 
Kurds  and  some  Shi'ite  religious  groups  to  take  the 
Iranian  side  against  the  Iraqi  State.  This  short- 
sighted  attitude  paved  the  way  for  regional  and 
foreign  powers  to  use  the  Kurdish  and  Shi'ite  issue 
as  a  trump  card  for  their  own  purposes.  The  Kurds 
had  failed  to  learn  from  previous  incidents  in 
which  Saddam  attacked  them,  using  chemical  weapons 
as  a  retaliatory  measure.  Moreover,  some  Kurdish 
opposition  groups  proved  hypocritical  attitudes  by 
co-operating,  at  times,  with  Saddam,  and,  at  other 
times,  with  Iran  or  Turkey,  in  pursuit  of  immediate 
personal  benefits. 
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THE  SECONED  GULF  WAR 
THE  IRAQI  COALITION  WAR The  Roots  of  the  Crisis 
In  the  wake  of  the  Iraq-Iran  war,  it  is  clear  that 
there  were  many  events  marking  the  steps  to  the  invasion  of 
Kuwait.  It  is  not  known  if  these  events  were  manufactured 
by  Saddam  and  America  together,  or  if  they  happened  by 
accident.  This  will  only  be  revealed  when  the  documents 
concerning  this  period  are  published  by  the  countries 
concerned. 
From  late  1989,  until  Saddam  sent  his  troops  and 
equipment  towards  the  Kuwaiti  border,  a  series  of  events 
punctuated  by  accusations,  threats  and  warnings 
characterised  relations  between  America  and  Saddam's 
regime.  It  seems  that  they  changed  from  being  associates  to 
enemies.  Britain  and  Israel  were  also  involved  in  this  cold 
war,  which  developed  into  a  war  of  nerves,  as  the  following 
chronology  of  the  events  reveals. 
In  October  1989,  Tdriq  ýAzlz,  the  Iraqi  Foreign 
I 
Minister,  visited  the  US  Secretary  of  State,  James 
Baker,  in  Washington  and  voiced  his  Government's 
concern  about  America's  involvement  in  Israeli  and 
Kuwaiti  plots  to  assassinate  Saddam  Husayn  and  change 
the  Iraqi  regime.  (1)  Saddam  had  faced  several  attempts 
on  his  life  throughout  the  post-war  era.  It  is  unknown 
whether  these  attempts  were  planned  by  America  and  its 
allies  or  merely  by  some  Iraqi  opposition  groups. 
Saddam  was  extremely  isolated  from  the  Iraqi 
570 population  and  ruled  them  by  the  most  extreme  forms  of 
repression  and  terror.  In  addition,  he  put  great 
pressure  on  them  because  of  the  war  with  Iran,  and 
despite  his  domestic  propaganda  efforts  to  disguise 
the  fact  that  his  country  was  crippled  and  that  its 
economy  had  been  destroyed  by  the  war.  (2) 
The  collapse  of  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  Eastern 
European  regimes,  and  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  made 
Saddam  increasingly  conscious  about  the  nature  of  the 
new  world  order  under  US  supremacy.  He  realised  that 
these  new  developments  would  allow  America  to  impose 
its  control  on  the  Middle  East  and  would  thwart  his 
ambition  to  be  the  regional  super  power.  Thus,  in  his 
speech  in  November  1989  he  explained  the  reason  behind 
his  desire  to  build  up  Iraqi  power,  which  was  to 
display  his  ability  to  challenge  any  American  attempt 
to  demolish  him: 
our  answer  to  this  is  that  we  want  this 
big  army  so  that  no  one  can  come  and  tweak  our 
moustaches  or  pull  our  beards,  and  so  that  we 
can  cut  off  the  hand  that  tries  to  do  this. 
This  is  all  we  want;  we  do  not  want  to  attack 
anybody,  and  we  do  not  have  ambitions  outside 
Iraq.  This  army  is  for  defending  Iraq  and  the 
Arab  whose  moustache  is  tweaked  and  the  Arab 
who  wants  us  to  support  him  and  who  we  believe 
has  a  rightful  claim  to  that  support.,, 
571 This  theme  was  repeated  by  the  Iraqi  regime.  on  7 
December  Iraq's  Minister  for  Military  Industries, 
Brigadier  Uusayn  KZimil,  announced  that  Iraq  had 
launched  its  first  space  rocket.  The  missile  was  named 
Tammaz  and  was  a  three-stage,  forty-eight  ton  rocket, 
twenty-five  metres  in  length.  He  added  that  Iraq  had 
also  developed  a  second,  long-range,  surface-to- 
surface  missile  called  al-'Abbds,  which  had  a  range  of 
1,243  miles  (2,000  kilometres). 
(2)  In  January  1990  Saddam  warned  Israel  that  any  attack 
or  Iraq's  scientific  on  military  installations: 
would  be  confronted  by  us  with  a  precise 
reaction,  using  the  means  available  to  us 
according  to  the  legitimate  right  to  self- 
defence.  "(3) 
Saddam's  threat  followed  some  incidents  of 
sabotage  that  took  place  in  Iraq.  They  were  aimed  at 
Saddam's  super  weapons  projects,  such  as  the 
mysterious  explosion  in  the  al-Qa'qd'  State 
Establishment  between  Laýifiyyah  and  Iskandariyyah 
near  al-]ýillah,  south  of  Baghdad,  which  took  place  on 
17  August  1989.  (4) 
Following  the  scandal  at  the  Atlanta  branch  of 
the  Banca  Nazionale  del  Lavoro  (BNL)  in  the  second 
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procurement  network  around  the  world,  which  was 
acquiring  components  for  Saddam's  chemical, 
biological,  nuclear  and  ballistic  missile  programmes. 
Iraqi  intelligence  was  directly  involved  in  the 
activities  of  the  companies  involved,  such  as  Matrix 
Churchill,  a  company  owned  by  Iraq  in  Britain.  It  was 
said  to  have  exported  military  equipment  worth 
millions  of  pounds  to  Iraq  with  illegal  BNL  loans.  (5) 
It  seems  that  the  western  intelligence  services, 
the  CIA  and  M16,  with  the  help  of  the  Israeli 
intelligence  service,  Mossad,  used  the  BNL  affair  to 
launch  a  widespread  campaign  to  speak  out  about 
Saddam's  ambitious  programme  of  non-conventional 
weapons,  in  order  to  destroy  it.  The  western 
governments  concealed  the  information  of  these  secret 
illegal  deals  from  their  Parliaments,  owing  to  their 
commercial  and  political  interests  with  Saddam's 
regime.  (6) 
(3)  Part  of  the  campaign  which  was  waged  against  Saddam's 
regime  was  a  wave  of  human  rights  criticism.  There  was 
a  call  for  a  Western  ban  on  all  weapons  delivered  to 
Saddam,  after  his  ruthless  campaign  in  August  1988  to 
eliminate  any  remnants  of  Kurdish  national 
aspirations.  (7)  The  world  had,  however,  turned  a  blind 
eye  to  his  continued  violations  of  human  rights  ever 
since  he  had  come  to  power.  America  expressed  its 
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ways: 
(a)  John  Kelly,  the  US  Assistant  Secretary  of  State, 
visited  Saddam  on  11  February  1990  and  delivered 
to  him  the  State  Department's  warning  about  his 
violation  of  human  rights  in  Iraq,  in  particular 
against  the  Kurds.  (8) 
(b)  The  US  Congress  condemned  Iraq  and  called  for 
sanctions  against  Saddam's  regime,  but  was 
prevented  by  the  Bush  Administration,  which 
merely  warned  Saddam  not  to  use  chemical  weapons 
in  the  future.  (9) 
(c)  The  Arabic  service  of  the  radio  station,  the 
Voice  of  America,  attacked  Saddam's  violation  of 
human  rights  in  Iraq.  (10) 
(d)  The  State  Department  published  a  report  on  21 
February,  mere  harshly  criticising  Saddam's 
violations  of  human  rights  in  Iraq.  It  appears 
that  Saddam  was  surprised  and  disturbed  by  the 
unusual  international  response  and  the  change  of 
America's  attitude  toward  his  regime.  Thus,  on  24 
February  1990,  at  the  first  celebration  of  the 
anniversary  of  the  Arab  Co-operation  Council 
(ACC)  a  meeting  took  place  in  Amman,  where  Saddam 
demanded  the  withdrawal  of  US  warships  from  the 
574 Gulf,  (11)  forgetting  that  he  was  responsible  for 
the  presence  of  the  US  navy  in  the  region  because 
of  his  war  with  Iran. 
(4)  On  9  March,  Farzad  Bazof  t,  an  exiled  Iranian 
journalist,  working  for  the  Observer  in  London,  was 
sentenced  to  death,  after  he  had  been  arrested  in 
Baghdad  by  the  Iraqi  security  services,  charged  with 
spying  for  Britain  and  Israel.  (12)  After  Bazoft's 
execution  on  15  March,  Saddam  was  subjected  to 
unprecedented  international  criticism,  and  the  Bazoft 
affair  became  an  excuse  to  attack  Saddam's  barbaric 
rule  and  its  threat  to  the  stability  of  the  region. 
Saddam,  hanged  Bazoft  in  spite  of  pleas  for  clemency 
from  the  West,  in  order  to  challenge  it,  and  to  send  a 
message  that  he  would  not  tolerate  any  traitors. 
However,  whether  Bazoft  was  innocent  and  just  a 
journalist  looking  for  a  scoop,  or  a  spy  (the  evidence 
against  him  is  quite  strong,  as  it  was  unusual  for 
such  an  important  British  newspaper  to  employ  someone 
with  a  criminal  record),  who,  in  the  guise  of  a 
journalist,  made  repeated  visits  to  Iraq, 
investigating  a  military  installation,  with  a  British 
nurse,  where  a  major  explosion  was  reported  to  have 
occurred,  Bazoft  was  a  victim  of  Saddam's  political 
manoeuvres.  He  was  looking  for  a  means  to  build  up  a 
wave  of  public  opinion  against  the  west,  particularly 
America,  Britain  and  Israel,  which  were  identified  as 
575 enemies  for  the  Arab  populace.  He  sought  to  rally  the 
Iraqis,  and  the  other  Arabs,  behind  his  regime,  in 
order  to  combat  this  international  pressure. 
Saddam,  skilfully  used  press  coverage  to  heighten 
Iraqi  and  Arab  tension  against  the  west.  A  huge 
counter-campaign  was  mounted  in  the  Iraqi  press  and  in 
large  sections  of  the  Arab  press,  financed  by  Saddam, 
to  support  his  regime  and  to  warn  against  the 
,,  imperial  is  t-  sponsored  Zionist  aggression  against 
Iraq". 
(5)  On  22  March,  a  Canadian  artillery  expert,  Dr  Gerald 
Bull,  was  murdered  in  Brussels.  Dr  Bull  was  a 
specialist  in  very  large-calibre  guns.  He  had  been 
working  on  a  super-gun  project  called  Babylon,  for 
Saddam's  regime.  The  Iraqis  were  familiar  with  Bull's 
technology  from  the  later  stages  of  the  war  with  Iran, 
when  they  were  under  severe  pressure  from  Iranian 
forces,  and  missile  technology  was  putting  an  end  to 
the  war.  Mossad  was  suspected  of  murdering  Bull,  to 
prevent  him  from  continuing  to  help  Saddam's  regime  to 
develop  the  long-rage  weapons  systems  which  posed  a 
serious  threat  to  Israel's  national  security,  and,  at 
the  same  time,  to  set  an  example  to  other  scientists 
around  the  world  who  were  collaborating  with  the  Iraqi 
weapons  programmes. 
576 (6)  Soon  after  Dr  Bull's  murder,  the  British  customs 
confiscated  in  Teesport  some  super-gun  parts, 
manufactured  by  a  Sheffield  company.  They  were 
identified  as  part  of  the  Babylon  super-gun.  A  few 
weeks  later  other  parts  of  the  super-gun  were 
intercepted  in  Greece  and  Turkey.  (13) 
(7)  The  British  customs  intercepted  on  28  March  1990  a 
packet  of  electronic  switches,  claiming  they  that  were 
to  be  used  for  a  nuclear  bomb,  purchased  in  the  United 
States  for  shipment  to  Iraq  via  London  on  an  Iraqi 
aircraft.  (14) 
(8)  On  31  March,  the  Israeli  Prime  Minister,  Yitzhak 
Shamir,  declared  openly  that  Israel  would  attack  Iraq 
if  it  developed  a  nuclear  capability.  Accordingly, 
Saddam  replied  on  2  April  with  his  well-known  threat 
that  he  would  burn  half  of  Israel  with  chemical 
weapons  if  it  attacked  Iraq.  (15) 
(9)  After  the  US  Senate  passed  a  resolution  to  accept  that 
Jerusalem  was  the  historical  capital  of  Israel,  the 
Israeli  Prime  Minister  announced  on  14  April  that 
Israel  was  free  to  destroy  sites  where  they  suspected 
Iraqi  missiles  might  be  based.  Saddam's  response  to 
this  new  threat  was  tough.  On  18  April  he  warned 
Israel  again  that  any  Israeli  attack  would  trigger  a 
war  which  would  not  end  until  all  the  occupied 
territories  had  been  liberated.  He  then  made  the 
577 matter  worse  by  announcing  that  Iraq  was  using  a 
super-computer  in  its  missile  programmes. 
According  to  official  Iraqi  statements,  it  appears 
that  Saddam  was  far  more  frightened  of  Israel  than  Israel 
was  of  him.  This  was  particularly  true  after  the  massive 
influx  of  Soviet  Jews  into  Israel  which  probably  increased 
Israeli  self  confidence,  and  made  it  ready  for  military 
adventure.  (16)  Saddam  also  revealed  his  concern  to  the 
American  Ambassador,  Richard  Murphy,  former  American 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State  for  Near  Eastern  and  South 
Asian  Affairs,  when  he  visited  Baghdad,  about,  an  Israeli 
attack  on  his  arms  industry,  similar  to  that  in  1981,  on 
his  Osirak  reactor  at  the  Tawaythd  research  centre.  The 
same  message  was  delivered,  to  the  British  Charge  d'Affaires 
in  Baghdad  by  the  then  Iraqi  Under  Secretary  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  Nizdr  Vamdfin.  (17) 
Saddam  was  probably  frightened  of  the  Israelis  because 
he  knew  that  they  possessed  nuclear  warheads  and  delivery 
systems  and  would  not  hesitate  to  use  them  against  any 
threat  to  their  national  security,  Thus,  he  understood  very 
well,  as  one  of  his  close  followers  declared,  that  he  would 
never  be  allowed  to  catch  up  with  Israel.  (18) 
Saddam's  threat  to  Israel  was  taken  at  face  value, 
even  though,  it  was  probably  it  intended  just  for  internal 
consumption.  At  the  very  time  that  he  was  threatening 
Israel  with  chemical  weapons,  he  communicated  with  Israel 
578 via  a  Harvard  University  Professor(19)  and  with  President 
Bush,  via  Prince  Bandar  Bin  Sulýdn,  the  Saudi  Ambassador  to 
the  US,  to  inform  them  that  his  threat  was  an  empty 
one.  (20)  Saddam's  unbalanced  policy  reveals  his  inability 
to  think  clearly.  He  gave  Israel  the  opportunity  to  arouse 
international  opinion  against  the  Arabs  and  Iraq  in 
particular.  Thus  Iraq  was  prevented  from  possessing  those 
advanced  technological  weapons  it  needed  to  safeguard  its 
national  security,  as  future  events  proved. 
As  a  result  of  the  ceaseless  press  campaign  against 
Saddam's  military  technology,  partly  caused  by  his  adding 
fuel  to  the  fire,  he  claimed  that  he  faced  an  Imperialist- 
Zionist  plot  to  de  stabilise  Iraq,  and  to  deprive  it  of  the 
chance  of  at  least  attaining  military  parity  with  Israel. 
Iraq  was  the  only  military  force  which  could  confront 
Israel  after  the  neutralisation  of  Egypt.  Of  course  this 
power  was  not  just  built  up  to  protect  the  Arabs,  as  Saddam 
pretended. 
In  this  highly  tense  atmosphere,  Saddam  escalated  the 
situation  still  further,  probably  in  response  to  the 
behaviour  of  some  of  the  Gulf  States,  particularly  Kuwait. 
According  to  Saddam,  Kuwait  and  the  United  Arab  Emirates 
had  increased  their  OPEC  quota,  forcing  down  the  price  of 
oil,  which  Saddam  perceived  as  economic  warfare  against 
Iraq. 
579 Some  observers  indicate  also  that  Kuwait  and  the 
United  Arab  Emirates  intended  deliberately  to  put  more 
pressure  on  Saddam,  in  addition  to  his  international  and 
domestic  plight,  in  order  to  push  him  into  making  some 
foolish  move.  This  suggestion  seems  near  to  the  truth, 
because  when  Iraq  asked  Kuwait  and  the  United  Arab  Emirates 
to  reduce  their  OPEC  quotas  and  make  room  for  the  Iraqis  to 
recover  their  quota,  which  had  been  halved  during  the  war, 
their  only  response  was  to  exceed  their  quotas. 
At  the  OPEC  meeting  in  January  1989,  Kuwait's  Oil 
Minister,  Ali  Khalifah  al-Sabdh,  demanded  a  30%  increase  in 
his  country's  quota  and  refused  all  pressure  to  reduce  it, 
stating  that  Kuwait  neither  accepts  nor  would  abided  by  its 
assigned  quota.  At  the  next  OPEC  meeting,  in  November  1989, 
Iraq  issued  a  strong  warning  to  the  Kuwaitis,  but  Kuwait's 
overproduction  continued;  this  resulted  in  the  price  of  oil 
falling  to  below  $18  a  barrel  in  the  spring  of  1990.  Saddam 
was  astonished  at  the  arrogant  policy  of  the  Kuwaitis  and 
regarded  it  as  a  challenge,  lacking  appreciation  for  Iraq's 
service  in  protecting  the  Gulf  States  from  the  Iranian 
threat. 
Kuwait's  explanation  for  its  behaviour  was  that  it  was 
in  desperate  need  of  money  to  repair  its  oil  installations 
after  the  Iranian  attacks  and  to  pay  for  Western  and 
Eastern  super  power  protection  for  its  shipments.  The 
degree  of  suffering  that  the  Kuwaitis  experienced  during 
the  Iraq-Iran  war,  and  the  damage  which  was  inflicted  on 
580 its  economy,  was  very  small  compared  with  what  Iraq  had 
suffered.  So  Kuwait's  excuses  did  not  satisfy  Saddam. 
Accordingly,  in  May  1990,  Saddam.  called  for  a  summit 
in  Baghdad,  to  discuss  the  emigration  of  Russian  Jews. 
However,  he  used  the  summit  to  focus  on  his  impending 
aggression  in  the  Gulf: 
In 
*000  sometimes,  war  is  launched  through 
economic  means.  To  those  who  do  not  mean  to 
wage  war  against  Iraq,  I  say  that  this  is  a 
kind  of  war  against  Iraq". 
The  tension  that  mounted  for  months  between  Iraq  and 
Kuwait  came  fully  into  the  open  in  July.  In  his  speech  on 
the  twenty-second  anniversary  of  the  17  July  coup,  Saddam 
accused  some  Arab  countries,  without  mentioning  names,  of 
openly  conspiring  with  imperialism  and  Zionism  against 
Iraq,  threatening  to  use  force  if  they  did  not  cease  their 
overproduction  of  oil,  and  denouncing  their  policy  as  a 
declaration  of  economic  war  against  Iraq.  He  added: 
%A  ,*9.  they  will  never  forgive  us  our 
victory  ...  our  technological  achievements  ...  what 
we  are  facing  now  is  a  loss  of  $14  billion  a 
year  in  oil  revenue.  This  is  a  conspiracy  to 
starve  us  ...  this  is  an  American  policy,  and 
there  are  Arabs  who  are  mobilised  in  the 
service  of  that  policy  ...  I  feel  sorry  to  talk 
581 about  those  Arabs,  1  feel  tormented  ...  but  we 
have  to  stand  up  to  those  who  have  come  with  a 
poisoned  dagger  and  thrust  it  into  our  backs. 
Iraq  is  not  going  accept  that".  (21) 
On  the  following  day  Iraq  wrote  an  open  letter  to  the 
Arab  League,  demanding  the  following: 
Compensation  of  $2.4  billion,  for  oil  that  had  been 
stolen  from  the  Iraqi  Sector  of  the  Rfimailah  oil 
field,  which  lay  on  disputed  border  territory  between 
the  two  countries. 
Cash  payment  of  $10  Billion  to  meet  pressing  needs, 
since  Iraq  had  not  been  properly  rewarded  for  its  long 
struggle  against  Iran,  guarding  the  eastern  flank  of 
the  Arab  world  with  the  blood  of  the  Iraqi  People. 
(3)  The  Writing-off  of  all  war-time  debts.  (22) 
(4)  The  raising  of  Oil  Prices  to  over  $25  a  barrel. 
(5)  The  formation  of  an  Arab  plan,  similar  to  the  Marshall 
Plan,  to  compensate  Iraq  for  its  losses  during  the 
war.  (23) 
Subsequently,  Iraqi  troops  began  moving  towards  the 
Kuwaiti  border.  The  Kuwaitis  did  not  try  to  alleviate  the 
situation,  in  spite  of  the  alleged  mediation  of  some  Arab 
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particularly  at  a  meeting  in  Jeddah  at  the  end  of  July, 
even  though  Saddam  had  delivered  more  than  one  warning, 
through  the  American  Ambassador  in  Baghdad  and  the  leading 
Arab  mediators,  that  he  would  use  force.  (24) 
Therefore,  in  the  early  hours  of  2  August  1990, 
Saddam's  tanks  flowed  into  Kuwait.  It  is  probable  that 
America  and  its  allies  in  fact  expected  this  and  were  not 
taken  by  surprise  as  they  claimed.  The  course  of  events 
suggests  that  America  was  responsible  for  the  scenario  of 
the  crisis.  This  will  be  the  focus  of  the  next  sections. 
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In  the  last  section,  we  assessed  the  political 
situation  which  confronted  Saddam's  regime  prior  to  the 
invasion.  In  this  section  we  will  discuss  the  important 
factors,  external  and  internal,  which  together  created  this 
crucial  decision  and  led  Saddam  to  invade  Kuwait. 
Some  sources  indicated  that  Saddam's  action,  as  were 
the  actions  of  previous  Iraqi  Governments,  was  due  to 
Iraq's  long-standing  hesitancy  to  accept  Kuwait's 
independence,  claiming  that  Kuwait  had  been  historically 
part  of  Iraq.  But  this  reason,  whatever  substance  there  may 
be  to  it,  was  not  the  vital  factor  behind  Saddam's  move. 
According  to  the  Iraqi  account,  the  Kuwaiti  file  was 
opened  a  few  months  before  the  invasion.  The  troops  were 
sent  to  the  border  to  show  Iraq's  military  capability,  in 
order  to  intimidate  the  Kuwaitis,  following  their 
provocation  of  the  Iraqi  regime,  and  possibly  to  secure  the 
two  islands  of  Warbah  and  Bubiydn  and  the  Rfimaillah  oil 
field.  They  were  also  keen  to  discover  America's  reaction 
to  this  move.  (25) 
This  probably  reveals  what  was  in  Saddam's  mind  at  the 
beginning  of  the  crisis,  because  his  difficult 
circumstances  made  it  impracticable  for  him  at  that  time  to 
invade  Kuwait.  He  had  just  finished  eight  years  of  bitter 
war  with  Iran,  which  had  left  his  nation  crippled  and  his 
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which  would  jeopardise  his  political  survival,  without 
first  testing  America's  attitude  towards  his  move.  He 
wished  to  dominate  the  Gulf  States,  but  at  the  appropriate 
time.  US  confirms  the  earlier  movement  towards  the  Kuwaiti 
border.  (26) 
Some  sources  suggest  that  Saddam  invaded  Kuwait 
because  he  needed  access  to  the  Gulf,  which  would  allow  him 
to  have  a  prominent  role  in  the  region.  Undoubtedly,  he 
always  sought  to  have  a  wide  sea  frontage  on  the  Gulf.  This 
was  one  of  the  reasons  for  the  Iraq-Iran  war,  so  the  Iraqi 
regime  claimed.  But  Saddam  would  probably  have  been 
satisfied  to  get  the  two  Islands  of  Warbah  and  Bubiydn 
which  opened  the  Iraqi  route  to  the  Gulf  from  its  port  of 
Umm  Qaqr  and  the  Rfimailah  oil  field,  as  mentioned  above. 
This  would  have  been  less  risky  and  more  effective 
internationally  than  to  invade  the  whole  of  Kuwait.  All  the 
American  decision-makers,  the  US  and  other  western 
intelligence  agencies,  the  Soviet  intelligence  service,  the 
Egyptian  intelligence  service,  the  British  Ambassador  in 
Baghdad  and  the  US  Ambassador  in  Baghdad,  Miss  April 
Glaspie,  all  expected  that  Saddam  would  take  some  of  the 
disputed  northern  part  of  Kuwait,  and  predicted  that  his 
build-up  on  the  border  was  unlikely  to  end  in  a  total 
invasion.  (27)  They  did  not  appreciate  that  a  person  like 
Saddam  would  not  stop  at  half  measures,  especially  when  he 
had  US.  and  international  support  for  his  adventure.  So,  it 
was  not  Iraq's  access  to  Gulf  waters  that  pushed  Saddam  to 
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encouraging  international  atmosphere  which  persuaded  Saddam 
to  make  this  crucial  move. 
Some  observers  believe  that  the  most  urgent  factor 
which  pushed  Saddam  to  invade  Kuwait  was  his  economic 
destruction  after  the  war  with  Iran.  It  is  obvious  that  the 
post-war  economic  crisis  was  one  of  the  most  important 
factors  which  challenged  Saddam's  regime.  There  was  public 
discontent  at  the  difficulties  of  everyday  life.  Many 
creditors  were  beginning  to  press  for  payment  and  Iraq 
could  not  get  fresh  credits  from  foreign  countries  to 
alleviate  the  desperate  economic  need.  Saddam  did  not  only 
want  money  to  rebuild  his  shattered  economy,  his  priority 
was  to  maintain  his  chemical,  biological  and  nuclear 
weapons.  He  was  involved  in  illegal  activities  with  the  US 
and  British  Administrations  and  other  western  countries  in 
using  some  of  the  Banks'  credits  to  procure  machinery  parts 
to  build  his  military  machine.  Thus,  after  these  illegal 
deals  were  revealed,  following  the  BNL  Atlanta  scandal,  the 
US  changed  its  mind  about  supplying  Iraq  with  the  $1 
billion  credit  for  food,  and  many  other  western  and  eastern 
countries  did  the  same.  (28)  So,  there  is  no  doubt  that 
Kuwait's  wealth  and  its  investments  abroad  tempted  Saddam 
to  fill  his  empty  treasury.  In  addition,  he  would  control 
20%  of  the  world  oil  reserves.  Thus,  the  first  action  for 
the  Bush  administration  after  the  invasion,  was  to  work  on 
a  plan  to  freeze  Kuwaiti  assets.  (29) 
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play  the  role,  in  competition  with  the  US,  as  well  with  the 
Soviet  Union,  of  protector  of  the  Arabs.  He  f  elt  he  had 
proved  his  ability  for  this  role  by  holding  off  the  threat 
of  Iran,  protecting  the  region  from  the  Iranian  revolution 
for  eight  years.  He,  therefore,  felt  more  entitled  to  do 
this  job  than  America.  (30)  In  his  meeting  with  Miss  April 
Glaspie,  he  gave  a  clear  hint  of  this  motive  when  he  said: 
had  the  Iranians  overrun  the  region, 
American  troops  could  not  have  stopped  them 
unless  they  used  nuclear  weapons.  I  do  not  want 
to  belittle  you  but  I  believe  that  ...  yours  is  a 
society  which  cannot  accept  ten  thousand  dead 
in  one  battle".  (31) 
obviously,  the  Americans  understood  very  well  what  was 
in  Saddam's  mind;  he  wanted  the  leading  role  in  controlling 
the  Gulf  Is  oil  resources,  which  would  make  him  a  super 
power,  able  to  challenge  the  Americans  and  the  whole  world. 
America  could  never  tolerate  such  strategic  competition, 
which  would  affect  its  interests  increasingly.  The  US 
Secretary  of  State,  James  Baker,  admitted  in  his  report 
that  one  of  the  important  results  of  the  Gulf  war  was  to 
prevent  Saddam  from  filling  the  seat  vacated  by  the  Soviet 
Union  in  the  region.  (32) 
Those  observers  who  believed  that  Iraq's  military 
achievements  would  allow  it  to  threaten  any  country  in  the 
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These  achievements  include  advanced  technology  weapons, 
weapons  of  mass  destruction,  including  nuclear,  biological 
and  chemical  and  missile  technology,  which  was  developed  in 
Iraq  during  the  Iraq-Iran  war,  with  the  help  of  Egypt. 
These  achievements  worried  America  and  Israel  increasingly, 
particularly  as  Saddam  had  become  very  interested  in  the 
post-war  era  in  accurate  long-range  missiles,  such  as  the 
Babylon  supergun  project,  which  was  designed  by  Dr  Bull. 
Saddam,  was  always  looking  for  a  leading  rule  by  using  the 
Palestinian  issue,  acting  as  a  Arab  hero  and  a  credible 
liberator,  who  would  win  back  the  rights  of  the  Palestinian 
people  with  his  anti-imperialism  and  anti-Zionism  slogans 
and  would  not  hesitate  to  use  any  weapon  if  he  had  the 
opportunity  to  do  so.  Thus,  these  weapons  made  Saddam  an 
international  threat.  This  was,  no  doubt,  one  of  the  most 
pressing  factors,  in  America's  apparent  indifference  to  the 
prospect  of  his  invading  Kuwait,  and  it  enabled  America  and 
its  allies  to  enter  the  region  with  justification  to 
destroy  Saddam's  dangerous,  non-conventional  weapons. 
However,  the  power  of  the  Iraqis,  which  was  built  and 
sustained  to  the  last  bullet  and  mine  by  the  super  powers 
and  their  allies,  could  be  crushed  very  easily  by  the 
technologically-superior  arms  suppliers.  The  Americans  and 
their  allies  managed  to  achieve  many  other  dreamed-for 
goals  when  Saddam  invaded  Kuwait. 
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Political  analysts  have  advanced  many  arguments  and 
views,  which  are  usually  at  variance  with  one  another, 
about  the  responsibility  and  the  real  motive  for  the  Gulf 
crisis.  There  are  those  that  argue  that  it  was  a  plot 
hatched  by  some  Arab  rulers  in  co-operation  with  the  US  and 
its  allies  to  destroy  Saddam's  growing  power.  Others  put 
the  blame  on  Saddam  alone  and  consider  him  responsible  for 
the  adventure,  because  he  was  trying  to  build  an  Iraqi 
empire  under  his  leadership  to  assume  the  position  of 
regional  super  power,  which  was  obviously  Saddam's 
dream.  (34)  He  did  not  turn  Iraq  into  a  massive  military 
storage  system,  with  help  from  the  west  and  the  east  and 
their  allies,  just  to  achieve  this  aim.  We  can  assume  that 
the  decision  to  invade  Kuwait  was  his  alone  and  that 
nobody,  not  even  a  member  of  his  inner  circle,  dared  to 
gainsay  him  even  if  he  thought  his  plans  might  end  in 
disaster. 
Nevertheless,  evidence  points  to  the  existence  of  more 
than  one  party  outside  Iraq,  that  bears  some  responsibility 
for  the  invasion  of  Kuwait: 
The  US:  During  the  Iraq-Iran  war  the  US  supplied  Saddam 
with  intelligence  data  and  also  encouraged  third  parties  to 
supply  him  with  weapons.  The  US  also  provided  him  with 
loans  and  assistance  directly  and  indirectly.  Saddam's 
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Irangate  scandal  which  was  exposed  in  1986.  The  US,  through 
George  Bush,  who  was  then  Vice-  president,  apologised  and 
assured  Saddam  that  there  was  no  shift  in  the  US  position 
toward  him.  (35)  Bush  was  on  the  pro-Saddam  team  in  the 
American  administration.  06) 
With  the  end  of  the  Iraq-Iran  war,  with  Saddam  as  the 
victor,  US  interests  were  secured  from  the  Iranian  threat. 
That  much  was  acknowledged  by  Iraq  and  the  US.  (37) 
However,  the  end  of  the  Iranian  threat  also  meant  the  end 
of  the  reason  for  US  support  of  Saddam.  Conservative  US 
policy-makers  did  not  agree  with  continuing  US  support  for 
Saddam,  but  Bush  and  other  members  of  the  Reagan 
administration  who  were  pro-Iraq  thought  that  it  was  in  the 
US  interest  to  continue  a  pro-Iraq  policy  on  the  grounds 
that  such  a  policy  would  help  contain  Saddam  and  might  even 
incline  him  to  moderation  through  financial  assistance  and 
diplomatic  courtesy.  Bush  and  like-minded  colleagues  argued 
that  such  a  policy  was  in  line  with  Iraq's  importance, 
particularly  in  view  of  Iraq's  economic  importance  as  the 
country  with  the  second  largest  (after  Saudi  Arabia)  oil 
resources  in  the  world.  The  Thatcher  government  followed 
the  US's  friendly  policy  which  was  shown  by  turning  a  blind 
eye  to  Saddam's  gross  violation  of  human  rights  and  the  use 
of  chemical  weapons  against  civilians  during  the  Iraq-Iran 
war. 
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Saddam  was  able  to  transform  Iraq  into  the  second  largest 
military  power  in  the  Middle  East  after  Israel.  he  was  able 
partially  to  use  US  agricultural  loans  to  buy  weapons.  Some 
of  the  deals  were  clandestine  to  the  extent  that  the  US  and 
the  British  Governments  concealed  the  details  from  the 
Congress  and  the  British  Parliament  respectively.  This  was 
due  to  the  strong  desire  of  the  US  and  British  governments 
to  maintain  strong  links  with  Saddam's  regime.  (38)  Later 
on,  however,  Mossad,  in  co-operation  with  the  CIA  and  M16, 
launched  an  anti-Saddam  campaign  motivated  primarily  by  the 
increased  Israeli  unease  about  Iraq's  growing  military 
strength.  (39)  The  campaign  stopped  when  Saddam  sent  his 
troops  to  the  Kuwaiti  border. 
On  11  April  1990,  when  the  western  campaign  had  reached 
a  peak  a  US  Congress  delegation  visited  Saddam.  The 
delegation  assured  Saddam  of  Bush's  desire  to  establish  the 
strongest  possible  relations  with  his  regime,  and  assured 
him  that  they  did  not  support  the  anti-Saddam, 
campaigns.  (40)  The  US  ambassador  to  Baghdad,  Miss  April 
Glaspie,  also  assured  Saddam,  when  she  met  him  eight  days 
before  the  invasion,  that  she  had  direct  instructions  from 
Bush  to  work  for  the  best  possible  and  the  deepest 
relations  with  Iraq,  because  Iraq  had  made  a  historic 
contribution  to  the  peace  and  prosperity  of  the  region.  (41) 
Saddam  thought  that  America's  attitude  towards  him  had 
not  changed  and  believed  Miss  Glaspie  when  she  told  him 
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threat  or  use  of  these  weapons  against  Israel  and  its 
allies  in  the  Gulf.  As  a  step  to  reassure  the  US,  instead 
of  confronting  her,  Saddam  concluded  a  non-aggression  pact 
with  Saudi  Arabia.  He  followed  this  with  a  verbal  message 
to  the  US,  delivered  by  the  Saudi  Ambassador  to  Washington, 
Prince  Banddr  Bin  Sult5n,  to  assure  the  it  that  his  threat 
I 
to  burn  half  of  Israel  was  simply  for  public  consumption 
and  that  he  would  not  have  made  such  a  threat  if  it  was  not 
for  his  belief  that  Israel  might  launch  another  attack  on 
Iraq  similar  to  that  in  1981.  (42) 
Egypt:  President  Mubdrak  of  Egypt  played  a  key  role  in 
the  Kuwait  crisis  that  preceded  Saddam's  invasion.  It  was 
Mubadrak  who  arranged  for  the  US  Congressional  delegation 
to  visit  Saddam  during  April  1990  in  an  attempt  to  clear 
the  air  between  the  US  and  Iraq.  (43)  The  efforts  made  by 
Mubdrak,  King  Iýusayn  of  Jordan  and  the  PLO  chairman,  Ydsser 
ýArafdt,  gave  Kuwait  the  wrong  signal  as  did  America, 
namely  that  Saddam  would  not  use  force  against  it.  This  led 
the  Kuwaitis  to  believe  that  Saddam's  troops  massing  on  the 
border  were  a  show  of  force  to  frighten  and  blackmail  them. 
This  caused  the  Kuwaitis  to  take  an  uncompromising  stand 
during  the  Jeddd  negotiations.  Egyptian  strategy  could  not 
be  different  from  that  of  the  US  since  Egypt  was  the  third 
most  important  regional  ally  to  the  US  after  Israel  and 
Saudi  Arabia.  Egyptian  diplomacy,  in  effect,  made  Saddam's 
invasion  of  Kuwait  inevitable.  obviously,  in  exchange  for 
this  attitude,  Egypt  was  hoping  to  receive  financial  and 
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it  wished  to  play  a  leading  role  within  the  new  political 
forum  that  appeared  to  be  being  formed  between  the  US  and 
its  allies  in  the  region.  This  might  well  explain  why  the 
US  wrote  off  Egypt's  military  debts  to  the  US. 
Kuwait:  The  Kuwaiti  government  cannot  be  considered 
blameless  during  the  crisis.  The  Kuwaiti  oil  policy  which 
led  to  over-production  resulted  in  lower  oil  prices,  which 
magnified  the  economic  plight  of  Saddam's  regime.  Kuwait 
also  refused  to  write  off  Iraqi  debts  or  agree  to  the  new 
demarcation  of  the  borders.  When  they  also  ignored  Saddam's 
threats,  he  felt  justified  in  begin  his  troop  build-up.  The 
Kuwaiti  delegation,  particularly  the  Kuwaiti  Prime 
Minister,  took  a  tough  stand,  which  Saddam  saw  as  a 
challenge  to  him  and  ungrateful  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
Kuwait  had  been  sheltered  from  Iran  by  Iraq  for  eight 
years.  The  Kuwaiti  stand  surprised  many  Arab  officials  and 
observers,  including  members  of  the  then  Kuwaiti 
opposition,  who  expressed  the  feeling  that  Kuwaiti 
diplomacy  could  have  avoided  the  invasion  and  saved  the 
area  from  the  catastrophe  of  war.  (44) 
Shaykh  Jdbir  al-ýabdlý  sent  a  note  to  his  Crown  Prince, 
asking  him  to  stand  firm  against  the  Iraqis  at  the  Jeddd 
meeting,  which  was  discovered  by  the  Iraqis  after  the 
occupation.  (45)  We  may  surmise  that  the  Kuwaitis  could  not 
have  had  taken  such  an  anti-Iraqi  position  if  it  had  not 
been  for  US  support.  The  US  was  the  protector  of  Kuwait  and 
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concerned  with  the  issue  of  oil  prices.  It  seems  that  the 
US  had  all  the  cards  in  the  crisis.  (46)  The  Kuwaiti 
military  attache  in  Baghdad,  Colonel  Sa'1d  Maýar,  sent 
intelligence  data  to  his  Government  three  months  before  the 
invasion,  informing  them  about  the  Iraqi  military  operation 
against  Kuwait.  On  25  July  he  assured  his  government  that 
the  Iraqis  would  make  their  move  on  2  August.  (47) 
Saddam's  warning  to  Kuwait  and  the  US  was  made  clear 
to  Miss  Glaspie: 
11  if  we  do  not  get  what  we  want  from  the 
Kuwaiti  during  our  next  meetings  with  them  in 
Jeddah,  then  it  is  natural  that  we  shall  not 
accept  that  we  should  let  Iraq  die.  11 
Miss  Glaspie's  reply  was  that  the  US  had  no  opinion  on 
Arab-Arab  conflicts,  particularly  border  problems  of  the 
kind  Iraq  had  with  Kuwait.  In  addition,  Miss  Glaspie's 
comments  on  the  impending  invasion  of  Kuwait  were: 
'"  ae*eI  received  an  instruction  to  ask  you,  in 
the  spirit  of  friendship  and  not  confrontation, 
about  your  intention.  I  say  this  is  a  simple 
description  of  the  concern  of  my  government.  I 
do  not  mean  that  the  situation  is  simple.  i3ut 
the  concern  is  simple".  (48) 
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green  light  for  him  to  advance  into  Kuwait,  which  was 
totally  in  contradiction  to  the  attitude  that  the  US  took 
after  Saddam's  invasion.  The  testimony  of  the  American 
Ambassador  to  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  in 
March  1991  was  different  from  the  Iraqi  account  of  her 
meeting  with  Saddam,  as  she  said  that  she  warned  Saddam 
several  times  that  Washington  would  not  allow  military 
aggression  against  Kuwait. 
There  were  other  American  signals  which  led  Saddam  to 
believe  that  his  invasion  of  Kuwait  would  not  be  confronted 
by  America.  These  signals  were: 
(1)  On  24  July,  State  Department  spokesperson  Margaret 
Tutweiller  said, 
we  do  not  have  any  s8curitY  commitments  to 
Kuwait.,,  (49) 
Lee  Hamilton,  Chairman  of  the  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  in  the  US  Congress  asked  John  Kelly,  the 
Assistant  Secretary  of  State,  on  31  July  1990,  if 
there  was  a  US  commitment  to  come  to  Kuwait's  defence 
if  it  was  attacked.  John  Kelly  informed  him  that  the 
US  did  not  have  a  defence  treaty  with  any  Gulf  country 
which  compelled  the  US  to  defend  Kuwait.  (50) 
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report  about  Miss  Glaspie's  meeting  with  Saddam,  an 
official  programme  on  The  Voice  of  America  was 
cancelled.  This  programme  was  meant  to  assure  Kuwait 
that  the  US  would  support  it  in  the  face  of  an  Iraqi 
threat.  The  programme  also  attacked  Saddam  strongly. 
Saddam  expressed  his  condemnation  to  Miss  Glaspie 
about  a  statement  made  by  Richard  Powertcher  on  19 
July  1990,  that  the  US  would  defend  its  friends  in  the 
area.  Saddam  considered  this  an  anti-Iraqi  stand  by 
the  US;  the  cancellation  of  the  Voice  of  America 
programme  was  thus  a  measure  meant  to  reassure  Saddam 
that  America  was  not  showing  hostility.  (51) 
(4)  Saddam  received  no  warning  from  the  US  or  its  allies 
about  massing  his  troops  on  the  border  with  Kuwait. 
The  US  never  warned  Saddam  that  it  would  use  f  orce 
until  the  very  hour  of  his  invasion.  (52)  This  led  to 
doubts,  even  among  America's  closest  friends.  (53)  This 
lack  of  warning  to  Saddam  was  in  spite  of  American 
intelligence  and  satellite  photograph  information, 
which  informed  the  White  House  and  the  State 
Department  that  an  invasion  was  imminent.  (54) 
Saddam  was  led  to  believe  that  the  US  was  preparing 
him  to  play  the  role  of  policeman  of  the  Gulf,  because  US 
policy,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Shah  of  Iran,  was  based  on 
strengthening  one  power  to  play  the  role  of  the  protector 
of  the  area.  Hence,  Saddam  thought  that  America  could  not 
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to  play  such  a  role  he  would  need  a  coastline,  which  meant 
that  Kuwait  might  give  him  such  a  coastline.  This  was 
probably  the  real  reason  behind  the  firm  instruction  that 
was  given  by  Saddam  to  'Izzat  Ibrdhim,  to  see  through  the 
Jeddah  meeting.  (55) 
To  reassure  Bush  about  his  desire  to  curb  oil  prices, 
Saddam  told  Miss  Glasple, 
"I  We  do  not  want  high  oil  prices.  During 
1974  1  dictated  an  article  which  appeared  under 
the  name  of  T5riq  'Azlz,  which  was  against  high 
I 
oil  prices.  it  was  the  f  irst  article  by  an  Arab 
in  that  direction-, 
However,  Saddam  did  not  appear  to  understand  the  real 
US  intentions  or  objectives.  US  strategy  was  based  on  the 
principle,  "Create  the  appropriate  conditions  so  that  we 
can  interfere".  This  was  the  basis  of  US  relations  with 
Saddam.  All  those  conditions  that  the  US  created  were  to 
enable  it  to  enter  the  area  in  full  strength,  so  as  to 
implement  its  design  of  total  control  over  oil  resources. 
This  was  particularly  so  after  the  demise  of  the  communist 
bloc  and  the  end  of  the  Cold  War,  which  meant  that  Europe 
did  not  need  to  depend  on  the  US  any  more.  Europe  indeed 
had  the  potential,  with  Japan,  to  become  a  greater  economic 
power  than  the  US.  (56)  In  such  a  new  world  order  Saddam 
began  to  exercise  power  in  competition  with  the  US,  just  as 
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US  to  control  Gulf  oil  resources,  which  would  put  it  in  the 
leading  role  in  the  new  world  order.  In  addition,  the  US 
through  Saddam's  misadventure,  achieved  other  goals,  which 
were  later  acknowledged  by  the  top  White  House 
officials.  (58) 
Some  analysts,  judging  from  the  sequence  of  events 
before  and  after  Saddam's  invasion  of  Kuwait,  claim  that 
Saddam  was  not  ignorant  of  the  real  US  objectives.  In  fact, 
these  analysts  think  that  there  was  an  understanding 
between  Saddam  and  the  US  to  manufacture  the  Kuwait  crisis. 
One  may  say  that,  whether  Saddam  was  ignorant  of  the  real 
US  objectives  and  was  led  once  again  into  a  US  trap  or 
whether  he  was,  in  fact,  a  willing  partner  of  the  US  in  its 
strategy,  the  result  was  the  same,  he  helped  the  US  to 
achieve  its  objectives  in  the  area.  Saddam  has  proved  to  be 
the  best  servant  of  US  interests,  since  he  provided  it  with 
the  excuse  to  control  the  area,  and  enabled  it  to  make  Iraq 
a  test  case  for  its  new  world  order.  This  represented  a 
neo-colonialism,  similar  to  the  old  one,  controlling  the 
Third  World,  but  with  different  means  and  with  limited 
casualties.  The  Iraqi  nation  had  to  pay  a  heavy  price  for 
this,  while  the  US  reaped  all  the  benefits  since  the  Gulf 
States,  Germany,  and  Japan  paid  for  its  protection.  This 
might  explain  why  Saddam  is  still  in  power  years  after  his 
defeat  in  the  Gulf  War,  and  why  the  US  rejected  any  other 
alternative  ruler  in  Iraq.  Major  General  Martin  Bradwater, 
a  Pentagon  official  said, 
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than  with  an  unknown  quantity.  "(59) 
599 The  Invasion  of  Kuwait 
At  2  am  on  2  August  1989,  Iraqi  forces  crossed  the 
border  and  quickly  gained  control  of  the  whole  of  Kuwait. 
Iraq  first  claimed  that  it  had  been  invited  to  help  Kuwaiti 
revolutionaries  who  were  attempting  to  overthrow  the  al- 
Sab5h  Government  in  Kuwait,  a  traitorous  regime  which  was 
involved  in  Zionist  and  imperialist  schemes,  to  establish  a 
new  Kuwaiti  provisional  free  government.  The  Iraqis  claimed 
as  well  that  their  troops  would  leave  Kuwait  as  soon  as  the 
new  government  was  in  place.  (60) 
Within  hours  of  the  invasion,  President  Bush  condemned 
the  Iraqi  aggression;  he  froze  Iraqi  and  Kuwaiti  assets  in 
the  US  and  sent  extra  warships  from  the  Indian  Ocean  to  the 
Gulf  region.  (61)  The  British  Government  froze  Kuwaiti 
assets  in  Britain  as  well,  which  were  worth  thousands  of 
millions  of  dollars. 
On  the  day  of  the  invasion  the  UN  Security  Council  met 
and  approved  Resolution  660,  condemning  the  aggression  and 
calling  for  Iraq's  immediate  withdrawal.  (62)  The  US  imposed 
a  trade  and  a  travel  ban  on  Iraq.  Europe  and  Japan  followed 
the  US  and  imposed  economic  sanctions  against  Iraq.  The 
Soviet  Union  and  China  suspended  all  arms  sales  to 
Iraq.  (63) 
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further  tightened,  as  the  Security  Council  passed 
Resolution  661,  which  involved  wide-ranging  sections 
against  Iraq,  including  a  complete  trade  boycott.  (64)  The 
following  day,  on  7  August,  Saudi  Arabia  closed  down  the 
Yanbu'  pipeline.  Turkey  closed  down  the  pipeline  running 
through  its  territory  to  the  Mediterranean.  The  United 
States  and  the  Soviet  Union  issued  a  joint  condemnation  of 
the  invasion  in  an  extraordinary  display  of  solidarity.  (65) 
The  rapid  international  response  within  twenty-four 
hours  was  due  to  President  Bush's  personal  diplomatic 
activity  with  other  heads  of  state.  (66)  Saddam,  had  not 
expected  such  a  reaction. 
Saddam  felt  surrounded.  He  regarded  the  invasion  as  a 
natural,  but  desperate  reaction  to  the  Kuwaiti  economic 
conspiracy  against  his  regime  after  he  had  tried  everything 
to  avoid  it.  Moreover,  all  indications  he  had  received 
before  the  invasion  suggested  to  him  that  Kuwait  was  going 
to  be  easy  to  target. 
Saddam's  political  history  indicates  that  whenever  he 
was  faced  with  a  critical  situation,  he  preferred  to  allay 
the  situation,  rather  than  to  confront  it  and  reduce 
tensions  rather  than  escalating  them.  Thus,  his  response  to 
this  unexpected  crisis  would  be  not  different  from  his 
usual  manoeuvres.  Accordingly,  Saddam  announced  that  his 
troops  would  be  withdrawn  as  soon  as  the  situation  of  the 
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knew  Saddam's  character  very  well,  and  knew  what  kind  of 
tactics,  he  might  employ  when  he  was  in  a  tight  corner. 
President  Bush  responded  quickly. 
Many  sources  indicate  that  most  of  the  Arab  leaders 
appeared  after  the  first  day  of  the  invasion  with  only  one 
subject  on  the  agenda,  to  seek  a  solution  through 
compromise.  King  Iýusayn  of  Jordan  and  Ydsser  ýArafdt  were 
working  together  on,  to  persuade  King  Fahd  and  Saddam,  to 
meet  face  to  face  in  a  mini-summit,  in  order  to  solve  the 
problem  without  any  outside  interference.  Saddam,  was  also 
keen  to  keep  the  crisis  in  Arab  hands,  especially  after  the 
massive  international  response  as  a  result  of  American 
pressure.  However,  all  the  Arab  mediations  were  sabotaged, 
owing  to  pressure  from  President  Bush  on  the  Arabs  to 
thwart  any  attempt  by  them  to  solve  the  crisis,  as  follows: 
He  took  great  pains  to  persuade  King  Fahd,  through 
Prince  Banddr  (the  Saudi  Ambassador  to  the  US)  ,  to 
accept  the  American  deployment,  sending  a  high-level 
team  with  satellite  pictures  of  Iraqi  forces  to  show 
that  the  Kingdom  faced  a  serious  threat  from  the 
Iraqis.  (68)  This  made  it  difficult  for  the  king  to 
reject  the  American  offer. 
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permit  an  American  presence  in  the  Kingdom  was  to 
point  out  to  him  that  there  would  be  an  Arab  and 
Islamic  cover  for  that  presence.  To  calm  the  worries 
expressed  by  the  King  about  the  deployment,  James 
Baker  assured  the  Saudis  that  the  American  soldiers 
would  leave  the  Kingdom  when  they  had  finished  their 
mission,  and  that  they  were  only  there  to  bolster  the 
Gulf  States  against  Iraqi  aggression. 
Thus,  when  the  King  went  to  Cairo  for  the  Arab 
summit,  his  aim  was  to  get  the  Arab  to  condemn  the 
invasion,  and  to  find  an  Arab  and  Islamic  cover  for 
the  American  troops  in  his  land,  rather  than  to  find  a 
solution  for  the  crisis. 
(2)  He  phoned  King  Uasan  of  Morocco  to  ask  him  to  accept 
the  Saudi  request  for  Arab  cover.  King  Uasan  could  not 
reject  the  American  request,  since  he  owed  his  throne 
to  the  CIA.  (69) 
(3)  He  maintained  contact  with  President  Mubdrak  from  the 
first  hours  of  the  invasion.  At  the  time,  King  4usayn 
of  Jordan  made  an  arrangement  with  Mubdrak  to  hold  a 
mini-summit  in  August  with  Iraq,  Egypt,  Jordan,  Yemen 
and  Saudi  Arabia,  to  devise  an  Arab  solution,  Egypt 
however,  condemned  the  invasion  on  3  August,  before 
the  meeting  of  the  Arab  Secretaries  of  State  in  Cairo. 
The  US  Secretary  of  State,  James  Baker,  announced  to 
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President  Mubdrak  to  send  troops  to  Saudi  Arabia,  even 
though  Mubdrak  had  asked  the  Americans  not  to  reveal 
this  information  before  the  Cairo  summit. 
Clearly  America's  aim  from  action  was  to  thwart  any 
Arab  compromise.  Owing  to  extreme  US  pressure,  the 
emergency  Arab  Summit  in  Cairo  marked  the  collapse  of  the 
Arab  League.  The  Arabs  divided  into  two  camps:  the  anti- 
Iraq  one,  consisting  of  Egypt,  Syria,  Morocco  and  the  Gulf 
States,  which  took  a  hard  line  against  the  invasion  and 
called  for  unconditional  withdrawal;  the  other  camp 
consisting  of  Jordan,  Yemen,  PLO,  Libya,  Algeria  and  Sudan, 
which  took  the  Iraqi  side,  not  because  they  supported  the 
invasion,  even  though  Kuwait  was  unpopular  among  most  of 
the  poor  Arab  states,  but  because  they  did  not  approve  of 
the  American  role  in  the  crisis,  as  being  too  domineering. 
It  was  suspected  that  the  Arab  League  summit  was  held 
to  give  legitimacy  to  the  American  deployment  of  troops  for 
the  destruction  of  Iraq's  military  potential,  rather  than 
to  find  an  Arab  solution.  Throughout  the  preparation  for 
the  summit  the  Iraqis  tried  to  get  the  Arab  radicals  to 
undermine  the  pro-western  camp.  But  all  their  effort  had 
little  effect,  and  the  resolution  of  the  Arab  summit  went 
in  favour  of  America  and  its  Arab  allies.  (70) 
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summit  conference  in  Cairo  was  part  of  an  imperialist 
conspiracy  against  the  Arab  nation.  Iran  also  viewed  it  as 
an  American  attempt  to  dominate  the  Middle  East  region.  (71) 
Bush's  decision  to  subvert  Saddam's  ambitions  was 
arranged  gradually.  His  first  plan  centred  on  the  defence 
of  Saudi  Arabia  from  the  possibility  of  Iraqi  aggression, 
despite  the  fact  that  Saddam's  plan  to  attack  Saudi  Arabia 
at  that  time  was  very  remote,  because  after  Kuwait  was 
taken,  all  the  Iraqi  forces  were  in  defensive  positions, 
and  avoided  any  sort  of  provocative  gestures  towards  the 
Saudis  that  might  be  misunderstood  as  an  Iraqi  signal  to 
invade  them. 
It  seems  that  all  the  evidence  about  Iraqi  plans  to 
invade  Saudi  Arabia  was  manufactured  by  President  Bush  to 
encourage  the  Saudis  to  agree  to  the  US  military  deployment 
in  Saudi  Arabia.  Moreover,  it  seems  that  President  Bush  did 
not  give  a  clear  explanation  to  the  American  people,  not 
even  to  some  of  his  top  officials,  who  did  not  want  to  use 
force  to  solve  the  crisis. 
Obviously,  President  Bush  tried  very  hard  to  arouse 
fear  of  Saddam.  He  claimed  that  he  would  undoubtedly  use 
force,  or  the  threat  of  force,  to  keep  any  country  in  the 
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controlling  the  oil  in  the  region  and  monopolising  the  oil 
market.  He  thus,  would  hold  America,  and  the  whole  world, 
at  his  mercy,  if  he  was  not  stopped  in  Kuwait. 
President  Bush's  tactic  in  declaring  in  more  than  one 
statement  that  the  American  mission  was  defensive  only,  (72) 
concealed  the  real  aims  behind  the  deployment  due  to  the 
following  reasons: 
The  king  was  reluctant  to  accept  the  presence  of  us 
forces  in  Saudi  Arabia  when  Bush  needed  to  deploy  them 
there.  According  to  an  American  intelligence  report, 
the  Saudis  preferred  to  deal  with  Saddam  in  their  own 
way,  by  pushing  him  away  with  money,  rather  than 
allowing  the  Americans  to  intervene.  (73) 
(2)  Bush  did  not  want  to  give  Saddam  a  signal  which  might 
push  him  to  attack  before  they  had  time  to  get  their 
equipment  on  the  ground  ready.  This  is  why  Bush 
refused  clearly  to  express  his  reactions  at  the 
beginning  of  the  invasion,  and  told  reporters  that 
America  did  not  contemplate  any  military 
intervention.  (74)  The  American  military  experts  and 
top  military  staff  were  very  concerned  about  the  first 
unit  which  was  sent  to  Saudi  Arabia  which  consisted 
only  light  forces  which  could  easily  have  been 
attacked  by  Saddam.  (75) 
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about  his  announcement  that  he  would  withdraw  from 
Kuwait,  following  the  massive  political  and  economic 
pressure  by  the  international  community.  Saddam 
demonstrated  to  Arab  leaders  his  desire  to  negotiate; 
he  desired  some  form  of  compromise  or  face-saving 
formula,  which  would  allow  him  to  take  his  forces  out 
of  Kuwait  without  being  subjected  to  total  defeat. 
There  is  evidence  that  he  sent  for  the  American  charge 
d'affaire  in  Baghdad,  Mr  Wilson,  on  6  August.  In  his 
meeting  with  him  he  offered  assurances  that  he  did  not  want 
any  confrontation  with  the  United  States.  He  expressed  his 
disappointment  about  American  attempts  to  sabotage 
relations  with  him  and  make  an  enemy  of  Iraq.  He  said  that 
America  had  made  a  horrible  mistakes  when  it  weakened  its 
friends,  i.  e.  the  Shah  of  Iran,  and  he  hoped  that  it  would 
not  repeat  the  same  mistake  with  him.  He  said  that  America 
could  safeguard  its  interests  only  with  strong  allies,  not 
with  weak.  (76)  The  American  charge  d'affaire,  assured  him 
that  President  Bush  was  most  concerned  about  Saudi  Arabia 
and  that  the  US  President  wanted  an  assurance  that  the 
Saudis  would  not  be  attacked.  Saddam  said: 
can  take  that  assurance  to  your 
President  and  to  the  Saudis  and  to  everybody  in 
the  Middle  East.  Those  who  do  not  attack  us,  we 
are  not  going  to  attack,  those  who  do  not  hurt 
us,  we  are  not  going  to  hurt,  those  who  seek 
607 our  friendship,  we  will  rush  after  them  and  beg 
for  their  friendship.  -(77) 
It  appears  that  the  American  and  British  Governments, 
after  initially  giving  Saddam  the  signal  to  invade  Kuwait, 
then  gave  him  another  signal,  to  stay  in  Kuwait.  The  second 
signal  which  made  Saddam  decide  not  to  pull  out  of  Kuwait, 
was  Mrs  Thatcher's  suggestion  that  sanctions  on  Iraq  might 
continue,  whether  Saddam  withdrew  from  Kuwait  or  not.  (78) 
Accordingly,  on  8  August,  Saddam  formally  annexed 
Kuwait.  (79)  On  10  August,  he  asked  all  diplomatic  missions 
in  Kuwait  to  relocate  to  Baghdad  by  24  August,  justifying 
this  action  by  saying  that  Kuwait  had  become  an  Iraqi 
province.  The  border  between  Jordan  and  Iraq  was  also 
closed  to  Westerners  trying  to  leave  Iraq. 
It  seems  highly  likely  that  the  situation  which 
developed,  directed  by  America,  left  Saddam  feeling  that 
America  wanted  to  deepen  the  crisis  in  order  to  finish  him 
off,  without  allowing  him  the  option  of  withdrawing: 
The  speed  of  the  American  military  preparations  and 
the  massive  forces  which  moved  into  Saudi  Arabia, 
together  with  the  British  and  French,  gave  the 
impression  that  their  role  was  not  simply  defensive. 
(2)  President  Bush,  in  his  speech  on  8  August,  to  the 
American  people  to  whip  up  support  for  his  decision  to 
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to  Saddam  that  the  US  forces  were  directed  at  him: 
This  will  not  stand.  "(80) 
(3)  Again,  on  9  August,  in  a  press  conference,  President 
Bush  uttered  the  famous  words: 
have  drawn  a  line  in  the  sand.  11 
This  statement  sent  a  message,  not  only  to 
Saddam,  but  to  many  other  Arabs  -even  those  who  had 
accepted  the  US  claim  that  their  forces  were  for 
defensive  purposes  only-  and  they  feared  the 
consequences.  (81) 
(4)  President  Mubdrak  also  gave  an  indication  in  a  speech 
on  8  August  that  the  situation  in  the  region  was 
serious.  He  sent  a  message  to  Saddam,  advising  him  to 
pull  out  from  Kuwait  in  such  a  way  that  he  could  save 
face.  It  was  so  expressed,  however,  that  Saddam 
regarded  it  as  a  deliberate  humiliation  by  the 
Egyptian  president. 
On  the  one  hand  it  seemed  that  Mubdrak  was  working  to 
avoid  a  catastrophe,  by  his  calling  for  an  emergency 
summit,  pretending  that  the  Arabs  still  had  the  opportunity 
for  an  Arab  solution,  while,  on  the  other,  he  had  already 
given  permission  for  the  nuclear  aircraft  carrier  US 
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to  Bush's  request  to  send  troops  to  Saudi  Arabia.  (82) 
The  whole  course  of  the  Cairo  Summit,  its 
announcement,  its  organisation,  to  its  result,  gave  the 
Iraqis  and  many  other  delegates  the  impression  that  the 
Summit  had  been  planned  by  America  and  its  allies.  (83)  The 
Iraqis  were  provoked  to  the  extent  that,  before  the  Summit 
was  finished,  Saddam  was  broadcasting  a  message  to  the 
people  of  Egypt,  Najd  and  Hejdz  to  revolt  against  their 
I 
governments,  which  had  allowed  the  imperialists  to  enter 
the  region  again.  (84)  These  unexpected  impacts  of  the  Cairo 
Summit  worried  both  the  Americans  and  the  British  about  the 
possibility  of  their  Arab  allies  retreating,  thus 
dismantling  the  coalition.  (85)  This  was  particularly  so 
after  Saddam's  massive  campaign  against  the  Saudi  ruling 
family,  following  King  Fahd1s  open  condemnation  of  his 
invasion,  on  8  August.  From  Baghdad  Radio  and  from  a 
station  called  Radio  Holy  Mecca,  broadcasting  from  Iraq, 
King  Fahd  was  described  as  a  traitor  for  inviting  foreign 
forces  into  the  holy  land.  (86) 
The  following  measures  were  taken  by  Saddam  to  face 
American  pressure  after  the  Arab  League  summit  in  Cairo: 
He  employed  his  tired  technique  in  the  media, 
declaring  a  large  scale  campaign  to  mass  the  Iraqis 
behind  him.  He  built  up  a  wave  of  public  enmity 
towards  America  and  its  lackeys;  the  latter  were  the 
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f  or  him,  as  America,  the  supporter  of  Israel,  was 
unpopular  with  most  Arab  populations. 
In  one  of  his  speeches  to  the  Iraqis,  to 
strengthen  their  fighting  spirit,  he  said: 
""....  the  Xragis  are  ready  to  eat  the  soil  and 
not  bow  their  heads  to  the  aggressive  invader.  - 
(87) 
on  the  other  hand,  the  international  siege  gave 
Saddam  the  opportunity  to  put  the  blame  on  the 
imperialist  West  and  its  allies  for  the  Iraqi  economic 
destruction  which  prevented  him  from  working  for 
economic  reconstruction.  (88) 
(2)  In  a  radio  message,  on  10  August,  Saddam  called  upon 
the  Arab  masses  and  all  Muslims  to  take  up  arms  for  a 
Jihad,  to  liberate  the  Muslim  shrines  in  Saudi  Arabia, 
which  were  in  the  hands  of  the  Americans  and  the 
Zionists.  Accordingly,  in  the  West  Bank,  Jordan  and 
Maghrib  States,  there  were  large  demonstrations 
supporting  Saddam.  (89) 
(3)  On  the  Arab  front,  in  an  attempt  to  link  the  question 
of  Kuwait  with  other  Arab  issues,  on  12  August,  Saddam 
suggested  that  Iraq  would  accept  Resolution  660  and 
withdraw  from  Kuwait,  if  Israel  withdrew  from  the 
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their  forces  out  of  Lebanon.  (90)  Saddam  was  playing 
his  trump  card,  and  sought  to  build  an  image  of  an 
Arab  leader  who  was  ready  to  face  Israel.  So,  he 
became  deeper  involved  in  the  crisis.  The  Americans 
and  British  responded  to  his  manoeuvre,  by  imposing  a 
naval  blockade  of  Iraq  on  13  August  without  any  UN 
sanction  for  this. 
(4)  For  the  second  time,  after  the  Algiers  Agreement  of 
1975,  Saddam  made  the  most  far-reaching  concession 
possible  to  ensure  his  political  survival,  by  offering 
the  Iranians  what  the  Iraqis  had  fought  for  eight 
years  of  bloody  war.  On  15  August  Saddam  accepted  in 
full  the  terms  of  the  1975  Algiers  Agreement,  which  he 
had  cancelled  eight  years  earlier.  (91)  From  this 
humiliating  move,  Saddam  seemed  to  be  trying  to  ally 
himself  with  his  larger  eastern  neighbour,  in  order  to 
fight  the  Americans  and  the  coalition  in  the  South. 
(5)  Saddam  then  played  the  hostage  card,  in  an  attempt  to 
bargain  with  the  west.  He  announced  on  17  August  that 
he  would  detain  westerners  in  Kuwait  at  civil  and 
military  installations.  The  next  day  forty  British  and 
more  than  twenty  American,  German  and  French  citizens 
were  moved  to  Iraq.  In  a  radio  interview,  'Abd  al- 
Razzdq  al-Hash-imi,  the  Iraqi  Ambassador  to  Paris, 
implied  that  the  fate  of  the  foreign  nationals  in  Iraq 
and  Kuwait  would  depend  on  the  behaviour  of  their 
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offer  that  he  would  free  all  foreigners  in  Kuwait  and 
Iraq  in  exchange  for  the  withdrawal  of  US  troops  and 
an  end  to  the  naval  blockade,  (93)  but  neither  the 
Americans,  nor  their  allies  were  willing  to  accept 
this  offer. 
Over  the  first  two  weeks  of  November,  against  the 
political  uproar  in  the  American  press  over  the  difference 
between  the  American  decision-makers  about  the 
administration's  Gulf  policy  and  the  demands  for  more 
deployment  to  the  Gulf,  Secretary  of  State  James  Baker's 
visit  to  Europe  and  the  Middle  East  gave  Saddam  the 
impression  that  the  Americans  were  moving  from  a  defensive 
to  an  offensive  plan.  However,  Primakov  had  informed  him  of 
this  shift  of  attitude  earlier  in  October,  on  his  second 
mission  that  month  to  Baghdad,  after  he  had  met  President 
Bush  and  Mrs  Thatcher,  and  knew  that  their  determination 
was  for  the  war  option  and  that  room  for  negotiation  was 
gone.  (94)  Saddam  was  assured  of  this  after  the  United 
Nations  Security  Council  passed  Resolution  678  on  29 
November,  authorising  the  use  of  force  to  dislodge  the 
Iraqi  forces  from  Kuwait. 
Saddam,  was,  by  now,  concentrating  on  containing  the 
international  coalition  which  was  confronting  him,  using 
his  favourite  strategy  of  stick  and  carrot,  -  which  had 
served  him  well  during  his  long  political  career,  to 
contain  the  coalition.  He  had  offered  financial  incentives 
613 by  supplying  Iraqi  oil  free  of  charge.  (95)  At  the  same 
time,  he  threatened  the  coalition  with  terrorist 
activities.  He  expressed  his  readiness  to  hit  the  allies, 
targets  throughout  the  world  if  Iraq  were  attacked.  This 
Iraqi  overture  was  expressed  by  Tdriq  ýAzlz  in  an  interview 
with  the  French  News  Agency  on  31  August,  (96)  and  confirmed 
by  Abil  Abb5s,  the  Head  of  the  Palestine  Liberation  Front,  a 
constituent  organisation  of  the  PLO,  in  a  press  conference 
in  Baghdad.  (97) 
When  Saddam  noticed  that  his  tactic  of  using  hostages 
as  a  human  shield  was  ignored  by  the  western  governments, 
he  tried  to  appeal  to  western  public  opinion  and  win 
international  sympathy,  which  might  put  pressure  on  these 
governments  to  deter  them  from  making  military  strikes 
against  Iraq.  on  23  August  he  was  televised  meeting  a  group 
of  British  and  American  hostages  to  show  the  western 
audience  his  good  will  and  to  improve  his  image  by  showing 
that  he  was  not  hiding  behind  women  and  children.  Then,  on 
28  August,  Saddam  ordered  the  release  of  all  women  and 
children  but  continued  to  detain  the  men  at  strategic 
locations  throughout  Iraq.  (98)  In  addition,  some  western 
politicians,  acting  as  mediators,  visited  Iraq,  and  Saddam 
released  some  of  their  countrymen  in  another  attempt  to 
influence  western  public  opinion.  It  appears  that  he  made 
the  release  of  hostages  a  weapon  to  punish  certain 
governments  and  reward  others  for  their  attitude  towards 
him. 
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strategic  sites  made  the  coalition's  bombing  of  these 
locations  less  likely.  But,  Sir  Edward  Heath  (Former 
British  Prime  minister),  who  met  Saddam  on  21  October  to 
ask  for  the  release  of  the  British  hostages,  said  that  Mrs 
Thatcher  would  not  stop  bombing  the  Iraqi  strategic  sites 
even  if  her  citizens  were  being  held  hostage  there.  (99) 
President  Mitterrand's  analysis  in  the  middle  of  November 
was  just  the  same  as  Sir  Edward  Heath's.  He  said  that  if 
Saddam  released  the  hostages  unconditionally,  he  was 
willing  to  negotiate.  The  hostage  release  would  regarded  as 
the  first  phase  in  resolving  the  crisis.  (100) 
Thus,  it  seemed  to  Saddam,  which  later  proved  to  be 
incorrect,  (101)  that  the  west's  anger  over  the  hostages, 
particularly  in  America  and  Britain  made  them  keener  to  go 
to  war  than  to  negotiate  with  him.  Accordingly,  on  6 
November,  Saddam  decided  to  release  all  the  foreign 
hostages  held  in  Baghdad  and  Kuwait.  (102)  Saddam  probably 
took  this  move  when  President  Bush  revealed  his  suddenly 
positive  attitude  through  in  his  30  November  offer  for 
direct  talks  with  him.  President  Bush  suggested  that  his 
Secretary  of  State,  James  Baker,  should  visit  Baghdad 
between  20  December  1990  and  3  January  1991  and  that  he 
should  receive  the  Iraqi  Foreign  Minister,  Tdriq  ýAzlz,  in 
Washington  after  10  December.  (103) 
To  make  sure  of  the  credibility  of  the  new  American 
attitude,  Saddam  tried  to  play  for  time  bY  postponing  his 
615 meeting  with  Secretary  of  State  Baker  to  the  last  possible 
moment  and  refused  to  meet  Baker  before  12  January  1991, 
three  days  before  the  deadline  set  by  Resolution  678.  At  a 
press  conference  on  9  January,  James  Baker  described  the 
Iraqi  insistence  on  the  12  January  meeting  as  an  obvious 
effort  to  avoid  the  deadline  of  15  January.  The  Americans 
suspected,  which  seems  probable,  that  the  Iraqi  President 
was  trying  to  spin  out  the  talking  until  the  holy  month  of 
Ramaddn  had  begun,  in  order  to  embarrass  the  Arab  members 
of  the  coalition  about  fighting  during  the  holy  month.  When 
the  hot  weather  started  af  ter  Ramaýdn,  conditions  would  not 
be  in  favour  of  the  western  troops.  President  Bush 
understood  Saddam's  manoeuvre  and  cancelled  "Azlzls  visit 
to  Washington  and  Baker's  visit  to  Baghdad.  Meanwhile,  the 
Iraqi  refusal  to  agree  about  timing  strengthened  President 
Bush  and  enabled  him  to  increase  his  demands,  which,  in 
addition  to  Iraq's  unconditional  withdrawal  from  Kuwait, 
now  included  the  elimination  of  Iraq's  missile  and  nuclear 
facilities,  together  with  compensation  for  losses  and 
damage  to  Kuwait. 
Saddam  reached  a  final  decision  after  this  failed 
attempt  at  talks,  which  he  saw  as  another  signal  that  the 
new  American  initiative  was  just  a  tactic  so  that  Bush 
could  assure  his  voters  that  he  had  done  all  he  could  to 
avoid  war,  freeing  the  hostages  while  giving  nothing  in 
return.  Saddam  was  convinced  that  President  Bush's  aim  was 
not  to  defend  the  Saudis  or  to  liberate  Kuwait  but  to 
destroy  his  non-conventional  arms.  It  appeared  to  him  that 
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in  order  to  thwart  Saddam's  ambitions. 
Thus,  unconditional  withdrawal  would  not  avert  war  and 
the  use  of  force  against  Iraq  appeared  inevitable.  Bowing 
to  the  Americans  could  only  affect  his  personal  prestige, 
and  he  would  be  in  great  danger.  His  economic  plight  had 
been  increased  because  of  the  sanctions  imposed  as  a 
result  of  his  invasion  of  Kuwait.  Any  retreat  now,  would 
make  him  more,  rather  than  less,  vulnerable  to  an  American 
attack.  If  he  withdrew  without  some  concession  in  return 
-which  the  west  refused  to  give-,  his  regime's  existence 
would  be  in  question. 
Thus,  Saddam  tried  to  play  the  last  card  in  his  hand 
to  save  his  personal  position.  He  announced  his  decision  to 
f  ight  to  the  end,  rather  than  to  suf  f  er  humiliation  f  rom 
the  Americans.  He  hoped  that  the  loss  of  Kuwait  in  the  war 
with  the  allies  would  make  him  a  hero.  He  would  be  lauded 
by  the  Arab  masses  as  a  new  Nasir,  a  leader  who  def  ied 
world  imperialism  and  survived.  He  gave  his  war  a 
fatalistic  shape  to  arouse  the  Iraqi  spirit  to  fight: 
VI  ....  if  it  is  God  Almighty's  will  that  we  fight 
this  battle  to  cleanse  the  Arab  homeland  of  all 
this  rottenness,  so  be  it".  (104) 
From  his  dealings  with  Saddam,  Bush  was  sure  that 
Saddam  would  never  shift  his  strategy  and  withdraw  from 
617 Kuwait  empty-handed.  The  aim  which  he  had  worked  so  hard  to 
achieve  had  at  last  succeeded.  Thus  it  seems  likely  that 
his  suggestion  for  direct  talks  with  Saddam  and  his  desire 
for  a  peaceful  solution  to  the  Gulf  crisis  were  to  conceal 
his  manipulative  role  in  the  crisis,  when  the  mater  was 
questioned  by  Congress,  the  media  and  the  American  people. 
Once  again  President  Bush  had  been  able  to  lead  Saddam 
into  a  trap  by  getting  him  to  free  the  hostages 
unconditionally.  This  appeared  clear  from  his  statement 
which  was  issued  on  21  December,  saying  that  the  release  of 
the  hostages  had  relieved  him  of  a  heavy  moral  burden  and 
gave  him  a  free  hand  to  act  as  necessary.  (105)  Thus,  both 
President  Bush  and  Saddam  sent  their  Secretaries  of  State 
to  Geneva  on  9  January  1991,  knowing  that  the  meeting 
would  be  a  fiasco,  because  each  one  would  offer  nothing  to 
the  other,  since  the  minds  of  the  two  Presidents  were 
already  set  on  war. 
Despite  the  Secretary  of  State's  announcement  of  the 
failure  of  his  mission,  because  of  the  hard-line  attitude 
of  the  Iraqis  and  their  rejection  of  any  diplomatic. 
solution  whatsoever,  (106)  President  Bush  again  pressed  the, 
United  Nations'  Secretary  General,  Javier  Perez  de  Cuellar, 
to  attempt  another  peace  mission  to  Baghdad,  to  show  the 
international  audience  that  he  had  given  peace  every  chance 
and  that  Saddam  was  the  one  who  was  insisting  on  war. 
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January,  France  tried  one  last  time  to  avoid  war,  on  14 
January.  The  proposals  were  explicitly  linked  with  Iraqi 
withdrawal  and  the  holding  of  an  international  conference 
on  wider  Middle  East  issues.  The  French  Foreign  Minister, 
Ronald  Dummies,  was  to  go  to  Baghdad  to  present  Saddam.  with 
the  plan,  (107)  but  the  US  opposed  the  trip,  probably  from 
fear  of  an  unexpected  change  in  Saddam's  attitude. 
Thus,  after  this  last  chance  for  peace,  which  was 
aborted  by  the  Americans,  Iraq  braced  itself  for  the  war, 
which  became  an  inevitable  consequence,  by  reason  of 
Saddam's  and  Bush's  intransigence  and  their  determination 
to  achieve  their  own  interests,  which  were  for  Saddam.  to 
save  his  political  skin  and  for  President  Bush  to  win  the 
next  election. 
619 Operation  Desert  Storm  and  the  Mother  of  all 
Battles 
In  the  early  hours  of  17  January  1991,  the  coalition 
attacked,  under  US  leadership.  The  Iraqis  only  knew  that 
the  war  had  begun  when  the  bombs  began  falling  on  their 
capital,  because  the  Americans  had  deployed  their  latest 
high  technology  military  products  to  attack  Iraq,  such  as 
the  F-117  fighter,  which  was  invisible  to  Iraqi  radar 
because  of  its  angular  shape  and  was  known  as  Shabah 
(ghost).  It  was  armed  with  laser-guided  bombs  to  hit  vital 
targets  with  accuracy.  (108) 
The  initial  coalition  attacks  were  on  the  Iraqi  early 
warning  stations,  air  force  headquarters,  radar, 
communication  bases  and  the  microwave  towers.  They  disabled 
Saddam's  defence  system,  weakened  his  resistance  to  the 
coalition  air  offence,  and  put  the  Iraqi  air  force  at  a 
serious  disadvantage.  Thus,  one  day  after  the  outbreak  of 
the  air  campaign  the  coalition's  air  forces  achieved 
complete  mastery  of  the  air  and  put  Iraq  at  their  mercy. 
This  enabled  them  to  paralyse  Iraq's  ability  to  command  and 
to  control  its  forces  and  destroyed  their  ability  to  fight. 
Then  the  coalition  began  its  extensive  attack  on  vital 
targets  such  as  oil  refineries,  air  fields,  chemical 
weapons  complexes,  power  plants,  the  Presidential  Palace, 
the  headquarters  of  the  Ba'th  Party  and  the  Ministry  of 
620 Defence.  The  Americans  and  their  allies  claimed  that  their 
main  motive  for  the  massive  air  offensive  was  to  weaken 
Iraq's  offensive  military  capabilities.  Eventually  their 
targets  widened  and  serious  damage  was  caused  to  the 
electrical,  water,  telephone  networks,  petrol  refining 
capacity,  the  main  bridges,  and  many  principal  roads. 
Air  Vice  Marshal  W.  J.  Wratten,  Deputy  Commander  of  the 
British  Forces,  said  that  the  key  Iraqi  targets  were  hit 
seriously  in  the  first  three  days  of  the  air  campaign  and 
that  Iraqi  air  force  could  not  be  used  in  any  offensive 
role.  (109)  Neverthe  less,  the  booming  campaign  on 
subsidiary  targets  continued  for  a  further  thirty-eight 
days. 
Two  military  analysts  claim  that  the  coalition's  aim 
in  this  ferocious  air  offensive,  of  which  the  world  had 
never  seen  the  like,  was  to  destroy  the  Iraqi  nation, 
rather  than  to  destroy  Saddam's  regime  and  his  war 
machine.  (110)  Some  credence  is  given  to  these  claims  by  the 
statement  of  the  formal  American  Chief  of  Staff,  General 
Colin  Powell,  admitting  in  his  memoirs,  that  the  Americans' 
desire  was  not  to  end  Saddam's  regime  or  to  destroy  his 
military  capability  totally.  He  also  stated  that  some  of 
his  military  capability  was  left  to  him  to  enable  him  to 
defend  his  regime  internally  and  to  contain  the  continuing 
Iranian  threat  to  America's  interests  in  the  region.  (111) 
621 From  the  following  reports  and  statements  we  can 
determine  the  real  aim  behind  America's  strategy  in  the 
war: 
Prince  Sadr  al-Din  Aga  Khdn,  the  leader  of  the  team 
appointed  by  the  UN  Secretary  General  Seflor  Perez  de 
Cuellar  to  study  Iraq's  humanitarian  needs  after  the 
war  submitted  a  sad  picture  in  his  report  about  the 
civilian  targets  struck  by  the  coalition  air  forces 
and  the  serious  damage  which  was  caused  to  public 
health.  This  was  far  removed  from  the  declared  aims  of 
the  War.  (112) 
(2)  An  investigation  carried  out  by  a  Harvard  University 
study  group  after  the  war  indicated  that  the  damage  by 
the  allies  to  the  civilian  infrastructure  would  cause 
acute  consequences  to  public  health  and  serious 
malnutrition  for  most  of  the  civilian  population.  (113) 
(3)  At  a  press  conference  on  23  January  1991,  General 
Colin  Powell  said: 
11  Our  strategy  for  dealing  with  this  Iraqi 
army  is  very  simple.  First  we  are  going  to  cut 
it  off  and  then  we  are  going  to  kill  it.  "(114) 
The  first  Iraqi  response  came  two  hours  after  the 
outbreak  of  the  allied  offensive.  A  Presidential  statement, 
622 broadcast  by  Radio  Baghdad,  informed  the  Iraqi  Nation  that 
the  mother  of  all  battles  had  started.  (115)  The  second  day 
of  the  fighting  Saddam  called  for  a  holy  war  between  pious 
Islam  and  the  evil  forces  of  the  infidels.  He  accused  the 
coalition  of  attacking  the  holy  Shrines  in  Kerbald'  and 
Najaf  and  accused  the  Saudis  of  defiling  the  holy  land  by 
allowing  Christian  forces  to  use  it  as  a  base  to  attack  an 
Arab  Muslim  country.  (116) 
On  18  January,  Saddam  carried  out  his  threat  to 
Israel,  which  he  had  issued  earlier,  that  he  would  strike 
at  the  heart  of  the  Israeli  State  if  he  was  attacked  by  the 
allies.  His  Scud  missile  campaign  against  Israel  continued 
for  two  weeks  in  order  to  create  an  Arab-Israeli  conflict. 
The  Israeli  government's  patience  was  at  breaking  point,  as 
it  had  never  failed  to  respond  in  all  its  history  since  the 
Israeli  State  was  declared  in  1948  to  any  Arab  attack  on 
its  territory.  Israeli  public  opinion  was  clamouring  for 
retaliation  against  Iraq,  but-Israel  was  requested  not  to 
do  so  by  the  Americans  and  some  members  of  the  coalition, 
particularly  the  Arabs  and  Muslims,  who  would  be  criticised 
or  in  danger  of  a  national  uprising  if  they  were  seen  be 
supporting  Israel  against  an  Arab  and  Muslim  country. 
obviously,  the  Americans  knew  that  Saddam's  attack  on 
Israel  was  imminent,  so  they  had  already  obtained  the 
Israeli's  reassurance  that  they  would  not  retaliate.  At  the 
meeting  between  President  Bush  and  the  Israeli  Prime 
Minister,  Yitzhak  Shamir,  which  took  place  in  Washington  in 
623 October  1990,  Shamir  assured  the  American  President  that  he 
would  not  attack  Iraq,  in  return  for  massive  military  aid 
and  many  other  promises  in  Israel's  favour.  (117) 
However,  Saddam  failed  to  trigger  an  Israeli  response, 
although,  from  the  course  of  events  it  seems  that  he 
achieved  some  success  through  his  Scud  missile  campaign. 
America  made  the  search  for  Scud  launching  bases  its  top 
priority  because  of  its  psychological  effect  on  civilian 
morale,  which  was  greater,  in  fact,  than  its  military 
threat.  It  disrupted  the  American  war  strategy,  as  they  had 
to  make  great  efforts  to  search  for  the  Scuds  to  prevent 
Israeli  retaliation,  which  would  have  jeopardised  the 
coalition. 
Saddam's  other  response  was  towards  the  environment. 
on  22  January,  he  set  fire  to  the  oil  installations  in 
Kuwait,  causing  vast  fires  and  smoke  in  the  area.  He  then 
ordered  the  crude  oil  from  the  Kuwaiti  tanker  terminal  of 
Mind'  al-Ahmad-I  to  be  pumped  into  the  Gulf,  causing  an 
ecological  disaster  to  the  environment.  This  act  was 
described  as  environmental  terrorism  by  President  Bush. 
Saddam's  aims  in  this  move  were: 
(1)  To  complicate  the  allies,  task; 
(2)  To  hide  his  failure  to  make  any  kind  of  military 
impression  on  the  coalition; 
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hoped,  might  somehow  bring  about  a  quick  ending  to  the 
war; 
In  an  attempt  to  force  the  coalition  to  stop  their 
attacks,  Saddam  put  their  captured  pilots  under  strong 
psychological  and  physical  pressure,  which  was  clear  their 
appearance  on  Iraqi  television,  threatening  to  deploy  them 
alongside  economic  and  military  targets.  (118)  Again,  his 
strategy  for  using  prisoners  of  war  as  a  human  shield 
failed,  as  it  increased  the  contempt  that  western  public 
opinion  felt  for  him,  and  he  received  a  strong  warning  from 
the  coalition.  (119) 
At  midnight  on  29  January,  hundreds  of  Iraqi  troops 
took  the  coalition  by  surprise  and  drove  toward  the  desert 
Saudi  border  town  of  Khdf  ji.  It  was  an  attempt  supervised 
personally  by  Saddam,  as  Baghdad  Radio  announced.  After  two 
days  of  occupation,  the  coalition  was  able  to  dislodge  the 
Iraqis  after  heavy  street  fighting  between  the  two  sides. 
The  US  lost  its  first  casualties  on  the  ground  at  Khdfjl. 
Twelve  marines  died  and  two  were  injured.  Another  seven 
marines  died  from  friendly  fire.  On  the  Iraqi  side  the 
loses  were  a  great  deal  higher  in  both  men  and 
equipment.  (120) 
It  seems  that  Saddam  wanted  to  achieve  a  propaganda 
gain,  rather  than  any  military  objective.  (121)  The  western 
allies  commented  that  it  was  an  indication  of  his 
625 desperation  to  lure  the  allies  into  a  ground  war,  of  which 
the  Iraqis  had  great  experience  in  their  eight  year  war 
with  Iran.  He  hoped  to  impose  substantial  casualties  on  the 
coalition  and  claim  a  political  victory  before  his  defences 
around  Kuwait  were  over-run,  resulting  in  his  losing  his 
freedom  of  manoeuvre  and  forcing  him  to  withdraw 
unconditionally  from  Kuwait  without  any  guarantee  that  the 
departing  force  would  not  be  attacked.  This  attack  had 
indeed  formed  part  of  Saddam's  war  strategy  since  the  war 
began,  but  President  Bush  prevented  it  from  being  fulfilled 
when  he  announced  that  the  land  offensive  would  be  launched 
if  and  when  the  time  was  right.  (122) 
Saddam  responded  to  the  American  President's  statement 
by  allowing  the  world  media  back  into  the  country.  He 
wanted  to  mass  the  Iraqis,  the  Arabs,  the  Muslims  and  the 
world  audience  on  his  side  by  allowing  western  journalists 
televise  scenes  to  show  indiscriminate  bombings  on  Iraqi 
civilian  targets,  particularly  the  attack  on  al-ýAmiriyyah 
shelter  during  an  allied  air  raid,  in  which  three  hundred 
civilians  were  killed,  most  of  them  women  and 
children.  (123)  He  tried  to  strengthen  the  peace  party  among 
the  coalition.  His  move  this  time  was  effective.  Massive 
demonstrations  took  place  in  support  of  Saddam  throughout 
the  Arab  world.  Mounting  waves  of  anger,  even  in  Egypt, 
Syria  and  Morocco,  broke  against  the  allies.  Anti-war 
demonstrations  occurred  throughout  the  Arab  world, 
particularly  in  the  Maghreb  States.  (124) 
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Union  again  tried  to  take  a  more  leading  role.  Primakov  was 
sent  to  Baghdad  by  the  Soviet  President  a  third  time  to 
persuade  Saddam  to  withdraw  from  Kuwait  unconditionally. 
Accordingly,  the  RCC  announced,  on  15  February,  for  the 
first  time  since  the  crisis  began,  their  readiness  to 
comply  with  Resolution  660,  (125)  which  called  for 
unconditional  withdrawal  from  Kuwait.  However,  it  made  a 
number  of  conditions: 
Israel  should  withdraw  from  Palestine  and  other  Arab 
territories,  and  if  it  refused  the  UN  should  impose 
sanctions  on  it  in  the  same  way  as  on  Iraq; 
(2)  All  the  American  and  allied  troops  should  withdraw 
from  the  Gulf; 
(3)  All  the  UN  Resolutions  against  Iraq  since  the  crisis 
began  should  be  cancelled; 
(4)  The  Iraqi  foreign  debt,  which  was  estimated  to  be 
about  $80  billion  should  be  cancelled; 
(5)  International  guarantees  should  be  given  f  or  Iraqi 
historical  rights  on  land  and  sea; 
(6)  Iraqi  losses  caused  by  the  coalition  air  attacks 
should  be  made  good; 
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of  their  conditions  but,  on  the  contrary,  had  increased 
them.  President  Bush  rejected  all  the  Iraqi  demands  and,  in 
addition,  he  called  for  Saddam's  downfall.  (126)  Saddam's 
response  to  this  threat  to  his  political  position  resulted 
in  his  giving  warning  that  he  would  use  chemical  weapons. 
Instead  of  carrying  out  this  threat,  however,  he  sent  his 
Foreign  Secretary,  Tdriq  ýAzlz,  to  Moscow  to  inform  the 
Soviets  that  he  accepted  their  proposal,  which  was  an 
unconditional  withdrawal  from  Kuwait.  He  dropped  his 
earlier  demands  and  he  set  the  time  for  his  troops  to 
withdraw  at  twenty-one  days.  He  left  the  Soviets  to  resolve 
the  Palestinian  issue.  This  means  that  Saddam  actually 
accepted  the  American  terms. 
Nevertheless,  the  Americans  regarded  Saddam's 
acceptance  of  the  Soviet  plan  as  a  trick,  resulting  from 
his  growing  desperation.  In  a  press  interview  on  21 
February,  President  Bush  gave  Saddam  until  8  p.  m.  Iraqi 
time,  on  Saturday  23  February,  to  withdraw  unconditionally 
from  Kuwait.  (127)  Saddam's  comment  on  President  Bush's 
statement  came  in  his  speech  on  22  February: 
-....  the  Soviet  leadership  told  us  that  if  Iraq 
agreed  to  withdraw  then  the  war  would  end  and 
negotiations  would  start.  Iraq  said  it  would 
withdraw,  but  what  did  Bush  say?  He  said  it 
was  a  trick  and  the  war  would  continue.  The 
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studied  it  carefully".  (128) 
Saddam  also  proclaimed  a  glorious  Iraqi  victory  over 
the  coalition  and  he  tried  to  justify  his  concessions  by 
telling  the  Iraqi  people  and  the  Iraqi  forces  that  the 
inevitable  withdrawal  from  Kuwait  was  an  act  in  their 
favour.  (129)  But  the  Americans  seemed  determined  to  thwart 
all  Saddam's  attempts  to  pull  out  from  Kuwait  with  some 
face  -saving  formula.  President  Bush  demanded  a  farther 
concession  from  Saddam: 
"to  ooo  we  must  hear  publicly  and  authoritatively 
of  his  acceptance  of  these  terms".  (130) 
He  confirmed  that  the  withdrawal  should  be  complete,  by 
the  time  the  deadline  expired,  otherwise  the  ground 
offensive  would  go  ahead. 
Obviously,  Saddam  could  not  accept  the  Americans' 
demand,  which  meant  a  public  admission  of  fault.  It  would 
have  posed  a  serious  threat  to  his  political  survival;  he 
would  have  accepted  the  destruction  of  the  whole  of  Iraq, 
provided  that  he  could  have  preserved  his  regime. 
Once  again,  after  he  had  failed  to  get  the  desired 
result  from  his  many  attempts,  he  began  to  mass  his  forces 
for  the  ground  offensive  and  to  raise  the  morale  of  his 
battered  troops.  He  said: 
629 -....  when  the  battle  becomes  comprehensive  with 
all  types  of  weapons,  the  deaths  on  the  allied 
side  will  be  increased  with  God's  help,  when 
the  flag  of  Allah  Akbar  will  fly  over  the 
mother  of  all  battles".  (131) 
President  Bush's  response  to  Saddam's  resistance  and 
his  roundabout  policy,  came  in  the  early  morning  of  24 
February,  as  the  ground  war  started  to  dislodge  the  Iraqi 
forces  from  Kuwait.  Saddam  was  looking  forward  to  the 
ground  war,  but,  after  two  days,  his  forces  were  defeated 
and  the  allied  forces  moved  rapidly  into  Iraq.  The 
coalition  attacked  the  Iraqi  position  from  the  rear,  while 
the  Iraqis  were  expecting  a  frontal  attack  and  had  built  a 
strong  protective  line  around  their  position  to  prevent  the 
expected  coalition  advance. 
When  the  army  was  close  to  defeat  in  Kuwait,  Baghdad 
Radio  announced,  in  the  early  morning  of  February  26,  that 
Saddam  had  ordered  his  troops  to  withdraw  from  Kuwait.  The 
Statement  said: 
v4  the  Iraqi  leadership  had  stressed  its 
acceptance  of  withdrawal  in  accordance  with  the 
UN  Security  Council  Resolutions,  when  it  agreed 
to  the  Soviet  peace  proposal,  and  it  applauds 
Iraq's  victories  as  it  faced  the  whole 
world.  "(132) 
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Saddam's  tactics  to  turn  his  defeat  into  victory  in  order 
to  gain  some  political  advantage.  He  announced  that, 
because  Saddam  had  not  acknowledged  his  retreat,  his  order 
for  withdrawal  was  to  save  the  remnants  of  his  army  and 
regroup  them  again  for  another  fight  later.  He  decided  that 
the  war  should  continue  until  Saddam's  military  power  was 
diminished.  (133)  This  statement  was  followed  by  massive 
military  action  which  destroyed  many  of  the  Iraqi  troops 
who  had  fled  Kuwait  to  save  their  lives.  (134) 
Next  day,  on  28  February,  after  the  slaughter  of  the 
Iraqi  troops,  President  Bush  rapidly  ordered  the  end  of  the 
desert  operation,  which  appeared  to  have  gone  well  beyond 
its  aims  as  set  out  by  the  UN.  He  called  a  cease-fire  and 
announced  that  the  war  was  over  before  the  coalition  had 
finished  their  job  of  destroying  the  Iraqi  leader;  they  had 
left  him  free  without  punishment.  Indeed,  in  spite  of  all 
the  crimes  he  had  committed,  he  was  left  with  enough  of  his 
military  capability  intact  to  defend  his  regime  internally, 
as  was  later  discovered.  (135) 
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As  soon  as  the  war  ended,  the  huge  scale  of  the 
destruction  of  life,  the  environment,  property  and 
production  facilities,  particularly  in  Iraq,  were  almost 
never  mentioned  by  the  Western  media,  and,  more 
importantly,  it  seemed  that  the  massive  campaign  against 
the  Iraqi  dictator,  who  was  responsible  for  these 
disasters,  had  stopped.  On  the  contrary,  he  was  backed  by 
the  coalition  to  repress  the  Iraqi  uprising  in  a  massive 
brutal  operation,  when  President  Bush  called  on  the  people 
to  revolt.  (136) 
So  the  high-principled  talk  of  democracy,  freedom, 
civil  rights,  stability  and  peace,  with  which  America  and 
its  allies  embarked  on  the  desert  operation  against  Iraq, 
concealed  aims  and  objectives'that  later  became  evident  in 
the  aftermath  of  the  war,  including: 
To  destroy  the  civilian  infrastructure  of  Iraq.  More 
than  110,0  00  air  attacks  were  launched  and  around 
90,000  tons  of  bombs  were  dropped.  This  ferocious  air 
campaign  caused  severe  damage  to  the  civilian  support 
structure,  (water  supplies,  fuel  supplies,  food 
stocks,  sewage  systems,  garbage  disposal  systems, 
transportation  systems,  Baghdad  television  and  Radio 
broadcasting  systems,  energy  generation  and 
distribution,  oil  production,  bridges,  strategically 
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every  major  settlement  in  Iraq.  Mass  starvation  and 
serious  disease  were  unavoidable  in  Iraq  because  of 
the  air  raids  on  the  above  civilian  facilities,  and 
the  sanctions,  which  were  later  imposed  on  the  Iraqis. 
The  international  aid  organisations,  which  supplied 
medical  supplies  to  the  Iraqis,  were  able  to  serve 
less  than  10%  of  the  country's  needs.  According  to 
American  estimates,  more  than  70,000  people  died  after 
the  end  of  the  war  for  lack  of  food  and  medicine. 
Some  independent  observers,  like  the  UN  task 
force,  reported  after  their  visit  to  Baghdad,  in  mid- 
March  1991,  that  the  scale  of  destruction  to  the 
civilian  facilities  was  neither  coincidental  nor 
accidental.  In  addition,  the  US  air  force  admitted 
that  70%  of  the  bombs  that  were  dropped  in  the  war, 
missed  their  intended  targets.  According  to  the 
estimates  of  a  Green  Peace  study,  based  on  American 
military  figures,  about  110,000  to  140,000  were  killed 
in  allied  air  attacks,  several  hundred  thousand  people 
were  wounded  and  many  others  were  forced  to  flee. 
Thus,  it  was  far  from  the  truth  that  the  aims  of  the 
war  and  sanctions  were  to  destroy  Saddam's  future 
potential  ambitions. 
(2)  To  impose  sanctions  against  Iraq,  through  America's 
influence  in  the  UN,  until  Saddam's  arsenal  of  weapons 
of  mass  destruction  had  been  neutralised.  These 
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of  Saddam's  intransigence;  they  have  seriously 
affected  the  Iraqi  nation,  but  they  have  continues 
with  them  for  the  following  reasons: 
(a)  To  force  Saddam's  regime  to  make  further 
concessions,  with  the  promise  of  eventually 
removing  the  sanctions  and  helping  the  Iraqi 
nation. 
(b)  To  put  Iraq  and  the  whole  region  under  scrutiny 
with  the  justification  of  watching  and  checking 
Saddam's  regime. 
(c)  To  keep  Iraqi  oil  of  f  the  market  so  that  the 
Saudi  and  Kuwaiti  could  take  over  the  Iraqi  oil 
quota.  This  would  help  to  restore  the  Saudi  and 
Kuwaiti  economies,  which  had  suffered  because  of 
the  war. 
(3)  To  provoke  a  campaign  of  denigration,  led  by  the 
Kuwaitis,  against  the  whole  of  the  Iraqi  nation,  its 
history,  culture  and  civilisation,  instead  of  against 
the  regime,  which,  in  fact,  has  inflicted  more  harm  on 
its  own  country  than  any  one  else.  Kuwait's  attitude 
will  result  in  negative  consequences  in  the  long  term. 
Iraqi  reaction  will  eventually  make  itself  felt,  to 
the  detriment  of  the  Kuwaitis.  This  has  recently  been 
recognised  by  the  Kuwaitis,  and  it  seems  that  they 
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towards  the  Iraqi  nation.  (137) 
(4)  To  the  domination  of  the  Middle  East  by  the  American 
through  acquiescent  and  autocratic  regimes. 
Throughout  the  crisis  the  allies  claimed  that 
Saddam  was  a  dictator  with  an  appalling  record  on 
human  rights  and  an  adventuirs  foreign  policy, 
possessing  alarming  military  power,  and  that  this 
justified  them  in  attacking  and  removing  him  by  any 
means,  in  order  to  save  the  region  and  the  world  from 
his  threat.  They  ignored  the  fact  that  he  was  their 
old  ally,  who  was  supported  and  armed  by  them  f  or 
eight  years  against  the  Iranians.  At  the  end  of  the 
war,  instead  of  removing  him,  he  was  once  again 
permitted  by  the  same  allies  to  suppress  the  uprisings 
across  the  country. 
It  was  claimed  by  the  American  decision-makers 
that  the  fall  of  Saddam  might  lead  to  more  instability 
than  had  been  experienced  to  date  because  the  Shi"ite 
Islamic  forces,  the  most  powerful  of  the  opposition 
movements,  were  backed  by  Iran  and  could  control  Iraq 
and  threaten  the  rest  of  the  Gulf  States,  imposing  a 
problem  for  US  hegemony  in  the  Gulf.  Thus,  it  was 
better  for  the  allies,  after  Saddam  had  been  knocked 
down  by  the  coalition,  to  keep  him  as  a  straw  man  for 
the  following  purposes: 
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well  experienced  in  this.  (138) 
(b)  To  encourage  Saddam's  neighbours  to  increase 
their  arms  purchases,  in  order  to  protect 
themselves  from  a  future  threat  from  him.  These 
purchases  would  boost  western  economies,  which 
were  in  recession  at  the  time. 
(c)  To  enable  them  to  establish  military  bases  and  to 
maintain  a  permanent  presence  in  the  Gulf.  This 
had  been  previously  refused  by  the  Saudis,  the 
Kuwaitis  and  other  Gulf  States.  This  presence 
would  allow  them  to  dominate  the  region  and  to 
secure  oil  supplies,  under  the  pretext  of 
preventing  the  emergence  of  a  future  threat  by 
Saddam  or  any  uprising  resulting  from  his 
continuing  policy  of  repression.  Immediately 
after  the  end  of  the  war  the  US  administration 
asked  Congress  to  sell  arms  worth  $18  billion  to 
Saudi  Arabia,  Egypt,  Bahrain,  the  United  Arab 
Emirates  and  Turkey.  (139) 
(5)  The  economic  aspects  of  the  war  were  vital  to  America 
and  its  allies,  as  James  Baker  explained  in  his  speech 
to  NATO  on  13  August: 
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said  that  the  Gulf  is  a  vital  US  and  Western 
interest  and  that  we  could  not  allow  any 
hostile  power  to  gain  a  stranglehold  over  its 
energy  resources.  Now  Saddam  Husayn  poses  just 
such  a  threat.  Given  the  central  importance  of 
Gulf  oil  to  the  global  economy,  all  of  us  share 
an  interest  in  thwarting  this  dictator's 
ambitions.  We  all  have  a  critical  stake  in 
this".  (140) 
The  most  significant  aspects  were: 
(a)  The  Americans  had  full  control  of  Gulf  oil  and 
the  oil  market,  which  was  worth  a  great  price  and 
provided  the  US  with  opportunities  which  were  to 
have  far-reaching  consequences  for  the  whole 
region. 
(b)  America  was  able  to  dominate  international 
affairs  in  a  bid  to  stop  its  serious  industrial 
and  financial  decline.  The  Gulf  War  fulfilled  the 
US's  desire  to  enter  the  area  in  full  strength 
and  implement  its  control  over  Gulf  oil 
resources.  It  thus  obtained  the  key  to 
controlling  Europe  and  Japan,  who  depended  on 
Gulf  oil,  and  put  itself  in  the  leading  role  of 
the  new  world  order.  It  was  able  to  implement 
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f  ollowing: 
-  The  defeat  of  the  Soviet  Union  which  had  been  a 
counter-balance  to  the  US  domination  of  the 
world,  which  was  strongly  supported  by  the  old 
imperialist  powers,  France  and  Britain. 
-  The  weakness  of  the  UN  and  its  inability  to 
confront  the  Americans  effectively  allowed  the 
Americans  to  control  decisions  about  security. 
(c)  The  American  Strategy  caused  economic 
difficulties  in  the  middle  Eastern  States.  These 
in  turn,  led  to  a  crisis  of  political  legitimacy 
in  the  Region,  accompanied  by  failures  in  human 
development.  Some  of  the  countries  of  the  Middle 
East  have  fared  poorly  in  this  respect,  because 
the  Americans  allowed  the  Gulf  Monarchies  to 
change  their  policy  of  subsidising  poorer  Arab 
countries  and  the  PLO  from  their  surplus  oil 
revenue  and  to  finance  their  own  budget  deficits 
instead.  (141) 
(d)  The  American  were  awarded  major  reconstruction 
projects  in  Kuwait  after  the  War.  There  was  a 
lack  of  competition  between  the  joint 
multinational  force  countries  but  the  Americans 
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political  influence  in  the  Gulf. 
(e)  The  British  took  part  in  the  war  because  of  their 
close  relationship  with  America  and  because  they 
wanted  to  have  some  political  and  military  role 
in  the  Middle  East  region  in  the  declining  years 
of  the  British  Empire.  (142) 
Arab  countries  like  Syria  and  Egypt,  that  aligned 
themselves  with  the  coalition,  did  so  in  order  to 
receive  American  and  Gulf  aid,  as  well  as  from 
other  political  motives. 
(g)  Turkey  supported  the  coalition  against  Iraq  in 
order  to  gain  admission  to  the  European  Community 
(EC).  (143) 
(6)  Both  during  and  af  ter  the  war,  there  were  popular 
protests  and  demonstrations  in  a  number  of  Arab 
countries,  whose  governments  had  supported  the 
coalition.  These  manifestations  were  a  source  of 
concern  to  the  governments  involved,  but  no  serious  up 
heavals  occurred.  The  Arab  liberation  movements  appear 
to  be  more  or  leass  quiescent,  at  least  for  the 
moment.  (144) 
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pressure  on  the  regimes  to  reform  their  tyrannical 
policies  or  comply  with  their  subjects,  political  and 
democratic  aspirations.  There  has  been  deep 
disappointment  among  the  masses,  which  has  resulted  in 
a  rise  in  religious  fundamentalism,  which  has  become 
one  of  the  most  characteristic  features  of  the  post- 
war  period  in  the  Arab  world.  (145) 
(7)  The  Gulf  crisis  and  the  war  opened  up  a  great  split  in 
the  Arab  world,  casting  doubt  on  one  of  the  key 
principles  of  Arab  politics  since  World  War  2,  that 
the  Arabs  formed  a  single  family  whatever  their 
quarrels.  The  crisis  shattered  this  ideal,  introducing 
into  inter-Arab  relations  unprecedented  hostility  and 
mistrust,  which  have  deepened  the  divisions  between 
Arab  states.  In  the  face  of  this,  there  have  been 
initial  moves  for  a  new  collective  security 
arrangement  among  the  Arabs  of  the  coalition  for  a  new 
order  for  the  eastern  Arabs.  (146) 
Many  other  countries  around  the  world,  as  well  as 
many  Arab  countries,  supported  the  legitimacy  of  the 
Gulf  war  because  they  considered  Saddam.  to  be  a  new 
Hitler.  However,  exception  may  be  taken  to  this 
characterisation  of  Saddam.  The  Second  World  War  was  a 
battle  against  fascism  while  the  coalition  attack  on 
Iraq  was  based  on  the  desire  to  destroy  the  civilian 
infrastructure  of  Iraq.  (147) 
640 (8)  The  crisis  and  the  war,  which  have  caused  Arab 
political  fragmentation,  have  also  shown  the  Arab 
states  military  capability  to  be  inadequate  compared 
with  that  of  a  super  power. 
(9)  The  above  indicates  that  no  Arab  state  can  withstand 
the  strength  of  the  US  and  thus  cannot  put  pressure 
on  it  to  formulate  a  settlement  in  favour  of  the 
Palestinian  people.  Politically,  the  Palestinian  cause 
lost  its  credibility  in  the  Arab  World,  and  its 
international  standing,  when  its  leadership  supported 
Saddam.  The  Palestinians,  justification  for  supporting 
Saddam  was  that  they  were  extremely  frustrated  after 
forty  years  of  dispersal  and  a  denial  of  basic  human 
and  national  rights,  even  though  Saddam  had  previously 
revealed  his  treachery  to  their  cause,  during  the 
Black  September  massacre  of  1970. 
The  Palestinian  cause  was  affected  more 
financially  than  politically  by  their  leaders,  support 
for  Saddam.  The  Palestinian  community  that  lived  in 
Kuwait  was  one  of  the  most  flourishing  Palestinian 
communities  in  the  Arab  world.  Its  wealth  played  a 
vital  role  in  the  Palestinian  economy.  Hundreds  of 
Palestinians  in  the  Israeli-occupied  territories,  in 
Jordan  and  elsewhere  all  over  the  Middle  East  were 
supported  by  their  working  relatives  in  Kuwait.  So  the 
invasion  of  Kuwait  and  the  PLO's  policy  of  supporting 
641 Saddam,  smashed  all  this,  not  only  in  Kuwait,  but  in 
the  GCC  countries  as  well. 
(10)  By  their  rapid  decisive  military  victory  over  a  Third 
World  Country,  the  Americans  got  rid  of  the  "Vietnam 
syndrome".  (148) 
(11)  The  war  has  also  indirectly  affected  those  countries 
who  supplied  migrant  workers  to  the  Gulf  States.  In 
many  cases,  particularly  in  Kuwait,  their  jobs  have 
been  taken  by  Turks.  (149) 
(12)  Another  consequence  of  the  Gulf  War  has  been  its 
ecological  impact.  The  War  caused  unprecedented  damage 
to  natural  habitats  and  the  environment,  both  by  the 
oil  spills  and  the  burning  of  the  oil  wells  by  Saddam 
and  by  the  massive  deployment  of  forces  and  the  new 
technology  of  warfare  employed  by  the  Americans  in  the 
region.  (150) 
it  is  almost  certain  that  the  coming  decades  will 
witness  a  greater  level  of  instability,  which  will  lead  to 
further  wars  and  will  bring  about  US  dictatorship  and 
hegemony  over  the  entire  world.  It  has  started  to  police 
the  world  by  interfering  directly  in  any  area  it  sees  fit. 
Revolution  against  all  the  US's  client  regimes  that 
have  implemented  its  policies  in  the  Middle  East  must  take 
place,  to  save  the  world  from  US's  tyranny.  This  applies 
642 particularly  to  the  Ba'th  Party,  which  has  successfully 
been  implementing  US  Strategy  in  the  Middle  East  for  the 
past  three  decades. 
643 Conclusion 
America  has  been  able  to  apply  its  new  world  order, 
after  the  collapse  of  the  communist  bloc,  and  to 
demonstrate  its  advanced  technology  weapon  capability, 
which  has  been  building  up  since  the  Second  World  War,  in 
competition  with  the  Soviet  Union  and  the  Warsaw  Pact.  It 
has  had  a  number  of  failures:  in  Vietnam,  in  Lebanon, 
where  President  Reagan  withdrew  all  US  forces,  after  the 
bomb  attack  on  the  US  Embassy  in  Beirut  on  23  October  1983, 
which  caused  the  deaths  of  two  hundred  and  forty-one 
American  Marines;  in  Iran,  where  the  Americans  failed  to 
use  force,  when  itwas  repeatedly  challenged  between  1979 
and  80.  America  had  its  revenge  in  April  1988,  when  its 
navy  sank  half  of  the  Iranian  fleet  in  the  Gulf. 
In  order  to  achieve  its  objectives,  America 
militarised  the  Middle  East  and  created  artificial 
nationalist  regimes,  which  ostensibly  built  up  massive 
strength  to  ensure  Arab  independence  from  the  world  of 
Imperialism  and  Zionism.  Thus,  the  Americans  would  be 
justified  in  entering  the  region  to  save  its  alleged 
stability  from  Saddam,  and  the  others  like  him.  Saddam  knew 
that  America  was  determined  to  destroy  Iraq,  as  he 
frequently  revealed  before  the  beginning  of  the  crisis  and 
his  invasion  of  Kuwait.  It  became  very  clear,  from  the 
first  stage  of  the  crisis,  that  America  was  monopolising 
it,  in  the  following  ways: 
644 (1)  From  the  first,  America  blocked  an  Arab  solution  to 
the  crisis  in  persuading  Saddam  to  leave  Kuwait. 
(2)  America  rejected  all  European  options  for  saving  the 
situation,  in  particular  the  French  initiative. 
(3)  America  persuaded  a  number  of  states,  both  eastern  and 
western  to  join  it  in  its  war  against  Iraq,  either 
militarily,  by  deploying  troops,  or  financially,  by 
paying  the  bills  for  the  operation  against  Iraq. 
(4)  By  dominating  the  United  Nations,  America  obtained 
legitimacy  for  its  war  with  Iraq.  The  UN  was  clearly  a 
tool  in  the  hands  of  the  Americans. 
(5)  America  also  persuaded  the  Arab  league  to  give  a 
broader  legitimacy  to  its  operation  then  that  provided 
by  its  clients  shaykdoms  and  Saudi  Arabia. 
(6)  America  also  raised  Islamic  cover  for  its  operation, 
in  order  to  protect  the  Islamic  position  for  its 
clients  states,  which  might  otherwise  have  been  called 
in  question. 
In  addition,  Saddam  had  discovered,  in  the  course  of 
the  supposed  American  initiative  in  Geneva,  to  avoid  the 
war,  that  America  was  ready  to  use  nuclear  weapons  if  he 
used  any  of  his  non-conventional  weapons.  Thus,  half  of  his 
645 military  power  was  negated  before  the  war  started.  However, 
this  did  not  make  him  withdraw  from  Kuwait,  thus  fulfilling 
America's  wish  by  paving  the  way  for  President  Bush  to 
achieve  his  objective.  He  heard  America's  threat  and  did 
not  use  chemical  weapons  against  the  coalition,  despite  the 
fact  that  he  had  never  hesitated  to  use  them  against  the 
Iranians  and  his  own  nation,  in  order  to  secure  his 
political  survival.  He  made  Iraq  as  a  guinea-pig  for 
American  high  technology  weapons,  which  devastated. 
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662 Conclusion 
It  is  clear  from  the  history  of  the  Arab  Ba'th 
Socialist  Party,  with  all  its  turmoil  and  ambiguities, 
ideologically,  politically  and  structurally,  since  its 
foundation  in  the  late  1940s  and  its  two  seizures  of  power 
in  ýIraq,  that  the  west  gambled  on  it,  as  they  did  not  find 
any  alternative  ready  to  implement  their  plans  in  the  area. 
This  is  indicated  in  many  official  documents  including 
those  of  the  Ba'th  Party  itself.  (1) 
The  Ba'th  regime  has  proved,  by  its  everyday  routine 
activities,  as  acknowleged  by  western  policy  makers,  that 
it  is  one  of  the  most  cruel  and  violent  regimes  of  modern 
times.  (2)  It  has  proved,  by  its  skill  and  ability  in- 
disseminating  propaganda  and  in  deceiving  the  people  whom 
it  seeks  to  subvert,  that,  on  the  one  hand,  it  can  talk 
about  the  national  interest  and  its  struggle  against 
imperialism  and  Zionism,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  events 
have  shown  that  it  was  their  best  servant.  It  acted  as 
their  tool  to  suppress  left-wing  forces  during  the  cold 
war.  (3)  Then,  led  by  Saddam,  it  was  their  tool  to  attack 
the  Islamic  revolution  in  Iran.  (4)  Finally,  in  its  name 
Saddam  invaded  Kuwait,  gave  the  land  of  Iraq  to  America  to 
test  its  latest  weapons  and  enabled  it  to  launch  its  new 
world  order  and  to  attain  objectives  it  could  not 
previously  attain.  (5)  Saddam.  and  his  Ba'th  regime  are 
still  a  strategic  investment  for  the  West,  which  explains 
his-remaining  in  power.  despite  all  his  political  disasters. 
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gained  from  the  Ba'th  regime,  particularly  since  Saddam 
took  power  in  1979,  America  has  decided  that  any  change  in 
iraq  must  come  from  within.  (6)  The  character  of  Saddam 
himself,  who,  according  to  all  the  available  biographical 
documents,  is  boundlessly  ambitions  and  ruthless,  may  be 
summarised  as  follows: 
He  has  monopolised  power  through  the  Ba'th  Party, 
through  intrigue  and  the  physical  extermination  of 
opponents,  using  the  same  methods  employed  by  Stalin 
in  the  1930s  and  1940s; 
(2)  His  power  has  been  strengthened  through  the  use  of 
other  political  movements  (communist  and  Kurdish)  with 
whom  he  has  tactically  allied  himself. 
(3)  He  has  constructed  a  huge  security  and  intelligence 
machine,  using  billions  of  oil  dollars,  through  his 
control  of  the  oil  industry  and  with  the  help  of  the 
Soviet  Union  and  East  Germany.  (7) 
(4)  He  has  taken  control  of,  and  developed,  the  military 
establishment,  both  in  manpower  and  in  ordnance. 
(5)  He  has  disseminated  his  influence  throughout  the  Arab 
World,  so  as  to  establish  himself  as  the  strongest 
Arab  leader,  and  as  a  spokesman  on  Arab  rights,  using 
the  Palestinian  cause  to  achieve  this  objective. 
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oil  wealth  so  as  to  make  Iraq  a  super  power. 
Saddam  has  been  able  to  achieve  most  of  his 
objectives,  particularly  after  the  shake-up  of  the  balance 
of  power  in  the  Middle  East,  caused  by  the  overthrow  of 
the  Shah  of  Iran  and  the  emergence  of  a  power  vacuum,  which 
Saddam,  has  used  as  an  excuse  to  promote  himself  as  the 
policeman  of  the  area.  He  was  successful  in  stemming  the 
Islamic  wave  brought  about  by  the  Islamic  revolution  in 
Iran  and  forced  it  to  remain  within  the  Iranian  borders.  He 
used  Iraq's  manpower  and  economic  and  military  power  to 
combat  Iran  so  as  to  serve  regional  and  international 
interests  to  which  the  Iranian  revolution  posed  a  mortal 
danger.  His  regime  was  supported  regionally  and 
internationally,  enabling  him  to  strengthen  his  military 
machine,  in  the  belief  that  the  next  objective  which  he 
would  achieve  would  be  the  building  of  his  Arab  empire. 
owing  to  his  political  ignorance,  he  did  not  realise  that 
he  would  be  prevented  from  becoming  a  strategic  player  in 
the  regional  and  international  balance  of  power  in  this 
strategic  area  of  the  world,  where  some  of  the  west's 
greatest  interests  lie.  Saddam's  military  capabilities 
became  greater  than  America  could  allow,  since  they  posed  a 
threat  to  America's  strategic  interest.  (8) 
America's  strategy  after  the  Iraq-Iran  war  was: 
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by  stripping  him  of  all  his  military  and  economic 
power.  (9) 
(2)  The  protection  of  oil  wells  in  the  Gulf  area  by  the 
establishment  of  permanent  American  military  bases 
rather  than  dependence  on  local  allies. 
(3)  Solving  the  Arab-Israeli  conflict  in  a  way  that  would 
guarantee  the  interests  of  America,  of  its  western 
allies  and  of  Israel,  which  is  the  strategic  ally  of 
the  West  in  the  area. 
(4)  Placing  restrictions  on  the  development  of  non- 
conventional  weapons  which  some  countries  in  the  area, 
including  Iraq,  were  developing. 
America  could  not  have  achieved  all  the  above 
objectives,  according  to  its  Defence  Minister,  (10)  without 
a  definite  means  of  obtaining  them.  Accordingly,  together 
with  its  Western,  as  well  as  its  regional,  allies,  it  began 
to  put  pressure  on  Iraq.  This  began  with  a  psychological 
and  media  war.  Then  came  economic  pressure  because  of  the 
lowering  of  oil  prices  and  the  increase  of  production  in 
Kuwait  and  the  UAE.  These  constituted  a  major  challenge  to 
Iraq,  which  was  suffering  from  an  economic  crisis,  owing  to 
its  war  with  Iran.  Following  the  American  declaration  of 
non-involvement  in  inter-Arab  conflicts,  which  was 
delivered  to  Saddam  by  the  American  Ambassador  in  Baghdad, 
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him  to  protect  its  interests  in  the  area,  and  he  saw  the 
intransigent  Kuwaiti  position  as  working  to  his  advantage, 
because  he  was  certain  that  America  was  the  one  that  had 
made  the  Kuwaiti  political  decision.  Thus  Saddam  thought 
that  if  America  was  against  his  invasion,  it  would  have 
made  every  effort  to  prevent  it.  A  senior  Bush 
administration  official,  General  Brent  Scowcroft,  who 
advised  Bush  on  national  security,  admitted  that  the 
administration  did  not  warn  Iraq  of  the  consequences  of 
invading  Kuwait.  Scowcroft  said: 
U 
....  we  could  not  do  that  because  we  had 
spent  all  our  time  building  support  for  us 
internationally  until  'Iraq  actually  invaded. 
if  we  had  warned  him  it  would  have  been  very 
difficult  massing  the  American  peoplets  support 
and  the  support  of  our  Arab  friends.  "  (12) 
So  the  American  decision  to  attack  I  Iraq  was  taken 
before  Saddam  invaded  Kuwait.  The  Bush  administration 
proved  this  when  it  rejected  all  attempts  to  solve  the 
crisis  peacefully.  (13)  Saddam,  in  his  turn,  declared  that 
America  would  attack  and  destroy  Iraq  whether  it  withdrew 
from  Kuwait  or  not.  (14)  He  did  not  withdraw  from  Kuwait  and 
thus  helped  America  to  achieve  its  objective,  which  is 
acknowledged  by  America's  decision  makers.  This  means  that 
Saddam  either  participated  directly  in  the  American  game, 
in  exchange  f  or  remaining  in  power,  or  was  led  into  the 
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case  he  was  trapped  into  decisions  and  policies  that 
undoubtedly  served  the  interests  of  America  and  its  allies 
at  the  expense  of  Iraq  and  its  future.  These  decisions  and 
policies  resulted  in  catastrophic  consequences  for  Iraq, 
specifically: 
The  elimination  of  Iraq's  sovereignty,  as  a 
consequence  of  signing  the  S,  afwdn  agreement  following 
military  defeat; 
(2)  The  expropriation  of  Iraq's  independence  politically, 
financially  and  militarily,  through  a  complex  set  of 
UN  resolutions,  which  will  remain  in  force  even  after 
Saddam  has  gone;  (15) 
(3)  The  total  destruction  of  Iraq's  infrastructure;  (16) 
(4)  The  total  destruction  of  Iraq's  economy  by  UN 
sanctions; 
(5)  The  death  of  hundreds  of  thousands  of  Iraqis  during 
the  Gulf  War  and  subsequently,  because  of  UN 
sanctions. 
In  addition  to  the  above  consequences,  one  can  add  the 
destruction  of  Arab  solidarity  and  the  destruction  of 
Iraq's  relations  with  its  neighbours  and  the  rest  of  the 
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balance  of  power  has  moved  in  its  favour. 
As  a  consequence  of  political  developments  since  the 
Gulf  War,  it  seems  that  those  who  took  the  decision  to  go 
to  war  want  to  rearrange  the  balance  of  political  power  in 
the  area.  (17) 
There  are  indications  (listed  below)  to  market  the 
idea  of  dividing  the  Arab  states  into  smaller  entities  that 
are  weak  and  in  conflict  with  each  other,  so  as  to  make  it 
easier  for  Israel  to  achieve  absolute  domination.  This  idea 
looks  like  being  applied  to  Iraq.  The  division  of  Iraq 
would  then  become  a  pattern  for  the  rest  of  the  Arab  world. 
This  would  allow,  according  to  the  wishes  of  the  planners 
of  the  so-called  'New  World  order,,  total  Israeli 
domination. 
White  House  experts,  such  as  Graham  Fuller,  Martin 
Andayck  (dual  containment  Policy),  Anthony  Leak  and 
Anthony  Kaudsman  think  that  Iraq  is  a  web  of  several 
ethnic  groups  and  sects  who  are  in  conflict,  which 
makes  it  liable  to  partition.  (18) 
Iraqi  social  conditions,  from  the  establishment 
of  the  state  of  Iraq  in  1921  until  the  Baý  th  Party 
came  to  power,  have  not  indicated  serious  ethnic  or 
sectarian  divisions,  despite  bad  monarchic  and 
republican  governments.  If  there  were  some  Kurdish  and 
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no  significance.  However,  the  ethnic  and  sectarian 
policies  of  the  Ba'th  inflamed  ethnic  and  sectarian 
feelings  to  the  extent  that  they  have  become  part  of 
reality  in  Iraq  today,  particularly  after  Saddam  came 
to  power  in  1979,  when  he  played  a  major  role  in 
inflaming  them.  Following  Iraq's  defeat  in  the  Gulf 
war,  Arab  and  western  media  began  to  look  at  Iraq  from 
the  angle  of  its  ethnic  and  sectarian  composition, 
stressing  that  Saddam  was  persecuting  the  Kurds  in  the 
north  and  the  Shi'ites  in  the  south.  The  existence  of 
Kurdish,  Shi'ite  and  even  Sunni  parties  has  given 
credence  to  this  claim,  since  Saddam  persecuted  all 
Iraqis,  whatever  their  ethnic  or  sectarian  situation. 
(2)  The  creation  of  air-exclusion  zones  north  of  the  36 
parallel  and  south  of  the  32  parallel,  with  the  name 
of  safe  havens',  for  the  Kurds  in  the  north  and  the 
Shi'ites  in  the  south,  under  allied  protection,  is 
nothing  but  a  preliminary  step  to  partitioning  Iraq. 
According  to  officials  in  the  American  administration, 
it  puts  a  pressure  on  the  Iraqi  military  establishment 
and  the  Ba'th  leadership,  indicating  to  them  that  the 
continuation  of  Saddam  in  power  carries  with  it  the 
danger  of  territorial  division.  (19) 
(3)  The  Rand  Organisation,  which  is  affiliated  to  the  US 
Ministry  of  Defence,  published  in  1993  a  study  under 
the  title,  "Does  Iraq  remain  united,  or  will  it  be 
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that  Iraq  will  be  partitioned  within  the  next  nine 
years.  (20) 
(4)  There  are  hints  from  Bill  Clinton,  after  winning  the 
Presidential  election,  that  what  matters  to  him  is 
stability  and  respect  for  human  and  civil  rights  in 
Iraq,  without  mention  of  the  necessity  of  safeguarding 
Iraq's  unity,  implying  that  there  is  an  American 
objective  in  perpetuating  the  de  facto  partitioning  of 
Iraq. 
Clinton's  administration  is  trying  to  prevent  Iran 
from  increasing  its  influence  in  the  absence  of  a  strong 
regional  power,  due  to  the  destruction  and  partitioning  of 
Iraq.  America  has  implemented  its  policy  against  Iraq 
through  the  economic  boycott  and  the  encouragement  of 
Turkey  to  play  a  bigger  Islamic  role,  so  as  to  balance 
Iran's.  (21)  In  addition,  America  exaggerates  its 
description  of  the  Iranian  threat  and  Iran's  support  for 
terrorism  and  the  extreme  fundamental  Islamic  wave  (22). 
The  reasons  for  choosing  Iraq  as  the  first  candidate 
for  partition  are: 
(1)  Its  important  geographical  and  strategic  position; 
(2)  Its  historical  importance  as  the  home  of  ancient 
civilisations  and  the  cradle  of  Semitic  religions; 
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and  minerals; 
(4)  The  strict  Shi'ite  ideology  of  the  majority  of  its 
inhabitants; 
(5)  The  character  of  the  its  people,  known  for  religious 
defiance,  confrontation  and  steadfastness  in  the  face 
of  pressure  and  challenges,  and  known  throughout  their 
history  for  having  suffered  repression  and  injustice, 
partly  owing  to  foreign  occupation  (Turkish,  Persian 
and  British); 
(6)  Iraq  represents  a  strategic  buffer  between  Iran  and 
the  rest  of  Arab  World  and  Israel.  Although  at  present 
iraq's  strategic  importance  is  diminished,  because  of 
Saddam's  regime,  it  is  possible  that  in  the  future  a 
revitalised  Iraq  might  mobilise  its  power  against 
Iran,  the  Gulf  States  and  Israel,  particularly  the 
latter.  The  western  mind  is  troubled  by  the 
possibility,  however  remote,  of  Iraq  reasserting  its 
historical  role; 
(7)  The  most  important  factor  in  providing  the  favourable 
conditions  for  partitioning  Iraq  is  the  continuance  of 
the  Baýth  Party  in  power  and  Saddam  at  its  head; 
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their  allies  are  all  bound  together  in  the  realisation  of 
each  others'  disparate  interests,  despite  their 
protestations  that  Saddam  and  the  Baýth  Party,  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  west  and  their  allies,  on  the  other,  are 
hostile  to  each  other.  A  careful  study  of  events  and 
documents  indicates  that: 
Through  the  Bath  Party,  Saddam  was  able  to  seize 
power  and  then  monopolise  it  with  the  consequent 
expropriation  of  the  liberties  of  the  Iraqi  people  and 
the  cancellation  of  human  rights  in  Iraq,  as  well  as 
the  physical  liquidation  of  his  political  opponents  by 
murder,  execution  and  exile.  According  to  Saddam's 
laws,  which  he  considers  to  be  patriotic  and 
revolutionary  contributions  to  the  service  of  Iraq  and 
its  people,  any  opposition,  even  the  most  peaceful,  to 
his  regime  and  the  Bath  Party,  is  considered  to  be 
treason.  Hence  the  destruction  of  all  the  opponents  of 
his  regime  is  a  patriotic  and  revolutionary  duty. 
Through  his  wars,  Saddam  has  killed  hundreds  of 
thousands  of  young  Iraqi  men  who  were  the  real  force 
in  Iraq,  about  which  the  West  and  its  agents  were 
apprehensive.  So,  through  his  policies,  Saddam  has 
been  able  to  achieve  the  destruction  of  this  force, 
which  was  the  real  objective  of  West  and  Israel. 
(2)  He  has  made  wide  use  of  ethnic  discrimination.  The 
Ba'th  Party  hoists  the  banner  of  pan-Arabism.  This 
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suppress  non-Arabs  who  lived  in  Arab  countries.  The 
Baýth  Party  succeeded  three  decades  ago,  owing  to  its 
campaign  of  forcing  non-Arab  Iraqis  to  take  up 
membership,  although  it  was  an  Arab  Party,  demanding 
the  establishment  of  one  united  Arab  state.  This  had 
the  objective  of  wiping  out  the  ethnic  identity  of 
non-Arabs,  but  it  has  led  them,  in  their  turn,  to 
demand  partition.  This  endangers  the  unity  of  Iraq, 
and  serves  none  but  foreign  interests.  Saddam  went 
even  further  in  using  a  policy  of  discrimination,  even 
among  the  Arabs  of  Iraq.  He  discriminated  against  the 
Shiýites  and  against  certain  Arab  tribes  and 
localities,  in  favour  of  his  own  home  town,  Tikrit, 
and,  later  on,  in  favour  of  his  own  family  which 
claimed  Iraq  as  its  backyard.  Thus,  he  made  most 
Iraqis  feel  alien  and  subject  to  injustice.  During 
the  war  with  Iran,  he  was  forced  to  modify  his 
discriminatory  policy,  in  order  to  exploit  the  basic 
patriotism  of  all  Iraqis.  He  succeeded  in  his  appeal 
to  the  Shi'ites,  who,  as  the  majority  of  the 
population,  necessarily  constituted  the  majority  of 
the  army;  he  failed  with  the  Kurds,  against  whom  he 
launched  retaliatory  attacks  during  the  war. 
(3)  Saddam  used  sectarian  discrimination  and  exploited 
divisions  within  the  various  Islamic  schools  of 
thought  and  interpretation,  hoping  to  provoke 
rivalries  and  conflicts  between  them,  which  would 
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activities,  in  particular  from  his  foreign  adventures. 
Saddam  persecuted  all  religious  sects  in  Iraq;  he 
denied  them  their  religious  rights  and  so  pushed  them 
towards  even  greater  opposition  to  his  regime.  Some  of 
these  sects  looked  for  support  from  neighbouring 
countries,  which  however,  proved  to  care  only  about 
their  own  interests. 
(4)  Saddam  managed  to  create  from  his  followers,  relatives 
and  other  Baýthists  a  bourgeoisie  which  controlled  the 
wealth  of  Iraq  and  made  huge  profits  at  the  expense  of 
the  vast  majority  of  Iraqis.  This  led  to  conflict 
between  this  class  and  the  rest  of  the  Iraqis.  As  the 
latter  are  uneducated  politically,  they  easily  fall 
victim  to  extremist  ideas,  such  as  communism  and 
religious  fundamentalism,  particularly  when  confronted 
by  the  unfair  distribution  of  wealth  that  they  saw 
both  in  Iraq  and  other  Arab  countries,  notably  the 
Gulf  countries.  This,  in  turn,  leads  to  internal 
conflicts,  which  threaten  the  unity  of  Iraq. 
(5)  Saddam.  managed,  through  the  Ba'th  Party,  to  create 
conflicts  in  many  nearby  countries  by  interfering  in 
their  internal  affairs  and  using  his  spies  and  agents 
to  create  havoc  in  them.  Again  this  served  western 
interests,  as  the  West  wants  these  countries  to  remain 
weak. 
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its  neighbours,  which  will  remain  for  decades  to  come, 
thus  bringing  about  favourable  conditions  for  future 
conflicts. 
(7)  By  invading  Kuwait,  Saddam  caused  a  deep  and  serious 
split  between  Arab  countries,  to  the  extent  that  they 
cannot  now  agree  on  anything.  As  a  result,  the  Arab 
League  is  now  no  more  than  a  dead  letter,  as  is  also 
the  idea  of  collective  Arab  security. 
(8)  By  invading  Kuwait,  Saddam  gave  the  Gulf  countries  a 
good  excuse  to  allow  America  to  station  military 
forces  in  the  Gulf  -  something  which  they  were 
hesitant  to  do  before. 
(9)  Because  of  the  destruction  of  Iraq,  and  the  subsequent 
domination  by  America  of  the  Arab  countries,  the  Arab- 
Israeli  conflict  is  being  solved  to  the  satisfaction 
of  Israel  and  America. 
(10)  Panic  buying  of  arms,  caused  by  Saddam's  war,  which 
has  depleted  Arab  wealth,  has  benefited  the  western 
arms  manufacturers. 
(11)  Through  his  ill-advised  policies,  particularly  that  of 
initiating  the  Gulf  War,  Saddam  helped  the  USA  to 
achieve  an  unprecedented  position  in  the  Middle  East 
and  the  world  at  large.  The  US  used  the  UN  to  issue 
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enforced  not  only  while  Saddam  was  still  in  power,  but 
also  after  he  had  gone.  Such  resolutions  may  well  be 
in  breach  of  all  international  law,  in  imposing 
collective  punishment  on  the  entire  Iraqi  nation. 
America  has  attained  all  its  objectives,  while  Saddam 
has  remained  in  power  with  his  opportunities  for  internal 
oppression  unaffected.  America  prefers  Saddam  to  remain  in 
power  for  the  following  reasons: 
It  is  easier  for  America  to  disarm  Iraq  and  impose  a 
long  term  system  of  monitoring  its  military 
capabilities. 
(2)  America  can  use  him  as  a  bogey-man  to  frighten  the 
Gulf  states  and  to  force  them  into  America's  arms.  (26) 
(3)  Saddam  can  confront  the  Islamic  wave  that  is  coming 
from  Iran.  He  has  proved  his  credentials  against  it 
and  is  the  best  person  to  confront  it.  America  can 
still  count  on  him  to  act  against  Iran  if  and  when  it 
becomes  necessary.  (27) 
(4)  The  US  can  constrict  Syria  by  sustaining  a  hostile 
neighbouring  regime,  thus  forcing  it  to  conclude  a 
peace  treaty  with  Israel. 
677 (5)  America  can  use  Saddam  as  a  pretext  for  the  boycott  of 
Iraq.  America  justifies  the  boycott  on  the  grounds 
that  it  will  help  overthrow  Saddam. 
America  rejected  a  boycott  as  a  tool  to  force  Saddam 
out  of  Kuwait.  (28,29)  It  now  professes  to  think  that  a 
boycott  will  force  Saddam  out  of  power.  For  years  it  has 
claimed  that  there  is  no  viable  alternative  to  Saddam,  and 
so  justifies  to  itself  the  continuance  of  its  policy  of 
boycott  and  containment.  This  is  now  the  preferred  course 
of  action  for  America  and  its  allies.  (30)  It  is  unfortunate 
for  Iraq's  future  that  some  of  the  so-called  'Iraqi 
opposition  gropus  in  exile,  ,  such  as  the  Iraqi  National 
Congress  (INC)  ,  repeat  America's  claims  and  have  become 
America's  puppets.  (31)  America's  course  of  action  against 
Iraq  is  the  one  of  least  cost  militarily  and  financially, 
in  addition  to  its  helping  to  achieve  its  true  objective, 
which  is  the  permanent  debilitation  of  Iraq  as  a  state  and 
a  society.  Despite  the  political  and  military  defeat  that 
America  was  able  to  inflict  on  Saddam's  regime,  he  is  still 
eager  to  offer  his  services  to  America  and  its  puppets  in 
the  Gulf,  playing  on  their  fears  of  the  spread  of  the 
Islamic  wave  in  the  area.  (32)  In  fact  Saddam  still  serves 
America  by  providing  it  with  justification  for  the  boycott. 
He  seems  to  play  his  role  as  if  he  were  in  prior  agreement 
with  America.  One  may  infer  this  from  his  dealings  with  the 
UN  disarmament  commission  and  from  his  ill-advised  massing 
of  troops  on  the  Kuwaiti  border  in  October  1994.  This  gave 
America  further  excuses  to  proclaim  that  Saddam  was  still  a 
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military  force  capable  of  making  good  that  threat.  (33) 
With  regard  to  the  neighbouring  countries,  each  in  its 
own  way  sees  the  continuation  of  Saddam  and  his  regime  as 
what  best  serves  its  interests.  They  see  that  a  weak  and 
paralysed  Iraq  is  what  is  best  for  them.  Iran  wants  a  weak 
Iraq,  which  cannot  threaten  it  and,  at  the  same  time,  gives 
it  an  excuse  for  interfering  in  Iraqi  internal  affairs, 
under  the  pretext  of  helping  the  Shi'ah-  This  actually 
happened  during  the  uprising  in  the  south;  (34)  Iranian 
interference  gave  America  an  excellent  excuse  to  help 
Saddam  crush  it  (35). 
Saudi  Arabia,  Kuwait  and  the  other  Gulf  states  still 
prefer  Saddam  to  other  alternatives  for  the  following 
reasons: 
As  he  is  in  a  tight  corner  and  under  the  boycott,  he 
cannot  export  oil  which  will  compete  with  their  oil, 
which  is  now  exported  by  the  Gulf  countries  cheaply  to 
America  and  the  West  so  as  to  pay  for  arms  purchases 
and,  to  reimburse  America  and  Britain  for  the  cost  of 
their  campaign.  (36)  Britain,  for  example,  received 
E500  million  from  the  UAE  for  its  role  in  the  Gulf 
War.  The  Prince  of  Wales  declared  in  a  television 
interview  that  he  wanted  to  establish  a  British 
volunteer  force  to  be  used  in  the  Gulf,  in  exchange 
679 for  money  from  the  Gulf  countries,  i.  e.  a  British 
mercenary  force. 
(2)  Kuwait  was  able  to  gain  strategic  advantages  by  the 
defeat  of  Saddam.,  in  the  redrawing  of  the  border  in 
its  favour  by  a  UN  committee  -  something  the  UN  has 
never  done  before.  The  British  and  Americans  assigned 
to  Kuwait  most  of  the  Iraqi  port  of  Umm  Qaqr,  so  as  to 
give  Kuwait  the  capability  of  strangling  Iraq  - 
something  the  British  have  always  encouraged  their 
Kuwaiti  puppets  to  do.  Through  American  and  British 
hostility  to  Iraq,  it  was  deprived  of  its  only 
remaining  outlet  to  the  sea.  Before  America  and 
Britain,  Iran  did  the  same  with  the  Shaýý  al-ýArab. 
The  Iraqi  people  will  never  accept  the  transfer  by 
America  and  Britain  of  Umm,  Qaý;  r  to  Kuwait,  as  they 
never  accepted  Saddam's  giving  the  Shaýý  al-'Arab  to 
Iran.  What  America  and  Britain  did  will  almost 
certainly  lead  to  a  war  with  Kuwait  in  the  future,  as 
happened  with  Iran.  (37) 
(3)  The  possible  alternative  to  Saddam  is  the  Shiýite 
Islamic  parties,  which  means  to  Saudi  Arabia  that  Iraq 
would  fall  under  Iranian  control.  Iran  is  in  conflict 
with  Saudi  Arabia,  as  it  sees  itself  as  the  centre  of 
Shi'ah  Islam,  which  is  in  competition  with  Sunni 
Islam,  of  which  Saudi  Arabia  considers  itself  the 
heart.  (38) 
680 If  Saddam  ever  tried  his  luck  again,  the  presence  of 
American  forces  in  the  Gulf  would  be  used  swiftly  to 
destroy  Iraq  again,  or  to  destroy  what  was  not  destroyed  in 
1991.  Thus,  Saddam  is  the  best  alternative  available  to 
America  and  to  all  neighbouring  countries.  Turkey,  for 
example,  does  not  find  any  alternative  that  is  better  than 
Saddam,  because  it,  like  Saddam,  represses  the  Kurds.  In 
addition,  the  continuation  of  Saddam's  regime,  in  its 
present  weak  and  isolated  state,  offers  Turkey  the 
potential  opportunity  to  interfere  in  Iraq,  under  the 
pretext  of  combating  Kurdish  separatists  in  Turkey  by 
seizing  northern  Iraq,  particularly  the  oil-rich  cities  of 
Mosul  and  Kirkak,  long  the  subject  of  Turkish  expansionist 
dreams,  (39)  For  Syria,  Saddam's  regime  is  the  best  possible 
alternative,  on  the  grounds  that  post-Saddam,  Iraq  will  be 
pro-American  and  pro-Israel,  thus  increasing  its  own 
isolation.  The  latest  Jordanian  interference  in  Iraq,  with 
King  1ýusaynls  proposal  for  its  future,  may  be  seen  as  part 
of  American  and  Israeli  attempts  to  pressurise  Syria  into 
concluding  a  deal  with  Israel,  as  the  US  and  Israel  have 
let  it  be  known  that  they  are  strong  supporters  of  King 
Husayn.  Thus,  it  was  expected  that  Syria  would  be  against 
King  4usayn's  proposal.  Israel,  in  its  turn,  prefers 
Saddam  to  other  alternatives  that  would  be  friendly  with 
Syria.  Israel  has  always  worked  hard  to  maintain  the 
conflict  between  Iraq  and  Syria.  The  two  Ba"thist  regimes 
have  helped  Israel  achieve  that  objective. 
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supplies  and  also  profits  from  Iraq's  trade  through  it.  In 
fact  it  can  be  argued  that  Jordan  has  benefited  a  great 
deal  over  the  years  from  Saddam's  regime,  particularly 
during  the  Iraq-Iran  war.  Jordan  hopes  that  while  Iraq  is 
weak  and  isolated,  it  can  benefit  even  more.  It  needs 
Iraq's  support,  whether  it  is  during  Saddam's  regime  or 
afterwards,  to  cement  its  relations  with  Israel.  This 
explains  Jordan's  desire  to  shape  the  future  of  Iraq  in  a 
way  that  is  advantageous  to  itself,  with  the  option  of 
dividing  Iraq  into  several  federal  states  in  confederation 
with  Jordan.  This  would  give  Jordan  the  balance  of  power 
between  the  dismembered  parts  of  Iraq.  (40) 
The  only  ones  who  are  really  against  Saddam  and  the 
Baýth  Party  and  want  to  see  them  destroyed  are  the  Iraqi 
people,  in  their  entirety,  because  Saddam  and  the  Ba'th 
Party  have  destroyed  Iraq.  The  mere  existence  of  Saddam 
with  his  Baýth  Party  is  against  the  basic  interest  of  the 
Iraqi  people.  This  rejection  of  Saddam  and  the  Baýth  Party 
was  clearly  displayed  during  the  great  popular  uprising, 
which  challenged  him  and  managed  to  occupy  and  to  seize 
control  of  fourteen  out  of  the  eighteen  Iraqi  governorates. 
Saddam  employed  brutal  methods  to  suppress  the  uprising, 
supported  by  America,  which  allowed  him  to  use  helicopters 
to  murder  the  Iraqi  people.  The  reason  for  the  failure  of 
the  uprising,  in  addition  to  Saddam's  severe  methods  of 
repression,  was  the  lack  of  proper  organisation  and 
682 effective  leadership  inside  Iraq,  because  he  had  long  since 
liquidated  any  possible  leaders  of  such  an  uprising. 
The  Iraqi  opposition  in  exile  dates  from  the  return  to 
power  of  the  Ba'th  Party  in  1968,  and  expanded  when  Saddam 
took  sole  control  because  of  his  violent  repression  and 
foreign  aggression.  Although  it  shares  the  same  principle, 
i.  e.  the  overthrow  of  Saddam's  regime,  and  while  all  its 
documents  and  literature  declare  that  it  is  a  democratic 
opposition,  it  has  failed  to  agree  on  a  programme  for  post- 
Saddam  Iraq.  It  has  also  been  effectively  contained  by 
America,  Britain  and  the  neighbouring  countries  i.  e.  Iran, 
Syria,  Saudi  Arabia  and,  recently,  Jordan.  The 
opposition  in  exile  is  characterised  by: 
(1) 
Iraqi' 
The  perpetuation  of  division  and  conflict  within  the 
opposition  itself  and,  hence,  its  inability  to  agree 
on  a  unified  political  programme  for  the  future. 
(2)  The  support  by  America  for  elements  within  it  that  are 
known  for  being  corrupt  or  criminal,  while  America  has 
used  others  as  spies.  The  neighbouring  countries,  i.  e. 
Iran,  Syria  and  Saudi  Arabia,  have  used  most  of  the 
rest  as  spies  and  puppets  in  their  service.  Thus,  a 
political  movement  has  been  debased;  it  had  the 
patriotic  duty  of  liberating  Iraq  from  Saddam  and  of 
defending  its  sovereignty  and  independence.  (41) 
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The  logic  of  the  actual  situation  on  the  ground  and 
the  web  of  international  and  regional  factors  are  still 
working  to  the  advantage  of  Saddam's  regime  through  the 
following: 
The  insistence  of  America,  supported  by  Britain,  on 
the  continuation  of  the  economic  boycott  on  the  Iraqi 
people.  Despite  the  failure  of  the  boycott  in 
producing  a  change  of  regime,  a  catastrophe  which 
endangers  the  very  existence  of  the  Iraqi  people  has 
been  created.  The  international  community  was 
persuaded  by  America  and  Britain  to  support  the 
boycott  strategy,  despite  the  fact  that  such  a 
strategy  had  never  succeeded  in  the  past  in  producing 
positive  results.  On  the  contrary,  the  actual 
situation  indicates  that  Saddam  is  now  more  powerful 
than  ever  in  his  methods  of  suppressing  the  Iraqi 
people.  (42)  This  confirms  the  suspicion  that  the  real 
aim  of  the  boycott  is  the  destruction  of  Iraq  and  its 
people.  (43) 
(2)  The  repeated  canards  about  the  division  of  Iraq  and 
the  possible  civil  war  which  threatens  the  unity  of 
Iraq  and  its  national  sovereignty. 
(3)  The  serious  decline  in  the  efforts  of  the  Iraqi 
opposition  in  exile  on  the  level  of  actual  work,  to 
684 bring  down  Saddam,  f  rom  the  level  they  reached  in 
1990-1991.  This  opposition  has  now  become  simply  a 
"political",  in  fact,  a  "commercial"  shop,  with  no 
interest  other  than  getting  money  from  any  source, 
while  the  Iraqi  people  lose  all  hope.  They  think  that, 
if  America  and  all  its  allies  could  not  topple  Saddam 
after  an  intensive  war  and  if  the  uprising  of  fourteen 
Iraqi  governorates  could  not  topple  him,  then  nobody 
can.  The  Iraqi  people  are  now  hungry,  impotent  and 
divided.  This  is  not  exactly  a  recipe  for  a  people's 
taking  matters  into  their  own  hands. 
(4)  The  overthrow  of  Saddam  by  an  army  mutiny  or  a  coup  is 
a  limited  possibility,  because,  since  the  times  of 
A4mad  Iýasan  al-Bakr,  the  previous  President,  Saddam. 
has  had  effective  control  over  the  army.  Even  if  the 
military  establishment  managed  to  overthrow  Saddam  and 
to  seize  power,  the  subsequent  regime  would  not  be 
likely  to  solve  Iraq's  ethnic  and  sectarian  problems; 
the  type  of  government  and  its  ethnic  and  sectarian 
composition  would  not  differ  much  from  that  of  Saddam, 
unless  some  members  of  it  were  to  be  drawn  from  the 
Iraqi  opposition  in  exile,  or  a  general  election  were 
held  immediately. 
(5)  The  possibility  of  toppling  Saddam  through  a  palace 
coup  is  only  slight,  because  his  intelligence  and 
security  agencies  are  powerful  and  effective  and  have 
managed  to  foil  several  coup  attempts,  the  last  of 
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zero  hour.  America  was  accused  by  some  Iraqis  in  exile 
of  complicity  in  informing  Saddam,  since  American 
officials  had  met  some  of  the  plotters  in  London.  (44) 
America  will  not  want  Saddam  to  be  ousted  unless  he 
again  directly  threatens  its  interests.  Even  then,  America 
has  insisted  that  the  post-Saddam  regime  will  have  to 
implement  all  the  UN  resolutions,  which  are  draconian  in 
their  treatment  of  Iraq  and  its  people.  Some  of  America's 
strategic  planners,  such  as  Martin  Andayck  and  Warren 
Christopher,  have  indicated  that  the  UN  resolutions  imposed 
on  Iraq  during  the  Gulf  war  must  be  implemented  by  Saddam, 
or  anybody  else  who  might  follow  him,  and  that  America  and 
its  allies  will  not  forgo  these  resolutions.  (45)  Thus 
America  has  already  decided  what  kind  of  regime  will  follow 
Saddam  and  that  post-Saddam  Iraq  will  be  completely  under 
America's  thumb. 
686 NOTES 
Released  British  government  official  documents  point 
out  Britain's  role  in  the  ascent  to  power  of  the 
Baýth  Party  in  February  1963  and,  most  particularly, 
the  role  of  British  intelligence  authorities  in 
overthrowing  General  Qasim  and  his  communist 
supporters,  in  pursuit  of  an  increase  of  British 
government's  influence  with  the  Ba"thist  regime  and 
the  isolation  of  Iraq  from  the  Soviet  Union.  Britain, 
it  transpired,  supplied  a  squadron  of  eighteen  Hawker 
Hunter  jet  fighters  in  the  summer  of  1963. 
2-  See  al-Qabas,  2  February  1994.  See  also  Graham 
Fuller,  Middle  East  Policy,  Part  II,  No.  3,1992. 
3-  Because  of  its  bloody  history  when  it  first  came  to 
power  in  1963,  the  Baýth  Party,  on  returning  to  power 
in  1968,  painted  a  false  picture  of  itself  through 
half-hearted  attempts  at  reconciliation  with  other 
political  forces,  particularly  the  communists,  the 
predominant  force  in  Iraqi  politics  then.  The  Baýth 
Party  then  nationalised  foreign  oil  companies,  the 
real  motive  being  not  to  benefit  the  Iraqi  people  but 
increase  the  financial  resources  that  Saddam  would 
have  at  his  disposal  to  eliminate  all  his  opponents, 
particularly  the  communists,  at  the  time  the  largest 
communist  Party  in  the  Middle  East.  For  more  on  this 
687 subject,  see  the  third  part  of  the  fifth  chapter  of 
this  research. 
4-  There  are  many  statements  by  American  strategy 
analysts  and  planners  confirming  this  fact.  See  the 
seventh  chapter  of  this  research. 
5-  Many  studies  and  reports  evaluating  the  Gulf  war  were 
published  by  American  strategy  planners;  see  the 
eighth  chapter  of  this  research. 
6-  See  the  CIA  report,  published  in  the  Iraai  File,  No. 
42,1995,  P.  10. 
7-  See  section  three  of  the  fourth  chapter  of  this 
research. 
8-  See  General  Norman  Schwarzkopf's  memoirs,  "It  doesn't 
take  a  hero"  New  York,  1993,  in  which  he  indicates 
that  he  was  appointed  in  1988  to  lead  America's 
central  forces,  usually  known  as  the  Rapid  Deployment 
Force.  He  was  requested  to  evaluate  the  potential 
threats  that  might  face  America  in  the  Middle  East. 
By  the  end  of  1989,  after  several  visits  to  many 
countries  in  the  area  and  studying  CIA,  Pentagon  and 
National  Security  Council  documents,  his  conclusion 
was  that  the  main  threat  facing  America  in  the  Middle 
East  was  Iraq. 
688 9-  See  the  Washington  Post  of  23  July  1990,  i.  e.,  eight 
days  before  Saddam  invaded  Kuwait. 
10-  See  al-Qabas,  in  its  edition  of  9  January  1995,  which 
contains  a  statement  by  William  Perry,  US  Secretary 
of  Defence,  about  America's  strategy  in  the  Gulf. 
Viores,  Milton,  Sand  Castles:  The  Arab  in  Search  of 
the  Modern  Worl  ,  London,  1994.  Viores  concludes  that 
the  level  of  oil  production  by  Kuwait  and  the  United 
Arab  Emirates  at  a  time  when  Iraq  was  suffering  from 
a  severe  financial  crisis  was  on  the  instigation  of 
the  USA. 
12-  A  talk  by  Brent  Scowcroft  with  media  and  businessmen 
at  a  public  lecture  in  Washington  on  12  June  1995 
under  the  title,  "Lessons  of  the  Gulf  Warff,  Iraai 
File,  No.  43,  July  1995,  p.  42. 
13-  Danrenther,  Roland,  "The  Gulf  Conflict:  A  Political 
and  Strategic  Analysisff.  This  study,  published  on  16 
January  1992,  is  based  on  secret  meetings  between 
military  officials  from  the  allied  countries  held  in 
London  during  April  1991.  It  indicates  that  the  then 
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